Responses

To the first, the consequence is able to be denied because such vital motion is something distinct from the vital potency.

In the second place, it is able to be said that God by himself alone is able to beatify the mind without some other quantity however incomplex, nevertheless it is not able to be without something complex. And this is the solution of the first argument against the second conclusion.

To the first against the first, the consequent is conceded about those things which are not past nor posited in being through speaking. The reason is because what he wills from eternity he is able to never have wished.

To the second, the antecedent is conceded because the law is God. But the consequences is denied because then all things would come about from necessity, which is false.

In the second place, it is able to be said that law is able to be taken in two ways, one mode from something in Christ which is God, in another mode for something complex something said to have been eternally ordered. In the first mode the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied. In the second mode the antecedent is denied and the consequence is conceded.

To the third, the consequence is denied.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied because, thought charity does not incline less intensely just as ?, nevertheless to every act to which the greater inclines, the lesser also inclines or is able to incline.

In the second place, this consequence would be able to be denied, a charity does not suffice for making the will to wish to be martyred, therefore it does not suffice for loving God sufficiently.

To the first against the second conclusion, a response has already been said.

To the second, the consequent is conceded, for just as generation is never properly said to another unless a generated terminus follows, so such motion would not be called a vital perception unless a terminus were vitally perceived.

To the third, the antecedent is denied, and to the proof I say that, though God is always really present, nevertheless not vitally objectively, whence such motion is to return objectively the thing not present. In the second place, I say that while God is always sufficiently present to the soul objectively, still the soul lacks such motion on account of other extrinsic objects which are not vitally present to the potency.

To the fourth, the consequent is conceded concerning his absolute power, and a contradiction does not follow from this when speaking about his acceptance for eternal life, nor does it follows that is not good because, though he does not accept this work for eternal life, nevertheless he will return or has returned to them something for that.

To another where it says if follows that God is not a just returner etc., here says Gregory, in distinction 17 of books 1, in question one, article two, corollary two, of conclusion two Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 2, corr. 2, xxx , that an act of a human being elicited from some charity is meritorious from condign among God neither of eternal life nor of any eternal or temporal prize, but the opposite of this is held by Bonsemblates Bonsemblates, XXX and some other hold this as well, nevertheless everyone should hold that what seems good to them, and the consequence is able to be denied.

To the first against the third conclusion, it would be able to be said that it neither is the case nor is the case but not by willing to keep this rectitude. Alternatively, Adam and Bonsemblantes say willing, and the consequent is conceded which is inferred in the divided sense. The first solution seems more secure.

To the second, it is able to be said that rectitude is able to be taken in two ways, in one mode absolutely, in another mode secundum quid. But Anselm speaks about rectitude secundum quid, But the corollary is understood concerning rectitude spoken absolutely.

In the second place, it is able to be said that to will is twofold, the first is an indicative efficacy, the second is chosen efficacy. Anselm speaks about the first saying that what wishes rectitude, namely with indicative efficacy, has it, and this kind of willing does not stand with mortal sin but the second kind does.

To the third, it is said that Anselm does not speak about rectitude or justice absolutely, but secundum quid, as is clear to the one paying attention to his words, therefore nothing is concludes against what has been said.

To the fourth, the antecedent is conceded de facto, but in the case in which God removes rectitude from the will with demerit of the will, this privation would not be a guilt, nor do the words of Anselm prove the opposite because the justice of the bad angel was in itself, therefore its privation was a sin, but in this case it would not be concerning its justice which God would deprive its rectitude without its own sin. To the arguments in opposition the solution is clear through what has been said above.