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            <div xml:id="pg-b1q18-Dd1e169" type="rationes-principales">
            <head xml:id="pg-b1q18-Hd1e171">
              Principal arguments
            </head>
            <p xml:id="pgb1q18-qnpqda">
              That not in the first place 
              because, 
              if God is able to make something please 
              from what is not pleasing without such a habit, 
              then he is manifestly able to make something pleasing 
              from what is not that has this habit in itself. 
              The consequent is false. 
              Again, 
              it follows that God is able by himself alone 
              to make that a white thing is without producing whiteness 
              and that man exists without producing humanity, 
              which are false. 
              And the consequences are clear 
              because the argument does not seem to about one more than another.
            </p>
            <p xml:id="pgb1q18-d1e163">
              In the second place principally, 
              it would follow that God 
              would be able to be the formal ratio 
              making the will pleasing. 
              The consequence is clear, 
              the falsity is proved because, 
              if so, 
              then it follows 
              that it would be possible 
              there to be motion of ordered love 
              in the created mind. 
              The consequent is false 
              since motion indicates an imperfection.
            </p>
            <p xml:id="pgb1q18-d1e173">
              In the third place, 
              if God were able to 
              withdraw rectitude from the mind, 
              it follows that it would be able to make 
              a sinning mind. 
              The consequent is false 
              because no one is bad from God as author 
              according to  
              <cit>
                <ref xml:id="pg-b1q18-Rd1e190">
                            <name ref="#Augustine">Augustine</name>
                        </ref>
                <bibl>Augustinus, XXX</bibl>
              </cit>.
              The consequence is clear 
              because every mind lacking rectitude is unjust. 
              This seems to be the opinion of
              <cit>
                <ref xml:id="pg-b1q18-Rd1e200">
                  <name ref="#Anselm">Anselm</name>, 
                  in his book
                  <title ref="#Anselm_DeLiberoArbitrio">On the Free Will</title>, 
                  in chapter 4
                </ref>
                <bibl>Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 4, xxx</bibl>
              </cit>.
            </p>
            <p xml:id="pgb1q18-d1e196">
              In opposition, 
              it is argued that the first part has already shown above, 
              but the second is proved 
              because rectitude and the will 
              are absolutely distinct things, 
              therefore God is able to separate one from the other.
              And as a consequence 
              he is able possible to separate and remove 
              the will from its rectitude, 
              therefore.
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