Principal arguments

That not in the first place because, if God is able to make something please from what is not pleasing without such a habit, then he is manifestly able to make something pleasing from what is not that has this habit in itself. The consequent is false. Again, it follows that God is able by himself alone to make that a white thing is without producing whiteness and that man exists without producing humanity, which are false. And the consequences are clear because the argument does not seem to about one more than another.

In the second place principally, it would follow that God would be able to be the formal ratio making the will pleasing. The consequence is clear, the falsity is proved because, if so, then it follows that it would be possible there to be motion of ordered love in the created mind. The consequent is false since motion indicates an imperfection.

In the third place, if God were able to withdraw rectitude from the mind, it follows that it would be able to make a sinning mind. The consequent is false because no one is bad from God as author according to Augustine Augustinus, XXX . The consequence is clear because every mind lacking rectitude is unjust. This seems to be the opinion of Anselm, in his book , in chapter 4 Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 4, xxx .

In opposition, it is argued that the first part has already shown above, but the second is proved because rectitude and the will are absolutely distinct things, therefore God is able to separate one from the other. And as a consequence he is able possible to separate and remove the will from its rectitude, therefore.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though from the ordered law no one is able to be pleasing from what is not pleasing without infused charity, nevertheless from the absolute or possible law it is possible that the one not having this charity is more greatly pleasing to God than another having it and ordinately loves God with a greater intensity. The first part is clear from what has been said. The second part is proved because the Holy Spirit alone actuates the mind and elevates it to God for loving more intensely than in fact a certain pilgrim who has this habit of created charity in the mind, therefore. The antecedent was clear above.

First corollary: although concerning the common law created charity is required for a pilgrim to be pleasing, nevertheless no created charity is required to act meritoriously to act well. The first is apparent because no one is pleasing without this habit. The second part is proved because if any charity is given the pilgrim would be able to act meritoriously with that created charity.

The second corollary: any created mind eliciting a meritorious act of love loves God infinitely more than is absolutely necessary. This is proved both because it is not absolutely necessary that the created mind loves God and secondly because the mind would be able to love God meritoriously with infinitely less charity or love.

Third corollary: the identity between whiteness and being white is greater than between created charity and being pleasing . This is clear because nothing is able to be white without whiteness, but it is possible to be pleasing without this charity.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though it is not repugnant to the Holy Spirit to be a formal power by which the power meritoriously an act of love, nevertheless it is repugnant to the Holy Spirit to be for the created mind the motion of ordinate love. The first is clear because to be such a formal power indicates no imperfection, indeed it indicates perfection and excludes everything repugnant, as was seen above, therefore. This is confirmed through Blessed Augustine, IV , capitulo 18 Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 3, n. 5 (PL 42:XX) explaining that passage We know that we will be like him when he appears I Ioannes 3:2 . The second is clear because such motion indicates an imperfection, namely potentiality, but the Holy Spirit is the highest act excluding from itself every potentiality, therefore.

The first corollary: this denomination of love should be more greatly applied to the formal ratio than to the vital motion of love. This is clear because this ratio per se and intrinsically is called love, but this motion is only called love extrinsically because it is determined to this love.

The second corollary: that not every formal ratio of formal love a being of the highest perfection is a mode of acting well or of meritorious loving because the Holy Spirit is or is able to be the ratio of this and not of motion.

Third corollary: that the one having the meritorious motion of love has the habit of charity is not necessary, and conversely it is not necessary that the one having the habit of charity joined to the mind has the motion of love. This is clear through the conclusion, and it is confirmed because to the grace of predestination alone corresponds the being of one meritorious from the power of divine acceptance, therefore. This was also made clear above.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: though God is able to introduce no latitude of guilt to human beings, nevertheless God is able to remove the rectitude of the will from human beings. The first part is clear because then such a person would become worse from God as author, against Augustine, in , in question 5 Augustinus, 83 questiones, q. 5 . In the second case it is proved because everything that is not the will God is able to separate and remove from it, but the rectitude of the will is not the will, therefore. The major is known because everything that is absolutely distinct, God etc. The minor is clear because rectitude and the created will, if they were the same, it would follow that every created will would be upright, indeed it would further follows that no will would be able to sine because then every will would be formally justice and rectitude, which is false, therefore.

First corollary: any absolute rectitude of a human will really includes the latitude of gratifying gratitude of charity. This is clear because, if not, then it would follows that the will would be able to have it from itself or from another creature, against the Venerable Anselm , in chapter 14 Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 14, xxx .

The second corollary: it is the case that the personal mind is in the entire latitude of rectitude and never demerits some latitude of penalty or reprentance. This is clear because, if God deprived as creature of rectitude, he would still not love it less, indeed he would be able to accept a greater prize than before, if he wished.

Third corollary: it is the case that a person deprived of the rectitude of the will is not also unjust, but would be just. This is clear because God is able to deprive someone of rectitude and is not able to inflict injustice or malice. From this it is clear what should be said to the question.

Objections

Against the first conclusion: it is argued, if it were not absolutely necessary that some creature is just, it would follow that God would be able to do the opposite of that which he eternally ordained. The consequent is false because the God would be changeable. And the consequences is clear because, if it not necessarily thus just as he ordained, then the opposite would be able to come about. This is confirmed because by through eternally predestining he wishes a to be just.

In the second place, because the ordained law is absolutely necessary, therefore whatever is necessary according to that law is absolutely necessary. But according to that law it is necessary that pleasing human beings have created charity, therefore. The antecedent is clear: because every eternal thing is absolutely necessary, therefore the eternal law is necessary, therefore.

In the third place against the first corollary: if no grace is required for doing good meritoriously, therefore one would be able to be saved according to the ordered law while having no grace.

In the fourth place against the second corollary: not just any grade of charity suffices for conquering strong temptation or for suffering martyrdom for God, therefore nor does just any grade of charity suffice for performing a meritorious deed. And as a consequence, if one were to love with a lesser charity, they would not love sufficiently.

Against the second conclusion: it is repugnant that the mind is united to God beatifically without motion toward the object, therefore the Holy Spirit is not able to be formally the ratio of perceiving God beatifically or of meritorious love. The consequence holds since this motion is repugnant tot he Holy Spirit. And the antecedent is proven because otherwise it would follow that such a beatific object would be essentially and intrinsecally present to the create potency, which is false because it is present thus to God alone.

In the second place against the first corollary: it would follow if motion of this type could stand without terms which would not be perception or vital operation. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because every vital perception suits itself alone terminatively extrinsically, as the corollary says.

In the third place, no such motion should be put, therefore. The antecedent is clear because this would be on account of the distance of the potency from the object, and this distance does not exist because God is always present to the potency.

In the fourth place, if the third corollary were true, it would follow that it would be possible for there to be gratuitious charity in something, and nevertheless that this thing not be pleasing to God nor accepted by him. The consequent is against the truth. Again, it follows that is not good. This is clear because one is not good which does not rejoice in good deeds, as is seen in I Aristoteles, Ethica, I, xxx .

Against the third conclusion: if God were to withdraw the rectitude from the will, he would do this this either unwillingly or willingly. Not the latter because God does nothing unwillingly, nor the second because, since the rectitude of the will is to will what God wills that it wills, it follows that God would be able to will that a will does not will what he wishes it to will, but this implies a contradiction, therefore.

In the second place against the first corollary: the rectitude of the will coexists with the mortal sin, therefore it does not include gratifying race. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is clear through Secundo, contra primum corollarium stat rectitudo voluntatis cum peccato mortali, ergo non includit gratiam gratificantem. Patet consequentia et antecedens patet per Anselm , chapter 13 , saying, the one wishing to have rectitude has rectitude Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 13, xxx , but one existing in mortal sin is able to wish to have rectitude, therefore.

In third place, it is argued through Anselmus, in the same work, in chapter 14 , saying, everyone having rectitude is able to be said to have justice and to be just because everyone having justice is just, nevertheless ?sensio? the promised eternal life is for just men, but only to those who are just with any injustice Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 14, xxx .

In the fourth place against the third and second corollary: the privation of justice and rectitude is formally guilt, therefore to any such person a penalty should be given. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is from Anselm, in , in chapter 4 , saying The devil he says loses the original justice in which he was made and for this reason invents his privation which has no essence, which we name injustice Anselmus, De casu diaboli, c. 4, xxx .

Responses

To the first, the consequence is able to be denied because such vital motion is something distinct from the vital potency.

In the second place, it is able to be said that God by himself alone is able to beatify the mind without some other quantity however incomplex, nevertheless it is not able to be without something complex. And this is the solution of the first argument against the second conclusion.

To the first against the first, the consequent is conceded about those things which are not past nor posited in being through speaking. The reason is because what he wills from eternity he is able to never have wished.

To the second, the antecedent is conceded because the law is God. But the consequences is denied because then all things would come about from necessity, which is false.

In the second place, it is able to be said that law is able to be taken in two ways, one mode from something in Christ which is God, in another mode for something complex something said to have been eternally ordered. In the first mode the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied. In the second mode the antecedent is denied and the consequence is conceded.

To the third, the consequence is denied.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied because, thought charity does not incline less intensely just as ?, nevertheless to every act to which the greater inclines, the lesser also inclines or is able to incline.

In the second place, this consequence would be able to be denied, a charity does not suffice for making the will to wish to be martyred, therefore it does not suffice for loving God sufficiently.

To the first against the second conclusion, a response has already been said.

To the second, the consequent is conceded, for just as generation is never properly said to another unless a generated terminus follows, so such motion would not be called a vital perception unless a terminus were vitally perceived.

To the third, the antecedent is denied, and to the proof I say that, though God is always really present, nevertheless not vitally objectively, whence such motion is to return objectively the thing not present. In the second place, I say that while God is always sufficiently present to the soul objectively, still the soul lacks such motion on account of other extrinsic objects which are not vitally present to the potency.

To the fourth, the consequent is conceded concerning his absolute power, and a contradiction does not follow from this when speaking about his acceptance for eternal life, nor does it follows that is not good because, though he does not accept this work for eternal life, nevertheless he will return or has returned to them something for that.

To another where it says if follows that God is not a just returner etc., here says Gregory, in distinction 17 of books 1, in question one, article two, corollary two, of conclusion two Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 2, corr. 2, xxx , that an act of a human being elicited from some charity is meritorious from condign among God neither of eternal life nor of any eternal or temporal prize, but the opposite of this is held by Bonsemblates Bonsemblates, XXX and some other hold this as well, nevertheless everyone should hold that what seems good to them, and the consequence is able to be denied.

To the first against the third conclusion, it would be able to be said that it neither is the case nor is the case but not by willing to keep this rectitude. Alternatively, Adam and Bonsemblantes say willing, and the consequent is conceded which is inferred in the divided sense. The first solution seems more secure.

To the second, it is able to be said that rectitude is able to be taken in two ways, in one mode absolutely, in another mode secundum quid. But Anselm speaks about rectitude secundum quid, But the corollary is understood concerning rectitude spoken absolutely.

In the second place, it is able to be said that to will is twofold, the first is an indicative efficacy, the second is chosen efficacy. Anselm speaks about the first saying that what wishes rectitude, namely with indicative efficacy, has it, and this kind of willing does not stand with mortal sin but the second kind does.

To the third, it is said that Anselm does not speak about rectitude or justice absolutely, but secundum quid, as is clear to the one paying attention to his words, therefore nothing is concludes against what has been said.

To the fourth, the antecedent is conceded de facto, but in the case in which God removes rectitude from the will with demerit of the will, this privation would not be a guilt, nor do the words of Anselm prove the opposite because the justice of the bad angel was in itself, therefore its privation was a sin, but in this case it would not be concerning its justice which God would deprive its rectitude without its own sin. To the arguments in opposition the solution is clear through what has been said above.