Rationes principales

Whether a pilgrim is able to assent scientifically without a special gift to every theological truth even a supernatural truth?

That this is so in the first place because every natural potency is able to perform its own natural act, but the intellect is a natural potency and its own operation is to know and to understand, therefore it is able to assent naturally to these truths without faith or the infusion of another light. This is confirmed because one is able to assent by the dictate of reason alone, otherwise they would truly be able to assent to anything. The antecedent is true and the consequence is proved on the one hand because in the first place the the senses are likewise able to have knowledge of that which is sensible, and on the other hand in the second place because all things truly have a single (ratio) of acting on the intellect, therefore all things are likewise in the first place are able to be known.

In the second place, heretics, the damned, and the devil are able to assent to the theological truth without a special light, therefore also the pilgrim. The antecedent is clear from the rich man of 16 Cf. Luke 16:19-31 . Then in the second place because when the agent and patient are sufficiently applied, there will follow an equal action. But the agent intellect is able to make all things and the possible intellect is able to become all things Aristoteles, De anima, III. 5 (430a14-15) as is clear from I . Therefore in a man having prepared (approximatis) equally, the action follows in him.

In the third place, if the question turned out to be false, it would follow that some a light or special gift would be infused to some theologian. The consequent is false because no modern theologian perceives himself to be so infused. The consequence is clear because it would be impossible that such lights or such habits are possessed by are hidden to the one having them as is argued by Thomas Argentinae in the first article of the second question of his prologue Thomas de Argentina, I, prologus, q. 2, a. 1 At we present we are not able to find a direct parallel in the identified passage. .

In the fourth place the pilgrim is able to convinced that there is a future life after this life by the command of reason alone, therefore. The consequence holds since this is a theological truth. The antecedent is true because just as the pursuit of a stone is to find a final place of rest, so it is with human beings. But the pursuit of a stone, which is found when these ends are acquired , is not able not to rest, therefore it is also the case for the pilgrim. The minor is clear. The major is proved because human beings are not less ordered to their natural end than a stone. Thus it is further true that the pursuit of man to naturally and finally rest in something, when this or these things are acquired, is not able not to rest. But there is not such thing in the present life, therefore there remains another life for the where human beings can rest. The major is clear through what has already been said, and the minor is clear from itself and through what Augustine says in the first book of the Confessions, chapter 1 , Lord you have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you. Augustinus, I, 1, 1 (CCSL 27, 1, ll. 6-7).

On the contrary Augustine in his Commentary on Genesis says The authority of scripture is greater than perspicacity of any human talent Augustinus, XXX . Again Lombard, in his prologue says ardua scandere, opus ultra vires praesumpsimus agere Lombardus, Sent. I, prol. (I, 3, ll. 3-4). . Again, Augustine in his second book cum rationalis anima cogitat ac ratiocinatur quidquid in ea ratione, verum est non est ei attribuendum sed ipsi luci veritatis Augustinus, II.32 (CCSL 35, 122, ll. 705-708). . Again no one is able to acquire created wisdom unless they have been illuminated with the grace which is God, therefore. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is from Augustine , question 24 Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q.24 (CCSL 44A, 29-20). .

First Conclusion

First conclusion: though theological assent is not distinct from a theological proposition, nevertheless it is true that two propositions are formed of the same subject or predicate signifying the same thing and are distinguished one from the other specifically. The first part is clear because, if they were distinguished, it would follow that theological assent would be able to be without a theological proposition. The consequent is false because then someone would be able to assent without complex knowledge which is contrary to the truth. The second part is proved because, if it were supposed that a believing person formed the following proposition Christ has died and an unbelieving person formed the same proposition with respect to the terms, then the faithful person assents to what is signified by this proposition when forming it, and the unfaithful person does not assent, therefore they are specifically distinct. The consequence is clear because one is really and intrinsically assent and the other is not, and nevertheless they have the same subject and predicate. Therefore the conclusion is true.

The first corollary: it is true that a person could know the entire holy scriptures and not be a theologian. This is clear because if an unbelieving person knew the scriptures, he would not be a theologian because he would not assent. This is confirmed because if the believing pilgrim knew and formed every proposition to which the unbeliever assented, he would despite this still be an infidel because he would consent to them. There for similar reason, the one know the Holy Scriptures and dissenting is not a theology. For this reason it should be known that infidelity is an assent with respect to what is false or dissent with respect to what is determined to be true by the Church or revealed in Holy Scripture.

The second corollary: it is true that the pilgrim could be informed with the theological habit yet not be considered a theologian. From this is able to further inferred and conceded that from the ordained law the theologian is able to remain in faith, but is not always able t to remain or be a theologian without faith. From this it further follows that the theological part is not as essential to the theological habit as the habit.

The third corollary: one indistinct proposition is able to have two contradictories distinct in species. This is clear because the contradictory of a proposition is able to be assent in the mind of one and dissent in the mind of another.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though a theological proposition is theological cognition, nevertheless it is not necessarily knowledge by which someone is said to know the total object of its own being. The first part is proved because faith or theological knowledge do not differ from theological assent, but theological assent is a theological proposition, therefore a theological proposition is theological knowledge or cognition. The major premise is clear because theological faith is not able to be without theological assent, otherwise someone would believe something and not assent to it, which is false. The minor is clear from the first conclusion. The second part is proved because nothing is caused by itself, but our knowledge is at least partially caused by an object, therefore this knowledge is not its own total object. This is confirmed because, suppose there was a vision that was a vision of itself, it would still be required some object by which ti is caused. Thus having supposed that the same thing is knowledge of itself, nevertheless another object is required by which such knowledge is caused, and, as a consequence, it is not its total object, which was the conclusion to be proved.

First corollary: theological propositions are not the object of Holy Scripture.

Second corollary: theology or another science is not properly speaking known, but is that by which something is known or cognized. This is clear through the fact that that which is known is the object of the science, but science is not the object of itself, at least not the the total object, therefore.

The third corollary: the following proposition according to the force of the word is false: Socrates knows grammar, logic, theology or any other science. This is clear from the fundamental point since science is not properly known but is that by which something is known to be in this way or not.

Third conclusion

The third conclusion, though it is not impossible for the pilgrim to not believe any theological truths and still have the act and habit of faith, nevertheless under the present law it is impossible that the pilgrim assent to theological truths without any special light. The first part is proved in the first place regarding the habit. There is no doubt that many have the habit of the virtues without that habit being put into act. But that the act of faith is able to be without believing is proved because the act of faith and the actuation or the doing itself are not more identical than an accident and its adherence. But God is able to make an accident without adherence, therefore. The second part is proved through Augustine in some epistle, where he says: Neque enim cum coepero te in tanti huius secreti intelligentiam introducere (nisi Deus intus ad iuverit, non potero) PL 33:453 , and elsewhere in several places. Again Anselm I , in chapter two: Rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei, prius credamus, quam ea ratione fidei praesumamus discutere Anselmus, I, c. 1 (II, 48, ll. 16-17) . Again Augustine in dicens, Deus illuminat parvulos et indoctos lumine fidei, maiores autem lumine sapientiae Augustinus, xxx Therefore a special light is required in order to scientificaly assent to theological truths.

The first corollary: many are saved in the end who have never believed or never actually believe. This is clear when considering young children who die immediately after baptism. Again this is clear when considering those being baptized how are lacking the use of reason, like those who are born mentally impaired.

The second corollary: many are blessed in the kingdom of heaven who, if they had believed, would have been damned and would have been among the numbers of the reprobate or in the place of the damned. This is clear from considering the young children of the Greeks dying immediately after baptism before the age of discretion. For it happens that the Greeks are baptized, though it is through a different form of words, and as a consequence they receive the grace by which they are able to be saved. Nevertheless because the adult Greeks believe differently than the Roman Church believes and commands people to believe, therefore they are not in the state of being saved.

The third corollary: it is possible under the current law that the pilgrim does not believe just as the church commands them to believe, and nevertheless the pilgrim while believing in this manner in no way sins or is at fault of. Or it is possible that some pilgrim is deficient in believing while not culpable and nevertheless does not believe in the way the church commands that they should believe. This is clear because it is possible that someone can licitly believe nothing for a certain amount of time, therefore it is possible that such a person does not err nor believe just as the Roman Church believes. From what has been said, it is clear that the negative part of the question true.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion it is first argued in the following way: a theological proposition is able to exist without theological assent, therefore it is distinguished. The consequence is valid. The antecedent is proved because every proposition which a believer is able to form is able to be formed by an unbeliever while remaining in a state of unbelief. And since this unbeliever does not have the assent of a theological truth, it follows that the theological proposition formed by this person is not intrinsically assent.

In the second place it follows that if a theologian were to become an infidel or heretic, then he would lose the entirety of the theological science. The consequence is clear because he would lose the assent to the theological propositions and such assent is the theological science. But the falsity of this is proved since such a person would still know how to defend our faith,to read and dispute, and to solve arguments just as before, since he does not know less than before.

In the third place, we assent to a proposition through assent, therefore theological assent is not a theological proposition. The consequence is clear because we do not assent to a proposition by means of a proposition since, if this were the case, the same thing would be that by which we assent and that to which we assent.

In the fourth place, it is possible that a proposition exists and assent to the proposition does not exist, therefore. The antecedent is proved because a person is able to believe some proposition to be true and later not believe, but rather believe the opposite on account of some reasons, while the same proposition remains.

In the fifth place against the second part it is argued because, if assent distinguished the type (species) of the proposition, then if someone were to form the following proposition no man is an ass, then it would follow that no one dissenting to this would be able to form a proposition of the same type (species). The consequence is clear from the terms. The falsity is proved because the one dissenting to this proposition is able to form a proposition of the same subject and predicate, therefore it is of the same type (species). This consequence is clear since propositions are nothing other than their terms taken together.

In the sixth place against the corollary because either faith and theology are the same habit or not. If they are the same, then the one having the theological habit has faith and as a consequence is a theologian. If they are diverse, then suppose that there is a remission of all things uniformly, equally, and precisely toward non-being, then they either arrive equally at non-being or not. If the first, then they are equal and consequently theology is not superior to faith which is false and against what Augustine XIV in chapter one says, hac scientia, scilicet theologia, non pollent plurimi quamvis fide polleant Augustinus, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1, xxx . If the second, then it follows that theology will stand without faith which is opposed what has been said.

In the seventh place against the second part of the second conclusion: everything that is known is true, but only a proposition is true, therefore only a proposition is known, therefore only a proposition is the total object of our science.

In the eighth place against the corollary of the same conclusion because either the total object of theology is a theological proposition or an external thing or the thing signified by the proposition. If the first, then the objection against the first corollary is sustained. The second option is not valid because then there would be several sciences about contingent things being able to be disposed differently just as the sciences about objects, which is opposed to what the Philosopher says in book VI of Aristoteles, Ethica, VI, xxx and in book I of the Aristoteles, Posteriora Analytica . The third option is not valid for the same reason since the proposition signifies a thing outside the soul. This is confirmed because by the same reasons some external thing would be the object of an opinion, of faith, and of error, and as a consequence it would mean that one and the same person would know, opine, believe and be ignorant which are false. The consequence is clear for it is true that a person knows that God is three and one, opines that He alone moves the heavens, believes that He became incarnate, and errs when thinking that He is of finite strength.

In the ninth place against the third conclusion: theological truths are either self-evident or deduced from what is self-evident, therefore for the knowledge of such things faith is not necessary. The antecedent is proved because no one would be obliged to believe without any doubt something that is self-evident in and of itself or deduced from something self-evident, but one is obliged to believe the theological truths without any doubt, therefore. The major premise is clear because every true thing is deduced or deducible from a first principle since every true thing is virtually contained within it.

In the tenth place, if it were true that such a light, etc, it would follow that anyone would be able to have greater certitude about such truths than the certitude of science. The consequent is false but the consequence is clear because the certitude of faith is infinite since it is infinitely removed from every degree of doubt.

In the eleventh place, no special light is required in order to assent to a lie, therefore it is not otherwise for a theological truth since the one saying a theological truth, which he believes to be false, speaks a lie.

Responses

In response to these arguments, to the first argument I say that a theological proposition is able to be taken in two ways. In one mode for some proposition signifying a theological thing, and thus a pure vocal proposition is able to be called theological. In another mode it is taken from a proposition which is intrinsically theological assent, and thus I say that such a proposition, which is the sign of the signified theological thing, is not able to be without theological assent. And for the proof, what the argument assumes is denied when taking the theological proposition in the second mode, though it is possible to form any proposition signifying whatever one wants.

To the second argument, the consequent is conceded when taking science as something that includes theological assent. But when taking science as a habit by which one is able to know how to conclude one proposition from another, in such a case he would not lose the science, but nevertheless such a person ought not to be called a theologian

To the third argument, the antecedent is denied, and for the proof it is said that the assent is the proposition itself by which we assent not to the proposition but that reality is thus or is not thus.

To the fourth argument, the antecedent is denied, and for the proof I say that as long as this proposition and assent will remain so also will a similar proposition be able to remain which will not be assent, and then this proposition is not a theological proposition, and thus it is able to be said that this proposition will remain, but will not remain a proposition.

To the fifth argument the consequent is conceded and for its proof the antecedent is conceded but the consequence is denied because the proposition which is an assent beyond the terms includes another assent, namely an assent which is not included in the other. In the second place it is able to be said that the copula of one is not of the same type as the copula of the other because the mode of joining the subject and the predicate is diverse since one proposition is assent while other is not, but only apprehension.

To the sixth argument it is said that they are not one habit. And since it is posited that they remit uniformly, perhaps someone would say that they are not able to remit uniformly. But having admitted the case, it is said that some degree of theology will remain, but it would not properly be called theology because without faith the habit would not be sufficient such that the one having could be said to have a theological habit. And thus it is able to be said in conformity with what has been said above that theology is able to remain without faith, but one is not able to remain in theology without faith, for this habit would not be sufficient such that the one having it could be said to be to have the theological habit, at least according to to present world order (law). Note that Alphonsus holds that the habit of faith and theology is the same, in the third question of his prologue, article two, conclusion one, but Thomas Argentinae holds the opposite and solves his arguments in question four, article two Thomas de Argentina, I, q. 4, a. 2 .

To the seventh argument, which is against the second conclusion, the minor is denied because many things are true which are not propositions like the things signified by the propositions. And this appears to be the mind of Aristotle in his book on the in the chapter on opposites Aristoteles, Praedicamentorum, xxx , where he says that the thing signified by one contradictory proposition contradicts the thing signified by the other propositions, and if one is true, the other is false. But the things signified by some extrinsic denomination assert (dicunt??) something either true or false because the things signified by them are true or false or would be if they were formed. And thus it is possible to say that the signified is true which is signifiable through a true proposition and the signified is false which is signified through a false proposition. Again it is able to be said that all true signifiable things are to be called true from the first truth which is God who is the truth and certain judgment of all such things.

To the eighth argument it is said that neither of the aforementioned (predicates), but it is the fact that it is in reality or that it is not. And if it is asked whether this is something, it is said yes, when taking thing loosely for every complex or incomplex signifiable, truly or falsely. And when it is said that there would be a science of contingent things, etc., here it is said no, therefore sciences are about necessary things because their objects are real and necessary things and entities since in this way there is nothing except God. But therefore they are said to be sciences about necessary things which are things which are known to not be able to not to be thus. Consider for example, this knowable thing, every isosceles has three angles, etc., is not said to be necessary because it is necessary that it is isosceles or that it necessarily has three, etc., but because it is necessary that, if it is isosceles, it has three angles, etc. Further this knowable thing is said to be eternal because whenever an isosceles was, it had three, and whenever it should exist, it will always have tree. With respect to the confirmation the consequent would be able to be conceded because we know that the same God exists and we believe the term and we are perhaps able to err about Him by holding some false opinion, and this according to diverse considerations and dispositions.

With respect to another [ninth] argument, the antecedent is denied when speaking about the knowledge of pilgrims, and the proof of this argument it is said that the major premise is false unless it were received self-evidently, that is on account of something asserted that cannot be more certain just as seems to be assumed by Altissiodorensis in the third book of his who says that the articles of faith are self-evident. Guillelmus Altissiodorensis, xxx . Note the difference concerning something that is self-evident put forward by Hugolinus in book one, distinction 3, question 1, article 1 Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, xxx .

With respect to another [tenth] argument, the consequence is denied. For the proof, it is denied that the certitude of faith is infinite, indeed no created certitude is infinite because any such thing is a finite act or habit inclining to a finite act.

With respect to the final argument the major premise is denied because in this case one ought to believe and assert a lie without hesitation, not nevertheless inasmuch as it is a lie, but precisely against the mind of the one saying and thinking the falsity which is actually true.

With respect to the first argument made before the opposition the major premise is conceded and the conclusion which is because the intellect naturally is able to know something. With respect to the confirmation the consequence is denied. For the proof again the consequence is denied. And for the proof this consequence is also denied because the ratio does not move the intellect either equally or in the same mode. On this point see Henry of Ghent in the first part of the first article 44 14 questions Henricus de Gandavensis, xxx

To another (second) argument, whatever is the case about the antecedent, the consequence is denied, and for the proof it is said that it is true about the complete and precise agent, but the agent intellect is not the total agent causing the understanding, therefore it does not conclude.

To another (third) argument the consequent is conceded, and for the disproof the consequence is denied because in this way it would be proved that the habit of charity or grace is not infused to a creature because not everyone who has the habit perceives it, indeed no one thus, whether in hate or love, is worthy. In the second place it would be able to be said that every theologian perceives, though they do not perfectly perceive this, nor do they perceive that they perceive.

To the last argument it would be possible to deny the consequence because if it is possible to convince without such a light, nevertheless not in such a way or in a such a perfect mode as faith or theology does, and thus it would be able to say to the immediately preceding (primum praecedens).

In the second place it is possible to deny the antecedent and to be said that helping proofs do not prove because it could be proved in the same way that man from his purely natural ability would be able to achieve beatitude which is false.

Principal arguments

The answer is no because the will is not the only subject of love, therefore. The antecedent is proved because love is cognition, but the subject of a created cognition is in the intellect. The major premise is clear because is not any more inconvenient to say that love is cognition than to say assent is apprehension. Further because it would follow that someone would be blessed and would not see God. This is clear because if there are two acts, God would be able to preserve one without the other.

In the second place the Trinity is not the only object of ordered enjoyment, therefore. The antecedent is proved since any creature is infinitely loveable, therefore it is enjoyable in an ordered way. The consequence is clear because, if it is not enjoyable, then it is loveable to a degree such that it can not be more loveable. The first antecedent is proved through Hugolinum in book one, conclusion three, article one Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, Sententia, I, d. 3, a. 1 . Again, this is proved by Facinus in his first book Facinus de Ast, Sententia, I, XXX because God loves any creature infinitely.

In the third place if the angel Satan were to transform himself into the species of light, a creature would be able to licitly enjoy him, therefore. The antecedent is clear through the Master in book one, distinction 30 Non invenimus and in the same book, distinction two, question 1 Non invenimus , where he says that, in such a case, the one believing the devil to be Christ is licitly able to adore him, and this error would not be dangerous.

On the contrary is the Master in the present distinction Lombard, Sententia, I, d. 1, c. 2 (XXX) quoting Augustine Augustinum, in the first book of , chapter 20 res autem quae nos beatos faciunt et quibus fruendum est sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana, I, 5, 5 (XXX) .

Prima conclusio

The first conclusion about the supposite: though every love depends on cognition causally, nevertheless any apprehension or cognition of the object with the freedom of the will suffices to cause love The first is proved because, if not, it would follow that love would be able to asserted or elicited naturally from the will, without any cognition. The consequent is false because then the will would be able to love into infinity, which opposes Augustine in book XIII, 2, 10 Augustinus, De Trinitate, XIII, 2, 10 (XXX) . The consequence is clear because, having posited every cause required for the production of some effect, with others having been excluded, such an effect would naturally be able to put into being. The second part is proved because if the cognition of the object alone etc., it would follow that, given the judgement or apprehension of some object under the aspect of evil with the existence of appearance of all things good removed, the will would be able to wish or love such an object. The consequence is known, but the consequent is contrary to the Philosopher and the Commentator book I of the Ethics because all things desire the good Aristotle, Ethica, I.1 (1094a1-3); Averroes, XXX .

The first corollary: that no love or volition is essentially cognition or formally apprehension. This is clear because the cause and effect are distinguished essentially. And the antecedent is clear through the conclusion because love depends causally on cognition and this on a type of formal, material, or final cause, therefore it depends on a type of efficient cause.

The second corollary: if love of the respect of some object is in the will, then it is necessary with respect to the same thing that the cognition be or be present in the intellect, when speaking naturally or with respect to the common law. This is clear through the conclusion because an effect presupposes its own cause.

The third corollary: if God is able to supply the exchange of some second cause, he is able to cause love in the will.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: it is both impossible that a created entity be intrinsically of infinite and unlimited goodness and it is impossible that any person has the intrinsic reason (ratio) of infinite loveability. The first is clear because uncreated nature alone is and is able to be intrinsically of unlimited goodness, therefore. The antecedent is clear through Augustine 134 saying that solus deus est summe bonus cui nihil boni simpliciter de esse potest Augustinus, Super Psalmos 134, XXX . This is confirmed because otherwise the creature would independent. The second part is proved because an created good thing is insufficient unto itself and lacking another good, therefore there is nothing that is infinitely loveable from its own intrinsic reason (ratio). The consequence is clear because something cannot be intrinsically more loveable than its intrinsic goodness.

The first corollary: no one loving a thing incomplexly and appropriately ought to extend the latitude of his love beyond the intrinsic worth of the thing loved. This is clear through Augustine IX , in chapter 9 Augustinus, De Trinitate IX, c. 9 where he shows that to the degree that something is less good than God, in the same degree it ought to be less loved. And he concludes in the end that anything, which is not God, ought to be loved infinitely less than God.

The second corollary: no one loving God less than a creature enjoys or loves that entity appropriately. This is clear because there is an equal perversity in enjoying what should be used and using what should be enjoyed.

The third corollary: it is both repugnant that someone should use God appropriately, and repugnant that a creature justly enjoy a creature. This is clear because no creature has as much goodness as God, therefore, nor as much loveability. Note that this is the proof of the preceeding corollary. It follows corollarly that everyone positing that that God exists is able to be demonstrated has to conclude: this being itself, which is above all things, ought to be loved. This is clear from the force of the word, for God is that which nothing greater can be thought Anselmus, Proslogion, 3 (I, 103, II. 1-2) according to the rule of Anselm Anselmi. But to whatever degree is the intrinsic goodness of something, so is the degree of its loveability through what has been said, therefore.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: just as the uncreated Trinity alone is objective reason (ratio) of proper fruition, so by the same token under a single reason (ratio) of the created image is there a motive for enjoying itself. The first part is clear through Augustine I Augustinus, De Doctrina Christiana, I, XXX where it was stated previously. Again in I ad te Domine nos fecisti et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te. Augustinus, I, 1, 1 (CCSL 27, 1, ll. 6-7). This is confirmed because no creature suffices unto itself for existence or to live well, therefore it does not suffice for another, and thus the ultimate and final rest is not able to be found in a creature. The second part is proved because, if because if not, then would be the case that it moves the intellect under the reason (ratio) of the true and the will under the reason (ratio) of the good, but this does not work (impedit) because it is entirely the same reason (ratio) of goodness and immense truth. But the immense Trinity does not demand that parts of the image should be enjoyed for their own sake, except under the reason (ratio) of the truth and the immense goodness. Therefore, it is by one reason.

The first corollary: just as the uncreated Trinity under one reason (ration) moves and shows itself beatifically in the image of a creature, so it is not the case that the created image, the memory, is elevated beatifically without the intellective (part) The first is clear through the conclusion. The second is proved then because both because there is a single motion, and because the thing moved and the thing received is the same, namely the memorative intellective power, as seems to be the position of Augustine IX in chapter three Augustinus, De Trinitate, IX, c. 3 . Nevertheless through this I do not wish to assert that man would not be able to understand God clearly and not love him because it is possible that he would see him clearly and not love him, though he would not see him beatifically.

The second corollary: it is both repugnant that the created image beatifically enjoy the divine persone with essence, and that it enjoys the essence and not some intrinsic perfection. This is proved because every divine perfection is formally and really the person and essence and vice versa.

The third corollary: just as the Blessed Trinity more intensely and remissively vitally changes the enjoyable perception of itself, so any object concurs causally and vitally for the perceptive perception of itself. The first part is proved because it freely moves the created potency and freely effects the total perception of itself, when it acts outside itself. From this fact it might be able to be inferred that, though the total and univocal cause is not able to exceed the genus of the species, nevertheless a partial and equivocal cause is able to cause and effect beyond the perfection of its proper nature. The first part is clear in multiple places in philosophy . The second is clear through what has been said since the material thing or object causally concurs for cognition, which is immaterial. From what has been said the affirmative part of the question follows.

Objections

Against the first conclusion and its corollaries it is argued since any volition and love is formally cognition, therefore. The antecedent is proved because, if cognition were destroyed in the mind, while love remained with respect to the loved object, then it would be asked whether or not through such love the object were known. If yes, the proposed position is obtained. If not, then it would follow that one loves something unknown, which is against Augustine Augustinus, XXX . Again, with respect to this, the first principle argument made in opposition to question.

In the second place, wherever there is a unity of the moving object under a single reason, there is a unity of acts. But in the operation of the intellect and will, at least in the enjoyment of heaven there is a unity of the moving object under a single reason, therefore there is a unity of acts, and as a consequence cognition and love, or loving and knowing, will be the same non-plurified act. The minor is clear through according to the second part of the third conclusion. The major is clear through Aristotle II Aristotle, De anima, II, XXX .

Against the second conclusion and its corollaries it is argued in the first that any creature is licitly able to be loved infinitely more than it is loved now, therefore.

In the second place because God and every created multitude are infinitely loveable and there exists something that is infinitely loveable and not God, but other than God. Therefore something other than God is properly enjoyable.

In the third place, God loves anything infinitely and immensely, therefore anything is loveable infinitely. The antecedent is clear because God loves as much and in the same way as he is, since his loving and his love and his mode of loving are really one and the same with him who is the infinite and who is infinitely.

In the fourth place against the second corollary, man is able to licitly enjoy his neighbor more than God, therefore he licitly able to love him more. The consequence is clear since to enjoy someone is to love someone. The antecedent is clear because someone is licitly able to lament the death of a friend more deeply (plus) and more enjoyable (fruentius) than the death of Christ, and more for the damnation of temporal things than for the committed sins.

Against the third conclusion it is first argued thus, the rational receptive potency of any creature is finite and limited, therefore some limited goodness is able to beatify and finally satifisfy the creature. The antecedent is proved because no creature is a greater perceptibility or capacity than an entity.

Against the same conclusion it is argued, God alone finitely beatifies some blessed creature, therefore finite goodness is able to supply its object influx in the perception of the creature. The consequence is clear because to every given finite thing there is able to be given something equally finite and better in perfection.

Against the second part of the same conclusion, the object of the intellect and the will is not able to move under the same reason, therefore. The antecedent is proved because the object of the intellect is intelligible as intelligible, but the object of the will is a willable object as willable. But these things differ by reason (ratio), which is proved in the first place by the fact that someone is able today to be willing and understanding one object and tomorrow to understand the same thing but not to wish it.

In the second place God understands today a man who he does not wish to love and tomorrow he has understood and loved him. But this diversity is not in God, therefore it lies in the obiectal reasons.

In the third place God understands the evil of guilt and yet he does not will it, therefore.

Against the same part it is argued in the second place principally thus, it follows that some part of the image is elicitive of enjoyment. The consequent is false because enjoyment is an act of the will alone, since it is love or loving some thing on account of itself. The consequence is clear because, if one does not elicit, then one is moved toward being elicited and the other is not. Therefore it does not move by a single reason some part of them, which is the opposite of this part.

Responses

To the first objection the antecedent in the first place is able to be denied, and for the proof it is said that, if love were to remain without knowledge, then either God woudl supply the exchange of knowledge, as it was said in one of the corollaries, or one would love mediately through a preceding ostensive cognition.

In the second place it is able to be said that, though love is able to be some experimental knowledge or perception, nevertheless it is not able to be our intellective cognition, or judicative, or indicative. And through this is able to be solved the first argument in opposition to the question by denying the antecedent. And for the first proof of this it is said that it is not inconvenient to say that assent is apprehension because it pertains to the intellect to assent and to apprehend. However to say that love is cognition, at least indiciative cognition, is inconvenient.

To the second proof it is said that no one is able to be perfectly blessed unless he sees God. Therefore the consequence is denied just as Magister Honofrius Honofrius, XXX says. On this matter see Gregory, in book one, distinction 1, article 2, question 2. Gregory Ariminensis, Sent., I, d. 1, a. 2, q. 2 .

To the second Alphonsus, in book I, distinction 1 Alphonsus Vargas, Sent., I, d. 1, q. 3, concl. 2 would respond by denying the minor because he holds that, in the enjoyment of heaven, the soul is not active but purely passive.

In the second place it is able to be said that, though properly speaking one potency moves causally effectively for eliciting an act, nevertheless this motion is not formal and objective, but only for the purpose of being perceived. But here I speak about formal perceptive and objectal motion and not about the other kind.

In the third place it would be able to be said that some beatifical potency in a single reason (ratio) has or is able to find its proper object since its obiectal motion is freely presentative which is not the case in other objects which naturally present and move themselves.

To the third in the first place responds Hugolinus, in distinction 1 of book 1, question 3 Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, Sent., I, d. 1, q. 3 . I concede the antecedent in the following way, that from an infinity of will it is possible to be loved more into infinity, but not from one will, see there. Additionally, it can be responded by denying this consequence, this creature is infinitely loveable, therefore it is enjoyable, unless this is added from the intrinsic worth of the thing.

To the fourth the antecedent is conceded thus, by understanding that nothing other than God, not including God or of which God is not a part, is not infinitely loveable. But in what has been proposed, this multitude includes God.

In the second place it is able to be said that this multitude is loveable with more loves than God is, but not more intensely, or man ought to wish more good things to this multitude than to God, not nevertheless a greater good. Thus it would be possible to say that Christ should be loved more than the Father, that is, in more modes because he died for us.

To the fifth the antecedent is able to be denied.

In the second place this consequence is able to be denied, some thing is loveable infinitely from an intrinsic reason (ratio), therefore it is enjoyable because it would then be required that by the reason (ratio) of some intrinsic goodness it would be intrinsically infinitely loveable. Again it would be able to be said that, though it is loveable infinitely, nevertheless it is not loveable infinitely.

To another it is said that to enjoy something in said in three different ways. In the first mode as cordial effection, in the second mode as bodily effect, in the third mode as sensual exertion. But in the second and third modes of understanding the word to enjoy the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied.

To another against the third conclusion Thomas of Argentina would respond that the soul is of infinite capacity for an objectal non natural potency. See question three of the prologue, article one Thomas de Argentina, Sent., I, prologus, q. 3 . Otherwise it would be possible to say that the soul is of an infinite capacity and of infinite perceptiveness, though it is not an infinite perceptive potency nor infinitely, and the consequence would be able to be denied. Kilvington, in his third question Richard Kilvington, Sent., I, q. 3 says that the capacity of the soul is a finite substance, but it is an infinite capacity, and thus he would deny the antecedent of the argument. Note the argument which he solves.

To another I respond that God would be able to create one object so delightful that, if God were to relinquish a soul of his nature, it would be as loveable in itself as in God and nevertheless it would not follow that such a soul would satisfy or beatify in the created object because, though it is as loveable with this one, nevertheless it would be the case the creature would still rather have that delight from God that from a created object.

But against this response it is argued that either such a creature is able to freely wish to have this delight from the creature just as from the creator or not. If the first, then he is satisfied in the created good, against what has been said. If the second, then it is not equally or in the same degree delighted in one as in the other, the opposite of which is conceded by the case in question.

Again a creature more greatly inclines to itself than to God, therefore God is not the final end to which the creature is moved. The antecedent is clear because, if the creature loves God, that is for his well being, then whatever desires its own well being aims at its own conservation in being and being well.

Again a rational creature is in objectal potency to being at rest in that in which God wills for it to rest in. Therefore, a creature is able to find ultimate rest in created thing. The consequence holds because God is able to will this and to do so properly, and in the second place because God is able to suspend his motion which moves the creature toward resting in God. Therefore it is said differently that no good below the level of God is able to satisfy and beatify the soul and bring it to rest because no good below the level of God is able to cause that kind of delight which restful. Therefore according to the argument made by Hugolinsu, in distinction one of the first book, in question three, near the end Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, Sent. I, d. 1, q. 3 (XXX) the consequence is able to be denied.

Again it should be known that, though the creature is not able to come to final rest in the created good, nevertheless it is able to believe that is at rest. This is clear because it would be able to have some created loveable thing such that he believes that is ultimate desirable things, even though it is deceived on account of bad acts.

Again it is the case that someone does not know that God exists and takes as its ultimate end some temporal good, and in this case the will is at rest in this and is deceived.

In the last place it is able to be said that God is able to create something good in which the soul is able to have as much delight and rest, where as much indicates the degree or latitude of an individual withing a species and not of a species within a genus.

To another against the second part it is said that it is able to be distinguished because either such diversity of reason comes form the co-rising (consurgentem) motion from the subject and predicate, and this is not against the conclusion or comes from the object precisely, and in this case the antecedent is denied. And with respect to the proof because the object etc., it is conceded. And when it is added but these things differ in reason, it is conceded for creatures, indeed they even differ in reality, but not in God. Therefore the argument against the conclusion does not succeed.

To another proof, the consequence is denied, though perhaps it concludes that there is not the same ratio of willing and understanding, but it does not support the distinction between the intelligible and willable.

To another proof in the first place the consequence would able to be denied and the antecedent conceded. In the second place consequent would be able to be conceded because he argues only for a difference in creatures.

To another proof it is able to be said that just as the evil of guilt, since it is a deformity, does not have the reason (ratio) of intelligibility, just as it also does not have the reason (ratio) of will-ability, et thus the privation is not properly known through habit, so neither does sin, unless in the case that is some privation of the good. Note Facinum in the second Facinus de Ast, XXX , where he offers an example, saying that a man knows himself to be lacking a floren not unless because in his mind he has the likeness of a flower upon which he is imagination is reflected, and thus in his mind by such a species is caused the judgment of the missing floren. Thus he says further that God knows there is not in Sorte, nor will there be, because thus he will have grace without discontinuation.

To another in the first place the consequent would be able to be conceded by extending elicere to effect causally because then enjoyment includes and act of the intellectu and thus enjoyment is not only an act of the will, but also of the intellect. In another mode the consequence is able to be denied when taking enjoyment strictly just as he precisely speaks of the act of the will, by holding the ration from the part of the moving object.

To the last argument in the opposition it in the first place Bradwardine Bradwardinus, XXX and Holcot Holcot, XXX would say that such a person would enjoy the creature but would excused on account of the unconquerable error and absolute ignorance.

In the second place Master Hugolinus would say that such a person would not love the creature but God, and therefore would most especially be excused, in such an error were not occurring from his guilt.

In the third place Master John Klenkot Iohannes Klenkot, XXX would say that such a person would be excused in part, but not from the whole, because either such a person is in original sin or not. If the first, then this error is the penalty for sin and is not excused. If not, but the person is in a venial sin, still in the penalty of venial sin God is able justly allow some to fall into mortal sin, and thus he is not excused because it is seem true that someone without any guilt should be permitted by God to fall into error.

Principal arguments

Whether it is able to be proved through the text of Holy Scripture that the creator of created nature is three and one?

It is not able to be so proved because in the first place God is not three and one, therefore etc. The antecedent is proved because no incommunicable is communicable to three things. But the Father is incommunicable and the divine essence is communicable. Therefore the Father is not the essence and consequently it is able to be argued about the Son and the Holy Spirit.

In the second place because this is not able to be proved through a false text. But the text of Scripture seems to be false or at least improper, therefore etc. Minor is clear in 2, where it is said the stones of the wall will cry out Habacuc 2:11 . Again Isidore valet Why have you made us wander from your ways and you have made us to harden our harts, so that we do not fear you? Isiah 63:17 Again the blind receive sight, and the lame walk Lucas 7:22 , etc. Again the Master in book 5 nothing is probable through scripture, which would have diminished faith Not found This text is not directly found in Lombard. It is possible that he means to cite the end (c. 5) of d. 2, which makes some sense. There the content is close, but the wording is different. See Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 2, c. 5 (I, 68, ll. 15). , but likewise to prove evidently the articles would diminish faith and empty it of it is value, therefore etc.

On the contrary, the Master in this distinction seems to be opposed. Again Augustin XIV in chapter one says that through the study of this science the saving faith is increased, defended, and strengthened Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 1 .

First conclusion

First conclusion: though this proposition, if God himself is three and one is able to be sufficiently deduced from a first principle, nevertheless that God is three and one is not able to be concluded evidently from that first principle The first part is clear because, from the contrary of the consequent, the opposite of the antecedent follows, therefore. The consequence is valid, although we do not this to be evidently valid. The antecedent is since it follows, God is not three and one, therefore God is not. For to the degree that is necessary that God is, it is to the same degree necessary that God is three and one. The second part is proved because, if it were possible to be concluded evidently from a first principle, then this would either be a priori, and this not the case because this is not possible, or a posteriori which is not the case. The latter is not the case because in the first place, since some created effect is finite, then such a proof would demonstrate that the first cause is finite. Again in the second place, though every demonstration proceeds from a created effect to a highest cause, this is insufficient because it has more dissimilarities than similarities. Further, given the fact that it might be possible for someone to be persuaded through this argument that there is a first cause, it would still in no way evidently convince them that this highest cause is triune. On this point consider the words of the Master in this distinction saying: Non enim per creaturarum contemplationem sufficiens notitia Trinitatis potest haberi sine doctrinae vel superioris inspirationis revelatione Lombard, Sent. I, d. 3 (XXX) .

The first corollary is that many said or formable propositions about God are deducible from the first principle. This is clear from the conclusion, and this is confirmed in the case of the proposition God is not a stone because it is able to be deduced from the first principle since the opposite proposition includes a contradiction. For it follows, God is essentially a stone, therefore God is God, therefore God is intelligent, therefore God is not a stone. The first consequence is clear because the same this is predicate of itself. The second is clear because given that is necessary that God is God so it is necessary that God is intelligent. And the third is clear because no intelligent this is essentially a stone.

The second corollary: though every evidence argues for certitude, nevertheless not every certitude carries evidence. The first is clear because everyone evidently knowing a conclusion is certain about that thing. The second is clear because the fact that God is three is most certain since is believed through faith, and nevertheless we do not have evidence concerning this article of belief.

The third corollary: just as it is repugnant that there is absolutely nothing, so it is repugnant that three supposites are not really distinct. From this it further follows that the following consequence is necessary: there are not three things, therefore nothing is. This is clear because it follows, if there are not three things, then there are not three divine supposites, therefore there is no God, therefore nothing is. From this it is still inferred that it follows well, there is one, therefore there are three because there are three divine supposites. The consequence is clear because the opposite of the consequent implies the opposite of the antecedent because it follows that, there are not three things, therefore there are not three divine supposites, there is not one.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: just as it is necessary in that within the divine persons there is one super simple unity of essence, so it is necessary that there is a real triune plurality or alterity. This is clear from what has been said in the first conclusion. The is confirmed because it is in reality just as the conclusion signifies, therefore that it is so is necessary. The antecedent is clear from faith. The consequence is proved because in whatever sort of thing is intrinsecally in the divine essence, it is necessary that such a thing is. This is clear This is clear through the Magistrum in this distinction Lombard, Sent. I, d. 2, c. 2 (I, 62, ll 15-24) . Again through Richard in his first book chapter 27 , saying confidenter fateamur personas in divinitate secundum substantiam deitas et substantiam significare et plures ibi personas, non plures substantias esse quia sunt plures habentes unum et indifferens esse ex differenti proprietate, unitas Richardus De Sancto Victore, IV, c. 19 (183, ll. 48-52). . This are the words of the Master in this distinction, in the beginning hoc itaque Lombard, Sent. I, d. 2, c. 1 (I, 61, ll. 1) etc.

The first corollary: not only in the divine is there solitude or singularity or simplicity of nature, but also a true and real trinity of three equal persons. This is clear from the conclusion, whence in alium paracletum dabit vobis. Iohannes 14:16 . Again in tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in caelo I Iohannes 5:7 . Again Athanasius alia est persona Patris, etc.

The second corollary: though the paternal notional utterance is to produce the son equal to itself, nevertheless some speaking or understanding divine supposite is not producing the Holy Spirit. The first part is from Augustine in his book saying Pater dicens se genuit Verbum sibi aequale per omnia; non enim integre perfecteque se dixisset si aliquid minus se vel amplius esset in eius Verbo quam in se ipso Augustine, de Trinitate, XV, 14, 23 . The second part is proved because since a divine person understands itself and something other than itself, it follows that the Son would produce either himself or another that is not himself. Not the first since according to Augustine nothing is able to produce or generate itself, and not the second because there would thus be a quaternity in the divine, which is impossible and against the conclusion.

The third corollary: just as is necessary that there be three supposites in the divine, so it is impossible that the Holy Spirit produce something within it. This is clear from what has been said because it is true that it does not produce something internally, therefore it is necessary, therefore the opposite of this truth is impossible

Third conclusion

The third conclusion: though the theologian through the text of scripture is not able to show evidently that God is three, nevertheless, through the same text, he his able meritoriously to sufficiently approve and deduce the Trinity. The first is clear because the object of this article is not evidently able to be deduced to the point of a contradiction, as is clear from the first conclusion Vide supra . The second part is proved because the article is sufficiently expressed in Sacred Scripture, therefore etc. The antecedent is clear in this distinction, where the the Master ways singulae pene syllabae novi testamenti hanc ineffabilem unitatis veritatem atque Trinitatis concorditer insinuant Lombard, Sent. I, d. 2, c. 1 (I, 62, ll. 4-5) . But that the theologian meritoriously able to inquire and to teach and deduce through scripture it is argued from the words of Augustine and alleged by the Master in this distinction Lombard, Sent. I, d. 2, c. 1 [n.3] saying that hac Trinitate nihil fructuosius invenitur Augustine, De Trinitate, I, 3, 5 (PL 42:822) . Again the Master in his prologue delectat nos veritas pollicentis Lombard, Sent. I, prol. [n.1], (I, 63, ll. 6-7) , namely the hope of having eternal life which was one of the moving causes for the compilation of his book.

The first corollary: No text of Sacred Scripture taken in its proper sense is false. This is opposed to what Ockham says in his Ockham, Sententia, XX . This is clear because otherwise the articles of faith would not be able to be proven or deduced through this text, indeed Scripture would be rendered suspect.

The second corollary: to study Sacred Scripture is a condition that increases merit. This is clear, if it is understaken in love and on account of God and is not repugnant to the catholic faith. Indeed to study in any science that has not been prohibited is meritorious, if it is commanded by a good act of the will, as Facinus shows Facinus de Ast, XX .

The third corollary is the affirmative part of the conclusion , namely that it is able to be proven through the text of Sacred Scripture, etc. This is clear through what has been said.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion it is argued: through natural reasons we are able to know and to deduce that the divine essence exists, therefore also that there is a Trinity of persons. The consequence is known because whatever is known about the divine essence truly coincides with the Trinity. The antecedent is clear through Tullius, , in the second book, after the beginning , omnibus enim innatum est et in anima quasi insculptum esse Deo Cicero, De natura deorum, II, XX . To the same is Augustine Augustine, , chapter 8 Augustinus, 8, 2 (CCSL 27, 114-116) , speaking about the Platonists, where he says that with reason itself he came to the knowledge not only of the divine essence. but also of the Trinity.

The second is argued thus: every perfection found in creatures out to be attributed to God, but to generate is a perfection in creatures, therefore.

In the third place: to whatever degree nature is more actual, so it is also more fertile. But the divine nature is infinitely in act, therefore it is of infinite fecundity.

In the fourth place: every good thing is naturaly communicative of itself. But God is an infinite good, therefore. The major is from Dionysius chapter 12 Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, XX . And the minor is in Anselm in his in many chapters Anselmus, Proslogion, 2, 3, 13, 20 (I, 101-103, 110-111, 115-116) .

Against the second conclusion: if there were three persons, etc., it would follows that in the divine there is a relation and an opposition of relation, therefore it will be either only one thing or many. If only one, then there will only be two supposites or two persons. But if many, then there will be at least four supposites which is a heresy. The consequence is clear because every relative opposition requires two extremes, namely to generate to be generated, to spirate and to be spirated.

In the second place it is argued thus: God is the same in every mode in which it is better to be the same than not the same. But to be the same essentially and personally is better than not to be the same in thse ways, therefore. The major is clear through Anselm, 15 Anselmus, 15 (I, 28-29). . The minor is clear because it is better that what suits the Father and any person exists than not exists. But to be the same essentially and personally suits each person, therefore being the same is better than not. The minor is clear because any person is personally and essentially the same as the divine essence.

In the third place: it follows that there are three eternal divine persons, and nevertheless not all three are eternal. The consequent is implied. The consequence is clear because through the conclusion and its corollary there are three coeternal persons, and they are alos eternal. But that there are not three eternal things is clear through Athansius who says there are not three eternal things but one Athanasius, XX .

In the fourth place against the second corollary: if through understanding, etc., then it follows that any person will produce the Son. The consequence is clear because everyone understands something, therefore it follows that this person produces himself or something other than himself through understanding or loving. This is confirmed because, if the Trinity of persons is compatible with simplicity, by the same reasons it is compatible with quaternity because there does not seem to be a reason why the Son is not able to produce the son through his own understanding just as the Father.

Against the third conclusion: that God is three is nowhere expressly found in Sacred Scripture, therefore. The antecedent is proved since, because Scripture has many senses and understandings, it would be possible for and adversary to say that Christ and others who are speaking about the Trinity were not speaking literally, but mystically and figuratively.

Against the first corollary because there are many propositions which appear to false in the literal sense, but this is the proper sense of Scripture, therefore. The antecedent is clear in 10 ubi Christus dicit I am the gate Iohannes 10:9 . Again, I am the true wine Iohannes 15:1 . This is confirmed because the doctors of the scripture contradict themselves, therefore. The antecedent is clear from Augustine Augustine, XX and from Jerome in many passages Jerome, XX . Again, the antecedent is confirmed because the Gospel authors seem to disagree among themselves. This is clear because, on account of this matter, Augustine seems to have written his book .

Again, against the conclusion and the second corollary: since the ones studying theology expose themselves to the danger of erring, therefore no one ought to study theology, nor is the study of theology meritorious. The antecedent is clear because within this study are mixed in the words of the philosophers and heretics which are neither licit nor helpful to read in their own right, as is clear from Jerome, who was seriously wounded by the fact that he read the books Cicero as it his said in his legend.

Again, through the study of theology the habit of believing is easily acquired, therefore through this study the one studying loses a circumstances that increases merit. The antecedent is clear. And the consequence is proved because the difficulty of believing is a circumstances that increases merit, whence Jerome in some epistle says what is of greater merit is that which is of greater labor Jerome, Exhortatio ad sponsam Christi, XX . Again Ambrose in his book says, all virtue consists in labor Ambrose, De Cain et Abel, XX .

the Philosopher in book II of the Aristotle, Ethics, II, XXX seems to support the same point, from which it seems to follow that it would be better to have the status of a simple faithful pilgrim than that of a profound or subtle doctor.

Responses

To the first: whatever is the case concerning the antecedent, the consequence is denied. For the proof it is said that the divine trinity is known by some and not known by some.

With respect to the saying of Augustine about the Platonists: in the first place it is said that Augustine does not say that he himself found this in the book of the Platonists, but in of some Platonist. But there were many Platonists after the coming of Christ, like Porphyry, Plotinus, et Apuleius, who were perhaps good men.

In the second place it is able to be said that if someone had known about the Trinity, they would have had this from divine inspiration, just as Augustine says in hermete Mercurii in the sermon Augustine, III, 1-21 (CCM 60, 264-268) .

With respect to the second: in the first place the major would be able to be denied because to merit or to be able to merit is a perfection in creature, nevertheless it is not able to be attributed to God.

In the second place, the minor would be able to be denied because perhaps to generate or to be able to generate is an absolute perfection most especially in the divine because, according to what is commonly argued, since the Son is not able to lack any perfection.

With respect to the third consequent would be able to be conceded because the divine nature in the supposites of the Father and the Son is of an infinite fecundity since the Father produces the Son in every way equal to himself, and the Father and the Son produce the holy spirit consubstantial to themselves.

The fourth: the entire argument is conceded and yet from this it is not evidently concluded that a Trinity of persons is in the divine. Indeed it could be equally proved through this means a quaternity and quinternity, perhaps even more than a trinity.

To another argument: the minor would be able to be denied and for the proof it is said that, though some person is of the same essence personally and essentially, nevertheless it is not the case that same thing suits all three persons personally at the same time. Again, it is able to be said that this major premise, in which it is said it is better that what suits the Father or any person exists than not exist, is true if it is not relative but is only including a relation.

To the third argument: it is said that the eternal or eternal things are able to exist substantively, and thus are not three eternal things but one eternal thing, or adjectively and thus there are able to be called there eternal or eternal things.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that it is more properly said that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are coeternal than eternal, therefore Athansius concedes the first and denies the second.

To the fourth: the consequence is denied and for the proof it is said according to Thomas of Argentina, in the second distinction of the first book, in the first article, that it is said is taken in two ways when applied to the divine. In one mode properly, and in this case it is the same things as grasping the world. And it is in this manner that Augustine VII Augustine, De Trinitate, VII, xxx uses the word when he says that no one but the Father is speaking internally. In another mode the word to say is take to mean to understand perfectly, and thus any person speaks itself, and in the same way it could be said about the word to understand. It is in this way that Anselm, in the , 57 et 59 chapters Anselm, 57 and 59 (I, 68-70) uses the term when he says individual persons speak themselves any of them speak themselves. But if an evident reason is sought for why the Son does not produce the Son through his speaking just as in the case of the Father, it is able to be said with Anselm, , 85o et 68o capitulis Anselm, Monologion, non invenimus , that this transcends every act of human understanding. Through the same, the response to the confirmation is clear when it is said by the same reason etc. The consequence is denied, and when it is said because the argument does not seem, etc., it is said that, though we know this properly but not perfectly, nevertheless there is something to it, and therefore through believing we ought to take the intellect captive.

To the first against the third conclusion: the antecedent is denied, for it is clear in in the last chapter Matthaeus, xxx , in chapter 1 Iohannes, xxx , and also in the in Decreti Romanorum Pontificum, xxx , in which, whoever would contradict, would be censured as a heretic. Nevertheless I do not want to say that the are Sacred Scripture. quibus, qui contradiceret, censeretur haereticus. Nolo tamen dicere illa decreta esse Scriptura Sacra.

To the second: in the first place the antecedent woudl be able to be denied, when speaking about propositions which are put in the text of Sacred scripture

not only narratively, but also assertively. In the second place for clarity, note that the proper sense of any scripture is the sense that the author Scripture intended by it. This is shown by Armacanus, in book one , in the beginning of this book. Richard FitzRalph, De quaestionibus Armenorum, xxx .

In the second place, note that, since Scripture has many senses, if the truth of some text is not able to be maintained according tone one sense, one should run to another with which the other Scriptures better harmonize. And the highest care should be taken that the figurative expression is not admitted to the literal expression, and conversely that the true and proper expression is not changed into a figure and through to be figurative.

In the third place, it should be noted that, though through scripture something can be signified through a likeness, nevertheless it is not necessary on account of this that the same thing in one place signifies one thing through this same word through a likeness. This notable is asserted by Augustine III Augustine, De doctrina Christiana, III, xxx and he offers an example about everything.

To the confirmation, it is said that doctors are not authors of Sacred Scripture, but only expositors. Concerning the evangelists it is said that in no passage are they really discordant. And accordingly his book is not called on the discord but on the concord of the evangelists. Nevertheless if it were called on the discord, this would not be true and real, but only an assessment or an opinion and mere words.

To another: the antecedent is denied, if one studies in the way they ought. For such a person ought not to seek to understand in order to believe, but believe in order to understand Anselm, Prosologion, 1, (I, 100, ll. 18-19) as Anselm says at the end of the prologue of his . To the proof concerning the sayings of the heretics, etc., it is said that reading such words is licit when it is for the learning of what is true and the rebuke of what is false. But such reading is not licit when it is for the purpose of believe or imitation or the vanity of assertion or the inordinate delight. And perhaps therefore Jerome was flogged and beaten because he was reading with delight since perhaps on account of that love he was missing the better and more useful parts.

To the last: it is said that, though the one studying believes more easily, nevertheless his merit does not diminish on account of this because in this case he acquires better things, such as to believe more intensely or extensively, more expressly or more truly. For through a habit of this type he subordinates faith to his love and actually directs it into God. .

In the second place it would be able to be responded by denying the antecedent because the more subtile theologian does not always believe more easily, indeed many arguments and objections arise for the theologian that do not bother the simple believer.

From what has been said it is clear that it does not follow from these things that through the study of theology there is acquired, with respect to the articles, a knowledge superior to faith. Therefore the same thing is evident and inevident, evident through science, inevident through faith. But it follows that one assents to an article through some means that does not come from scientific evidence.

The first argument to the contrary: in the first place it would be possible to say that when taking communicable as communicated to another, it is distinct from the one to whom it is communicated. In this way it is said that the essence is not properly communicable.

In the second place, it is said, by following the common school and the mode of speaking of the doctors, that the essence is communicable and not the person. And then the major premise is able to be understood in two ways. In one mode nothing incommunicable is communicable to three things, that is, it is not something which is communicated to three things, and thus the major premise is false. In another mode nothing incommunicable , that is, this is not able to be communicated to three things, and then the major premise is true, but form of arguing is not valid.

To the other two it is clear through what has been said what should be responded.

Rationes principales

That not because the human soul is not productive of its own acts, therefore etc. The consequence holds and is also proven because the human soul is not formally active, as John of Ripa says in his , in the second question, in the fourth conclusion Iohannes de Ripa, Determinationes, XX . Then in the second place because it is receptive of its acts and passive with respect to them, therefore it is not active because then the same thing would be the agent and patient.

In the second place, not every created thing is a vestige of the trinity, therefore the image the same Trinity is not able to found in the soul. The consequence is clear because in the same way that the soul relates to the image, so the every creature relates to the vestige. The antecedent is clear because otherwise it would follow that anyone conceiving or seeing something created would have one proper concept of it which is false.

In the third, the human soul does not lead into perfect knowledge of the Trinity, therefore it is not its image. The consequence is clear because, since an image is unitve of that of which it is an image, it leads into perfect knowledge of whatever trace. The antecedent is proved because otherwise we would have perfect knowledge about the uncreated Trinity in the natural light, which is against what is said in the preceding conclusion.

The opposing position is found in the the Master in this distinction E.g., Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 3, c. 1 (I, 70, ll.20-31). using Augustine to support this position in many places, as is clear in the text.

First conclusion

First conclusion: it is as repugnant to the human soul to not be intellective as it is to not be formally active and receptive of its own acts. This is proved because any rational creature is formally active and receptive of its own acts, therefore. The consequence is valid because what formally and instrinsically is something, it is repugnant for it not to be this thing, if it exists. In the second place because the powers of the soul and the soul are formally the same thing, as I now suppose, therefore etc. The antecedent is proved in the first place because, according to the Master, in book II Lombardus, Sent. II, d.38 (I, 547-552). the will is effective of its own acts, therefore it is either formally and intrinsically active in itself or or not. If it is, then the proposed is obtained. If not, but it is active through another, then it is asked about this, just as before, whether it is formally active or not. If it is, then it follows that it was equally standum? as in the first place. If not, then there will be a process into infinity, which is false. This is confirmed because the soul therefore is active of its vital acts because it is the life of the body, therefore it is formally active. The consequence is valid and the antecedent is clear through the Philosopher in book II of Aristotle, De anima, II . But that the soul is receptive of its own acts is clear because otherwise there would be no enduring elicited acts. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because so many ancients denied that the soul is the effective cause of its own act because then the same thing would be agent and patient, moving and moved, which is thought to be inconvenient.

The first corollary: it follows from what has been said in the conclusion, the parts of the image belonging to the human soul lack real plurality.

The second corollary: it stands that the perceptive potency is formally active, and nevertheless to perceive is not to act formally. This is clear because the fact that God is is not formally the fact that God creates, and nevertheless God is formally creative. Again, to perceive oneself is not to act on oneself, and nevertheless the same thing is formally the perceptive potency of itself and formally active of another.

The third corollary: though any perceptive potency is formally active, nevertheless not every active potency is formally perceptive. This is clear because the perceptive is below the active power. Again, fire is active and nevertheless it is not perceptive of some object.

Another corollary: if some receptive or passive power is a denomination, than any angel is less perfect than any one who is just a person. Indeed it follows that the human soul is more perfect than any angel. This is clear because the angel is of a greater capacity than the human soul, therefore the angel is less perfect? since the capacity of an angel and man is the receptive passive power. Indeed it follows that however more perfect the soul is, the less perfect it is because it implies etc. This is clear since the soul is its capacity, therefore what ever amount of capacity it has, this is its degree of essential perfection. Therefore the more capacity it has, the more perfection it has. Or for the other perspective, the more capacity it has, the more receptive it is and the more passive it is, and the passive and receptive it is, the more imperfect is it is, therefore proposed is obtained.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: Though any supposite of a created entity carries the trace of the Blessed Trinity, nevertheless it is the case that from the consideration of this trace and also from the same thing a concept of the Trinity is not obtained. The first is clear in this distinction because any supposite has a unity, a charm, and a goodness. The unity represents the Father because, just as unity is beginning of number, so the Father is the beginning of the Trinity and the fontal origin. Charm or beauty represents the Son upon which, as an exemplar, the beauty of every creature is formed. Goodness truly represents the Holy Spirit, which is the love of the Father and the Son, the one from who every good thing proceeds. The second is proved because it is the case that the consideration of the trace is to speculate about it or consider it not under the ratio qua trace, and this does not bring one back to the Trinity. This is clear because otherwise whoever knows Socrates, who is a father, would know his son, which is false.

The first corollary: though it stands that to consider the created entity from another also does not bring knowledge of the Trinity, nevertheless any created entity represents the Blessed Trinity more perfectly than the entity itself. The first part is clear through the conclusion. The second is proved when speaking about representation as the creature is perfectively intuitively seen according to the degree of its perfection because it is suited to the Trinity in the first place through its unity, charm, and goodness, and every perfection without exception. Therefore the consequence is clear because in these things consists the perfection of the creature.

The second corollary: when the trace under the ratio of the trace is attended to or known, some contemplation of the Trinity in the mind is produced or conceived. This is clear because the trace and the thing traced are correlative, therefore the cognition of one thing under the ratio of relativity introduces the cognition of the other. The antecedent is clear Aristotle saying that the same thing is cognition of the opposites or the relatives, just as it is does not stand that someone knows that Socrates is a father without knowing the son or without having some concept of a son.

The third corollary: the trace of the Trinity is known by one, and by another the vestige of the Trinity is not known

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: just as the soul is the effective cause or effectively causative of its own acts, so the same thing is subjectively receptive of its own acts. This conclusion is clear through what has been said in the first conclusion, nevertheless the first part is proved in another way. Any created thing has some formal effective principal of its own beginning, therefore acts of the soul have a beginning of this type. But it seems that no such thing should be posited besides the soul, therefore. It is confirmed, the will is the cause, therefore also the soul. The consequence is proved because the will is one mind, one substance, one life, according to Augustine Augustinus, ?? and alleged by the Master in this distinction Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 3, c. 2 (I, 73, ll. 8-12). . The antecedent is clear through the same author in the, in chapter nine where he says nihil tamen est in potestate voluntatis sicut ipsa voluntas Augustinus, Retractionum, ?? . The second part of the conclusion is commonly held and it clear through what is said in the first conclusion. It is also confirmed through 16 filii recordare Lucas 16:25 etc., where he speaks to the letter and was a history, not merely a parable, as is clear through Augustine speaking in chapter 7. Augustinus, Super Genesis, c. 7 (??) To the same point is Anselm chapter 4 Anselm, De conceptu Virginali, c. 4 (II, 145, ll. 23-26) , in the members of the body there is neither pain or pleasure without the soul and the rational will.

The first corollary: every act of the created image has many causes of its own origin. This is clear because the object of such an act is a true effective partial cause, as is clear through Augustine IX , in chapter 13, saying omnis res quam cognoscimus congenerat in nobis notitiam sui Augustinus, De Trinitate, IX, c. 13 (PL ??) . But beyond this cause, the soul is the principal cause, as the conclusion says, therefore. This was also clear in the first conclusion.

The second corollary: it is neither repugnant nor impossible for a natural cause to produce a free act. This is clear because the created object causes freely but naturally and concurs with the natural influx. This is confirmed because the intellective potency is in some way the cause of the acts of the will, as it was said above, therefore etc.

The third corollary is responsive, namely the affirmative part of the question is true, which is clear because there is an essential unity and a causal or potential trinity, therefore. The consequence and antecedent are clear from what has been said by Augustine Augustinus, ?? and the Master in this distinction Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 3, c. 2 (I, 73, ll. 21-28). .

Objections and Responses

Against the first conclusion is the opinion of John of Ripa Iohannes de Ripa, Lectura, XXX . It is not the case that the divine intellect is formally active, therefore neither is the created intellect. The consequence is clear, but the antecedent is proved because, if this were true, it would follow that in God it would be the same thing formally to be able to do a and to be able to perceive a. The consequent is false because then God would be active of himself, which is impossible.

In the second place, an intellective or perceptive power adds something above an active power, therefore they are not formally the same. The consequence is valid and the antecedent is proved because, as it was said in the third corollary, fire is active but not perceptive. This is also clear because to be active is a common property common both to a vital power as well as to a non vital power, but a merely perceptive power. This is confirmed because that which is perceptive adds that which is active, therefore it is either formally active or not. If it, is then it follows that the perceptive power is active, and then it follows that the perceptive power is a greater perceptive power than any non perceptive active power is active. The consequent is false. If it is not formally active, but is that by which an animal or something is formally perceptive, then it is perceptive, and thus it is not an active being, as proposed, and the same act would be able to come from a passive power.

In the third place, if the perceptive power is formally an active power, therefore either this is so praecisely really or precisely intentionally. Not the first mode nor the second because any real active power speaks a greater perfection in reality an intentional active power. However not any real active power is of a greater perfection than a formally active intentional power, namely a perceptive power. Therefore the perceptive power is not formally an active power either really or intentionally.

In the fourth place, it is proved that to be an active power or to be active is not formally the same thing is being a passive power or being passive because to be active is a type of perfection in some thing.

Against the second part of the second conclusion it is argued in the first place thus: a creature is not less dependent on God than an accident on its subject. But the one conceiving an accident forms a proper concept of a substance. Therefore someone seeing a creature or a vestige of the Trinity forms in the mind a proper concept of God.

In the second place, the Apostle in the fifth chapter of seems to be opposed to the first part and its corollaries when he says his judgements are incomprehensible Ad Romanos 11:33 etc.

In the third place, nothing unmeasured is known or thought through what is measured or finite. Anything created is finite. Therefore God is not knowlable through such things. The major premise is clear because the ratio of finitude excludes completely the ratio of immensity and infinity.

Against the first part of the first corollary and against the second it is argued, if this were true, it would follow that the one seeing a creature intuitively would know God more perfectly than the creature. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because through the corollary it represents God more perfectly than the seen creature. Therefore since through this vision the creature is intuitively and perfectly known, it follows that God is known through it more perfectly.

In the fifth place, no such concept proper to God is perceptible or discoverable in the vision of a creature, therefore this is not able to be asserted. The antecedent is clear because no one is able to discern such a concept from the concept of a creature.

Against the third conclusion: if this were true, it would follow that the same thing would be moving and moved, acting and acted upon. Contra tertiam conclusionem, as was argued above.

In the second place, then the soul would be of infinite virtue and activity since it would be of infinite receptivity.

In the third place, if the soul were intrinsically formally active, then it would be able to act without corporal senses, which is false because then the blind would be able to judge about color.

In the fourth place, against the first corollary: if the object were the cause of the action of the soul, it would follows that the same created agent, having itself precisely in the same mode, would be able to be the cause of opposites. The consequent is false, as is seen. The consequence is clear because, with the cognition of the object remaining, the will is able to freely wish and not wish the object successively and these are opposite acts caused or causabile by the object, therefore etc.

In the fifth place, against the second corollary, if the object is able to be the efficient cause of love freely, it would follow that the intention of goodness in the object follows the intention of love in the soul. The consequent is experience as false, therefore etc.

In the sixth place, against the third corollary, if the soul were the image of the Trinity, therefore, either according to its pure essence, or according to its powers, or because of its acts, it is active and receptive. But neither of these things should be said, therefore etc.

Responses

With respect to the first, the antecedent is denied, and with respect to the proof because the same thing would be etc this is denied because, as the second corollary of the first conclusion says, it is one thing to say to perceive is not formally to act and another thing to say the perceptive is not formally active. For these two things are quite diverse.

To the second, the consequence is denied. With respect to the confirmation it is said that the thing added, thought it is formally active, it nevertheless does not follow that it is more active than any other active thing.

In the second place it would be possible to say that nothing below adds something beyond that which is signified through the superior genus. And thus it would be possible for the antecedent of this argument to be denied.

In the third place it would be possible to be said that the whole argument concludes nothing more than that the active power is not formally the perceptive power. But from this it does not follows that perceptive power is formally active, as the third corollary says, because they are disposed just as the superior and the inferior.

To the third, it is said that in each mode the intellect is active because it intentionally creates an external object in existence, but really causes its acts. And when it is said that some real active thing etc., this is denied because fire is really active and the intellect is only intentionally because it is able to cause in itself a natural likeness of fire, and it is the case that the intellect is more perfectly active than fire because it is active perceptive, but fire is not.

To the fourth, the antecedent is conceded but it is denied that any passive being is a kind of imperfect, when understanding passive being to mean a subectively informable perceptive being. For otherwise it would follow that an angel would be lesser perfection the greater its perceptiveness, as it has been said.

To the first against the second conclusion it is said, I concede the entire argument, namely that the one seeing the vestige of the trinity forms a concept of God in the mind, and most especially if they consider the vestige under the ration qua vestige, as the corollary says.

In the second place it would be able to be said that since one conceiving the accident not under the ratio of inherence, but under the ratio qua entity, thus it is not necessary to have a concept of the substance.

For the solution, note that having a concept of God is possible in two ways, namely virtually and formally. Virtually indeed when by virtue of it one is able to have a formal concept, formally when through such a formal concept God is signified. Again, this is able to happen perceptibly or imperceptibly, such that the former whenever the act of beginning is perceived and the thing is conceived, and the latter whenever the act of beginning is perceived and the thing is not conceived.

To the second, it is said that the Apostle intends that they are not comprehensibile in every way and perfectly, though they may be known imperfectly because quod non fuit comprehensibilia omnimode et perfecte, licet imperfecte cognoscantur, quia the invisibile things of God through those things Romans 1:20 etc.

Secondly, it is able to be said that this is true about every judgment and all his ways at the same time, nevertheless everything per se is able to be investigated in some mode and is able to be known either through revelation or some other mode.

To the third, in the first place the major is able to be denied. In the second place it would be possible to say that, though the finite is not able to lead into cognition of the infinite under the infinite ratio positively, nevertheless it is able to do this remotely or negatively because to the infinite is to know a thing which is not finite or limited.

To the fourth Vide supra , it is said that if the consequent is understood with respect to the object known, then it is conceded. But if it understood with respect to the act of evident cognition, in this case the consequence and consequent are denied because when creatures are seen we have evident knowledge, but not about something representing God.

To the fifth Vide supra , when it is said no such concept etc., it is clear through the distinctions what should be said because it stands that it is not perceived and seen. Again, it is able to be virtual, not formal. Again, it is not proper in this way because God, in the same mode in which he is in himself, subsists to this concept, but because through such a concept God and not something else is known and signified.

To the first against the third conclusion, the consequent is conceded concerning the partial agent and the whole receptive, just as the soul with respect to its acts, when speaking to be about passiong which is not an object or a corruption, but health is a perfection.

In the second place Osbertus Osbertus Pickingham, XXX would say that the will moves according to itself, and is moved according to what has been informed through apprehension. And thus it is further said that the will always begins a new motion, unless it is moved in some way by something else, think by a command or judgement of an apprehensive power. And thus it does not follows that the same thing is moving and moved in the same way.

To the second, the consequence is denied because to be receptive is not a perfection absolutely. In the second place it would be able to be said that the soul is not of infinite virtue or activity, but finite.

To the third, the consequence is denied because the soul is not the total cause of many judgments, as in the case of judging or to syllogizing about colors, but it also requires causally an object and an organ of sight, and I speak about the totality of the cause and not the effect.

To the fourth, the consequent is conceded about the partial cause concurring requisitively, as is the cause with the object or cognition of the object.

To the fifth, the consequence is denied because the object is not the total cause but only the partial cause.

To the last, what is assumed on behalf of the second part is denied. However for the matter at hand it should be known that, according to Thomas of Argentina in this distinction, image is able to be taken in three ways. In the first mode, with respect to the soul and it powers precise. In the second it is for the powers informed by acts. In the third mode it is taken more properly since such acts and habits are with respect to an immense object. Thus Augustine speaks about the image in IX , saying imago Dei est in mente non quia sui meminit, amat, et se intelligit, sed quia potest Deum, a quo facta est, meminisse, amare, et intelligere Augustinus, IX .

With respect to the arguments to the contrary, it is clear through the what has already been said what should be said.

Principal arguments

That not because God did not generate God, therefore. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved because God did not generate another God different from himself, therefore he did not generate God. The consequence holds because nothing is able to generate itself nor another because then there would be many gods, therefore etc.

In the second place, if he generated a God different than himself, it follows that there would be some reason signaling why one would generate another distinct from itself rather than the other. The consequent is false because there is no such reason discoverable of giveable for one that does not equally apply to the other, even in the case of an infinity of things.

In the third place, the Son in the divine began to be, therefore hew was not before etc. The consequence holds and the antecedent is proved because the Son is in some instant and was never before that instant, therefore in this instant he began to be. This is confirmed because the Son began to be in some instant because, if did not begin to be etc., it follows that he did not begin to be in this instant, which is false.

In opposition is the Master in this distinction Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 4, c. 1 (I, 78, ll. 15-33). because Athansius in says eternal Father eternal Son Symbolum S. Athansii etc.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though the Virgin Maria conceived the same son temporally which God the Father generated eternally, nevertheless the Virgin Mother conceived something that God the Father did not generate. The first is clear because the son of God the Father and of the Virgin Mary is the same thing. The second is clear because the Virgin conceived the body of Christ and God the Father did not generate this.

The first corollary: though Christ was eternally, nevertheless he temporally began to be Christ. The first part is clear because the Son was eternally. The second part is clear because he began to be man temporally, therefore he temporally began to be Christ. The consequence holds because, just as the rational soul and the body are one man, so God and man are one Christ.

The second corollary: though there was some man eternally, nevertheless whatever is a man came to be a man temporally.

Third corollary: it does not follow, this, i.e. Christ, was eternally, therefore he did not begin to be man temporally. This is clear from the same means because the humanity of Christ began to be temporally.

Another corollary: though Christ is necessarily as much the Son, as he is God, nevertheless Christ is contingently the son of someone. The first is clear because as the Father is necessarily the Father, so the Son is necessarily the Son and both are God. The second is clear because he is contingently the son of the Virgin.

Secunda conclusio

Second conclusion: though with respect to us it is not evidently probable that ther eare not many sons in the divine, nevertheless it is necessary that God the Father begets a single Son coeternal and consubstantial with himself. The first is clear because every means evident to us for inferring that the father generates one son is able to infer equally the Son produces another Son because all three persons are of the same perfection, omnipotence, and activity. The second is clear in the present distinction. Again, it is clear through Augusine in book VI , in the secon chapter, the Son is God from God but not except through generation Augustinus, De Trinitate VI, 2 (PL ??) , therefore etc. This is confirmed because de facto God the Father produced or beget only one Son equal to himself in every respect, therefore it necessary that this is so. The consequence is clear from what has been said above. The antecedent is a catholic truth.

The first corollary: that it is not able to be demonstrated to us in this life that there is one Son any more than it is an infinity are generated. The conclusion is clear.

Second corollary: it is not evidently probable that there are productions of diverse types in the divine. This is clear because by faith alone it is held that there are only two, namely generation and spiration.

Third corollary: just as there are many necessary things which are not demonstrably necessarily evident, so many things are impossible which even imply a contradiction to which no one is able to be led through natural reason alone. The first part is clear from the articles of faith that are signifying the Trinity. The second is clear because the statement that Father does not generate the Son includes a hidden contradiction which no one in the natural light is able to illuminate or show demonstratively to another.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: thought God the Father eternally generated God the Son, it is nevertheless not properly said that after his generation he produced something temporally. The first is clear through what has been said and it is able to be confirmed through 2 Dominus dixit ad me Filius meus est tu, ego hodie genui te Psalmus 2:7 . The second is proved because any divine act internal to itself is measured in an instant of eternity, therefore terms conveying a lapse or difference of time are no properly said about the divine. The consequence holds because after, before, when, and similar terms deal with differences of time. The antecedent is clear through Augustine in 101 where he says: Aeternitas ipsa dei substantia est, quae nihil habet mutabile; ibi nihil est praeteritum quasi iam non sit, nihil est futurum quasi nondum sit; non est ibi, nisi est; non est ibi, fuit vel erit Augustine, Commentary on Ps. 25 . Again, Item, the same author in book XII , in chapter 15: Istae divisiones seu dimensiones temporalium spatiorum quae usitate et proprie dicuntur tempora a motu siderum ceperunt unde etiam Deus, cum instituit, dixit: Et sint in signa et tempora et dies et annos Augustine, De civitate Dei, XII, capitulo 15 . Again, the same author in , Filius Dei debet dici natus, quia semper nascitur, quia eius nativitas seu generatio numquam praeteriit, sed semper praesens est Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, q.37 (CCSL 44A, 59, ll. 6-7). Note that Gracilis explicitly identifies this quotation as rough paraphrase. See his note that immedieately follows. . See the text because these words are not the precise words. Nevertheless note that there it is not always taken for a temporal difference, but for an eternal measure or instant.

The first corollary: though God the Father before the creation of things did not generate his son, nevertheless no created thing was coeternal with him. The first is clear like the conclusion because, just as there is not after in eternity, so there is not before. The second is clear because otherwise God would not have produced from the beginning of time, which is false because God created Gensis 1:1 etc.

The second corollary: in some sign or instant the Father generates and he never generates before that moment. And nevertheless the Father does not begin to generate because the Father generates in an instant of eternity and never before that moment because before that moment there was not instant.

Third corollary: though the Father in some instant generates the son and will never generate him after that moment, nevertheless he will not cease to generate and does not cease. This is clear from nature of the instant of eternity because after that instant nothing is or will be. From these things the negative part of the title is clear, namely that before corporeal being was made temporally made God generated God the Son eternally. This is clear when taking before in the matter stated.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion: in the divine there is no motion, therefore there is no generation. The consequence holds because every motion is a generation. The antecedent is clear in first book of Iacobus 1:? .

In the second place, the Virgin did not beget anything except a creature, but the Son of God is not a creature, therefore etc. The major premise is from Augustine, , chapter 34 Augustinus, Enchiridion, 34 (PL ??) The minor is clear in book 3 of the , distinction 11 Lombard, Sententia, III, d. 2 (II, 27-31) . . Again, the argument made before the opposition is against this conclusion.

In the third place against its corollaries, some act of understanding of the Father precedes the act of generating, therefore the Son was not etenrally. The consequence is clear because the Father was knowing not only in the Son, but also in himself as is clear through Augustine III Augustinus, De Trinitate, III, ?? (PL ??) . Therefore it seems that the Father had the knowledge of understanding before the expression of the word.

Against the second conclusion is the second argument made in the opposing arguments Vide supra .

In the second place, if God generates God, therefore he either generates with wisdom or without wisdom. If the first, then the same thing is the terminus from which it was produced and the terminus to which it was produced, which does not seem to be true. If without wisdom, then the Father produces the Son in ingorance, which is false.

Against the third conclusion is the third argument in the opposition Vide supra .

In the second place, every ratio different from the being in God is posterior to the being itself. However to generate the Son is a denomination or ratio different from the being of God, therefore it is posterior. Therefore it is both prior and posterior. The major premise is proved because in the divine essence there is an order of essential reasons according to Dionysius, , chapter 3 Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 3 (PG ??) . Again, it seems that God is living prior to understanding, and understanding prior to willing. But these by nature precede the generation of the Son, therefore.

In the third place, that which has the ratio of the beginning in some way precedes what it begins. But the Father with respect to the Son and the understanding of the Father with respect to the his speaking has the ratio of the beginning, therefore in some way he precedes This is confirmed because to understand is common to the three suposites but to speak, therefore understanding is prior to speaking.

Responsiones

To the first: the consequence is denied. With respect to the proof I say that not every generation is motion, just as is clear from this. In the second place, it is said according to James of Viterbo, in the second question of Iacobus de Viterbo that sometimes a genus indicates an imperfection and a species indicates a perfection, and in such a case the genus is not said about God but the species is appropriately said about God, just as it is clear in the proposed about generation and motion. Sometimes it the converse, and in such a case the genus is said about God but the species is not, just as the universal whole is said about God and the integral whole is not because God does not have parts. Sometimes bot the genus and species speak a perfection and then each is suitable to God. For this it is clear that, granted there is motion superior to generation and the genus, it nevertheless does not follow that since generation is said of God, therefore this is also true of motion.

To the second it is said that Augustine wishes to says that the Virgin did not beget anything except Christ, who according to his humanity is called a creature, as genuit nisi Christum, qui secundum humanitatem potest dici creatura, ut dicit Lombard says in distinction 11 of the book III Lombardus, Sent. III, d. 11, c. 2 (II, 79, ll. 25-26). . This is addressed in a different way in the following.

To the third: the antecedent is denied. With respect to the proof it is said that the knowledge of the Father in himself is not prior to the knowledge of the Son, indeed they are essentially the same.

To the first argument in the opposition: the antecedent is denied, and with respect to the proof the consequence is denied because, though God does not generate another God, nevertheless he generates God the Son, who is different in personhood, but is nevertheless not another God.

To the first argument against the second conclusion, which is the second argument in the opposition, Hugolinus would say: I concede the consequence, while assigning the ratio of it to this. that the Father produces the entire breadth of his cognition into being by saying one word. Therefore therefore there are not many words nor many sons. But this does not seem to be a sufficient reason because could still be objected, why through this total immense breadth of cognition did he produce this Son and not a different one.

In the second place Brinkel would say to this that he produced this Son and not another because in God there is only this productive memory and there it is not possible for there to be another. Johannes Brinkel, ?? . But this is similarly not sufficient because it would thus be possible to say anything about any man becuase in him there is only one productive memory and nevertheless he has many words. Again he solves the same through the same and thus does not return an argument, since memory, intelligence, and cognition are in the Son just as in the Father. Therefore I say otherwise that no argument is known to us for why the Father generated this Son and not another, an argument in which the antecedent is known to us from the consequent can be inferred because, given any such reason, it is equally able to be inferred about the Son and the Holy Spirit.

To the second it is said that he generated with wisdom to good sense, ad for the disproof the consequence is denied. Again, it is said that, if the same thing is taken essentially, the consequent is conceded. If personally, then the consequence is denied.

To the third it is said that God generated God, and here this stands for a person. Therefore, in the argument that just as it is conceded that there are three persons, so there are three Gods, the consequence is denied because the Church does not admit that these things are equal.

To the first argument against the third conclusion: the antecedent is denied, and with respect to the proof the consequence is denied. From this it follows that this is not well or sufficiently explained. The third begins through these propositions, a is in the present instant and never was before this, therefore a begins to be, But it ought to be said: a is in this instant of time, etc. And thus it is able to be said about he ceases in its own unique way. To the confirmation, the consequence is denied because he argues from the inferior to the superior with the negation placed before the part of the predicate.

To the second: the major premise is denied. With respect to the confirmation it is said that in the divine essence there is an order of essential reasons, it is said that such order intrinsically should not be admitted in any way, and does not put such an order in the Trinity.

To the third: the antecedent is univerally conceded, but denied in the divine. With respect to the confirmation: whatever is the case regarding the consequent, the consequence is denied because living does not precede understanding, nor does understanding precede willing, and nor does willing precede speaking because, as it was said, there is no priority or posteriority.

Principal arguments

That not because de facto many causes totally effect some thing, which is clear in the first place because God and the created will are total causes of the free acts of the created will. Therefore it follows that God is a total cause of these acts. This is clear because the whole act and any part of it depended totally on God to come into being and to be conserved. But it also follows that the will is a total cause of these acts. This is clear because other there would not be some portion of the act of the will that be effectively from the will, and thus it would be in within its power, which is against Augustine Augustine, XXX .

Secondly, if two fires equally disposed are applied to something combustible like wood, in every circumstance, one of them would be the total cause of the combustion, which is clear because any one of them is a sufficient cause of combustion, which when posited, the effect follows.

Thirdly, the divine essence is the generative principle of itself and the subject of its own generation, therefore. The antecedent is clear because there does not seem to be another principle by which or in which something could be internally generated except in the divine essence.

On the contrary it is argued, because one of these is impossible and there is no range of impossibility because all impossible things are equally impossible.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though some effect on account of itself and something of its own depends effectively causally on many things, nevertheless it is not the case that the same effect depends equally on several total causes. The first part is clear through first argument made before the opposite about the acts of the will. The second part is proved because the first cause influences the effect more and more perfectly than the second, therefore. The consequence holds because the first cause necessarily requires the production of some effect, as I suppose. The antecedent is clear through the author of the Liber de Causis, XXX . This is also clear because the first cause independently causes and influences, therefore it does not do so equally with the second.

The first corollary: though with respect to the same thing there are many total causes in the totality of the caused effect, nevertheless it is not the cause that with respect to the same thing there are at one and the same time many total causes in the precise causal totality. This is clear through the conclusion and entire corollary.

The second corollary: that it does not follow that, a is in some mode the total effective cause of b, therefore, when a has been posited with by some remote divine influence b does not follow.

The third corollary: that this consequence also does not follow, a totally produces b, therefore nothing other than a produces b. The same this is clear because the opposite of the consequent stands with the antecedent taken in the stated mode.

From what has been said it could be further inferred that for the production of a fly as many productive things or active potencies are required as are required for the generation of the word in the divine essence. This is clear because in both cases an immense potency is required. This is clear through what has been said.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though in the divine essence the name of cause is not intrinsically posited, nevertheless the ratio of a beginning in the divine is not denied. The first is clear because the cause is called the being to being of which another follows. But in the divine essence one thing does not follow to another because there nothing is prior or posterior, nor is there a giving substantively of one thing and then another, therefore. The antecedent is clear in book V of the Aristoteles, Metaphyisca, V, XXX . The second part is proved because truely the Son in the divine is from the Father and the Holy Spirit is from both of them, therefore the ratio of a beginning should be put in the divine. The consequence holds because according to Philosopher, book V Aristoteles, Metaphyscia, XXX , the beginning is that from which something has its being. The antecedent is clear because in the Symbol the Son is from the Father alone Symbolum Athanasii, XXX , etc. Again The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son Symbolum Athanasii, XXX etc. This is confirmed because, according to Augustine, the Father is the beginning without a beginning, and the Son is the beginning from the beginning.

The first corollary: only the uncreated Trinity is able to be called properly the total and sufficient cause of any creature. This is clear because, having posited its causality with respect to anything externally producible thing, while everything else set aside, something else follows, that is the effect, and this is to be the proper cause according to what the proof of the conclusion says.

The second corollary: though in created things the beginning and the cause are convertible, nevertheless in the divine they are not said in the same way.

Third: that no creature or producible entity necessary demands several efficent causa for being. This is clear because the first cause alone suffices.

Third conclusion

The third conclusion: though something that implies a contradiction is not able to be caused by the first cause, nevertheless whatever formally and properly includes a contradiction is able to become and produced. The first part is proved because the first cause or God is something that does not include a contradiction. But God is not able to be caused by something, therefore. The major premise is proved because no simple or incomplex entity includes a contradiction. The second part of the antecedent is clear because if God were able to be caused, it would either be by himself or by something else. He is not cause by something because every other cause depends on God to be conserved and to act, as has been said. Not the second because according to Augustine, book I of , chapter one no thing is that which begets itself Augustine, De Trinitate, I, 1, 1 (XXX) . The second part of the conclusion is proved because only propositions formally and properly include contradiction. However all such things are formable by the first cause, therefore Secunda pars conclusionis probatur quia solae propositiones formaliter et proprie contradictionem includunt, sed omnes tales sunt a prima causa formabiles, ergo ergo etc..

The first corollary: that the formal ratio of the term and also of the principle by which the Son was formally generated or the Holy Spirit was spirated does not belong to the divine essence, but is rather denied by it. This is clear because otherwise the same thing would beget itself which is contrary to what has been said in the question and against the Master in this distinction Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 5, c. 1 (I, 81-82). . Again, in favor of this corollary is the determination of the Church Item, pro isto corollario est determinatio ecclesiae , de summa Trinitate et fide catholica, capitulo dampnamus where it is said that the divine essence neither generates or is generated Liber Extra, XXX . Again, this is proved by Gregory our Doctor in this distinction, article 4 Rimini, Sent., I, d. 5, a. 4 (XXX) .

The second corollary: just as the divine essence is not the formable productive principle of divine generation, so it is not the material subjective principle of the same. The first part is clear through what has been said. The second part is clear because the divine essence is not able to be perfected, therefore it is not able to be subjected to this generation. The consequence is clear because the terminus of any generation perfects its subject. The antecedent is clear in itself.

The third corollary: Tertium corollarium God is not, a Chimera exists, the whole is less than its parts, contradictories are true at the same time do not formally and properly include contradictions. This is clear through the second part of the conclusion, since they include because such things are not able to become from a first cause. The affirmative part of the conclusion is clear from what has been said.

Objections

Against the first conclusion there seem to be two reasons made in the opposition to the question.

In the second place against the second part, it is argued, since many things are able to be the causes of some effect, given that one of them is posited, it follows that the effect is also posited. But to be a cause in this way is to be the total cause, therefore. The antecedent is clear from the two fires, form the many ships which are pulling of which the middle would be able to pull the ship in this case, and from many other examples.

In the third place, if the first part of the conclusion and the first corollary were true, it follows that the saying of the Philosopher Aristoteles, XXX is false, in which it is said that an efficient cause is sufficient, such that when posited, the effect is also posited, and, when removed, it is removed. The consequence is clear because, when the causality of the will within respect to some act of the will is posted, the effect does not follow, unless there is also posited some concurrent cause, think God, therefore.

Against the second part of the second conclusion, if the ratio of the beginning were instead to suit a divine person, it follows that it would be possible that some divine supposite is begun. The consequent is not conceded, and the consequence is clear because the beginning and the begun are correlatives, which are said to correlate at the same time.

In the second place against the first corollary, if God were the sufficient and total cause of any create effect, it would follow that a second cause produces something in vain. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because, if the second cause did not act, the effect would nonetheless still follow, therefore.

In the third place against the third corollary, if some entity for its own generation does not need several efficient causes, it follows that God alone would be able to produce in something hatred of himself. The consequent is false, since this act is necessarily involved in wickedness, and the consequence is clear because every act is a producible entity.

Against the first corollary of the third conclusion, it is argued that the essence generates and is generated. In the first place thus, every divine essence or Son is generated, the whole Trinity is the essence or the Son, therefore the whole Trinity is generated. The premisses are true and the form is good, as it is seen, therefore.

In the second place thus, something generates in the divine, and this is nothing other than the essence, therefore.

In the third place, this Father generates, this Father is the essence, therefore this essence generates. And this is able to be reduced to the first mode of the first figure, every father generates, every essence is the Father, therefore every essence generates.

In the fourth place, what is generating is the divine essence, therefore the divine essence is generating. The consequence is clear through the conversion absolutely speaking. The antecedent is proved because the Father generating is the essence, therefore what is generating is the essence.

In the fifth place, the Father is both convertible to the essence and the essence would be convertible tot he Father, if its only suppositum were the Father, but then, whatever would be said about the Father, would be said about the essence, therefore. Now it is thus, therefore, just as generating is said of the Father, so it is also able to be said of the essence.

In the sixth place, the divine essence is not not-generating and it exists, therefore it is generating. The consequence seems to be known. The antecedent is proved because whatever is in the divine is either generating, or generated, or proceeding.

Against the second corollary of the same conclusion, it is proved that the divine essence is the subject of divine generation because that which remains under each term has the ratio of a subject. The divine essence is of this type, therefore.

Secondly, to any active potency there corresponds a passive potency. But in the Father there is an active potency, therefore in the Son there is something passive. But this is not the relation, therefore it is the essence. Secundo, cuilibet activae potentiae correspondet passiva potentia sed in patre est activa potentia ergo in filio est aliquid se habens passive sed hoc non est relatio ergo essentia.

Thirdly, because the following propositions is conceded the Son is from the Father, it is therefore conceded that the word a connotes that the circumstance of either the causal origin or material principle. If the first, then Augustine conclueds nothing in , in book 3 Augustine, Contra Maximum, III, XXX because Maximus conceded that the Son is from the Father. If the second, the proposed is obtained because in the generation of the Son the essence is the subject. For the solution of the argument it should be known that the fact that something is a cause or depends totally on a cause is able to be taken in two ways. In the first mode because the entire effect and whatever is effective of it effects it without another cause. In the second mode, that the entire effect and anything of it effects in isolation with any other efficient cause. According to the first mode given about the total effective cause or the effective dependence, I have posited and I understand the first part of the first conclusion and therefore the first part o of its first corollary, and there the two other corollaries. But according to the second sense given about the total cause, I have put the second part of the conlusion and the second of its corollaries, as is clear to the one looking.

Responses

To the first, therefore the antecedent, consequent, and consequence are conceded concerning the total cause in the first sense, but not in the second, because, if the antecedent were taken in the second sense, then it would be false because in this sense God alone is the total cause because no second cause is able to cause an effect with him. Nevertheless having supposed the general divine influence, it is still able to be said there are able to be several total causes with respect to effect, especially if the same effect is able to be produced by diverse created causes and by one without the other. And in this way the other three arguments proceed as well.

To the first against the second conclusion, it is said in the first places that the consequent is not inconvenient, but nevertheless is not able to be conceded on account of heretics, lest they have an occasion for saying against us that some divine person is finite. In the second place it is able to be said that the beginning may sound an imperfection, but the beginning itself, therefore the consequent absolutely must not be admitted but rather denied.

To another, the consequence is denied. Facinus identifies the reason in the second because God wishes that the second cause would act so that it will be perfected. For if God alone were to produce the motion of the heavens, then the created intelligence moving it would not be perfected through this motion, and nor would the soul be perfected through the motion of the body, and thus for other things. Therefore, though, assuming the second cause does not act, the effect would be the same as if it did act, nevertheless it is not in vain that the second cause acts.

But, against this response, it is argued, since every perfection which the soul or second cause acquires through its action or through its own participation, God is capable of supplying, therefore it is in vain a said before. There Hugolinus responds differently, saying that when the causality of the second cause with respect to some effect is removed, then the effect would not be put into being, having supposed that God does not now wish to act differently than before the subtraction of the causality of the second cause. The reason is because God does not merely wish to be the effector of the effect, but the coeffector, which he is not able to be unless the second cause acts with him.

To the third, the consequent is conceded in this sense, that the entity or quality, which is the hatred of God, God is able to cause. And with respect to the disproof, because this act etc., this is denied because, just as it is the case that there is vision and through this nothing sees or is seen, so it is the case that the quality, which is the hatred of God, is and through this its subject is neither effected nor actualized. Whence just as the vision is not seeing, likewise hatred is not hating. If nevertheless the consequent were taken for both, namely for the quality affecting and actualizing the subject, then the consequence and the consequent would be denied, and it would be said that, whatever is there of the entity, God himself alone would be able to produce. But he would not be able to affect through this because this is not properly to effect something, but rather to defect something according to Augustinum Augustine, XXX. .

To the first against the third conclusion, the major premise is denied, just as this proposition every lion or every man is risible is denied. And if such propositions were proved through the induction of their singulars by saying thus, this lion and or this man is risible, and this lion or this man is risible, and so on about individuals, it is said that this induction is not sufficient because one is not able to have enough individuals.

To the second, the consequence is denied because it is not sufficient.

To the third, having dismissed various modes of solving these syllogisms, for now I say that such things are not rightly regulated when speaking about everything because such propositions are sufficiently universal, though vocally they appear as universals. The first part is clear because to be well regulated by speaking about everything requires that the major premise in the first figure is sufficiently universal and really so not just vocally. And this is not able to be in this case because every proposition sufficiently universal implies sufficiently one exclusive thing about the transposed terms. And thus, if this were sufficiently universal, every divine essence is the Father, then this consequence would be valid, every divine essence is the Father, therefore only the Father is the divine essence, which is false, therefore.

Again, for this major premise to be sufficiently universal requires that the subject suits nothing that the predicate does not also suit. But it is not so in this case. Whence it happens in the following propositions that it takes something under the subject about which the predicate is not said, namely every divine essence is the Father or similarly in this everything that is the Father is the Father because the Son is the divine essence. Similarly that which is the Father is predicated of the Son and the Holy Spirit and nevertheless neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit is the Father. Through what has been said here all the syllogisms made regarding this matter are able to be solved. Whence, if it is argued thus, this essence is the Son, this paternity is not the Son, therefore this paternity is not the essence , this is clear, because, if the circumlocution or the major were sufficiently universal, this will be false on account of the aforesaid reasons.

Again, this Father generates, this Father is the essence, therefore the essence generates . It is clear that, if the major is understood as it ought, it is false, and if the circumlocution does not occur, then the form is not valid.

Again, every thing that is the Father is the Father, everything that is the deity is that which is the Father, therefore everything that is the deity is the Father . Such forms are easily solved through what has been said because, just as they are no sufficiently regulated, so the premisses are not sufficiently universal or, according to another way of speaking, there is not the proper circumlocution in the premises, therefore the forms are not valid.

To the fourth it is said that consequent of the conversion is able to be take in two ways. In one mode the divine essence is generating, that is, this which generates, and thus it is conceded. In another mode thus the divine essence is generating, id est, it generates, thus the consequences is denied because it is not able to be converted in this mode, but only in the first mode.

To the fifth, it is said that the assumed is true with respect to essential predications, but not to notional predications because now there is an opposition of relations, and then there would be nothing.

To the sixth, the antecedent is denied because it is not generating, and to the proof because whatever is in the divine essence is said because it out to be understood thus, whatever is in the divine essence either is generating, that is, either is that which is generating, or that which is generated, etc.

To the first against this corollary, it is said that, if these terms producing and produced are understood in this way, then the major premise is false. But if the terms are taken for the privation and introduced form, then the minor is false because the Son never had the term, since he is eternal.

To the second, it is said that the major premise has truth in mixed compositional potencies, but not in a being lacking composition and possibility, as in the case of the divine.

To the third, it is said that the word a denotes the circumstance of the substantial origin or the consubstantiality of some principle with its product. But the argument also speaks of a consubstantiality which notes some distinction, and then the argument does not conclude because, though Maximus considered that the Father generated the Son, nevertheless he would not allows that the Son was consubstantial with the Father.

From what has been said it is clear that the antecedent of the third argument in the opposition should be denied. Nothing more is required, what has been said is sufficient.

Rationes principales

That not because the Father produces naturally, therefore not freely. The consequence holds and the antecedent is proved through Damascene in book one, chapter eight saying generation is a work of nature Iohannes Damascenus, De Fide Orthodoxa, I, 8 (PL XXX). .

In the second place, it follows that the generation of the Son would be an operation of the will. The consequent seems false because it is an act of the memory of the Father. The consequence is clear because complacence or to please is an act of the will according to Anselm in , in chapter two Anselmus, De Conceptu Virginali, 3 (II, 143, ll. 16-21) . This is confirmed because the act of the eternal supposite is an essential act, therefore no more determined to begetting the Son than the Son is determined to this, therefore. The conclusion is false, the consequences valid, and the antecedent apparent because every internal act of the Father is an immanent act and therefore essential and common to the whole.

In the third place, The Father is determined for begetting the Son in no way, therefore. The antecedent is proved because to be determined indicates an imperfection, therefore it should not be attributed to the Father or any other divine supposite. The proof of the antecedent is because for something to be determined by something is effectively to have been produced by that, or produced, or at least moved.

In opposition, there is the position of Augustine IX , chapter 8 , the Word is conceived in love Augustinus, De Trinitate, IX, c. 8 (XXX) . With respect to the same position there is position of the Master at the end of this sixth distinction Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 6, c. 1 (I, 91, ll. 3-6). , where lays out the position of Augustine in Augustine, XXX . This is confirmed by reason in the following way: the eternal generation of the word is the most perfect operation, there it is a pleasing and free operation. The consequences holds because according to the Philosopher in book II and X of the Aristotles, Ethics, X (1174b31-33) , the most perfect operation is the most pleasant. The antecedent is proved because in whatever degree the produced term is of a greater perfection, the operation or production is more perfect in the same degree. But the Son in the divine is of an infinite perfection, therefore also his production. But for this the Father is not undetermined, therefore he is determined

First conclusion

The first conclusion: though the infallible Word is beget immutably with the necessity of exigence, nevertheless without perfection the Father generates it with delight and for the sake of pleasure. The first part is proved because the same thing which is pure act necessarily drives forward such that it exists in three supposits. But these three things would not be unless the Father were to generate the Son, and the Father and the Son spirated the Holy Spirit. Therefore, from the necessity of natural exigence, The Son is beget from the Father. And this is confirmed because the Father is not able not to beget the Word, therefore he necessarily generates it.

The first corollary: though the Father begets with the necessity of exigence, nevertheless this necessity excludes both the necessity of co-action or indigence. The first part is clear through the conclusion. The second is clear because contra Aureolum Aureoli, XXX omnipotence is not able to be compelled.

The second corollary: just as it is repugnant that the Holy Spirit is not spirated from the Word, so necessarily essential love concurs for the generation of the Word. This is clear through the second part of the conclusion, which is proved through Richard, , in the sixth book, in chapter 17, who says ingenitum velle de se habere conformem atque condignum idem videtur mihi quod gignere Richardus de Sancto Victore, De Trinitate, VI, c. 17 (252, ll. 52-53) . To the same Dionysius in his book says amor divinus non dimisit Deum esse sine gignitione germinis. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4 (XXX) Whence in chapter, Here is my beloved son with whom I am well Matthaeus 3:17 etc.

The third corollary: the Father, or the fecundity of paternal memory, in no way, after he has produced the Word, was able or wished to produce the Word. This is clear because otherwise he would have generated it with the antecedent will, in opposition to Augustine , quaestionem 8 Augustinus, Ad Orosium, XXX , and against the Master in his text Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 6, c. 1 (I, 89-91). . Again, then there would be a priority in the divine, which is against what was said in another question Cross-Reference, XXX .

Second Conclusion

The second conclusion: just as it is repugnant that the paternal memory produced a fallible word from eternity, so it is repugnant that every aeternal act is or was notional. The first part is clear through what was said in another conclusion Cross-Reference Nevertheless this is confirmed because it is repugnant that something fallible exists but is not measured by time. Therefore no such thing was able to be produced without time. The second part is proved because the act of predestination of Peter or another is an eternal act and is not notional, indeed it is common to three persons, therefore.

The first corollary: the futurition or the privation of no-thing either absolutely lacks a beginning in time or always was or was eternally. This is clear because futurition and privation are similar things either are something or nothing. If nothing, then they were neither temporally nor eternally. If they are something, then they are either a creator or creature. Not the first, because this is a pure act that is always present. If it is different from God, then it follows that they were not from eternity, as is clear through the first part of the conclusion and its proof. From what has been said it seems to follow that contradictories would not would not be able to be at the same time, that the judgement or the antichrist will be was not able to be true from eternity because it was not from eternity. In the second place it would be able to be inferred that to the negation of things to have eternally existed, it follows that produced something outside of himself eternally. This is clear because, if God eternally produced nothing outside himself, then the negation of nothing thing existed from eternity, which is against Hugolino, in book two, question two, article four Hugolinus de Urbe Veteri, II, q. 2, a. 4 (XXX) .

The second principle corollary: not every eternal act of the Father is appropriate or notional. This is clear through the second part of the conclusion because the act by which the Father foreknows some future is common to the three suppositions and as a consequence is not notional.

The third corollary: not every cognitive act of the Father is productive of an infallible Word. This is clear because some act of the Father is productive of no term. This is clear from the act by which he predestined Peter.

Third Conclusion

The third conclusion: though the paternal memory is fecund with freely and with pleasure, nevertheless the generation of the Word is not properly and formally determined. The first part is clear through the first conclusion. The second part is proved because to be determined properly in this way suggests imperfection, therefore it should not be attributed to the paternal memory. The antecedent is clear because a potency is determined with respect to something, with respect to that act for which it was previously a potency, but this sounds like an imperfection.

The first corollary: just as it is necessary that the Father is enjoying the highest beatitude, so it is necessary that the infallible Word is beget by the same fruition. This is clear because it is just as pleasing to himself in the Word as it is in his very self. Therefore, in , chapter 3 , he says: This is my beloved son Matthaeus 3:17 , etc.

The second corollary: just as it is repugnant to the Father not to be, so it is necessary that he beget. This is clear both because his action is connatural to himself, and also because his action is his being. patet tum quia sua actio est sibi connaturalis tum etiam quia suum agere est suum esse.

The third corollary: though the eternal Word is said by the paternal memory freely, with pleaure, and naturally, nevertheless it is not properly or formally predetermined to do this. This is clear through what has been said, from which the negative part of the conclusion is able to be inferred.

Objections

Against the first conclusion it is argued: the eternal Word is not able to be and not be indifferently, therefore it does not produce freely and for its own pleasure. The antecedent is known. The consequence is clear because only those things are produced freely which are able to be in different ways, or which are able to be and not be.

In the second place, it is argued through the saying of Richard II , at the end of chapter seven , where he says, although each one, namely the Father and the Holy Spirit, is from the father, nevertheless each has its own mode of proceeding in one and in the another. Richardus de Sancto Victore, De Trinitate, II, c. 7 (235, ll.33-37). Cf. III, c. 1 (135, ll. 17-21), and VI, c. 17 (250-252). . But it is certain that, if the Son is produced freely and with pleasure, since the Holy Spirit also proceeds in this way, it would follow that there would not be one mode of proceeding in one and another mode in the other.

In the third place against the third conclusion: there seems to be the position of Augustine IX , in the last chapter , where he says that some appetite precedes a part of the mind Augustine, De Trinitate II, c.12, n.18 (CCSL 50, 310, ll. 69-73). . Again, against this, see Item, contra hoc, vide Scotus, distinction 6 of the first book Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 6 (XXX) .

Against the second part of the second conclusion and its corollaries: if there were some eternal non-notional act, it would follow that there would be many gods. This is clear because any eternal act is God himself. Therefore, if there are posited a multitude of eternal acts, it is necessary to posit a multitude of gods, which is nonsense. This is confirmed because in the divine it is the same to know and to understand and to will and so for similar things.

Against the second corollary: the Holy Spirit loves itself by the same love by which the Father and the Son love themselves. But the act of love in the Father and the Son, therefore also in the Holy Spirit. By the same reason, any eternal act of the Father will be notional.

Against the third corollary: if God does something internally through an essential act, then something non-notional is produced internally. The consequence is clear because from active to passion is a good consequence, just as it follows, God creates, therefore something is created. Thus it follows that God acts, therefore something is acted upon.

Against the third conclusion: the paternal memory is not able not to produce the Son, therefore it produces the Son necessarily, therefore not freely. The consequence holds because free and necessary are opposed.

In the second place, it would follow that the will would have the ratio of a principle, as is the case in this kind of generation. The consequent is false because the will would either be following, preceding, or at the same time. Not the first because this was the error of Eunomius who says that it is false that the Son is of an antecedent will as says Augustine III , in chapter 20 Augustinius, De Trinitate, III, c. 20 (XXX) . Not the second on account of the third corollary of the first conclusion. Not the third because then Son would not be said to be from the Holy Spirit, which is an error.

In the third place against the second corollary: it is just as repugnant that the Father is and is not, as it is that that He does not beget the Son. Therefore this kind of contradiction or repugnance is able to be shown by way of the first principle, and thus it follows that the diversity or plurality of the divine persons would be able to be demonstrated evidently, against what was said above. The first consequence is clear because that the Father is and is not includes a contradiction so formally that such a contradiction is able to be shown evidently from the first principle. Therefore that from the Father does not produce the Son a contradiction follows is able to be shown from the truth of the first principle, which is false.

Responses

To the first it is said: that the will concurs in the production of the Word or the will is the productive principle of the Son is able to be understood in an antecedent mode principally, or in another pleasant or delightful mode coexigitively. In this way the principle antecedent is conceded to the argument and the consequence is denied, when taking concurrence of the will in the second mode. But if taken in the first mode, then the entire argument is conceded, and this is not contra to what has been said.

To the second: that is the authority of Ad secundum: quod est auctoritas Richard with our Doctor Gregory, in book one, distinction six, article two Gregorius Ariminensis, Lectura, I, d. 6, a. 2 , that there is a single mode of proceeding for each, and the authority of this Doctor in this part should not be believed.

To the third it is said that in this place Augustine speaks about part of our mind, not about the divine mind, as is clearly seen in following text.

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said, regarding the position of Anselm , from chapter 62 up to 65, , where he treats this material saying, dubium esse non debet quod Pater et Filius et eorum unus quisque se ipsum et alios ambos dicit sicut se et alios Anselmus, Monologion, 62 (I, 72, ll. 6-8) , he understand that if it is thus, how are there as man words are there sayings in the highest essence? And he adds capitulo 63, sicut singulus eorum est sciens et intelligens ita singulus quisque dicens, nec tamen omnes simul sunt tres dicentes sed unus solus dicens Anselmus, Monologion, 63 (I, 73, ll. 18-22) . For what is said there except the essence of those things? If therefore there is only one thing, one thing alone is said, therefore if one thing alone is said, then there is also only one thing which says and is said. It follows there that there are not many words. See the place beginning with process.

To the same is the process of Henry of Ghent, in the first part, article 42 , where he asks, whether there is no understanding except when the essential part corresponds to the some essential word in God Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, I, a. 40, q. 7 , where he shows that this is not sufficiently explained . For whoever wishes, let him see through this that two other arguments are able to be solved and there is a confirmation of the first.

To the first against the third conclusion: the antecedent and the first consequent are conceded, and the second consequence is denied, and to the proof because liberty is opposed to necessity it is said that this is true about the liberty of coaction and indigence, but it is not opposed to the necessity of pleasure and immutability.

To the second it is able to be said just as it is said to the first argument against the first conclusion because, if it is understood that the will produces the Son antecedently principative, then the consequent and the consequence is denied. If indeed with pleasure and coexigitive, then the consequent is able to be conceded. And it is said further to the arguments against that it is produced by a coeval will, and when it is inferred that therefore the Son is not distinct from the Holy Spirit, the consequence is denied when understanding the will or to produce voluntarily uniformly.

To the third, the consequence is denied because, though one is just as repugnant as the other, nevertheless that one is a contradiction which does not stand and nor does it appear to us just as the other. Therefore it does not follow that, if one repugnance is able to be demonstrated to us by the truth of the first principle, that also the other is able to be shown to us evidently.

To the arguments in opposition, it is clear from what has been said how the will concurs in the generation of the Son. Again, it is clear why paternal memory is not properly determined, as the arguments proved, although it is perhaps able to be said to be determined when speaking improperly.

Rationes principales

That not, no suppositable ratio speaks a perfection, therefore there is not an active generation. The consequence holds because active generatio is a suppositable ratio of the Father. The antecedent is clear because then in the divine there would be another goodness besides the essential goodness. Likewise because to not produce, would be to argue an imperfection, and thus neither the divine essence nor the Holy Spirit would be essentially perfect.

In the second place, it would follows that every divine person would not be as perfect as the essence. The consequence is clear because any person lacks some supposibile ratio becase the Father does not have the suppositable ratio of the Son, nor of the Holy Spirit, nor of the converse.

In the third place, it would follow that the theologian evidently would be able to prove that there is generation in the divine. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because it is evidently able to be deduced that whatever God is, he is everything that it is better to be than not to be absolutely, since he that which nothing greater is able to be thought Anselmus, 3 (I, 103, ll. 1-2). , as says Anselm in .

In opposition, the generation in the divine is the Father, but the Father is of immense perfection or is immense perfection, therefore.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though from the Son and the Holy Spirit no divine word is able to be generated, nevertheless something is producible through the speaking of the Son or the Holy Spirit. The first is clear because otherwise there would be many possible words in the divine, indeed de facto this should be put against faith. The second part is proved because through the speaking of the whole Trinity all created things are produced and producibile things are able to be produced. This is clear through that he spoke and things were made Psalmus 32:9 et Psalmus 148:5 . Again 1 through him all things were made Ioannes 1:3 .

First corollary: that not every speaking with the word speaks the word, though perhaps the converse is true. This is clear because speaking the divine word is precisely and properly to the Father, but speaking with the word suits three, as is clear through the conclusion. From which it seems to follow that, though every internal speaking is understanding, nevertheless not every understanding is speaking.

The second corollary: the eternal productive power of the Word is not a pure relation or merely something related. This is clear because a relation is not a ratio of the Father's being absolutely, therefore it is not a ratio of acting. From which it seems to follow that just as the essence is the ratio of the Father's being, so also it seems to be the ratio of producing the Word. From which it follows further that power of generating the divine word speaks something absolute with respect to what is principally signified, though he knows with respect to what is begotten.

The third corollary: though the word has being and act from the Father, nevertheless the Father and Son produce equally freely. This is clear because the Son is not determined by the Father with some natural necessity, therefore they produce the Holy Spirit equally freely, just as the Father himself generates the word. The antecedent is clear from what has been said above. Further it follows that it is as repugnant to the Word to intrinsecally depend as it is necessarily repugnant to it that the Father demanded or needed. This is clear because all things convey an imperfection. This corollary is against Scotus, in book one, distinction 6 Scotus, I, d. 6, xxx .

Conclusion 2

Rationes principales

That not, there is some creature that is indivisibly simple, therefore etc. The antecedent is proved then because to every specific grade of some thing there corresponds a punctual or indivisible being. This is clear because, whenever something grade is added or subtracted no matter how small, the thing does not remain in the same species, therefore such a thing is indivisible.

In the second place, there something below the first cause that is necessary, therefore. The antecedent is clear because through the Holy Doctor , book two, chapter 29 , where from what has been said therefore that in which there is not matter, or, if there is, there is not potentaility for another form, does not have the potency for non being, therefore such things are absolutely necessary Aquinas, II, c. 29 (13, 335). . But it is certain that an neither an angel nor a a soul has matter, therefore. This is confirmed because an angel and a soul do not have within them a principle leading them to non being, therefore they have no potency for non being, therefore they are necessary.

In the third place, in the first cause there is an absolute modal distinction and a conceptual or virtual distinction, therefore. The antecedent for the first part is from James of Viterbo Iacobus de Viterbo, XXX and for the second part is from Alphonsus, distinction eight of book one, article two, conclusion four Alphonsus Toletanus Vargas, I, d. 8, a. 1, conc. 4 . The consequences is clear because any such distinction is repugnant to the highest simplicity.

In opposition is the opinion of the Master in this distinction Lombardus, Sent. I, d.8, c. 3 (I, 98) et 6, (I, 100). . Again the Apostle in 6 says says that God alone has immortality I Timotheum 6:16 . Again Augustine III says God alone does not change and is not able to change Augustinus, De Trinitate, III, XXX .

First conclusion

The first conclusion: it is as necessary that the first cause is as it is that a creature is able to be. This is proved because inasmuch as it is necessary that God is God and is omnipotent, by as much necessity he is externally productive, and by as much necessity is something external able to be produced and is able to have being, therefore etc. This is confirmed because, if the first cause were not able to produce anything outside itself, it would seem that from the fact that something is producible it would be produced, but this is impossible. Nor does this seem to be a problem because it would still be able to corrupt this whole and then recreate it, therefore.

First corollary: thought it is not the case that a creature is not able not to be, nevertheless if the first cause were to act outside itself through the mode of nature, then it would be necessary for some producible thing to be. The first part is clear because some created thing is contingently produced by and in conserved in its being. The second part is clear because, if one thing were produced and not another thing, then either this would be because it would were determined that this thing be produced and not the other, and not this because this is to produce freely since one is equally as possible as the other, or this would be because one thing would be able to be produced and not the other, but this is not the case because then it would be producible and not producibile.

Second corollary: if the first cause were to act outside itself necessarily and naturally, all producibile and corruptibile things would be produced and corrupted at the same time and equally. This is clear because if a fire itself were able to produce b heat and corrupt b heat, it would produce and corrupt at the same time. Therefore, since the first cause alone is able with another it is able in the genus of an efficient cause, the proposed follows that if it were to act naturally, etc.

Third corollary: it is not stand that the first cause is productive of every producible creature and to this to act outside of itself from the necessity of nature. This is clear to this that to produce naturally, it would follows that all producible things are produced and corrupted at the same time and equally. But this implies a contradiction, therefore.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though only three supposites are distinguished in the one super simple essence, nevertheless this is not properly called diversity or difference. The first part is clear through faith because there is one Father, another Son, and another Holy Spirit, therefore only three supposites are distinguished in the divine essence. This is confirmed because a distinction or difference is nothing, therefore the should not be put in God. This is clear because whatever is in God is something. The antecedent is clear because if only God and man were to exists and nothing else, God and man would still be different, therefore distinction or difference are nothing something or somethings. For this conclusion there is the reasoning Augustine VI , chapter 4, de magnis Augustinus, De Trinitate, VI, c. 4 and chapter 14, de parvis Augustinus, De Trinitate, VI, c. 14 . From the second part of the conclusion, it follows that though it would be said truly and properly that some things are distinguished in reality, and in intention, and in reason, nevertheless it is not properly said that this distinct is intentional, real, or of reason. This is clear because a distinction is nothing, therefore it is not. The consequence is clear because what is absolutely nothing does not exists

First corollary: every perfection which God really is some perfection of God formally. This is clear because, if the divine perfections in some mode differed or were different, it would follow that the divine supposites would not differ only in the divine essence. The consequence is clear in the first part of the second conclusion Vide supra .

Second corollary: that just among divine perfections there is no formal distinction, so also are a distinction of reason or modal distinction repugnant to them Or thus, just as it does not stand that the divine perfections are distinguished formally, so it is also repugnant for them to be distinguished by reason or formally. This is clear because otherwise in them there would not be the highest simplicity and indifference.

Third corollary: just as it is repugnant that there are a plurality of Gods, so it is repugnant that there are a formal diversity of perfections in God. This is clear because, if such a plurality of formalities in God were possible, it follows that there is something which is absolutely formally God which is not every God. Again, it would follow that something would be God really which is merely contingent, but this is as repugnant as it is that there are many gods, therefore. The first consequence is proved because if divine justice is God formally, then the divine wisdom, if it is formally not justice, then it will not be God formally. The second consequence is clear because the fact that God wants to beatify Peter is really God, and nevertheless by positing formalities of this type God is contingently.

These three corollaries seem to be from the mind of Anselm in the chapter 17 who says whatever is said essentially about the highest essence, thus this is in one consideration essentially one. For since some man is said to be a body, rational, and man, he is not in any mode or consideration said to be three things. Thus truly the highest divine essence is in no way said in such a way that it is not this same thing according to consideration and according to another Anselmus, Monologion, 17, (I, 31, ll. 25-32) . From this these corollary seem to be clear.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: just as the first cause alone has every perfection absolutely and is including itself, so also is it formally and completely lacking any kind of compositions and excluding from itself. The first part is proved because according to Anselm God is that which nothing greater or better is able to be thought Anselmus, Proslogion 3 (I, 103, ll. 1-2) . The second part is because simplicity should be placed before composition according to Augustine , chapter 12 Augustinus, De quantitate, XXX , ergo, But the first cause alone is of the highest simplicity. This is clear indivisibility, immutability, and per se actuality belong to the ratio of simplicity, but these things suit God alone and are not able to be found in a creature.

The first corollary: any species either of a given or giveable form are perfectly confluibile into a superior form or species. This is clear because no such species is unchangeable in its being, therefore God is able to make it that flow together in a unified way into something superior.

The second corollary: it is not the case that some individual depends on a first cause and unitively contains every degree of perfection. This is clear because then such an individual would not be able flow unitively with another individual into a superior species or into some more perfect individual.

The third corollary: it is not the case for some individual that it is repugnant that some dependent created being is not able to be subjectively under some accident and that it is repugnant that this created thing truly is able to unitively contain every grade of simplicity. This is clear because non individual of any given or giveable species is able to be so simple that it is not able to be the subject of an elicited act or the subject of some habit infused by God, therefore. The antecedent is clear because simplicity of this type suits God alone. From what has been said the affirmative part of the conclusion follows.

Objections

Against the first conclusion and its corollaries: something other than God is necessary, therefore. The antecedent is proved because the divine perfection goes out to what is produced similar to itself to the degree that is not repugnant to the creature. But to be necessary is not repugnant to a creature, therefore the divine goodness produces the creatures in this way. The major premise is known. The minor premise is clear because, if it were repugnant to the creature to be necessary, then it would seem to be by virtue of the fact that it comes from another. But this is not the case because the Son has his being from another, and nevertheless it does not have this being contingently, therefore.

In the second place, if an angel or the soul were able not to be, then this would be because God withdrew his influence from them. But this is impossible because this would mean his goodness had changed, therefore such things are not able to be.

In the third place: substances separated from matter do not have a passive potency for privation or corruption, therefore they are not able not to be. The consequence holds since matter is the ratio of maintenance and corruption in creatures. These are the arguments of the Holy Doctor, in the place it was noted earlier at the beginning of the question.

In the fourth place: because either for something to be necessary it corresponds precisely either that it is punctual or quantitive. If the first, then it is not of immense perfection. If the second, then it is able to be imagined in this species that there is a greater and lesser necessity, since for every thing that has quantity there is able to be given something less, so it is possible to give to this necessity a lesser quantity, and thus there will be many types of necessity.

In the fifth place: if the entire line of producbile things were contingent with respect to being and non being, it follows that the whole would be able to be put completely into being. The consequent is false through what has been said because the first cause would not be able to act outside itself. The consequence is clear because the whole is able not to be as the first corollary Vide supra says.

In the sixth place: no individual of an inferior species is able to contain the total perfection of its species, therefore it is necessary that one thing is not able to contain the total breadth of necessity, therefore there is not only one thing in that species. The antecedent is clear through the second corollary of the third conclusion Vide supra , and the consequences are clear. This is confirmed because to be, as the proposition man is an animal signified, is necessary being, therefore there are many necessary beings. The consequence holds because this is not God. Again, to this proposition nothing is, a contradiction does not follow, there this is able to be true, therefore nothing is necessary to be necessary. The consequences holds, and the antecedent is proved because to no negative does an affirmative follow, therefore neither does some contradiction because every contradiction is composed from an affirmative and negative or at least includes one.

Against the second conclusion: in the first place it is argued the authority the Damascene, in book one, chapter three, where he says Whatever we say about God affirmatively does not show his nature but those things, which are about his nature. For if you say he is good, if just, and if wise, and anything else, you do not speak his nature. Ioannes Damescenus, I, c. 4, (PG 94.799BC); Burgundionis versio 4,5, p. 21, 41-45)

Against the first corollary: if God were immensely simple, he would be so either divisibly or indivisibly. Not the first because then he would have parts. Not the second because then he alone through his indivisibility would stand apart from nothing, and thus the divine essence would be infinitely less distant from an angel than any creature, which is false.

In the second place, wisdom in common is not justice in common, therefore infinite wisdom is not infinite justice. The consequence holds because infinity does not destroy the proper ratio of something, as it seems.

Against the second corollary: those things which are not synonymous signify diverse things or the same thing by diverse reasons. But goodness, and justice, mercy, and eternity are not synonymous in God, therefore. But they do not signify diverse things, therefore by diverse modes. Therefore in God there is a modal distinction as stated by James of Viterbo, three, question seven Iacobus de Viterbo, Quodlibet III, q. 7, 2, XXX .

In the second place it follows that willing divine would be formally and an intellective divine and the conversely. The consequent is false because then, whatever the object may be, one would be the object of the other. This mode is false because God understands the evil of guilt which he nevertheless in no way wishes.

Third: that which necessitates the intellect to essentially distinct acts is distinguished according to reason or conceptually. But the divine perfections necessitate the intellect to essentially distinct acts, therefore divine perfections of this type are distinct conceptually or virtually. The major is clear where one thing necessitates to essentially distinct acts this makes the same thing that really distinct diverse things would make. The minor is clear because divine wisdom necessitates the intellect to the concept of wisdom and goodness to the concept of goodness, and such concepts are really and essential distinct, therefore, ergo. Alphonsus.

In the fourth place against the third corollary: non justice is not repugnant to wisdom as such, therefore wisdom in some mode is the same as justice. But another god is not repugnant to divine wisdom, therefore.

Against the third conclusion is another proposition in in which it is said that intelligence is a substance which is not divided, therefore it is not the case that God alone is undivided.

In the second place the Philosohper II says the intellect absolutely unmixed and immaterial Aristoteles, De anima, II, XXX .

In the third place, against the first corollary is the first reasons in the opposition because some simple thing is so simple that only a single grade and punctual being corresponds to it, therefore.

In the fourth place, by the authority of the Commentator in book 12 of the who says that all forms are existing in actuality in the first mover which are in potency in the prime matter Averroes, XII commento 18. (Juntina VIII , 305v I) , therefore is not in God simplicity in every form.

Responses

To the first, the antecedent is denied. To the proof, the major and minor is denied. And to the proof of the minor, I say that to be necessary is repugnant to the creature not only from that which is from another, but also because it is freely contingently produced from nothing and contingently conserved.

To the second, the assumed is conceded and it is denied that it is impossible because it does not follow that the divine will changes or is changeable. Otherwise it would be able to be proved that ever future thing comes about necessarily.

To the third, the consequence is denied because then the accidents and the light produced in some manner in medium would not be able not to be.

In the second place, I say that though they do not have matter, nevertheless they have their own nothingness as if matter and this suffices.

To the fourth, it is able to be said that punctual and indivisible being corresponds to it, and the consequence is denied, therefore it is not of immense perfection because at the same time it is indivisible, super simple, and immense, not having in itself formally any gradual latitude although it contains supereminently every latitude of perfection.

To the fifth, the consequent is conceded because some part of the latitude is able to be put into being, and if it is inferred, then it is able to be put into being at the same time. The consequence is denied because, just as it also does not follow that some part of that latitude is able to be put into being, therefore it is possible that some part of it be put into being, so it does not follow that some continuous part a from Socrates is able to be seen, therefore Socrates is able to see some continuous part a. Nor does it follow that some possible grade of perfection is able to be put into being, therefore it is possible that some possible grade of perfection should be put into being, thought I hold the consequent to be probable in my principio Supra vide against what it said before.

To the sixth, the consequence is denied because the deity does not exist in manner of a created person nor that of the divine person through the mode of individuals because, thought two human beings are some one thing which is greater than one alone, nevertheless two divine persons are not greater than one alone, as Augustine says in VIII , capitulo primo Augustinus, De Trinitate, VIII, c. 1 (XXX) .

To another, the consequence is denied because the conclusion and corollary are understood about real entities and not about things signifying in a complex way.

To another, the antecedent is denied because for this, it follows that to be necessary is not to be necessary. And to the disproof, I say that for the impossible, something follows, and as a consequence the from the negative, the affirmative follows.

To the first against the second conclusion, it is said that Damascenus does not speak about perfections that are not really in God, but about names which are predicated of God, some of which according to him are not predicated of his nature, but about those things which are concerning his nature which should not be understood with respect to the thing signified because, if a thing which is divine wisdom were not the divine nature, but something concerning his nature, it would not only be distinguished formally, but really and absolutely, which is false. But it is understood with respect to the mode of predicating because such names are predicated of God denominatively. And those things that are predicated about God with respect to the mode of predicated of God with respect to the mode of predicating do not speak about nature about, but about something concerning nature. This is the solution of Alphonsus.

To the second, in the first place it would be able to be said that divisibly or through a divisible he distances himself from an angel because he distances himself through the total perfection of all creaturea actual and possible. And the consequences is denied, therefore so are parts because this divisibility is not instrinsic in God, but extrinsic.

In the second place, by denying the consequence it would be able to be said that he distances himself indivisibly, therefore infinitely less than anything below because that which is indivisible through what it distances itself is immense because it is God.

To another, the consequence is denied. The reason is because infinite wisdom and infinite goodness in reality are something circumscribed by every reasons of the intellect. But wisdom in general and goodness in general are not thus because they are not unless some concept or being of reason. And to the proof, it is conceded because infinity does not destroy the formal reason of something, but this does not prove the intent because wisdom and goodness in general are not only predicated of infinite wisdom and goodness, but also of finite wisdom and goodness. About this see Alphonsum.

To another against the third corollary, having conceded the antecedent, the consequence is denied, for it does not follow that this thing is in diverse ways because it is possible that the proposed same signified thing is in one true and another false, nevertheless it does not follow that the thing signified is true and false.

To another, the consequent is conceded. And to the proof, because the object of one, etc., it is conceded. And when it is disproved, because God understand evil etc., it is conceded, but what is inferred does not follow.

In the second place I say that the divine will understands every evil because the divine intellect which understands is formally the divine will. Evil therefore is an object of the will, not as something willed, but as something known and understood.

In the third place this consequence would be able to be denied, the divine will and intellect are the same, therefore whatever the intellect understands, the will wills.

To another, the major is denied and the minor because it is not necessary that everything that necessitates to distinct concepts is conceptually distinct unless we wish from the use of a word. Nor also does divine perfection necessitate to the distinction of diverse acts as the argument assumes.

To the argument against the third corollary, the major is denied because divine wisdom is every perfection formally, and everything that is is better than what is absolutely not under the good intellect.

To the first authority against the the third conclusion, intelligence is a substance which is not divided. This is true with respect to parts of nature with respect to duration, which is a whole at one and the same time.

To another, it is said that the intellectu is a simple power, that is, non organic. This is the position of the Philosopher.

In the second place it is said that simple in some mode is not simple absolutely because every creature in some mode is a composite subject to potentiality.

To the first reason in the opposition, it is said that, if the antecedent is understood about simplicity absolutely, then it is false. And to the proof, it is said that consequence is not valid. And if it were further inferred that the soul is not simple, therefore it has parts, the consequence is denied.

To another, it is said that forms of this type are in the first mover are indistinct in act because the creature in God is not other than the divine nature indistinct within.

To the other arguements in the opposition, the solution is clear through what has been said.

Principal arguments

That not because the Word is the measure of a creature, therefore the Word is not coeternal with the Father. The antecedent is clear and the consequence is proved because equal and proportionate in a measured way to what it measures.

In the second place the divine Word is immense, therefore it is not measured by eternity because it seems to be a contradiction for the immense to be measured. The antecedent is a catholic truth. This is confirmed because the Word is above and beyond eternity, therefore it is not measured by eternity. Elsewhere it is proved in chapter 3: The Lord will reign for ever and ever Exodus 15:18 .

In the third place, eternity is made, therefore the Word is not eternity, nor is it measured by it. The antecedent is clear through Augustine in where he says: God is the author of eternity Augustinus, q.23 (CCSL 44A, 27, ll. 11-12) . Again Boethius says that sicut nunc fluens facit temporis sic nunc stans et permanens facit aeternitatem Boetius, XXX .

In opposition is the claim of the Master of the in this distinction. Again, in a similar way, in this Trinity there is not prior or posterior, etc.

First conclusion

The first conclusion: though eternally or the duration of eternity in abstract to world outside itself is not a communicable perfection, nevertheless this is an eternal and formal measure of whatever is produced. The first part is because it would follow that a creature would be able to be coeternal with God or that any creature would be produced before some time, but each of these options is false or impossible, therefore. The second part is proved because the properties of measure do not properly suit God with respect to a creature and not only transumptively, therefore. The antecedent is show by Giles, in book two, distinction eight, question three, in part two since the ratio of number fits himself temporally, uniformally, absolutely, and indivisibly. Secondly, because ratio of adequation suits the the creature in two ways, namely through conformity and imitation, therefore it follows that God is causally, formally the measure of any produced being. The first part of the conclusion is confirmed because invariability, immutability, and simultaneity, therefore not eternity. The consequence is clear because these are properties of eternity as will be clear later. And the antecedent is clear because according to Gregory in that in which a creature is, it has the vicissitude of changeability Gregorius Magnus, Moralia, V, c. 37, 4 .

The first corollary: immensity and eternity of measure do not infer the immensity of the measured nature, against John of Marchia, in the first question of his , in his determination in the response of the first argument against the second conclusion . This is clear because the immense God is the formal measure of the creature, and nevertheless the creature is not immense, and as a consequence is not proportionally adequate to him, as he says there.

The second corollary: the ratio of formal eternity is not a denomination of perfection absolutely. This is clear because any such perfection is communicable outside itself to a creature concretely, but eternity is not communicable to a creature, therefore.

From the first corollary and conclusion it follows that any material and divisible nature is measured by an immaterial and indivisible measure in some mode and not adequately.

The third corollary: though eternity as such is not a perfection as if absolutely denotively, nevertheless it is a mode of perfection in identity, really, and entitatively. The first part is clear through the second corollary Vide supra . The second is proved because eternity is essentially the eternal God.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: just as the highest goodness is its own supersimple nature, so it is its own eternity and every measure of it. This is proved through Anselm 24 where he says it stands that the highest substance exists without a beginning and an end, nor does it have a present, past, or future Anselmus, 24,(I, 42, ll. 11-12). . Item Alexander in the book , proposition 52 says tempus rem a suo principio distare facit aeternitas vero rem suae causae continuat[?] et coniungit in aeternitate non est pars neque prius aut posterius Alexander, XXX . Again proposition 44 says that nullum immutabile mensuratur mensura successiva aut succedente sed aeterna Alexander de Alexandria, De memoria rerum difficilium, prop. 44 .

The first corollary: the measure of any divine operation or causality is an every present and indivisible instant of eternity. This is clear because God is his own operation taken nominally and actively, therefore. This is confirmed because both God and creature are measured by eternity, and as a consequence by this instant because they are precisely the same thing.

The second corollary: a plurality of gods is as repugnant to divinity as multiplicity of signs is repugnant to eternity. therefore any measure of it is totally adequate to it. But any sign or instant of eternity is a proper measure of it, therefore any such thing is simple and not multiple. And I understand through equal measure with God lasting supersimple permanence and being independent and without a beginning.

Third corollary: just as eternity is a measure intrinsecly exlcuding a plurality of signs, so an instant of eternity is including contentively every durative succession. The first part is opposed to Scotum in many places which is proved thus because otherwise the entire Trinity will be more multiple than its signification, which is false and against the second corollary Vide supra . Again the sign would be simpler than its eternity, which is false. The second part is against Hugolino which is proved because the instant of eternity is adequately this instant of eternity, therefore any instant of eternity is a precontentive instant of eternity contentively including this and inclusively containing this. But eternity precontains and includes every successive durative pause both real and imaginative, therefore.

Tertia conclusio

Third conclusion: the generation of the eternal word or to generate eternally in an instant of eternity is considered to be measured. This is clear through Damescenus, in book one, chapter 8 divine generation is without beginning and eternal, existing as a work of nature Ioannes Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, I, 8, (PG 94, 813: Buytaert 32, 77-80) . Again this is proved by reason because this generation is invariable, incorruptible, simultaneous without succession, but these are properties of eternity, therefore. The first part of the antecedent is clear, and the second is through Augustine III , chapter three who says that God is true eternity Augustinus, De Trinitate, III . Again in IV , chapter 19 his true eternity is unchangeable Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, 18, 24 To the same speaks Giles, in distinction 8 of book 1, the second part, question two where he posits these properties inforam

The first corollary: it is not the case that the Word is able to be called for any sign and in that instant this is not produced through generation, which is contrary to Scotus, in distinction 22 of book 1, in the second question Scotus, Ordinatio, I, d. 22, q. 2 . This is proved because if in some sign the Father were able to generate the Son and for that instant he would not generate him, it follows that generation would not be measured by an instant lacking a beginning. The consequent is false through what has been said. The consequence is clear because the first sign in which a first person is habitually fecund would precede the generation of the Son, and as a consequence for that instant there will be a preceding negation of the word, which is false.

The second corollary: for any sign the Father generates an only begotten, while the Son spirates the Holy Spirit with the same sign, contra Scotus, where it is proved above, and in the sign the first sign of the origin in which the Father is fecund and the Son not according to him. And let this sign be a and the second sign in which the Son is fecund be b, then in this case a has a separate negation of fecundity of the Son, therefore in a the Son is not fecund, and a is before b, therefore the Son is not fecund prior to the point when he is fecund. The consequence is clear because a is prior, b is posterior, otherwise a would not be first and b second as he says. But this consequent is false because then the Son would begin to be fecund and he would not be fecund without beginning against what has been said, therefore the corollary is true.

The third corollary is the affirmative title of the question which is proved by Lord Alphonsus, in distinction one Alphonsus Vargas, I, d. 1, xxx , see there. This is confirmed because in the divine there is not some priority besides some origin not in any place. I do not intend to deny through what has been said in this question because I speak only about the measurative priority against Scotus's way of speaking who thinks that in an instant of eternity there are three signs of the origin. In the first are all the essentials, namely knowledge, wisdom, goodness, etc. In the second the Father generates the Son. In the third he spirates the Holy Spirit and he says consequently that the Father spirates the Holy Spirit from an origin prior to that of the Son, see Alphonsus, in distinction 9 of the first book Alphonsus Vargas, I, d. 9, ?? . The responsive corollary Alphonsus proves thus, virtually in the Son and to any divine person for any sign of the origin or nature it is repugnatn not to be, therefore also to be posterior, therefore no person is prior to the other. The antecedent is clear because it is necessary in the highest degree. And the consequence is clear because, for if for some some sign one person is prior, then another is posterior. But therefore in that sign the Son has being or not. If yes, then in that instant the Father is not prior to him. If not, then the Son has being after non being and thus is produced from non being to being. The consequence is clear because in the second he has being, indeed it follows that no being is not repugnant to the Son which in opposition to the antecedent.

Objections

Against the first conclusion: God is not of the same genus as created things, therefore he is not the measure of created things. This consequence is clear through the Philosopher X who says the measure out to be one Augustine, Metaphysicae, X , that is, of one genus when measured.

Secondly, God is not proportional to a creature. Again, he is not replicable. Again, quantity applies neither to God or eternity, but these are the properties of measure, therefore.

Against the second conclusion and its corollaries: if eternal measure were proper intrinsically to any divine operation, it follows that divine doing would be eternal. The consequent does not seem true, but the consequence appears because then when the divine willing is eternal and the divine willing is doing, it follows that the divine doing is eternal, and thus all things would be made from this eternality.

In the second place, it follows that two contradictories in an instant of eternity are true at the same time. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because in one mode God does not wish that Christ suffers, and this not wishing is eternal. And he wishes that Christ suffers, therefore this wishing was eternal. And thus in the same instant he wishes and does not wish or is unwilling, which are contradictories.

In the third place, if he wishes equally in the present that being would be and the past being would be, it follows that it would be equally necessary that one is just as much as the other. The consequent is false.

In the fourth place, against the corollaries: everything that one says is indivisible indivisibly is simpler than what one says is indivisible and not indivisibly. But one says that the sign or instant of eternity is truly indivisible, but not indivisibly, therefore etc.

In the fifth place, against the second and third corollary, there is the position of 16, where it is said about the spirit that it speaks whatever it hears Ioannes 16:13 . But it is certain that the future is not able to be carried back unless to the some eternal sign, and thus there will be many signs in eternity. Again 12 glorify me father with glory which I had with you before the word began John 17:5 . Again against the conclusion it is the position of Boethius augustini boetii alleged earlier because if eternity is made, it follows that it is not God. Again, there is the authority of Augustine.

Against the third conclusion is argument made in the opposition because the the divine word, etc.

In the second place, through 3 The Lord will reign for ever and ever Exodus 15:18

In the third place, passive generation and the Son have a beginning, therefore its duration has a beginning. The consequence is clear because they are the same. The antecedent is clear through Augustine V 14 who says the Father is the beginning of the Son Augustine, De Trinitate, V .

In the fourth place, in the divine is number. The antecedent is clear because of the Trinity. And the consequence is clear because in any number duality follows unity and unity precedes it.

In the fifth place, whatever is near to the first thing seems to be prior. But the Son is nearer to the first thing because it is more immediate to the Father, therefore the Son is prior to the Holy Spirit and similarly the Father to the Son. The major is known and the minor is proved because the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father mediated by the Son.

For a solition of the arguments aginst the first conclusion, it should be known that measure is said in many ways. In one way through the replication of measure, and thus it is taken in the X Aristoteles, Metaphysicae, X, xxx about heavy things.

In the second mode through the likeness and approximation and imitation of other things to it.

In the third place it is taken according to the causality, priority, and determination, and thus the art is called the measure of the artificer, thus it is said in V Aristoteles, Metaphysicase, V, xxx about the intelligibile.

In the fourth mode according to the formal reformation or reception, and thus knowledge is said to be the measure of what is known.

In the fifth mode through the interposition of position and the hight of this position is the measure of this or that distance.

In the first and last modes, God is not said to be the measure, though he is correctly said to be the measure of things in the second, third, and fourth modes.

Responses

To the first, I say that by taking genus loosely for anything common verifying about many things either univocally or equivocally, it is thus able to be conceded that it is of the same genus with creatures because being is said about creatures and God in this mode.. But if genus is taken strictly and properly for something that is said about many things univocally, then only the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied, in the first place for that sense, but not in another.

To the second, it is said that though between God and creatures there is not proportion of adequation quantitatively, nevertheless there is between them a proportion of order or exemplar or imitating, and this is sufficient for him to be the measure of things.

To the third, the consequence is denied and to the proof it is said that replication is not about the ratio of measure absolutely, but only about the ratio of measure quantitatively.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied because, though the name of quantity was in potency to the things of quantity primarily and properly, nevertheless with this it stands that what is signified is suitable to God.

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequent is conceded, but nevertheless it is not eternal activity when about speaking about the activity of God outside himself. Further it would be able to be said that not every willing of God is an activity, though not the converse.

To the second, the consequence is denied. To the proof, I say that Christ suffers is able to be taken in two ways. In the first mode for the utterance or for this proposition, Christ suffers. In the second mode for the reality behind the utterance, namely for the moment in which Christ was suffering and for the passion of Christ. If it is taken in the first mode, the consequence is not proved because these propositions were not eternally existing. If in the second mode, then it is said that God wishes whatever he has ever wished and ever wish is present in his present instant of eternity where there is no change of the past or future. And through this solution many similar arguments in this matter are able to be solved.

To the third, the consequence is denied because this kind of necessity of past time does come from something intrinsic to divine knowledge, but rather from something extrinsic. Think for example because the thing posited is in actual existence.

To the fourth, the minor is denied because eternity is as simple and indivisible as an instant or sign of eternity is simple or indivisible and conversely.

To the fight about the Holy Spirit, here responds Augustine in homily 45 showing that we speak truly about God when we say he was and will be because he never will cease from being nor every did cease, not indeed because there is some plurality of signs in his very self.

In another way it is able to be ssaid that God, though he is not properly in time and the persons because they do not vary according to time through accident, nevertheless he is in time because when time, then the words of past and future of time are able to be said about God. This response is drawn from the words of Giles, book 1, in this distinction part three, question four Aegidius Romanos, I, d. 9, p. 3, q. 4 .

In the third place, it is able to be said that the phrase before the world began to able be habitually, that is, if there were a time before the world began, he would have glory in that time.

In the fourth place, it would be able to be said that, if time were received for any imaginary possible positive or privative succession, then there was infinite time before the world because such things are to be taken as signs of what is imagined to succeed.

To Boethius who says that the now stands etc., it is conceded with respect to the apprehension of our mind or with respect to the cognition of our intellect.

To Augustine it is said that he speaks about a participated eternity and secundum quid, but not about eternity absolutely or he speaks about eternity a parte post..

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said that, though the divine Word is unmeasure by any measure distinct from it, nevertheless it is said that it is measured by a measure which is its own eternity, as is shown by Giles, in distinction 8 of the first book, part three, question three Aegidius Romanos, I, d. 8, p. 3, q. 3 .

To that argument from 3 Exodus 15:18 it is said that eternity is taken in two ways, in one mode first for that period of any one natural life, in the second mode for the uniform and immmobile simutaneous existence. In the first mode it is conceded absolutely, but in the second it is denied.

In the second place, it would be able to be said according to Anselm in the , chapter 3 that God is beyond that ultra illa quae etiam finem non habebunt tum quia illa nullatenus sine eo esse possunt ipse autem non minus esse si omnia in nihilum irent tum secundo quia illa possunt cogitari habere finem Deus vero nequaquam Further because the eternity of God and them is in God completely, but not in them Anselmus, c. 20. .

To the third, in the first place the consequence is denied because it would be possible to argue similarly that the essence would have a beginning because this is the same in the Son. Again it would be possible to be said that if beginning is taken for duration, then the Son and Holy Spirit have a beginning because just as the Father communicates deity to the Son, so also eternity. But if it is taken for a limitation of duration, then no divine person has a beginning.

To fourth concerning number, it is said that just as in the divine there is wisdom, magnitude, though nevertheless this is not a quality or quality, so there is a threeness, nevertheless it is not properly said in number, and about this it will be seen below.

To the fifth, the minor is denied because it is not therefore said that the Father produces the Holy Spirit through the mediation of the Son because the Father does not immediately produce it, but because the Father has from the Father the spirative power. But against this it is objected through Augustine, in book where he says the just in heaven will see what is between generation and spiration and they will see that the Father precedes the Son, not in nature, but in origin

Nevertheless to this Alphonsus says that Augustine wishes to say that among the Father and Son there is a priority of origin, not in which, but from which, that is, because the Son is from the Father by order of nature, nevertheless there is not there a real, durative, and measurative priority of signs, as Scotus and his followers try to prove, the arguments for which Alphonsus solves in this ninth distinction Alphonsus, In Sent, I, d. 9 (XXX) . See there.

Principal Arguments

That not because then it follows in the first place that it is only repugnant that the Holy Spirit is not produced by the Son just as it is not distinguished from it. The consequent is false because if, through the impossible, the Son were not to produce the Holy Spirit, this distinction between them would still exist, therefore. The first consequence is proved because, if in the same mode, the Father and Son spirate, then therefore the Father spirates in such a way that, if he were not to spirate the Holy Spirit, it would not be said to be from him. It follows that, if the Son also does not spirate, then it would also be distinguished.

In the second place, that the Son does not spirate the Holy Spirit is proved by the authority of Damascene, in book one, chapters 10 and 11, saying Spiritum Sanctum ex Patre dicimus et Patris Spiritum Sanctum nominamus ex Filio vero non dicimus sed Spiritum Filii nominamus Damescenus, De fide orthodoxa I, c. 8 . Therefore, if it is not from the Son, it does not seem to precede from him.

In the third place, if this is true, it would follow that it would naturally proceed from them. The consequent is false because it proceeds in the mode of love and of liberty or of the will. But the consequence is proved because internally there is a single mode of proceeding in the divine that cannot be made into a plurality as was said above. But the Son proceeds from the Father in a natural mode or naturally, therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from something, this will be naturally and not freely.

In opposition is the position of the master in distinction 11 Lombardus, I, d. 11, XXX , and , De summa Trinitatem and fide catholica, libro 6 VI, 1, 1, 1 (CIC, II, 937). .

First conclusion

First conclusion: though the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father prior or more greatly than from the Son, nevertheless that the Spirit is or proceeds from something is only able to be shown by means of faith. The first part is proved because for each sign the Holy Spirit is spirated from the Son, but for every sign for which it is spirated it is from the Father, therefore for any sign spirated by the Father for the same sign it is spirated by thed Son. The major premise is clear because, if the opposite were given, it follows that in some sign the Holy Spirit would from one only and not from two, contradicting the faith. The second, namely, the minor, is proved because for each for which there is active spiration, there is also passive spiration, therefore. The antecedent is proved because otherwise it would follow that the Father some sign would spirate the Holy Spirit for which sign the Holy Spirit would not be spirated, which is a contradiction. The second part of the conclusion is proved because it would follow that the Trinity of the divine persons would be able to be shown by evident reason, which is false as has been proven. Again, every argument short of faith proving that the Holy Spirit proceeds would prove that the Holy Spirit produces another Holy Spirit, just as was said about the generation of the Son. But that it is able to be shown by means of fatih is clear from , de summa trinitate and fide catholica, in book 6, the chapter on faith Liber Extra, Liber 6, Titulus Primus, De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, c. 1 (Friedberg 1879 v. 11, col. 937) Concile de Lyon II (oecum. XIV), 7 mai - 17 juillet 1274 (sous le Bienheureux Grégoire X); Session II, 18 mai 1274: Constitution "de summa Trinitate et fide catholica", (Enchiridion Symbolorum, Denzinger. 850 460) . Again through Augustine IV , capitulo 53 de parvis Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 53, xxx , where he deduces this from many authorities of Sacred Scripture.

The first corollary: just as the Father does not speak the Word earlier than he spirates the Holy Spirit, so the generation of the Divine Word is not really prior to the spiration of the Holy Spirit. The first is clear because the Son is not prior to the Holy Spirit, therefore. The antecedent is proved because, just as it is proved that the Father is not prior to the Son, so it is proved that the Son is not prior to the Holy Spirit. The second part is proved because in the divine there is no real priority in quo as it has been proved. Likewise if generation preceded spiration, it would follow that what is generated would precede what is spirated, which has been disproved.

The second corollary: that in God the Son produces the Holy Spirit causally because it exists as its express image and perfect likeness. This is clear because by the same reason it would be proved that the Holy Spirit produces the Son, therefore.

Third corollary: not precisely from the fact that since the Son is God the Son spirates or produces the Holy Spirit. This is clear because it would be proved that the Holy Spirit would produces its very self or another that is the Son. And the consequence is clear because it is no less God that the Father or the Son is.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though nothing other than active spiration is distinctive of the Holy Spirit from the Son nevertheless the following is not a formal consequence the Holy Spirit is not produced by the Son, therefore the Son is not distinguished from the Holy Spirit. The first part is proved because nothing is in the Son that is not active spiration, therefore. In the second place, because if it were distinguished through something else, it follows that the Son would not be most simple. The consequence is clear because there are many incomplex entities in it. The second part is proved because the Son is not precisely distinguished from the Holy Spirit because he precisely spirate it, therefore the consequnence is not formal. The consequence is clear because in this consequence it is argued from causes of truth to one, but such a consequence is not valid. But the principal antecedent is argued because the Son is distinguished sufficiently form the Holy Spirit through the fact that he proceeds from the Father by being born and the Holy Spirit does not, but only by proceeding. This argument is also confirmed by the saying of Augustine V , chapter 14 therefore the Holy Spirit is not the Son though both come from the father because he comes not in the mode of being born but of being given Augustinus, V, c. 14, n. 15 (PL 42:XX) . Item , chapter 2, one is born, the other proceeds, therefore one is the Son, the other is the Holy Spirit De Fide Catholica, XXX .

The first corollary: The relative opposition alone is not distinctive of the divine persons. This is clear because, if there were no opposition of this type between the Son and the Holy Spirit, they would still be distinguished through the conclusion. This is confirmed because the divine persons are distinguished in themselves and not only through relations. This corollary is in opposition to Thomas of Argentina, in book 1, distinction 11, question 2, article 2 Thomas de Argentina, I, c. 11, q. 2, a. 2 .

The second corollary: if, through the impossible, the Son were not to produce the Holy Spirit, it would still be the case that no divine person would proceed through generation and spiration. This is contrary to Giles, in 1, question 6 Aegidius Romanos, Quodlibet I, q. 6. . It is likewise opposed to Ockham Ockham, XXX and Aureolus Aureolus, XXX . This is proved because, in this case, it the produced persons would still be sufficiently distinguished from one another, as it is said in the second part of the conclusion second part of the conclusion See above .

Third corollary: the following consequence is neither evident nor formal, the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, therefore the Holy Spirit is not and does not exist, against Gregory, in book 1, distinction 11, article 2 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 11, a. 2 . The corollary is clear because, if the consequence were formal, it would follow that, if the Spirit were not produced from the Word, it would not be distinguished from it, which is disproved in the conclusion. This is confirmed because the Holy Spirit is sufficiently distinguished from the Word through something incomplex besides spiration, therefore, apart from spiration, whether this is impossible or possible, the Holy Spirit would still be distinguished from the Word. The antecedent is his in article one of the same question Vide supra and the consequence is clear through what has been said.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: though the Father communicates active spiration to the Son nevertheless the Holy Spirit is produced by each in the same natural and free mode. The first part is clear in distinction 12 of book 1 Lombard, I, d. 12, XXX in which it is said that the Father gives to the Son that he spirates the Holy Spirit, therefore. But that they produce the Holy Spirit in a natural mode is clear from the authority of Hilary V Hilarius, De Trinitate, V, XXX , and this is alleged by the Master in his text where he says from the virtue of nature in nature the Holy Spirit subsists under the same procession Lombardus, I, Distinctio 18, C. 3 but that it proceeds freely is clear because it is voluntarily, as Augustine says in 15 capitulo 17 Augustinus, De Trinitate, XV, c. 17, XXX . See the source. This is also confirmed because it is not repugnant that the Son is generated naturally and freely, therefore nor is it repugnant that the Holy Spirit is spirated naturally and freely. The consequence is clear the similarity, but the antecedent is proved above.

The first corollary: the Spirit of immense goodness is not produced through the mode of the will, contrary to Scouts, in book1, distinction 18, in question one, in article one Scotus, I, d. 18, q. 1, a.1 and contrary to Ockham, in the same distinction, in the first question Ockham, I, d. 18, q. 1 . This is proved because either will is understood essentially or notionally. Not the first because it is certain that the will does not produce the Son nor the Holy Spirit. Not the second because then the Holy Spirit would produce itself. The consequence is clear through Augustine 15 , chapter 3 de magnis and 16 de parvis where he says The will of God, if properly said, is some person in the Trinity, the name best fits the Holy Spirit, just as love. For what is love besides the will? Augustinus, De Trinitate, 15, 20, 38 . Through this argument Augustine argues against Eunomius the heretic that the Son is not the son of the will or is from the will.

Second corollary: in the same beginning, with respect to the term of the same thing, liberty and necessity concur in active spiration in a unified way. This is proved because a single term is simple, namely the Holy Spirit, but this is produced from the Father and the Son freely and naturally and necessary through spiration. Nevertheless note that this is not the liberty of contradiction but of pleasure and of natural love, against Gregory in his opposition to Scotus.

The third corollary is part what is asked in the affirmative.

Objections

Against the first conclusion, it is argued in the first place thus from the authority of Dionysius, in chapter 2 of the who says one should not dare to speak about the Holy Spirit a and the divine mysteries beyond things which are divinely expressed to us from the holy texts Dionysius, De diivnis nominibus, I (PG 3, 587) . But in the holy texts of the canons this truth does not seem to be expressed, therefore it should not be asserted.

In the second place, it follows that the identity between the Father and the Son is greater than between the Father and the Holy Spirit. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because the identity of essence is beyond the identity of active spiration.

In the third place, for any absolutely simple actions there is one principle, therefore. But this is false which it is proved in the first place because, if there were one principle spirating the Holy Spirit, then there would be some fourth person in the divine, since the neither the Father nor the Son is this one principle. In the second place, it follows that there are only two persons there. I prove this because there is only the spirative principle and and spirated principle or the terminus of spiration. In the third place, it follows that the Father and Son are somehow one, and the Holy Spirit would it not be one in this way. The consequent is false, and the consequence is clear because the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, but the Holy Spirit is not thus one with them, therefore. The antecedent is clear because otherwise it would follow int he first place that the same indivisible terminus with a single relation would be referred to many. In the second place, that one and the same thing could be produced absolutely from many total causes was disproved above. In the third place, it follows that the effect depends on a cause, which when removed, nothing less would be produced. This is false, therefore.

In fourth place principally, either this truth follows necessarily and expressily from what has been said in Sacred Scriptures or not. If the first, then it is marvelous that the doctors of Greece , such as Damascene, Theophilus, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Cyril, have not seen this. If the second, it follows that we ought not to teach this, nor should the faithful be pressed to believe this, and nor should the opposite be labeled heretical.

In the fifth place, some principle of the Holy Spirit is not the Son, therefore no principle of the Holy Spirit is the Son. The antecedent is clear because the Father, who is not the Son, is the principle of the Holy Spirit. And the consequence is proved because in natural material the indefinite or singular implies something universal, just as in the proposed.

Against the second conclusion it is argued in the first place thus: from whatever something is constituted in existence, it is distinguished from that for the same reason. But the Son is constituted in existence by personal filiation. Therefore, circumscribed by possible or impossible spiration, the Son will remain personally distinct from every other person, therefore not only is he distinguished from the Holy Spirit through spiration, as it says in the first part of the conclusion. This is the argument of Scotus Scoti, in distinction 11, question 2 Scotus, I, d. 11, q. 2 .

In the second place, between the divine persons there is not able to be a distinction unless through some opposition, which is not able to be unless it is relative opposition. But such opposition is not able to be unless through some origin. Therefore, if there is no origin of the Holy Spirit from the Word, neither is there any relation, therefore there is no distinction. See the Holy Doctor in the , first part, question 36, article 2 Aquinas, Summa, I, q. 36, a. 2 .

Against the second corollary: active generation and active spiration in the Father mean the same thing, therefore passive generation would deal with passive spiration unless dealt with active generation. But if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, then passive generation would not deal with active spiration, therefore the same thing would be a generated and spirated person. See Thomas, where he is cited above Aquinas, XXX .

Against the third corollary: the Holy Spirit would not be if it did not proceed from the Son. This consequence is formal the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, therefore it is not distinguished from him. The consequence is sound because what is distinguished from nothing does not exist. The antecedent is proved in three ways. First because, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, then there would not be a gift of the the Father and the Son, therefore nor would there be the Holy Spirit. In the second place, because the Son through itself is the principle of the Holy Spirit, therefore if he did not spirate it, then the Holy Spirit would not be. In the third place, if some creature did not proceed from the from the Son, then it would not be produced by the Son or by the Father, therefore it will thus be from the Holy Spirit. And as a consequence., if the Son did not produce the Holy Spirit, then it would not exist. This is the argument of our Doctor Gregory, in distinction 11 of the first book, article 2 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 11, a. 2 .

Against the third conclusion: the Father sufficiently produces the Holy Spirit, therefore it is superflous for the Son to produce. The consequence is valid because, just as it would be in vain that something happens through many etc, a fortiori many would be in vain for what is in fact sufficiently done through one alone. But God and nature never do anything in vain, therefore. The antecedent is proved because something is not more perfectly produced by two things than it is by one alone.

In the second place, in someway the Father produces the Holy Spirit in a way that the Son does not produce it, therefore not in the same mode. The antecedent is proved because the Father does not have his own producing from another, but the Son has his from the Father, therefore.

In the third place, diverse acts belong to divers supposits, but the Father and the Son are divers supposites, therefore, if they spirate, they are diverse spirations and diverse acts. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because, though two angels love themelves, nevertheless it does not follow that there is one love between the two of them, therefore so it is in the divine.

Against the first corollary: the will is the internal productive principle, and it is not this unless it is of love, therefore the Spirit is produced out of immense goodness. See Scotus, in distinction 10 Scotus, I, d. 10 .

Against the second corollary: it would follow, if this were the case, that there is no difference between the free and the necessary, contra the Philosopher IX Aristoteles, Metaphysicae, IX . And the consequent is proved by Gregory, in distinction 10, article 2, conclusion 2 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 10, a. 2, c. 2 .

Against the third corollary: the productive principle of the Holy Spirit is the will, therefore it is produced freely and not naturally or necessarily. The consequence is clear because, just as the intellect does not have a mode of acting freely, so the will does not have a natural mode. The antecedent is clear because the Holy Spirit is love, therefore it is produced from the will. This is the argument of Alphonsus, in distinction 11 of book 1, article 2, conclusion 3 Alphonsus Vargas, Sent. I, d. 11, a. 2, concl. 3

In the second place, the Holy Spirit is not produced by being born in someway, therefore it is not produced naturally. The antecedent is from Augustine, in book [?] , chapter 12 Augustinus, De Trinitate, XXX, c. 12, xxx . The consequence is proved because whatever is produced naturally in the same nature with what is producing is produced as if born, therefore, from the opposite, what is not produced as if born, is not produced naturally, therefore the consequence was valid.

Responses

To the first, which is the saying of Dionysius, it is said that the authority and similar things ought to be understood through another or beyond, and thus that is contrary or in an adverse way, as is clear since Dionysius himself teaches many things which are not expressly in the canon, and in this way many other authorities are able to be explained.

To the second, the consequence is denied, and to the proof it is said that the identity of spiration does not add some further essential thing.

To the third, in the first place the consequent would be possible to concede, just as Thomas says, in the first part, question 36, article 4 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 36, a. 4 . But this does not seem consistent with what he says in his , book 1, where he says we are not able to say that the Father and the Son is a spirating or a spirator, but we ought to say that they are two spirating things or spirators because they are two supposits Aquinas, Scriptum, I, d. 12, q. 1 , while in his as noted above he says that they ought not to be called two spirators on account of one spiration Aquinas I, q. 36 a. 4 ad 7 .

In the second place, Our Gregory would says that this proposition, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, is valid only in the following way, The Father and the Son in one and the same mode, as if one principle, spirate the Holy Spirit. And thus he would not concede that the Father and the Son are one productive or spirative principle of the Holy Spirit because there are two things which spirates. See the arguments he gives there.

In the third place, Hugolino would say, as if following Gregory, there is not one principle of spirating the Holy Spirit, when understanding the word one strictly for a simple single number because either it would this essence or two persons or only or the aggregate from the essence and relation or the common relation, but none of these ought to be said, therefore. In the second place he says the same thing because when say in the , on the highest trinity, in book 6 , fideliter fatemur capitulo quod Spiritus Sanctus aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio tamquam non ex duobus principis sed tamquam ex uno principio non duabus spirationibus sed una spiratione procedit Liber Extra, Liber 6, Titulus Primus, De Summa Trinitate et Fide Catholica, c. 1 (Friedberg 1879 v. 11, col. 937) Concile de Lyon II (oecum. XIV), 7 mai - 17 juillet 1274 (sous le Bienheureux Grégoire X); Session II, 18 mai 1274: Constitution "de summa Trinitate et fide catholica", (Enchiridion Symbolorum, Denzinger. 850 460) , it ought not to be understood that the did not intend to affirm the one principle or the unity of the principle, but rather the unity or the uniformity of the mode of beginning, Therefore it does not say as if from two principles, Likewise, it wished to assert the numerical unity of the spiration or procession of the Holy Spirit. From the things which have been said, it is clear that, though according to him, this is not true The Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless this common conclusion is put forward by the doctors.

In the fourth place, it would be able to be said that, though it is conceded that the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless it should not be conceded that they are the same principle of the Holy Spirit, lest the identity of the person should be understood. Again, it should not be conceded that the Father is another principle of the Holy Spirit besides the Son, lest there is noted a plurality of spiration.

In the fifth place, it should be noted that it should not be conceded that the Father and the Son are some principle of the Holy Spirit on account of the word something which is a principle denoting a intrinsic relation, just as it is not admitted that the Father and the Son are some God.

In the sixth place, it should be known that in the Sexto, notandum quod habetur in cardinal gloss of , De summa trinitate Cardinalis glossa in libro extra, xxx , mentioned above, on the phrase single spiration, where the gloss objects saying, many things are many supposits, therefore there are many actions because actions belong to supposites. The glosa responds saying where there are many supposites and many reasons of acting, there are many actions, where there are many supposites and a single reason of acting, it is not necessary for there to be many actions, just as it is stated in what was proposed because, though the Father and the Son spirate, nevertheless because there is one reason, therefore there is one spiration.

From what has been said it would be able to be inferred otherwise to the form by denying that one part of the action is the principle. And to the proof, because if not, etc., this consequent is conceded just as the by the same whiteness Socrates is similar to white Plato and dissimilar to black John.

To the second, what is inferred is conceded, just as it was explained in the fifth distinction when speaking about the totality of the produced term because the entire Holy Spirit is produced by the Son, nevertheless it is not the cause of it.

To the third, the consequent is also conceded.

To the fourth principal argument, it is said that this truth follows from the sayings of Sacred Scripture, as Augustine says above XXX and the Master in this distinction Lombardus, I, d. 10[?] , adding to this many authorities of the New Testament which are clear in the text. And when it is said the doctor somehow etc. Vide supra , it is said that perhaps the stubbornness of them was and is the cause of their blindness and ignorance.

To the fifth, the consequence would be able to be denied, and further it would be able to be said that this logical rule is not general but precise, where predication is absolute and essential.

In the second place, it is said that the form is not valid because it would be said absolutely that something is the Father and not the Son, therefore the essence, which is the Father, is not the Son, which is false.

To the first against the second conclusion, the major is conceded, but the minor is denied, both because no divine person is constituted in personal being, and also because the Son is constituted in his personal being through nothing that is not formally the Son himself.

To the second, int he first place it is able to be said that the argument is founded a false assumption, because it is imagined that the divine persons are not distinguished among themselves but only through relations, which is denied.

In the second place, have conceded this, they are nevertheless not only distinguished through opposite relations but also through disparate relations.

To the argument against the second corollary, the consequence is denied because this is not the argument for why paternity and active spiration do not constitute two persons because they are not opposite relations, but rather it is because active spiration is communicable to the Son, therefore it is not constitutive of a supposite. And this is clear because, if this argument was actually true, then the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be two persons because the Son and the Holy Spirit are not constituted by diverse opposite relations because in the Son there is not opposition to passive spiration. This is the response of Alphonsus, distinction 11 of the first book, in article two Alphonsus Vargas, I, d. 11, a. 2 . Besides this, I say that the argument is founded upon something false because it is imagined that the constitution and distinction of persons is through relations and that the persons are not distinguished through themselves, which should not be said.

To the argument against the third corollary, the antecedent is denied. And to the proof, because then they would not be, the consequence would be able to be denied. In the first place and to the authorities of the Apostle and Augustine it is said that they speak as it is now, but not as it would be in that case. In the second place, it would be able to be called the gift of the Son, and then it would, but not be, the gift of the Son. In the third place, it would be possible that the consequence is denied because, though it would not be a gift of the Son such that it would be from the Son, nevertheless it would be a gift of the Son because it would be give by the Son, just as the Greeks in fact say.

To the second, the consequence is denied his motive.

To the third of the same, the consequence is also denied because there is no similarity between inner notional acts and external essential acts.

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said by some that the consequence is not valid on account of the single principle of spirating or on account of the single power of producing which is the divine essence. However, because to this it follows that the divine essence is the principle by which is the source of production, which I do not say, therefore I respond otherwise by denying the consequence because otherwise it would follow similarly that the Father sufficiently is God, therefore the Son or the Holy Spirit is superfluously God. Again, only the Father sufficiently produces creatures, therefore three divine persons produce these superfluously.

To the second, in the first place it would be possible to deny the antecedent absolutely.

In the second place Master John Klenkok would respond by denying the consequence, while conceding the antecedent because it would produce by the same thing, namely the Father himself would produced the Holy Spirit in a different way than he would produce the Son and the Father would produce the Holy Spirit in one way and the Son would produce the Holy Spirit in another way. And if it is objected through the Liber Extra, I, c. 1 which says that they produce equally and together, it would be able to be said that this equality to origination ought to be referred to as active because bot the Father and the Son are actively originating or spirating the Holy Spirit.

In the third place, it would be able to be said that the word otherwise is able to be taken adverbially, and thus the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied, or nominally, and thus the antecedent is denied and the consequence is conceded.

In the fourth place, it is able to be said that the word otherwise is able to indicate the Father himself or the production itself or the Holy Spirit. If the it is taken in the second or third way, then the antecedent is denied, if in the second way, the consequence is denied.

To the third, the universally supposed antecedent is denied because otherwise creation would be a three-fold act, since it is an act of three supposites. And to the proof about the two angels, it is said that the cases are not similar on account of the essential identity of the divine supposites.

To another argument against the first corollary, I say in the first place that the will is not formal productive principle, at least internally.

In the second place, it is able to be said that, since no thing begets or produces itself, and between the will and the Holy Spirit there is no distinction, therefore the argument does not work.

To another argument against the second corollary, the consequent is conceded about the liberty of immutability because this is not repugnant to the highest necessity, and it is regarding this that the corollary speaks.

To another, the antecedent is denied. And the to the proof, the consequence is denied when taking will essentially, just as I have understood it. Nevertheless it indeed follows that something which is the will is the principle of the Holy Spirit because the Father and also the Son. In the second place, it is said that it does not follow, that love is an act of the will, therefore it is not natural because nature or naturally is taken in many ways, just as Scotus shows in distinction 10 of the first book Scotus, I, d. 10, xxx , and similarly Bonsemblantes Bonsemblantes, xxxx .

To another, the consequence is denied. And to the proof because whatever is produced, etc., this is denied, for it does not seem a greater inconvenience that the Holy Spirit produces naturally than that the Son exists voluntarily, and nevertheless the Master, in distinction 6 of book 1, in the last chapter says Dicamus ergo, quod Pater sicut sapiens, ita volens genuit Filium Lombardus, I, d. 6, c. 1, n. 7 , so similarly it seems possible to say about the Holy Spirit

To the first and the third reasons of the opposition, the solution is clear from what has been said.

To the second, Our Doctor Giles responds in the first place that opinion of Damascenus should not stand because he was Greek. Alternatively Thomas of Strasbourg Aegidius Romanus, I, d. 11, princ. 1, q. 1 (Venice 1521, 64rb-va). says, in order to save what Damascene says, that the Greeks believed well and would have believed this article, except that they were not called to the council where this was ordered for belief, therefore they did not wish to believe. In the second place he says that these words from or out of signify among the Greeks something which begins what has begun, which is not suitable to the Son, which is why they do not deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, but they deny that it proceeds chiefly from him, and this seems to be consonant with the truth.

Alternatively Armicanus responds in his in , in book 6, chapter 2 saying that Damascene only treats about those things which in his time alone where only definitely expressed and treated from believing, therefore he is excused. Whence concerning Damascene the Master of the , in book III, distinction 11 says that no depravity of intelligence is noted with suspicion Lombardus, Sent. III, d. 5, c. 1 , therefore he is able to be excused about this having supposed that he believed that the Holy Spirit is not produced by the Son because the determination had not yet be put forward by the church that it proceeds from both.

Rationes principales

It truly seems that this is not the case because, if the Holy Spirit were not begotten, it would follow that the pilgrim theologian would be able to know the difference or the distinction between generation and procession. The consequence is valid and the falsity of the consequent is clear through Augustine and the Master in the text of his 13th distinction saying: between generation and procession, while we live here, we are not able to distinguish Lombard, I, d. 13, c. 3, n. 1 .

In the second place, the internal productions of the divine are of the same reasons and species, therefore just as the Son through one is said to be begotten, so the Holy Spirit for a similarity in species is able to be called begotten. The consequence is clear because specific identity of production and of producing and the produced terms argue sufficiently for the identity of the denomination or of the natural properties, otherwise it would be the case that the production of Socrates and Plato would be of the same species, and nevertheless one would be of the same species and the other would not. The antecedent is first proved because the terms or persons produced through these productions do not differ in species, but only numerically or personally.

In the third place, the Holy Spirit is and is not begotten, therefore it is unbegotten, The consequence is clear because the negative infers one affirmative about a negated predicate and a proposition about negated predicate infers one about an infinite or infinitated predicate, therefore etc.

In opposition is the Master in this distinction 13 Lombardus, I, d. 13, XXX and Augustine, in book 1 , chapter 6 Augustinus, De Trinitate, I, XXX .

Prima conclusio

The first conclusion: though it is impossible that the production of the Son is not distinguished from the production of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless from the common law in the present life no one is able to know this distinction with evident reason. The first is proved because otherwise it would be possible that there is in the divine which now de facto is, if these productions were not distinguished. But this is impossible, therefore. The impossibility is clear through what is said above because in whatever way the divine is internally, it is necessarily that way. The second part is clear through the Master, in this distinction XXX . Again through Augustine XIII , chapter 13 saying that we will see the Trinity in this light where no reason will be Augustinus, De Trinitate, XIII, c. 13, xxx . And the entire conclusion confirmed through Damascene, in book 1, chapter 10 saying in someway we say there is a difference between generation and procession Damascenus, De fide orthodoxa, I, c. 10 . But what mode of difference this is are in no way for this and also the conclusion words in the text of the Master. .

The first corollary: in which it does not follow evidently that the the Son is produced only by the Father and that the Holy Spirit is produced by both, therefore the generation of the Son is distinguished from the procession of the Holy Spirit. This is clear because the unity or plurality of the one's producing does not imply the plurality or distinction of the productions, most especially where there is one mode of acting, as is the case in what has been proposed, as it was said above.

The second corollary: that in the same way it does not follow, produced supposites are plurified distinctly, therefore the productions of the same are in some way distinguished. This is clear from the same.

Third corollary: that from the mode of producing such a distinct is not able to be evidently shown. This is clear because, if the mode of proceeding sufficed, then this would be, therefore because the Son proceeds as born and the Holy Spirit as given, as says Augustine V , chapter 14 . But this argument does not show why the Holy Spirit does not proceed as born, therefore it does not suffice. From what has been said it would be able to be inferred that something is a necessary being which no pilgrim under the current law is able to know. This is clear from the distinction of the production of the persons.

Second Conclusion

Second conclusion: a specific distinction between the divine persons is as repugnant as the same distinction between eternal productions. This is proved because it is repugnant in both cases, therefore it is equally repugnant. The consequences is clear because the repugnance or the opposition of a contradiction does not have latitude nor can it be more or less when taken in the same way. The antecedent is proved because every specific distinction argues and implies diversity of nature. But such diversity is repugnant to the divine essence, therefore a specific distinction in the divine persons or productions should not be asserted. The second part is proved because productions are not distinct unless by reason of a distinction of the persons or because it terminates in distinct persons. But the persons are not distinguished in species but only in number, therefore. In the second place, the conclusion is proved because the divine supposites are absolutely of the same perfection, therefore they are of the same species. The consequence holds because, just as no two species are of the same perfection, so etc. The antecedent is catholic. In the third place, it is confirmed through Damascene, in book III, chapter 6 saying: we say the hypostases differ in number and not in species or in nature Damascenus, 3, 6 (Buytaert, 186, ll. 9-10) , therefore.

The first corollary: but the divine supposites and internal productions are not distinguished specifically, it is conceded catholically that they are distinguished in number. This is clear through what has been said.

Second corollary: it does not follow a is produced through generation and b is not produced through generation, therefore a is specifically distinguished from b. This is clear because the Son and Holy Spirit are not distinguished specifically, and nevertheless the Son is generated and the Holy Spirit is not.

Third corollary: though in the divine there are three supposites distinct in number, nevertheless they are not properly called three individuals of the same species, This corollary is asserted by Thomas of Argentina, in book 1, distinction 13 Thomas of Strasbourg, XXX saying it is not able to be because individual conveys a difference of nature, but not a supposite.

Third Conclusion

Third conclusion: just it is not the case that the Holy Spirit is the Father or the Son, so it is repugnant that the Holy Spirit is begotten or not begotten. The first part is proved because the divine persons are necessarily distinguished, therefore. The consequence is clear and the antecedent is proved because, if it were not, there would be a confusion of persons in the divine or there would only be one, each is an error and impossible, therefore. The second part is proved because to be begotten is to be the Son and to be unbegotten is to be the Father, therefore etc. The antecedent is clear in distinction 13 in distinction 13 where he says that if the Holy Spirit were begotten, there would be two sons in the divine, and if he were unbegotten, we would put two fathers in the trinity Augustinus, Ad Orosium, q. 2 (PL 40:734) Cf. Lombardus, Sent. I, d. 13, c. 4 , just as Augustine says, therefore.

The first corollary: just as the alterity of persons is through natural identity, so the duality of the productions is through triune personality. This is proved because in the divine there are only two productions, namely generation and procession.

The second corollary: just as the Father alone is produced by nothing, so the Father alone is properly called unbegotten. This is clear through what has been said. Again through the Damascene, in book one, chapter nine , saying only the Father is unbegotten, only the Son is begotten, only the Holy Spirit is processible or proceeding. Damescenus, De Fide Orthodoxa, I, c. 9 .

Third corollary: though the Holy Spirit is able to be called unbegotten improperly and negatively, nevertheless it ought not to be called unbegotten properly or privitively. The first part is clear because the Holy Spirit is not begotten, therefore it is unbegotten, when understanding unbegotten negatively. The second part is clear through what has been said because then the person of the Holy Spirit would be the person of the Father, which is impossible. From everything else the affirmative part of the conclusion follows.

Objections

Against the first conclusion, it is argued in the first place with the arguments of Hugolinus against Gregory arguing in the first book, in distinction 10 up to distinction 14 Hugolinus, XXX because the Son is from one, the Holy Spirit from two, therefore from the mode of proceeding between generation and procession there is able to be a distinction. But Master Gregory says that this does not suffice, therefore Hugolinus replies in opposition where there is production of the Word a double producing or productive thing is not required, therefore the ratio of distinction between generation and procession is able to be assigned. The antecedent is clear because one producing thing is sufficient.

In the second place, where there is generation of a living person, there is not able to be several generating, unless one of them were disposed in the mode of a mother, but this is impossible in the divine, therefore.

In the third place, where a person is omnipotent and speaks itself, if another person is required, it follows either that it is not omnipotent or produces in another mode than by speaking, therefore.

In the fourth place against the third corollary, since, though the Holy Spirit is knowledge, nevertheless it is not knowledge through process, nor is the Son love by generation. Therefore these productions are sufficiently distinguished given that the Son is not love through generation and nor does the Holy Spirit have what is knowledge through spiration. See Hugolinus, book I, distinction 10 and 11, article 4 Hugolinus, I, d. 10 et 11, a. 4 , where he argues against Gregory.

In the fifth place, ever perfect operation terminates in some produced terminus. But it possible to conclude by reason that in God there is the perfect operation of intellect and will, therefore it is possible to conclude that divine understanding terminates int he Word and the divine will terminates in love. But when nothing produces itself, it follows that what is produced really differs from what is producing. But such a difference is not able to be in the essence, therefore it must be in the persons and their processions.

In the sixth place, that created nature is found in many supposites is a type of perfection in creatures absolutely, therefore it should be attributed to the divine nature. The consequence holds because whatever is a kind of perfection in creatures ought to be attributed to God.

Against the second conclusion, the production of divine persons is according forms distinct in species, therefore such productions are distinguished in species. The consequence is clear because a distinction is specific which is according to distinct forms. And the antecedent is clear because divine relations are distinct in species, namely paternity, filiation, and passive spiration, and through things the divine supposites are distinguished, therefore.

In the second place, the divine supposites, having been made distinct through these things, are not able to give a distinction other than this which suits them according to their formal ratio. But paternity and filiation differ in species according to their formal rationes, therefore these things which make them distinct are distinguished in species.

In the third place against the corollaries, in the three divine persons there is not a greater goodness than in one, therefore three persons are posited in vain, therefore this should not be posited. This consequence is clear because God and nature do nothing in vain Aristoteles, De caelo, I (XXX) as is said in book I , and the antecedent is catholic.

In the fourth place, just as the highest good is disposed to evil, so the highest one is disposed to a multitude. But it is repugnant for there to be evil in the highest good, therefore it is repugnant for there to be a multitude in the highest one. Therefore, just as sin or the ability to sin is repugnant to God, so is a plurality of persons.

In the fifth place, every relative real opposition goes out to two extremes which are really distinguished. Therefore either it is necessary to posit one relative opposition in the divine or two. If one, then there will only be two extremes, If two, then there will be four extremes, and as a consequence there will be four persons, which should not be said.

In the sixth place, it is the same thing to say the Father speaks himself as it is to say he generates the Word. But the Son and the Holy Spirit perfectly speak themselves or understand just as the Father, therefore either three words are said or none.

In the seventh place, the Father by loving the Son, and the Son by loving the Father back produce the Holy Spirit. But the Father does not love the Holy Spirit less than the Son, nor is loved less in return by the Holy Spirit than by the Son, therefore the Father and the Holy Spirit produce another Holy Spirit or no person is produced through love.

Against the third conclusion and corollaries, it is argued in the first place through Jerome who is quoted by the Master in distinction 11 Lombard, I, d. 13, c. 4 , saying The Holy Spirit is not the Father, but is unbegotten, nevertheless he is not the Father because he is of the Father Hieronymus, Regulis definitionum, XXX , therefore the Holy Spirit is unbegotten.

Against the first corollary, there is a single mode of communicating nature, as says the Commentator VIII of the . But through some internal production nature is communicated, therefore there will only be one production.

In the third place, between the generation and the procession there is no relative opposition, therefore there is no distinction. The consequence holds because all things are the same where there is no opposition of relation. And the antecedent is proved because everything that is generated proceeds although the converse is not true, therefore.

Responses

To the first, what is assumed is denied universally because the word of our mind according to being proceeds both from the mind and from an object.

In the second place, I say that, having supposed that the one producing is sufficient, if nevertheless there are two, the Word does not fail to proceed.

To the second, the antecedent taken universally would be able to be denied because some mode of generation of all living things is not known to us.

In the second place, I say that this only has truth in those things which concur materially for the generation of what is produced, and thus does not apply to the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit because they equally spirate the Holy Spirit.

In the third place, the argument is redirected against the one making it in no production of the living from the living are there able to be several things producing unless there is one, etc. But the production of the holy Spirit is a production of the living from the living, therefore the Son takes the place of a mother.

To the third, it is said that the antecedent does not have greater truth with respect to speaking than it does with respect to loving. For it is the case the Father while loving himself is omnipotent, and nevertheless the Son, who loves himself, is required for the production of the Holy Spirit.

In the second place, it is said that one divine person does not properly require another, as this word suggest a lack or imperfection.

In the third place, I say that, according to the objector himself, the consequence is not valid. For the production of b many persons are required, therefore neither is omnipotent, for in distinction 7 he says this consequence is not valid a is of so much potency that it suffices alone to produce b, and a alone is not able to produce creature d, therefore a greater potency is required for producing d than b.

To the fourth, it is said that the argument begs the question because, when the Holy Spirit proceeds and the same nature through procession, each equally communicates perfectly why one production does not speak the other. Therefore, that the Son is not love through generation, etc. is to manifest the same thing through same thing or more greatly known through the less known.

To another, the adversary would say that this does not have truth in immanent operations, just willing and understanding are internal, whence in book IX of the and book I of the it is said that through immanent operations nothing is constituted, otherwise it be equally proved that the Holy Spirit produces internally.

To the sixth, the antecedent is denied because a spiritual nature not multiplied in many supposites is more perfect than a material and corruptible thing which is multiplied through individual supposites.

To the first against the second conclusion, in the first place the antecedent is denied because, just as the Father is not distinguished in species from the Son, so the Son is not distinguished from paternity because the 'by the Son' and the Son are the same. In the second place, it would be possible to be said that, granted that paternity and filiation were specifically distinguished considered unto themselves, nevertheless, as they constitute divine supposites, they have the mode of individual properties. But because I do not say that they are constituted as persons through these properties, therefore I stand with the first solution and reject the second which is the solution of Thomas of Strasbourg XXX .

To the second, it is said that the major premise does not have truth with respect to those things which give individual and incommunicable being, as is the case here. But it holds with respect to the divine principles which being distinct in and of themselves give being absolutely.

To the third, the consequence is denied because this goodness is there in many modes.

To the fourth, the major premise passes, but when it is further said that to God or to the divine essence, which thus is the good in the highest way, plurification is as repugnant as sin and condemnation, this is conceded, but nevertheless with its unity the plurality of persons is perfectly compatible.

To the fifth, it is said that in the divine there are only two opposite relations. For the first we have the Father and the Son. Fro the second we have the Holy Spirit because the second of the extremes of the dua relations does not constitute a person, namely the active spiration which is common to the Father and the Son.

To the sixth, it is said that, though evident reason is not able to be assigned apart from faith why the speaking or understanding of the Son does not terminate in some produced term, nevertheless with the supposition of faith t is able to be said that to speak is able to be taken in two ways. In one way properly which is the same as conceiving the word, and Augustine V Augustinus, De Trinitate, V, XXX takes it this way when he says that non singulus in divinis sed Pater est dicens Augustinus, De Trinitate, VII, c. 1 . And in this way the major of the argument is conceded and the minor o the second part of the antecedent is denied. To say is taken in a second mode when it is meant to understand perfectly, and in this way the minor ought to be understood. And in this case, note that the conclusion does not follow because medium is changed.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that non only is he able to produce perfectly in virtue of the fact that he understand perfectly precisely, but also because the perfect understanding is in the Father himself with inclusion of the required relation for the producing the son which relation is paternity, but the Son and the Holy Spirit, though they understand, nevertheless they do not have a relation, therefore they do not generate through understanding. But in saying it this way it is to solve the same thing through the same thing.

To the seventh, it is said, just as before, that it does not follow, for though the Holy Spirit equally perfectly loves in addition to the Father and the Son, nevertheless it does not have this with the relation necessarily required for producing the Holy Spirit, which is active spiration which is opposed to passive spiration which the Holy Spirit has or is.

To the first against the third conclusion it is said to Jerome that unbegotten is able to be taken in three ways. In the first place, for that which does not have generation in itself understood passively, In the second place, for that which does not have the generation of this thing. In the third place, for that which does not have generation and nor is from something having it, and with this has a property in opposition to passive generation. In the first mode, the Holy Spirit is said to be unbegotten because it is not begotten and it is in this mode that Jerome speaks. In the second mode, the divine essence is said to unbegotten. In the third mode, only the Father is unbegotten and, and it is in this mode that the conclusion is meant.

To the second it is said that the Commentator speaks about the communication of the created nature.

To the third, it is said in the first mode that the argument is founded on something false. In the first place, because persons are not only distinguished by opposing relations. In the second place, because the productions of the divine differ from themselves and not only in relations, therefore the argument does not conclude.

To the first argument in the opposition, it is clear through what is said in the first conclusion because it does not follow that the pilgrim is able to know, even though it is the case.

To the second, the consequence is denied.

To the third, it is clear from the third conclusion and the solution of the arguments against it because the Holy Spirit is able to be called unbegotten and improperly according to the first mode of the distinction posited.

In the second place, it would be possible this consequence that is not begotten, therefore it is unbegotten is denied, just as it does not follow that this is not just, therefore it is unjust because this can be said about a stone. The antecedent is true and the consequent is false.

Principal arguments

That not because the Holy Spirit is not given nor sent temporally to creatures, therefore. The antecedent is proved because, if this were true, either such a giving would require some prior disposition in the receiving creature, or some nature. If the first, it follows that it is a disposition of a disposition, and thus there will be an infinite process in such prerequisite dispositions or there will be some disposition that can be given absolutely not presupposing a prior disposition, and then it will be able to be said similarly about the giving of the Holy Spirit that it is will be a first not requiring a prior. If the second, it follows that one will be equally capable of receiving the Holy Spirit whether indisposed or disposed, which is false, therefore. In the second place, the antecedent is proved because, if the Holy Spirit were given to a creature, it would follows that it would be united to itself as habitual charity, which is false.

In the second place principally, it is argued therefore the Holy Spirit would be given either with its own gift or with nothing or with something and not something. Not the first then the Holy Spirit would coexist with the gift of fear, which is false because charity expels fear. Not the second because then contraries would be verified about the same thing without change or a new position of the thing against the article. Nor the third because the argument is not greater for one thing than for another, therefore.

In the third place principally, it is as repugnant to be eternally given in time as it is to be given or proceed temporally as eternal, but the first is impossible, therefore. The antecedent is clear because a person proceeding and everything temporal is mutable, as says Augustine IV , in chapter 2 Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 2, xxx .

In opposition is the Master in this distinction Lombardus, I, d. 14, xxx And this is confirmed because things which differ in reason alone are really different. But the temporal sending of the Holy Spirit and the eternal procession are of this type, therefore. The minor is clear because when the procession of the Holy Spirit terminates in an eternal object it is called eternal, but when it terminates in a temporal object it is called temporal.

First Conclusion

First conclusion: it is the case that any incomplex gift of the Holy Spirit formally inheres in the rational creature and through this gift the creature is not able to be gratified by God. This is proved because it is the case that any created incomplex gift is able to be conserved and to not be accepted as agreeable to himself by the same one, therefore. This is confirmed because only God suffices to justify and elevate the mind gratuitiously, therefore.

The first corollary: though the Holy Spirit or the uncreated gift is only sufficient for gratification, nevertheless it does not inhere in the mind through the mode of a gift or habitual grace. The first part is clear because the mind is pleasing to God prior to the created charity given to it, therefore. This is confirmed because God does not choose us from time, but before the constitution of the world Ephesios 1:4 according to the Apostle . The second part is proven because it is a kind of imperfection to inhere in a manner other than through the mode of habit, therefore from God this should be entirely denied.

The second corollary: no incomplex created gift of the Holy Spirit is formally and intrinsically repugnant to or incompossible with damnation or guilt. This is clear because every thing that is repugnant is intrinsically able to gratify and and sufficient for the expulsion of guilt.

Third corollary: no created grace nor some created gift suffices through itself to remove guilt or mortal sin. This is clear because, through the preceding corollary See above , sin is compossible with any such created gift, such as created charity.

Second conclusio

The second conclusion: though the Holy Spirit is the effective causal ratio of all his gifts, nevertheless it is not a necessary connexive ratio existing in them all at the same time. This is clear through Prima patet per illud 2 For we are his workmanship created in Christ Jesus in good works which God prepared so that we would walk in them Ephesians 2:10 about which Augustine says: non utique illa creatione qua homines facti sumus sed de ea ipse dicebat qui iam homo erat create in me a clean heart, O God Psalmus 50:12 Augustinus, De Gratia et Libro Arbitrio, I, 8, 20 . The second part is proved because the Holy Spirit does not have a greater nor a more necessary connection with respect to one than with respect to all, but it does not have a necessary connection with respect to all according to the Apostole, , in chapter 1 saying that there are divisions among grace. And it follows But all things work with one and the same Spirit, who divides to everyone as it wills I Corinthians 12:11 , where it is also clear in each part of the conclusion.

The first corollary: it stands that the Holy Spirit descends to the rational mind and does not communicate to it any gratituous incomplexly created gift. This is clear because between this there is no necessary and absolute connection through communication. This is confirmed because the Holy Spirit communicates his gift most freely, not only what he wills, but even when he wills according to the Apostolum, see above See above , therefore.

Second corollary: it stands that the gift of the Holy Spirit is diffused in the rational mind and the person of the Holy Spirit is not infused through this special descending into the same mind. This is clear because gifts are distinct from it. Again, gifts do not have a necessary connection, such that they necessarily exist in the same thing at the same time, therefore.

Third corollary: although the Holy Spirit is able to be communicated with any of its gratuitious incomplexly created gift, nevertheless the Holy Spirit is not able to be given without some other gratuitious gift. The first part is clear through what has been said. The second part is proved because it is impossible that the Holy Spirit is given to the rational mind with innovation or renovation through which there is created in it a clean heart and a just being. But this some complex gift of the Holy Spirit. For example, that the mind just and pleasing to God.

Tertia conclusio

Third conclusion: though the sending by which the Holy Spirit is communicated to men temporally from its same eternal procession is not really distinguished, nevertheless the sending or gratuitous diffusion of this type is improperly referred to as temporal. The first part is proved because the indivisible simplicity is not properly nor really distinguishable from itself, and the mission of the Holy Spirit, etc. is of this type. The major is known. The minor is proved because otherwise the Holy Spirit would at sometime begin to have a disposition or real production which it did not have from eternity, which is false. The second part is clear through the Master in the first chapter of distinction 14 where he says this production is temporal Lombardus, I, d. 14, c. 1, n. 5 . But this is not able to be said properly and intrinsically, therefore improperly and terminatively of some new extrinsic relation, which is what has been proposed.

The first corollary: it is possible that the Holy Spirit produces in the mind of a just pilgrim as perfectly as the Holy Spirit is produced in the original font of the highest spiration. This is clear because it is produced by the same production really and nominally in the mind of the pilgrim and in the font of inspiration.

The second corollary: that the eternal emanation of the Holy Spirit is the temporal justification or gratification of holy men. This is clear because the diffusion of the Holy Spirit in the mind is the gratification of the mind, and this is not really anything other than its eternal emanation, therefore.

Third corollary: although the gratuitious diffusion of the Holy Spirit made to holy men is called and was a temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless in no way is this or is this able to be changeable. The same thing is clear with eternal procession, which is entirely unchangeable, therefore. From these things the affirmative title of the question follows.

Objections and Responses

To the principal argument, the antecedent, the antecedent is denied. And to the proof it is said through the third conclusion that at least from the absolute power and law of God the Holy Spirit is able to be communicated and to be sent without these gifts, and conversely because there is no necessary connection between these, and nevertheless it does not follow from this that it is against the article because without the position of a new thing contradictories are able to be verified sinece when taking thing loosely, as if extending to the mode of the thing, this giving of the Holy Spirit would not occur without some complex created gift because it would confer to the mind just and pleasing being and this suffices for the article, nevertheless it would occur without a habitual incomplex created gift, as is said in the third corollary of the third conclusion Vide supra .

Against the first conclusion: it is argued in the first place thus that it suffices that to elevate the mind to some point of acting meritoriously it is the efficient principle and is sufficiently gratifying and gratuitously elevating of the mind. But a gift of gratuitously caused grace is of this type. Proof: because the created gift elevates so intensely for the power to act well, just as to be well, and conversely, therefore when it elevates to intrinsecally being well, thus it leads to doing well, and in this what is proposed is reached.

Against the first corollary: the uncreated form is not mediately or immediately uniteable to a subject, therefore there is required a first disposition of the gift or of the uncreated form. Therefore the Holy Spirit by itself is not able to gratify the mind or deliver grace.

Against the second corollary: created charity is a greater good than the remission of guilt, therefore this has sufficient imputability or activity for the remission of guilt. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is proved because through created charity the mind is more perfected and more supernaturally elevated than through the remission of guilt.

Against the third corollary: it follows that the habit of charity is not effective of a meritorious act, which is false, because the assistance does not suffice for operating meritoriously. The consequence is proved since a meritorious act seems intrinsically and formally gratuitous because it does not seem impossible that an act is meritorious of eternal life and not meritorious or gratuitious.

To the first, the minor is denied, and to the proof, the consequence is denied. But it ought to be concluded thus and the minor ought to be formed, but sufficiently through itself it intrinsically elevates to being well morally, therefore to operating, and arguing in this way the minor is denied.

To the second, I say that if it understands about gratuitious union through the sanctification of the mind, about which now is the word, then the antecedent is denied not only because God is an agent of infinite power but also because the soul is as if an immediate subject in that union, and again because the agent is said to be where it works, but God works in us every good disposition, therefore it is in us earlier than such dispositions.

To the third, having conceded the antecedent, the consequence is denied because, if it were valid, it would be proved in a similar way that man would suffice for producing some individual of a species inferior to itself. The consequence is clear because man is more perfect than those things, for example a horse or an ass.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied, and to the proof, it is said that when taking such an act as an incomplex entity, in this case the act is not formally intrinsically gratuitous, but extrinsically and denotatively, namely because is the kind of thing accepted from God and because one freely accepts and is able to not accept. Therefore it stands that such an entity is and is not meritorious.

Against the second conclusion, it is argued in the first place thus, it is impossible that some creature is and God does not exist in it through its present power and essence, therefore. The antecedent is clear through the Master in distinction 37 of the first book Lombardus, I, d. 37 . The consequence is clear both because these kinds of gratuituous gifts are things and because they are true things to those to whom they are given, therefore the Holy Spirit will be in those things as in gifts, therefore one is not given without the other.

Against the first corollary: because it would follows that something would be able to have a gratuitous being without a gratuitous form. The consequent is false because the form is that which gives the being of the thing Peter of Spain, Tractatus 5 (De Rijk, 68) . The consequence is clear because the habitual gratuitious form is a gratituous created gift of God, and anyone who has the Holy Spirit has the gratuitous being, therefore.

Against the second, it follows that some habitual form would inform the subject and it would not be called this or that something without the Spirit would be able to merit eternal life, each is false. The consequence is proved because since love is the gift Holy Spirit, if this is had without the Holy Spirit, then either it would render that one sufficiently beloved for eternal life or not. If not, then it would follow that charity does not denote one who is beloved, which is the first inconvenience. If so, then the second inconvenience follows, namely that such a person would merit, while not having, eternal life, that is the Holy Spirit.

Against the third corollary, it is asked what is this gratuitous gift? Either it is the Holy Spirit precisely, and then it follows that without distinction or position, etc, against the articule, as Gregory infers, or it is the mind itself elevated through the Holy Spirit, or something else emerging from all these things. The second is not given because then the mind would gratify itself nor is the third able to be said, therefore.

To the first, the consequence is denied, and to the proof, I say that here I do not speak about this in the common mode of being by which God is in all things, but about this in the way Christ is spoken of, if anyone loves me etc. we will make our abode among him Ioannes 14:23 about which Brother Jordan our doctor says that such a gratuitous union is to mind greater than it is or was the divine hypostatic union to the supposite, not only because in this union not just one person is united and comes but the entire trinity, on account of which it is said we come, but also because in this union it comes on account of him, to him, and in him. Third because it does not come only to return, but will remain eternally, therefore it is said, among him we will make our abode Ioannes 14:23 . Therefore it would be able to be said that this special mode of being is the intimation in the heart of created and uncreated charity and some diffusion of the immeasurable divine sweetness and some refraction in the intellect of the divine light, such that anyone perceiving and accepting this would be able to say that God you, turning, will bring us to life Psalmus 84:7 This point is made by Master Herman of Schildesche on the chapter 4 , to the beloved, and his turning is to me Hermanus de Schildesche, xxx .

To the second, it is said that, that someone has gratituous being, is able to be in two ways. In one mode, habitually, intrinsically, and informatively, in another mode, extrinsically and denotively. In the first mode, the consequence is denied. In the second mode, the consequence is conceded, and the consequent and its proof work in the first mode, not in the second, because such a soul would be called good extrinsically and causally through the Holy Spirit, nevertheless not formally or informally.

To the third, it could be said in one mode that from the absolute power of God the consequent is possible for the first part. In another mode, the antecedent is able to be conceded because someone would be able to reach eternal life while not having the Holy Spirit in this mode of having it. In a third mode, is able to be said that the principle denomination of created love is not that we are loved by God, but because God is loved by us, and thus the first consequent does not follow.

To the fourth, it is said that none of them is, but there is some other mode by which God makes the soul just and freely and gratuitiously accepted by him into eternal life, and this suffices.

Against the third conclusion, it is argued in the first place thus, there is a double procession of the Holy Spirit, therefore one is distinct from the other. The consequence is clear from the terms, and the antecedent from the Master in this distinction Lombardus, I, d. 14, c. 1 . This is confirmed because processions are counted according to terms, just as it is possible to see from IV Aristoteles, Physicorum, IV, xxx concerning motions. But temporal and eternal processions are different kinds of terms according to Commentator X Averroes, Metaphysicae, X corruptible and incorruptible differ more than in kind, therefore the conclusion is false.

Against the first corollary, it follows that God would not produce the Holy Spirit more perfectly in the soul of one just person than any other. The consequent is false because it follows that the Holy Spirit was not more perfectly in the soul of Christ than he was in the soul of Peter

Against the second corollary, it follows that the gratification of man would be eternal and immeasurable. The consequent is false because then man would be immeasurably pleasing to God, and thus one person would not be more pleasing than any other.

Against the third corollary, there is Augustine IV , in chapter three Augustinus, De civitate Dei, IV, c. 2 who approves the word of Apuleus who says in his book all earthly things are subject to change upheaval and destruction Apuleius, On the World, 34 , therefore since according to Augustine every temporal thing is changeable, it follows that, if the procession of the Holy Spirit is temporal, that it is changeable.

To the first, it is said that the Master wishes to say that the Holy Spirit proceeds in two modes and nevertheless in a single procession. To the confirmation, the antecedent is conceded where what is proceeding is referred to such terms really and intrinsically rather than extrinsically according to reason alone. Whence according to Augustine V , in the last chapter capitulo ultimo Augustinus, De Trinitate, V, c. xxx , the Holy Spirit refers to an eternal object according to its being, but to a temporal object only according to reason.

To the second, I say that such a production is able to be considered in four ways, in the first mode with respect to act, with respect to the term, with respect to the mode of production, and with respect to the fruit of production. In the first or second mode the consequent is able to be conceded, but not in the third or fourth mode, and nor do I wish to say so.

To the third, I say that it follows well that the gratification of man is immeasurable, but is not an immeasurable gratification of man. It would be able to be said similarly about beatitude, and many other things, that the beatitude of man is immeasurable, but is not, etc.

To the last, I say that Augustine is speaking about the temporal properly and intrinsically, but the procession of the Holy Spirit is not the kind about which he is speaking.

To the first in the opposition, the antecedent is denied, and when it is said because this kind of giving presupposes etc., it is true from the common and ordered law, and an infinite process is denied.

To another, the consequence is denied.

To the third, it is clear through what has been said that it is possible that charity is in some subject and such a subject is not pleasing or loved.

To another the solution is clear through what has been said.

To the last, the antecedent is denied for the first part because nothing proceeds while it is not, but no temporal thing has had being from eternity, but temporality is able to coincide with the eternal, not intrinsically, but extrinsically or by some extrinsic denomination, without changing itself.

Principal Arguments

It is argued thus because to receive is purely passive and to perceive is active, therefore one is able to stand without the other. The consequence holds because with respect to the same terms the created mind is not able at the same time to be purely passive and active, since perceiving is not formally passive, and also because the perceptive power is universally more perfect than a passive power.

In the second place, if the question were true, it would follows that be fitting for any divine person to be perceived by the same one by whom it would be proper to be sent. The consequent is false because it appropriate for the Father to be perceived, and nevertheless it is not fitting for him to be sent, as is clear in the penultimate chapter of this distinction Lombardus, Sent., I, d. 15, c. 9 . The consequence is clear because, if the sending and the perception are the same, it follows that to be perceived and to be sent are the same.

In the third place, if the question were true, it would follows that anyone existing in grace would perceive evidently. The consequent is he is worthy by love or hate. And the consequence is clear because to perceive something is to know it. In the second place, it follows that the newly baptized would have a mental perception of grace or of the Holy Spirit. In the third place, it follows that someone would receive grace as intense as they perceive it. The consequent is false because then the virgin would have had a more intense perception than someone, indeed than any angel, because she received more grace than any angel.

In opposition are the words of the present distinction in chapter 10 where he says, tunc unicuique Spiritus Sanctus mittitur cum a quocumque cognoscitur atque percipitur quantum cognosci et percipi potest secundum capacitatem animae rationalis Lombardus, I, d. 15, c. 7, n. 2 . Again, in the same distinction in chapter 12 Lombardus, I, d. 15, c. 7, n. 2 , when to be sent is said to be perceived by the mind from time Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20, n. 28 .

First conlusion

First conclusion: though the created intellective potency is in some way active with respect to some mission or vision of the divine, nevertheless no creature is able to be actively disposed, with respect to the expression of the uncreated word, through the mode of speaking. The first part is clear because in heaven the created intellective potency with respect to enjoyment is actively disposed. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is clear through the God bless our fruition stands or our formal beatitude consists in two acts of the because of the intellect and will which is the entire latitude of formal glory. The second part is clear because it follows that the uncreated Word would be a terminus produced from a created intellective power. The consequent is false, and the consequence is clear because it does not seem possible that the saying of anyone saying this is to speak a produced terminus of the same thing, and thus to speak would have a created uncreated terminus, which is false.

The first corollary: though the blessed soul is able to effectively concur with its own fruition, nevertheless it is not able to produce the light of glory in any mode. The first part is clear from the conclusion because such a light is producible by God alone.

The second corollary: though the created memory is able to be elevated beatifically through the divine essence as if an intellective species, nevertheless it is not the case that by this the uncreated Word is properly formed. This is clear because then the finite potency would produce an immeasurable term. John of Marchia in his Ripa, Determinationibus, Q. 3, a. 2, concl. 3 asserts the opposite of this corollary. The first part of is clear because God is able to supply two efficient causes in turn.

The third corollary: though the blessed soul is disposed passively with respect to fruition, nevertheless the same thing is able to be disposed actively with respect to cognition and delight. The first part is clear because it is receptive of these acts. The second part is clear through what is said in the conclusion and other corollaries.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though it is appropriate only for the Holy Spirit and the Son to be sent, nevertheless active mission is proper to each divine person. The first part is clear because to be sent is not appropriate for the Father, but it is for the Son and Holy Spirit. The first part of the antecedent is from Augustine IV , in the last chapter who says that the Father is not said to be sent Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20, n. 28 (PL 42:xxx) . The second part of the antecedent is clear through Augustine II , chapter 5 saying the Son was not able to be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit, for the Father is understood as the one who sent him because he was made the feminine because he certainly did not make him without the Holy Spirit Augustinus, De Trinitate, II, c. 5, 8 (PL42:xxx) . But that the Holy Spirit was sent through the same one is clear through Augustine in book IV , in chapter 19 , where he says expressly that The Holy Spirit gives and sends itself Augustinus, XXX . Again 15 I am sending you the spirit of truth Ioannes 15:26 . The second part is proved because the external work of the Trinity is undivided, but to send some person, etc., therefore. This is the argument of the Master in distinction 15 Lombard, I, d. 15, XXX .

First corollary: it is not more repugnant for the Son to be sent by the Spirit that it is for the Son to be the spirator of the Holy Spirit. This is clear from what has been said because from each is true and not repugnant.

The second corollary: it ought to be admitted that it is appropriate for each person that the same thing is sent and sends itself. This is clear because to send is to act externally.

Third corollary: the perception of any divine person under a bodily species is not the passive mission of the same person. This is clear because the Father is not sent, and nevertheless appeared under a bodily likeness in the transfiguration when his voice was heard saying Here is my beloved son Matthaeus 17:5; Lucas 15:24, Marcus 9:6 . From what has been said it is clear that to be sent is not merely absolute, but also convey a relation of some origin. This is clear because, if it were merely absolute, then it would be able to suit the Father, just as it suits the Son and the Holy Spirit. Whence Augustine IV , in chapter 30 says, that the Son is sent is to know that it is from another Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20, n. 29 (PL 42:xx)

Tertia conclusio

Third conclusion: though it is not the case that the Holy Spirit is received from something and that it is no way perceived by the one receiving it, nevertheless according to the common law non one is able to knowing perceive that he loves God meritoriously. The first part is clear because temporal sending of the Holy Spirit is a vital perception in the created mind, therefore. The antecedent is from the saying of Augustine introduced above in which it is said the sending is said to be when the Holy Spirit is perceived by the mind from time Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 20, n. 28 . The second part is clear through the saying of the Apostle 13 Nothing is known to me, but I am not in this justified I Corinthians 4:4 . Again , in chapter 3 The Spirit breathes where he wills but you will not know from where it comes or where he goes John 3:8 Again, I do not know whether he is worthy of hate Ecclesiastes 9:1 , etc

The first corollary: while the law stand, though no one is able to know that they have ordinate love, nevertheless someone ought to believe that they have the sending of the Holy Spirit. The first is clear from what has been said. The second is proved because someone ought to believe that they have charity, therefore. The consequence holds because for the Holy Spirit to be sent into the mind is for charity to be infused in the mind, as the conclusion says. And the antecedent is clear from an adult approaching a sacrament by which grace is conferred, just as in the case of baptism and the eucharist.

The second corollary: it is not the case that the fruit of the divine mission increases in the mind and the vital perception of God is not intensified in the same thing. This is clear because, if not, if follows that not everyone receiving a sending of the divine person would have this vital perception, which is against the conclusion.

The third corollary: we do not always understand knowing uniformily. This is clear because otherwise one having such a perception would have evidence and experiential cognition, which is against what has been said. From what has been said the response is clear that it stands that some, etc.

Objections

Against the first conclusion, it follows that created memory would be able to concur through its own essential active power to the clarity of the light of glory. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because created intelligence is no more able to concur to the supernatural disposition and vital union of the divine essence than to the light of glory.

In the second place against the first corollary, it is repugnant that the natural potency act supernaturally through its own essential power, therefore it is repugnant that the created intellect concur effectively for heavenly enjoyment

In the third place against the second corollary, created intelligence concurs effectively to the motion of vision by which the uncreated word is made present vitally to this intelligence. But this is to speak the uncreated word, therefore.

Against the third corollary, it follows that beatitude corresponds more intensely, all things being equal, to what is more perfect in natural things, and as a consequence with equality of merits remaining the inequality of the first things will remain on account of the prior essential things, which is false. And the consequence is clear because because purer essential things are able to do more than less pure and imperfect things.

Against the second conclusion, to be sent and to send are correlative, therefore since being sent recognizes the relation of origin, it follows that to send speaks the same relation. But the Holy Spirit originates nothing internally, therefore it is not able to send any person. The consequence is clear because according to Augustine to be sent is to be originated, therefore to send is to originate

In the second place, because the relation which sending speaks either will be to that which is the mission, and then it will be common to three persons, and thus the Father will be sent. The consequence is clear because it is an external relation of reason. Or it speaks a relation to that which is sending, and if thus, therefore either it will be of reason only, and then it will be able to be in the Father, or real, and then again sending will not be essential, and as a consequence it will not be common to three persons, which is repugnant to the second part of this conclusion.

In the third place, to be sent speaks a relation of origin, therefore no person is able to send itself. The consequence is clear because non person is able to originate itself.

In the fourth place, to be sent speaks ann imperfection and indignity, therefore it not belong to any divine person. The consequence is valid, but the antecedent is proved because according Dionysius in Dionysius, De angelica hierarchia, XXX superior angels always assist God and not sent on account of their dignity. But the divine person has more dignity without proportion than every angel, therefore on account of its dignity it ought not be sent.

Against the third conclusion, someone is able to know that they are worthy of eternal life, therefore someone is able to know that they meritoriously love God, at least habitually. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved because someone is able to know that they have filial fear, therefore also love. The consequence holds through on the perfect love cast out fear I John 4:18 . The antecedent is clear 22 I know because you fear God Genesis 22:12 , that is I have made you to know. Item, 2 let your requests be made known to God Phil. 4:6 , where according to the the Gloss XXX this should not be understood as if they are made known to God who knew these things before they were, but that they are made known by us before God.

Again, anyone is able to know that he loves all things on account of God and has left all things behind, therefore he is able to know that he is worthy of eternal life. The consequence holds from 19 everyone that leaves etc. will posses eternal life Matthew 19:29

Again, someone is able to know that they have no servile fear, therefore he is able to know that he charity. The consequence holds that passage from 4 perfect chartiy I John 4:18 , etc.

Against the first corollary, no article forces someone to believe that they are in charity, therefore. The antecedent is clear because, if there were, then the following would be given I believe in the Holy Catholic Church. But this is not because the Church in no place commands this, indeed it would seem to be hypocrisy to judge one self in charity, it even seems to be meritorious to judge one's self outside of charity, as is clear from the publican in 18 Luke 18:9-14 .

In the second place against the second corollary, the sinner ought expunged from sin, therefore he ought to believe that he is in charity. And further every adult either is in charity or outside, therefore everyone ought to believe that they are in charity, which is the first.

Against the other corollaries, every perception is some sort of cognition, and to the intension of perception it follows the intension of cognition, therefore these corollaries are false.

Responses

To the first, the consequence is denied, and it is said to the proof that not every sending of the divine person is a supernatural disposition as the argument intends to speak about disposition.

In the second place, the antecedent would be able to be denied generally.

In the third place, the consequence is able to be conceded which has already been negated, namely that memory, etc., indeed not by doing this in itself and about itself.

To the second, it is said that the antecedent is true, if through its natural power precisely it is not repugnant to act in this manner with the addition of another potency. But in what is proposed it is not only the natural agent but also the supernatural agent that is elevating the potency of the natural power itself and actuating it for acting.

To the third, the minor is negated because to concur to such motion is not to speak the incarnate word.

To the fourth, it is said in the first place by denying the consequence because to the intension of a partial cause the effect of the action is not always intended.

In the second place, it would be able to be siad that retribution of the first things will not stand according to the proportion of merits because then no first thing would be give for baptismal grace, which is false.

In the third place, the consequent would be able to be conceded, nevertheless while concurring with the will of God, which is able to distribute rewards in whatever way pleases him.

To the first against the second conclusion, there is a distinction concerning the word to send, because in one mode it is understood principally authoritatively, in another mode consequently determinatively. In the first mode, it only applies to the Father and the Son, in the second mode to all three. Therefore, if the antecedent is taken in the first mode, then it is conceded. If it is taken in the second mode, then the consequence is denied and nor is the antecedent true.

To the second, it is said that to be sent speaks a relation not indeed to the one sending determinatively consequently, but principally authoritatively. Similarly it would be able to be said about sending that, if it were taken authoritatively, then no persona sends itself nor another unless that which it produces, but this nicely made clear in the second mode.

This is clear for the third argument, about this see Thomas of Argentina Thomas de Argentina, XXX .

To the fourth, it is said that otherwise it is true in creatures because when a creature is sent, it is changed and moved to some place where was not previously. But because God is everywhere, therefore the divine person is able to be sent without mutation or imperfection because it is not sent where it was not, but in this manner was not a new effect, namely causing in the creature without change to itself, nevertheless not without change of the creature.

To the first against the third conclusion, the antecedent is denied, and to the proof it is replied by speaking about fear formed in charity. This is denied, and to the proof it should be said that Abraham knew from this divine revelation indicating this to himself, and to the other proof, your petitions Phil. 4:6 etc., it is said that from the this is not had unless that in something we believe that we are from God from having heard and perhaps we know that the operated effect has come about. But from this, the opposition to the conclusion does not follow.

To another, the consequence is denied because he is not justified from works because Socrates despised reaches according to Jerome, and nevertheless he was not justified.

Again to another, the consequence is denied because from pure natural ability someone is able to have no fear.

To the first against the corollary, the antecedent is denied because it is contained under the aforenamed article or because this article speaks what is the same. Also the church says that concerning those receiving the sacrament of the eucharist, as is clear from 2 but let man prove himself I Corinthians 11:28 etc. And this is able to occur without hypocrisy and boasting

To the third, the consequence is conceded as well as the consequent, and the further consequence is denied, but if follows well that he ought to be in such a state in which he believes that he is in charity, against the Monachus Niger.

To the fourth, the consequent would be able to be conceded regarding habitual cognition, but not actual, about which I speak in the conclusion and corollary. Again, it would be possible to be said that such cognition is intensified, nevertheless not in the being of cognition, but only in the being of experiential perception. This is clear from what has been said.

Principal arguments

That not because then it would follow that the distinction of such visible species would imply proportionally a distinction of things known. The consequent is false because every cognition of the created intellect is placed in the genus of quality, but the species in which the Holy Spirit appear are not always in the same genus. This is clear from the the case of the dove and the fire. The consequence is clear because active causes differing in species acting naturally not freely cause specifically distinct actions. But these species are natural things, therefore, if they change the intellect by co-creating cognition in it, it follows that there will be a diversity of cognitions on account of a diversity of species. This is confirmed because in II it is said that to the distinction of objects it follows the distinction of acts and operations and from the distinction of operations follows the distinction powers Aristoteles, De anima, II, xxx .

In the second place, species existing in the created memory actuate the potency only mentally but not causally, therefore species existing extrinsically do not actuate causally or create change. The consequence holds because the argument does not apply less to one than to the other. And the antecedent is clear through John of Ripa, quaestione 2, articulo 3, distinctione 2 Ripa, I, d. 2, a. 3, a. 3, xxx .

In the third place, the species in which the Holy Spirit appeared visibly were only imaginary and not real, therefore. The antecedent is clear because, according to Blessed Augustine II , capitulo 5 , the visible mission of the Holy Spirit came for this reason so that the heart of man understanding anew by having seen through external things would be converted by understanding to the hidden deity Augustinus, De Trinitate, II, c. 5, n. 10 (PL 42:XXX) . But the created intellect is moved by phantasms and imaginary species, therefore.

In opposition there is Gospel text In oppositum est textus evangelicus 3 , where it is said it descended in corporeal species Lucas 3:22 , therefore it was not phantasmatic or imaginary but had true and real body, therefore.

First conclusion

The first conclusion: though the divine person appearing in a visible mission is able to be believed to create such a species without a second cause, nevertheless it possible that the blessed angels form such corporal species. The first part is clear because God able to do alone whatever he is able to with another in the genus of the efficient cause. The second part is proved because according to Dionysius in , the law of divinity is to order the lower things through mediate things Ps-Dionysius, De angelica hierarchia, XXX .

The first corollary: though the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared visibly was formed by the angels, nevertheless only the humanity suppositionally united to Christ by the three persons was created. The first is clear from the conclusion. The second is proved both since in the reason of dignity of that suppositional union it proper that this matter is immediately produced by God, and in the second place because it was formed in an instant. But this does not seem able to happen from a finite power, as I now supposed. This is also seen in Scripture 1 what is born in her is from the Holy Spirit Matthew 1:20 . Again in 1 The Holy Spirit will come upon you Lucas 1:35 etc.

Second corollary: though an angel is able to produce a corporeal sign of the temporal mission of the divine person, nevertheless the angel is not able in any way to effect the thing signified by this kind of sign. This is clear because this gratuitous gift added to the mind is produced by God alone.

Third corollary: just as the gift signified through a species is not subordinated to angelic activity, so not the angel but the divine person whose nature relates to this gift is said to appear or to be sent. This is clear because this gift signified through the species declares and denominates a sent person. And therefore, if this gift is a kind of wisdom, then it is able to be said that the Son is sent because wisdom is attributed to him. If it is a kind of love or mercy, then the Holy Spirit. If it is a kind of authority or power, then the Father is able to be said to appear, nevertheless he is not sent because he does not originate from anything.

For these things it would be possible to infer that, though the angels are not able to be creatures, nevertheless they are able to be producers of creatable things. The first part is clear because to create is for something to independently move through production from non being to being. The second part is clear because, as it has been said, this dove in the mystery of those things was produced, which was able to be created, indeed would be able to be recreated by God.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: the sensible species assisting extrinsically and intrinsically in the existence of the memory vitally changes the intellect and actuates it as an object and causally. This is clear, with respect to species extrinsically existing, through Blessed Augustine in , chapter 6 Augustinus, De vera religion, c. 6, xxx and II , chapter 4 Augustinus, De Trinitate, II, c. 4 . Again, it is clear through the Philosopher in , where he says motion made by the sense or by the sensibile impresses just as some figure or sensible picture Aristoteles, De memoria et reminiscentia, xxx . The second part is proved because, if such a species is existing in the memory intrinsiscally and does not change the potency as an object, then it would follows that there would not be a different between and habitual specie and a habitual concept in act, which is false because then someone having such a species actually would know it, which should not be said. This last consequence is clear because phantasm is a is the habitual word of the sensible species, as is clear through Blessed Augustine where he is cited above Vide supra.

The first corollary: it is stands that some vitally power changes and this is neither the vital form nor its formal act. This is clear because the voice and the fire and many other sensible species change the created intellect through the the senses, and nevertheless such species are vital forms, nor is this change the formal act of these species, since it is the case that those things are and change nothing vitally.

The second corollary: it is the case that the intellect apprehends something and is moved vitally by the same thing, and the thing moving is really and seated in the intellect. This is clear through Beatum Augustinum in , where he says, they apprehend vitally the son being absent and Rome or Carthage being distant Augustinus, De Vera Religione, XXX . And we have experience of this.

Third corollary: just as the intelligence is able to know a thing that is absent, so also is it possible to apprehend cogitively something not existing through a representing species . This is clear because just as one knows an absent and distant thing through a species abstractively, so concerning a thing not existing it is possible to have a species and through this to conceive something, therefore.

Third Conclusion

Third conclusion: though the dove in which the species of the sent Holy Spirit appeared was a real and true entity, nevertheless scripture expresses or asserts that some sign, in which the Holy Spirit appeared or was seen, that was not a real thing. The first part is clear through Blessed Augustine II , where, speaking about the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared during the baptism of Christ, he says there is no doubt that it was real true body since scripture asserts that it descended in a bodily likeness Augustinus, De Trinitate, II, c. XXX . The second part is clear in the same book, in chapter 5 where concerning the tongue of fire on the day of Pentecost the Holy Spirit appeared he raises the question whether it was truly a thing or imaginary. The question unsolved is unsolved nor does he assert some part of it, but asserts as if a problem without an answer, nevertheless he concludes after saying many things for they do not see tongues like fire they are seen by them Act 2:3 . For in spiritual things we say it appeared to me and I have seen. But in those things which are shown to the eyes through an expressed bodily species, it is not accustomed to be said it appeared to me, but I have seen Augustinus, De Trinitate, II, c. 6, n. 11 (PL 42:xxx) , therefore the conclusion is true.

The first corollary: that not every gratuitous sign demonstrating or putting forth that a creature is pleasing to God is created charity or a sacrament or infused habit gratifying the mind. This is clear because the mission of the Holy Spirit made under some visible sign is to cause a sign of sanctity to which an illative showing is sent, and nevertheless this bodily sign is not something of the aforementioned type, therefore.

Second corollary: it is the case that some person appears in a bodily sign and that this person is never sent or was sent. This is clear concerning the Father who appeared in a voice when Christ was baptized saying here is my Son Matthaeus 3:17 , etc., and nevertheless nowhere in scripture is it read that he was sent because he originates from no other.

Third corollary: no thing in which the Holy Spirit appeared visibily was united it suppositionally. This is clear because the Holy Spirit it is never read tha the Holy Spirit was a dove, a tongue, or breath.

For this it is clear what should be said to the question, for it is possible to be said that some species in which the Holy Spirit appeared was a true and real entity, and some were only appearing and imaginary, nevertheless by all such instances was it possible for the sensitive or intellective created power to be changed or to be moved, etc.

Objections

Against the first conclusion it is argued, if it were true, then it follows that angels rather than the divine persons would be said to be sent and to appear or to have appeared. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because, when angels form some body from the elements by applying something to active to passive things, it seems that the same thing appears in the formed body.

In the second place, the absolutely invisible is not able to be sent or to appear visibily without a fiction. But a fiction is repugnant to any divine person, therefore, etc. The consequence is clear because every divine person is absolutely invisible, according to , he inhabits a light inaccessible which no one sees I Timothy 6:16 .

In the third place, against the second and third corollaries, a gratuitous gift is subordinated to the activity of the sacraments of the church, therefore it is able to be subordinated to angelic activity. The consequence holds because an angel is more worthy, more perfect, and more active than any sacrament. The antecedent is clear because the sacrament of baptism confers and causes grace in the baptismal right.

Against the second conclusion, if this were true, it would follows that a species of this type or an object of this type would be caused. The consequent is false because the species of an object either represents more perfectly the species of memory or equally or less perfectly. Not the first because such a created species depends in its being and conserved by a species of the memory, and therefore as a consequence is less perfect. If it is said that it represents equally or less perfectly, then such an act distinct from the species would be posited in vain, which is equal or more sufficient for causing such a vital change. to such a vital change, would be posited in vain.

Against the first corollary, no change is vital which stands to be without this which is changed by the potency, but an objective causal change is of this type, therefore it is not in such a thing. The major is known. The minor is proved because it stands that some act is caused both informatively in the existing and through no superadded action, therefore.

In the third place against the second and third corollaries, only that which is vitally in a vital potency, is vitally apprehended, therefore whatever is apprehended in this way is present to the apprehending potency in this way. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved because if follows that a is vitally apprehended by the intellective potency, therefore a is present to the intellective potency.

Against the third conclusion, if this were true, it would follows that the Holy Spirit in the dove in some special way would be beyond the mode by which God is in all things. But the consequent seems false because this would either be through an infusion of grade, and cannot be because it is not capable of grace, or through the unity of a supposite, and this cannot be as stated by the third corollary or through representation, and this cannot be because either such a representative sign would either be natural and universal, and thus the Holy Spirit would appear in some creature since everything is a vestige of the Trinity or this representative thing would be a gratuitous sign, and thus the Holy Spirit would be sent and appear in any sacrament. And the consequence is clear since the Holy Spirit is a gratuitious gift.

In the second place against the second part of the conclusion, it is repugnant to the highest truth that it shows itself through some fiction, therefore it is repugnant that the Holy Spirit manifested itself through imaginary and fantastical tongues of fire and not real tongues of fire. The consequence is clear because the appearances of a phantasm are fictions. The antecedent is clear because one showing themselves to be something which is not deceives the one to whom such a showing is made.

In the third place, it would follow that the Holy Spirit would not have appeared in those tongues unless to those Apostles and holy man who received the Holy Spirit. The consequent is false because they appeared to many others existing in the house with the Apostles.

Responses

To the first, the consequence is denied because, though an angel forms such a body, nevertheless it is not able to form nor create the signified gift though such a body, but God alone is able. Therefore this person alone is said to be sent or to appear namely, the one to whom the gift belongs, as is said in the third corollary.

To the second, it is said to the major that something is able to appear can be understood in two ways, in the first mode formally, intrinsecally, or with an intrinsic denomination suitable to itself, in the second mode with an extrinsic denomination. In the first mode I say that the appearance is repugnant to the divine person, but not in the second mode because in this way the divine person is said to appear visibly, not because it is seen, but because we see something through which we know that the Holy Spirit or another divine person is, in a special way, in the creature which such a sign is sent.

To the third, the consequence would be able to be denied because it does not follow that man is more perfect and more active than an ass, therefore man is able to produce an ass as an ass.

In the second place, it is said that though grace stands under the activity of the sacraments instrumentally and dispositively, nevertheless not principally and effectively.

To the first against the second conclusion, in the first place the consequence would be able to be denied because such a causal reason would be able to be sufficiently terminated in this incomplex act of cognition or in this complex acting..

In the second place, the consequent would be able to be conceded, and to the disproof it is said that it is more perfect even when it is disproved. The consequence is denied because this likeness does not depend on this species as if a total cause, but only as a partial cause.

In the third place, it would be able to be said that, given that this likeness would represent itself imperfectly, nevertheless precise species of memory with such a created likeness would represent these species more perfectly than species of memory alone, since this likeness is not posited in vain.

To the second, the major is denied because such change does not proceed from such a species as if from a total effective cause.

In the second place, the minor would be able to be denied because with all the positive things required objective vital change is not able to be such that the potency is not changed.

In the third place, it would be able to be said that for something to change vitally it would be possible to be understood in two ways, in the first mode thus that the thing changing is vital, in the second mode that it is not in itself vitally changing, but nevertheless something vitally changes. In the first mode the the major premise has truth in somethings, but by taking vitally in the second mode the major is absolutely false.

To the third, the antecedent is denied because otherwise no existing thing outside the soul would be able to be perceived vitally, which is false. And say further that this consequence does not follow, a is vitally apprehended, therefore a is present to the apprehending potency.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that something existing in the vital potency is able to be taken in two ways, in the first mode in itself and proper being, in another mode in a species or its representative. In the first mode the antecedent should be denied, but in the second mode, with the preceding understanding, the consequence is denied.

To the first against the third conclusion, the consequence is conceded because it was there as if in a gratuitious sign showing the grace of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless this sign is not in any mode the cause of grace, though grace is reached through it, see Thomas of Argentina, in distinction 16, article 1 Thomas de Argtina, I, c. 16, a. 1, xxx , where he posits a triple sign.

To the second, to the antecedent it is said that if fiction is taken for some imaginary revelation or representation, thus I say that it is not repugnant to God to revel himself to creatures in this way, for the prophets had knowledge of many things through such imaginary visions, as is clear in their books. But if fiction is taken for deception, in this case the antecedent is conceded, but the consequence is denied.

To the third, it is denied because this sign by divine strength was able to be multiplied in the fantasy of everyone one to whom these tongues appeared..

To the first in the opposition, the consequence is conceded and the consequence of the disproof is denied because the perfection of cognition is not always quantified precisely with respect to the perfection of the known object or the thing vitally changing the potency objectively, as the argument seems to suggest. To the other arguments it is clear what should be said from what has been said.

Principal arguments

That this is not the case is argued in the first place because created charity with the will sufficiently produces some meritorious act, therefore positing that the Holy Spirit is formally that by which the mind loves and earns merit strays from the truth. The consequence is valid and the antecedent seems to come from the mind of the Apostle in 15 who says, I have worked harder than all of them, but not I, but the grace of God within me I Corinthians 15:10 .

In the second place, only charity divides among the sons of the kingdom and perdition Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, 18, 32 (CCL 50A, 507) , as says Augustine XV , in chapter 18 . But this love is not the highest personal love or the Holy Spirit, as Our Gregory says is clear from the text of 13, where it says if I speak with tongues of men and of angels I Ad Corinthios 13:1 etc. Again 5 the charity of God is diffused in your hearts Romans 5:5

In the third place, nothing immeasurable is able to be the intrinsic form of something measured, therefore. The consequence is valid. The antecedent is proved because subjective inherence is repugnant to the unmeasured. In the second place because the measured then would have unmeasured justice formally, which is repugnant, therefore.

In opposition, it is argued that the highest love alone is able to sufficiently justify the created mind and to actuate for ordinate loving, therefore the question is true. The consequence is good, and the antecedent is clear because the Holy Spirit is able to be communicated to the created mind without incomplex created gifts, as is proved above Vide supra .

First conclusion

First conclusion: that created love is a habit supernaturally infused to the mind by God actuating the mind in a special way, this making the mind beloved to God and God beloved to the mind from the divine acceptance actually or habitually since it is partially causing some merit of the mind. This is proven in the first place that the habit is supernaturally infused. This is clear from , de haereticis in clementinis Extra, XXX . In the second place, that it is from God actuating the mind etc., is clear because God is the life of the soul, therefore he actuates it in its spiritual being. The consequence is valid. The antecedent is from Gregory , in the second part of his fifth homily Gregorius Magnus, Super Ezechialem . In the third place, that he makes the mind pleasing is clear through the word of Christ I know my sheep John 10:27 or I know whom I have chosen John 13:18 . Item, 13 he loved them to the end John 13:1 . But that charity makes God beloved to the mind is clear though Augustine in , in chapter 14 through love, he says, it happens that we formed to God Augustine, Moribus Ecclesiae, c. 14 . Again he calls love the motion of the soul Augustinus, De Doctrina Christiana, 3, 10 . Again in the book of the my weight is my love by which Augustinus, Confessionum, 13, 9, 10 etc. The fourth part is clear from the above.

The first corollary: it stands that charity actually informs the mind and the same mind does not actually incline, in opposition to the opinion of Hugolino, in distinction 17 or 14 Hugolinus, XXX . It is clear that created charity does not incline unless moved by the Holy Spirit since this is its instrument and also according to itself. Whence he says that in meritorious work uncreated charity gives life, inclines, and operates, but the potency or will only operates, and the Holy Spirit does not actually move except when it wishes the mind to act, as is clear in the first book of , where it says where the impulse of the spirit was, that is where they went Ezekiel 1:12 .

Second corollary: the one having the habit of charity is not able to go out into its proper act unless the Holy Spirit actuates and moves the created will. This is clear through Augustine, in his book, , etc. where he says that the good which makes man good in nothing other than God, for one does restore a good man unless that person is always good Augustinus, XXX , against the position of Henry of Ghent Henry of Ghent, XXX .

Third corollary: love does not only produce merit with respect to some intension and grade, but also with respect to substance and act. This is clear from the last two parts of the conclusion which indeed with this corollary are proved by the saying of the Apostoli alleged above for the first argument laboravi I Corinthians 15:10 etc.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: meritorious action of eternal life inasmuch as it is of this type proceeds formally and effectively from the grace of eternal predestination. This is proved because ratio of divine acceptance of any type of good operation corresponds to this kind of grace alone, therefore. In the second place, because this alone renders the mind worthy for eternal life, therefore. In the third place, it is proved through Augustine, in his book , in chapter 8 Augustine, XXX , where he shows that through this alone is one able to fulfill the divine command, therefore.

First corollary: it is possible that an act is accepted by God and no infused habit is in the mind, against Scotus, in this distinction 17, question 2 Scotus, I, d. 17, q. 2 , because only the grace of predestination is a means suitable for making a good act accepted by God and to be meritorious of eternal life as the conclusion states.

Second corollary: though every meritorious act is produced freely by a created will, nevertheless for something to be a meritorious act is not in the power of human beings alone because it is not in their power that such an act is accepted by God, therefore. This is confirmed because then the acts of the blessed would meritorious just as those of the pilgrim. The consequence is clear because every causality which the blessed had in this life with respect to a good act, they also have in heaven, they cause more perfectly, therefore this corollary is in opposition to Scotus where noted above.

The third corollary: it is not the case that some numbered among the damned had ever merited the prize of those being saved. This is clear because no act of foreknowledge proceeds from the grace of predestination, therefore no such thing is meritorious of eternal life. The consequences is clear from the conclusion from which it is able to be elicited that just as it is impossible that being saved is foreknown, so it is impossible that a life is foreknown to merit or have merited eternal life.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: personal love of the divine essence is a vital form of the created power elevating and actuating in some good doing. This is proved through the saying of the Apostle love of God is diffuse Romanos 5:5 etc. which Augustine Augustine, xxx explains is about uncreated charity. Again, in For the spirit gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God Romans 8:16 , and in the same place, whoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God Romans 8:14 , where the Apostle speaks notionally in the spirit and not through the Holy Spirit. For the third question there are the words of Augustine XV , in chapter 5, de parvis love which is from God and is God is properly the Holy Spirit through which charity is diffused in our hearts through which total charity dwells in us Augustinus, De Trinitate, XV, c. 5 , and there he says more things related to what we have proposed.

The first corollary: something is the form of another thing elicitively or actuatively and to the same thing it is not in it constitutively, inhaesively, or informatively, against Fastinus, in book 3, question 2 Fastinus de Ast, III, q. 2 . This is clear because that it is able to be communicated to itself intrinsically, representatively, exemplarily, immutatively, causally, and elevatively, supernaturally, just as Lord Jacob of Viterbo deduces in his Iacobus de Viterbo, Qudodlibet, xxx .

The second corollary: the Holy Spirit or the highest personal love is the efficient formal ratio by which, through which, and on account of which the act of ordinate love is elicited, in opposition to Gregory, in book 1, distinction 17, question 1, article 1, near the end Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 1, . This is clear because otherwise while the Holy Spirit is formally and intrinsically actuating it would be possible for the mind to be elevated to gratuitous being, which is false. This is confirmed because the Holy Spirit is personally intrinsic to the mind without its own gifts by such intimatione which would suffice for gratituous being. This is clear from what has been said, and just he himself also concedes in in that distinction, article 2 XXX, I, d. 17, a. 2 . Again, if the Holy Spirit were given to the created mind without its own incomplex created gifts, it would not be otherwise united to it in this case than it is now, but in that the mind would love in the Holy Spirit, through the Holy Spirit, and on account of the Holy Spirit, therefore it loves just as now give that it loves ordinately. This is clear through the same person, in book 1, distinction 14 XXX, I, d. 14

Third corollary: created love of the mind which is elevative into God is the same as the grace that gratifying the mind, against Saint Thomas, first part of the second part, question 2, article 3 Thomas Aquinas, S.T., I-IIae, q. 2, a. 3 , and against Thomas of Strasbourg, in distinction 17 of books 1, question 1, article 4 Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 4 . The corollary is clear because both the Apostle and Augustine indifferently exchange one for the other and use them to mean the same thing in diverse places. This is confirmed because otherwise it would be the case that the mind is acceptable to God but not beloved or vice versa, which does not seem to be possible.

From what has been said affirmative part of the title is clear, namely that personal love etc., for in the specified mode it is the form forming, causing, and supernaturally elevating the mind, nevertheless it is not the form inhering or composing.

Objections

Against the first conclusion and the first corollary, created charity is the weight of the soul as is clear through what has been said, but weight always actually presses and weighs down that to which it is joined, therefore charity always actually moves and inclines the potency in which it is to acting well

In the second place against the second corollary, the one having the Holy Spirit does not lack the special motion of the Holy Spirit, but the one having charity has the Holy Spirit, therefore. The major is known. The minor is proved through Apostle who says the grace of God or charity is diffuse Romans 5:5 etc.

In the third place against the third corollary, if charity effected meritorious action with the will, either this happens later, and this is not the case according to Anselm 5 Anselmus, Monologion, 5, xxx where he compares the grace to a dwelling and the will to a mule, or prior, and this is not because then the habit would use the potency against the ratio of a habit because a potency ought to use a habit, or they equally would produce in the same moment, and this is not since they are partial causes and differ equivocally in species. Therefore charity in no way concurs effectively. The consequence is clear by this sufficient division

Against the second conclusion and its corollaries, it would follow that God would have another volition according to reason about some "oso" itself in no variated thing. The consequent is false, and the consequence is proved because a sinner before penitence is not worthy of eternal life, therefore he is not accepted for eternal life, and after penance he is worthy and accepted, therefore. And this is true either through something inhering, and if this is true, it would be had against the conclusion because it will be necessary to put a created form, or through nothing, and if this is true, the proved consequence would be had because while no change is made in the mind God with respect to his volition will have something different than before.

In the second place, if God were to accept penitence for eternal life, this would either be to will to beatify someone with a will pleasing at that time, and this is not the case because then he would immediately beatify, or it is to will this according to disposition which he now has to be worthy for such a prize which he did not previously wish to be worthy of, but such diversity is not able to put in the divine will unless on account of the diversity of the creature or on account of some other mode of being of the creature.

In the third place, the divine volition, since it is one act in itself, does not have ratio of opposite actus or the ability to wish and not wish without a distinction of objects. Therefore, when God wishes to accept a sinner as justified for something to which he does not want, it follows that this distinction of the divine will necessarily requires an actual distinction on the part of the objects, therefore, otherwise the justified would be in a different way than the non justified and not unless through created grace, therefore.

Against the third conclusion, because this seems to be the opinion of the Master in distinction 17 Lombard, I, d. 17, xxx , which ought not to be held because many inconveniences follows. For on this matter it follows that the act of love will not be meritorious, in the second place it will not be voluntary, in the third place it will not be delightful, in the fourth place that act is the Holy Spirit, in the fifth place that man would merit from his purly natural abilities, in the sixth place that the Holy Spirit in an act of delight would be united suppositionally to the rational nature, all of which are false.

Against the first corollary, because when the form is not more removed, the form for the thing that it informs, than the form is in its own nature, it follows that the Holy Spirit would be unmeasurable to the mind and would be an immeasurable form, and consequently immeasurable justice, and thus the well being of God and the of men will not be two different things, contra the Blessed Augustine, Augustinus, De quaestionibus novi et veteris, xxx .

In the third place against the second corollary, it is able to be argued from the words of Gregory where stated above Gregorius Ariminensis, XXX in the first place because the quia Apostle speaks uniformly about charity and the other habits.

In the second place, through Blessed Augustine, , explaining this passage from 8 the Spirit himself asks for us Romans 8:26 etc., what Augustine says does the Spirit himself intercedes for the saints Romans 8:27 , except the charity itself which is made in you through the Holy Spirit Augustinus, XXX , therefore this love is not the Holy Spirit otherwise it would be said to be made, which is false.

Against the third corollary, the substance of charity and of grace are diverse, therefore they are distinct habits. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is proved because the immediate subject of grace is the substance of the soul, but the subject of created charity is the will Thomas de Argentina, II, d. 26-27, q. 1, a. 2 (Genoa 1585, 185v) , therefore. This is the opinion of argument of Thomas of Strasbourg .

Responses

To the first, it is said that weight always inclines in act or in habit, and Augustine seems to have understood it in this way, saying by that I am drawn wherever I am drawn Augustinus, Confessions, XIII, 9, 10 . He does not say by that I am always drawn, nor is this similar to the weights of natural heavy things because charity is a supernatural weight which actually inclines only as much as the Holy Spirit wishes it to incline and to act.

To the second, in the major premise it is said that the Holy Spirit is able to be had as if gratificatively and habitually, nevertheless I do not say through the mode of habit and it is able to be had motively and actually. In the first mode, major is denied. In the second mode, the entire argument is conceded because I speak about this motion and habit in the conclusion.

To the third, in the first place it is said that, if such an act should be considered as an act, thus it is principally from God and as if equally first from grace and the will. If it were considered as free, thus it would be first from God, second from grace, and third from the will. If as meritorious, thus Hugolinus Hugolinus, XXX says that neither grace nor the will has effective latitude with respect to this. But Scotus, in distinction 17 Scotus, I, d. 17 , says that is thus principally from God, second from grace, third from the will. But Scotus in the aforesaid response of Hugolinus in book two regarding distinction 27 Scotus, II, d. 27 because regard this to be valid.

To the first against the second conclusion, I say that all three of these reasons are founded on something false, namely that the predestined person existing in mortal sin is not accepted by God and then afterwards is accepted, which I do not concede. Indeed, I say that the predestined one however much a sinner is always and was from eternity accepted by God for having eternal life. And the Subtle Doctor also says this against which these corollary are posited, as is clear in his second question against this distinction Scotus, XXX , nevertheless in this same distinction Scotus, XXX he posits a triple acceptance. The first is the simple agreeableness in which God accecepts every possible thing or future. The second is the efficacy and this is that by which he wishes a thing to be in effect and in way necessarily required for it, and thus he accepts every existing thing. Third is a special acceptance which is a volition ordered to a vow, such that something greater is achieved and this is perfective. And this meaning about which is being spoken, but not about the others, as is clear from what has been said.

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said that according to the exposition according to which the opinion of the Master is commonly expressed this is false because my conclusion does not negate the created habit of charity nor does it posit that the Holy Spirit is love informatively inhering in the mind, but intrinsically and actuatively. But whether the Master denied the created habit, Scotus says, so also does Thomas of Strasbourg, that he does not, just as it is clear in distinction 3 of the first book Scotus, XXX, I, d. 3; Thamas de Argentina, XXX, I, d. 3 and distinction 26 of the second book Scotus XXX, II, d. 26; Thamas de Argentina, XXX, II, d. 26 .

In the second place, I say that the inferred inconveniences do not follow from the sayings of the Magistri, just as about the three earlier things Our Giles, in this distinction, first part, second question Aegidius Romanos, I, d. 17, pars 1, q. 2 . shows. Concerning the other three things Thomas of Strasbourg, in the same distinction, question one, in some article Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. XX , see his responses and the arguments proving the caused habit of charity not being in its power.

To the second it is said that the antecedent is true concerning the constitutive, intrinsic, or informative form, but the Holy Spirit is an intrinsic form to the mind in this way because the Holy Spirit does not inhere in the mind. And I say further that through the Holy Spirit the mind is not intrinsically just In the third place I say that it is able to be conceded that there is not one well being of God and another for man, though the well being of God is in one way and the well being of man in another.

To the third, I say that the Apostle does not always speak in the same way, as is clear from the words of Augustine in the third conclusion introducing the authority of Augustine who says What is the Holy Spirit unless this charity of life made by the Holy Spirit? Augustinus, In epistolam Iohannis, Tractatus 6, 8 . I say in the first place that the authority in this form is against Dico primo quod auctoritas in forma est contra our Gregory and for thhe Master because Augustine say that the Holy Spirit is nothing except the charity of life Augustinus, In epistolam Iohannis, Tractatus 6, 8 . In the second place, I say that he does not say that the Holy Spirit is made or that charity is made absolutely, but that charity is made or that Holy Spirit is made in the mind because it begins to be charity in the mind and it began to be in the mind, just as God began to be in the world, nevertheless God never began to be. Therefore it makes a big difference to say that the Holy Spirit is made charity and to say that charity is made in you or that the Holy Spirit is made charity in you because the second is true and the first is false.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied because the will is not distinguished from the essence of the soul, at least really.

In the second place, I say that the consequence is not valid, even among Thomas of Strasbourg because has to concede that some accident is able to have many subjects, and nevertheless they will be one in number because according to him the immediate subject of the accidents is the quantity itself and the principal subject is substance and these are distinguished between themselves. Thus similarly, having posited that the will would be distinguished from the soul to this, the will is able to be the immediate subject of grace and the essence the principal subjec ot the soul, and thus it would be possible to be named by each name.

To the arguments in the opposition, it is clear from what has been said.

Principal arguments

That not because any doing well of a just pilgrim is to act well immeasurably with respect to the species of moral goodness and virtue, therefore no such thing is intended, and as a consequence neither is charity. The consequence is clear because to the unmeasured something greater is not able to be given. The antecedent is proved because to do something meritorious proceeds from the formal power of the Holy Spirit, consequently such an act is an immeasurable good with respect to the species of moral virtue and moral goodness. This is the argument of John of Marchia, in distinction 17 of book 1, in article three Ripa, I, d. 17, a. 3 .

In the second place, if charity were able to be intended gradually, it would follow that that would also be able to remitted gradually. The consequence is clear because just as through the replication of degrees there becomes a gradual intension, so through the remission or the cessation of those degrees there is a remission of them. But the falsity of the consequent is proved because this remission occurs either through a mortal or a venial sin. Not the latter because this corrupts the entire charity, and not the second because then the venial sin would punish with an eternal penalty by its own proper ratio, which is against the Master, in book 2, distinction 42 Lombard, II, d. 42, xx .

In the third place, if charity were intended gradually, then either acquired charity would be the same with the first or different. If the latter, then it follows that the same thing increases and produces itself. If the second, it follows that two habits distinct only in number would be in the same soul, and thus there would be as many loves in man as a man has degrees of love, which does not seem like it should be said. This is confirmed because either this degree would essential to the quality of charity preexisting in goodness or it would be accidental. If the first, then this first form would be prior to the species of the other because charity is in some essential part. If the second, it follows that it does not make one thing in itself with the charity preceding it, and thus it does not increase it.

In opposition, it is argued that the moral goodness of any pilgrim proves according to the common law some degree of charity in the same thing, therefore the greater goodness would prove greater charity. But now some pilgrim is more perfect and morally better than before, therefore someone now has more charity than before, and this cannot be unless through the gradual intention of charity, therefore the question is true. The antecedent is from the Apostle 13 by the grace of God I am what I am I Cor 15:10 . Again, the church prays eternal omnipotent God, give to us an increase of faith, hope, and love XXX , etc. .

First conclusion

First conclusion: though the Holy Spirit is not able to form and actuate the created mind immeasurably, nevertheless the Holy Spirit is the activating formal power and salvation of the just mind. The first part is clear because it is repugnant for the finite and measured to be actuated and formed immeasurably in its own acting. The second part is proved through Augustine in his book who says, we are formed and created by God in all good works Augustinus, De gratia et libero arbitrio, xxx . Again, in Augustinus, XXX . And these words are used in this distinction where it is said that without the Holy Spirit we are not able to love Christ and we are not able to keep his commandments and the less we perceive it to the same degree that power is not able to reach us.

First corollary: the formal actuative power of the Holy Spirit is as intensely in the mind as it intrinsically gives pleasing or charitable being to it. The conclusion and corollary are against Master Radulphus de Castello in this question or determination Radulphus De Castello, xxx where he asks whether naturally good things are able to be rationally proportioned or compared to gratuitiously good things. The corollary is clear because according to Augustine Augustinus, XXX the less we perceive the Holy Spirit in us the less we are able to love Christ, and the more we perceive it the more we love, therefore

The second corollary: any action proceeding from the formal power of uncreated charity is a finite act with respect to the degree and species of virtue and moral goodness. This is clear because then the Holy Spirit would not be power in the mind according to greater and lesser degrees, against Augustine Augustinus, XXX .

Third corollary: not every act of the created will proceeding from the formal power of uncreated charity with respect species in the being of the mind is infinitely meritorious or attributable to the will. This is clear because otherwise all meritorious works would be of the same species, which is false. The consequence is clear because all things proceed from the formal power of the Holy Spirit. These two corollaries are from Iohannis de Rippa, in distinction 17, in question 1 Ripa, I, d. 17, q. 1 .

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though no grade of charity is removed from some evil or guilt, nevertheless any created charity is an intensibile and remissible form. The first part is proved because guilt does not diminish charity according to the second introduced against the opposition. The second part is proved because any created charity is divisible in degrees, therefore it is intensible and remissible through some power. The antecedent is clear because neither a maximum nor minimum degree of charity should be given. And the consequence is clear since God is able at once and successively to produce or corrupt any form having and intensive latitude. But to us it does not matter whether God produces it in the soul at once or successively, as Gregory says, in distinction 17, article 4 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 17, a. 4 .

The first corollary: the fervor of any created charity is not reduced through committing or the replication of a venial sin, against Gregorium in distinctione ista Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 17, xxx and against Henry of Ghent, 5 quodlibet, question 24 Henricus Gandavensis, Quodlibet 5, q. 24, xxx . The corollary is proved because just as intension is in a corporeal quality, so fervor is in charity. But the intension of a quality is not distinguished from the quality, though through a comparison of the extremes it is in some way varied, therefore neither is the fervor of charity distinguished from charity itself. But according to the conclusion no degree of charity is diminished through a venial sin, therefore neither is the fervor diminished.

The second corollary: infused charity is not only diminished by the indolence of the mind, against Climenton in his , question 2 Ricardus Kilvington, xxx . The corollary is proved because venial guilt is compossible with charity and does not reduce charity, therefore neither does indolence which is clear a fortiori.

The third corollary: though charity is not actually diminished from the gratuitous acceptance and conservation of God, this is nevertheless able to be diminished from its own proper and intrinsic ratio. This is clear because this is able to be intensified and diminished, as the conclusion says, therefore if it were dissovled of its own proper nature, it would be diminished by its own contrary, but sin is the poison of charity Augustine, 83 Quaestiones, q. 36, c. 1 , according to Augustinum, , question 36 .

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: without the intension or remission of created charity it stands that the pilgrim is better and more perfect than moral perfection, otherwise the conclusion would be posited that without a new grade or the abjection in the mind of the pilgrim it stands that charity would be intended and the pilgrim would be better now than before. The conclusion is proved because the Holy Spirit with any charity is able to incline the mind equally to inhering in God with love more firmly and for doing well meritoriously, therefore. The antecedent is clear because it is just as easy for the Holy Spirit to concur and to produce with a weak and diminished second cause as it is with an intensified and great second cause. The consequence is clear because that the mind loves God fervently is improve the pilgrim and for charity to be intensified. This conclusion Lord Giles, in distinction 17 Giles of Rome, I, d. 17, xxx seems to prove as well as in Quodlibet 2, question 14 Aegidius Romanus, Quodlibet II, q. 14, xxx , where he shows that when love is intensified, the essence of love with respect to its essentila grade does not change. Nevertheless I do not wish to say that the intension of charity thus occurs de facto but from the possible.

The first corollary: with respect to the remission of cupidity the intension of created charity should not be quantified. This is clear from the conclusion, against Hugolinus, in distinction 17 Hugolinus, I, d. 17 . This is confirmed because the charity of the glorious virgin would not have been intensified, which is absolutely false. The consequence is clear because she did not have cupidity which would be able to diminish or in contrast which is would be able to increase.

Second corollary: it is the case that one does not stand apart from another from love of the world or from sin and the same one has in himself greater love or better charitable operation, against the same one in the same place Hugolinus, I, d. 17, XXX . This is clear through the conclusion.

Third responsive corollary: though de facto greater moral perfection implies a greater charity in the mind or in the will of a just pilgrim, nevertheless without the gradual intension of charity it is the case that the same thing is better now than before from the actuation of immeasurable love or of the highest creator. This is clear because the mind is able to be disposed better and the Holy Spirit is able to be intimated to the mind more fervently without the creation or production of a new grade of charity or grace. It is clear what should be said to the question.

Objections

Against the first conclusion, it is argued, if this is true, it would follow that the Holy Spirit would be its form in some mode. The consequent is false because either it would be its essential form or its accidental form. The first is not the case because then it would be its constitutive form, nor the second because nothing is of this type unless it is an accident, but the Holy Spirit is not able to be an accident, therefore. See Radulphus where cited above.

In the second place against the conclusion and the first corollary, it is argued thus because as intensely as the Holy Spirit is able to be formal to itself so would it be as intensely a formal power to the created mind, and thus it would immeasurably absolutely.

In the second place against the second corollary: any act proceeding from a habit in the created and proceeds from the Holy Spirit from the unmeasured volition of the ultimate end with respect to species, therefore the infinite rectitude with respect to species, therefore any such act is of unmeasured virtue.

Against the third corollary: it this kind of acting well were only attributable to a finite created will, it follows that some pure created power will be attributable to it, which is false. The consequences is clear because the formal power of the created Holy Spirit will be able to be intended up to what point is adequate to that power which corresponds to the Holy Spirit from which it is only finite and not immeasurable. The consequent is false.

Against the second conclusion: every evil removes the good, but every sin is evil, therefore sin removes some good and not a natural good, therefore a gratuitious good. The major is clear from the of Augustine, in chapters 12 and 13 Augustinus, Enchiridion, cc. 12-13 . The minor is known.

In the second place against the first corollary: venial sins make human beings indisposed for eliciting a good work, therefore they reduce the fervor of charity. The consequence is clear because, if the same fervor remains after the committing an venial sin, then the sinner will operate just as promptly, easily, and delectably as before. This is contrary to experience because a habit is opposed to good things whenever it is generated from repeated venial sins.

In the third place against the second corollary it is argued from scripture, 19 who condemns small things, falls little by little Ecclesiasticus 19:1 . Again, 24 the charity of many grows cold Matthew 24:12 . Again, Chrysostum , in the uncompleted work says: just as every corporeal artifact is maintained through supervision, so also in the mind virtue is increased through exercise and reduced through desire Chrysostum, xxx . Again, it follows that man would have to love and to choose to do meritorious work equally with desire just as without. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because desire does not harm one's self nor brings any benefit.

In the fourth place principally against the third corollary through the author of the six principles, because the form is consisting in simple inherence and invariable essence, therefore charity is not remissible from his own nature. The consequence holds because every remission is a variation.

Against the third conclusion, it follows that the same thing would produce itself. The consequence is clear because when charity concurs if it is really the same charity that is acquired was before the intention, it follows that the same charity increases and produces itself. See Scotus, book 1, distinction 17, in the last question Scotus, I, d. 17, q. xxx . Again, if charity were able to be intended without stopping, it follows that God would be able to make infinite charity and make it infinitely perfect. The consequent seems value. In the third place, it follows that an entity more perfect than the charity of Christ would be able to be given, against the Master, in distinction 13 of the third book Lombard, III, d. 13 .

Against the first corollary, it is argued through the saying of Augustine, in , question 36 Augustine, 83 questions, q. 36 , the increase of charity is the decrease of desire, therefore with respect to the advance against desire there is an intention of charity. Again, 4 says cupidity lessens while charity grows Augustinus, Enchiridion, 32, 121 .

Against the second corollary, there is the Augustine in , question 36 where he says, the venom of charity is the hope gaining and retaining temporal things Augustine, 83 questions, q. 36, n. 1 , there to whatever degree man is distanced from the love of temporal things, to the same degree is his charitable operation improved, and as a consequence the corollary is false

Against the last corollary, because motion is the acquisition of a part after the part of that to which the thing is moved, therefore without acquisition of a new degree charity is not able to be intended in the mind. The antecedent is from the Philosopher Aristotle, Physics, V and the Commentator V , comment 48 Averroes, Physics, V, comment 48 .

Responses

To the first, the consequence is denied because unchangeable form is able to be causally and supernaturally elevative, as it has been said.

To the second, the consequence is denied because it does not follow that the power of the will is immeasurable, therefore such immeasurable power is a power to an immeasurable will.

To the third, the consequence is denied because, though it proceeds from an immeasurable power and from an immeasurable will, nevertheless this immeasurable volition and immeasurable charity is only in the finite created mind and not immeasurably.

In the second place, I say that such acting is not able to be quantified with respect to the fluidity of the uncreated agent, but with respect to all circumstances surrounding such good actions, for it ought to be attended to and named according to the fluidity of the uncreated agent in acting action and not in others one creating action would differ no more than another which one action of God actively taken from another. The consequent is false.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied because they are of a different ratio, therefore whatever created power is intended, it would never reach equality of the other because it would always remain in the latitude of its own species which is below the latitude of another more perfect thing, and similarly to whatever degree the influence of a more perfect agent is diminished, it would never reach to the equality of the inferior.

To the first against the second conclusion, Augustine wished to say that it is said that evil removes either the good which is inside or the good which would be inside if the committing this sin did not commit it, so it is said in what has been proposed because, though a venial sin does not remove or withdraw the good of charity, nevertheless it deprives the mind of some good which it would have if it had not committed it. But against this it would be able to be objected because as much as a good work is able to bring advantage precisely to the same degree is a sin able to bring obstruction. But some good work brings advantage to a certain degree of charity, therefore some sin is able to be an obstruction by diminishing the a certain degree of charity.

In the second place, because it follows that God would equally love the one sinning and the one not sinning. The consequent seems false. The consequence is proved because from the fact that a venial sin does not diminish charity, it follows that the one sinning venially only is loved by God just as before.

To the first, when it is replied, it is said that, if a comparison is made to demeritorious act and infused habit already in act, then the major is denied, but if the comparison is made with respect to a habit which were acquired, if the work were good, then the major is conceded, but nothing is had against the conclusion.

To the second, it is said, I concede the consequent, indeed perhaps he loves the one sinning more than the one not sinning in the cause in which the one sinning venially has more grace.

In the second place, it is said that the consequent is able to understood in two ways. In the first mode thus that the one sinning himself is as pleasing when committing the sin as when not committing the sin, when speaking about an existence that is pleasing according to the eternal law of God, in this way the consequent is conceded. In the second mode that it is equally pleasing or beloved, that is, that it is pleasing to God that he acts in this deformed way just as it is pleasing to God to with old this guilt a, in this way the consequent and the consequence are denied.

To another argument against the first corollary, whatever is concerning the authority, the consequence is denied because, though it is the same fervor after committing of venial sins that it was before, nevertheless the one committing is not able in so [to achieve as] intense acts on account of the inclination of cupidity toward the opposite, just as is clear in the object where a greater weight not intensed or diminished, but only for the intension of the lesser weight, the same greater weight is not able to move equally quickly or to lift the lesser weight as before.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that a venial sin indisposes one as much as an added good act disposes better and more, therefore the argument does not conclude.

To that authority whoever despises small things Ecclesiasticus 19:1 etc. it wishes to say that man from indolence and negligence of doing good work omits many good works which be would do if not for his idleness, and through this something contrary to the corollary does not follow.

To another, the consequence is denied, and when it is said because indolence harms nothing, this is able to be denied because, though a sinner does not diminish charity, nevertheless it impedes the multiplication of works because more meritorious works would be done if there were not this indolence, as is said in the preceding solution.

In the second place, it is said and said better that something should been fled from or desired always and proportionally according to what hurts or advantages, for according to Augustine, XIV, , chapter 13 Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIV, 13, 2 it advantages some to sin, and nevertheless no one ought to desire to sin. He points to the example of Peter. Again, it is not as bad to kill a man and to repent as it is to commit a venial sin and not make satisfaction, and nevertheless the first should not fled less than the second, rather more so.

To that argument which is said form is simple, etc., in the first place Giles would say that the indivisible form would be able to be intended and diminished according to the greater or less participation of that form to the subject. This Lord Giles says in this distinction Aegidius Romanus, I, d. 17 and in his Quodlibet, question 14 Giles of Rome, Quodlibet, xxx, 14 .

In the second place, it is said that the authority speaks in this place about simplicity opposed to mobile quantity, not of perfection, therefore it does not conclude, contra Scotus, in distinction 17 Scotus, I, d. 17 .

To the first against the third conclusion, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that God without motion and without any production is able to intend charity however it is pleasing to him. In the second place, it is said that given that charity would concur actively for its own intension, nevertheless it does not do so productively because not every thing is production because not every agent produces something. In the third place, it is said that it would not be necessary that such a course terminates to some entity, but to being in some way that it was not previously.

To the second, the consequent would be able to be conceded because that something is infinite does not contain a contradiction according to some.

In the second place, the consequence is able to be denied.

To another, the consequence is denied because given that there would be greater charity in the soul of Peter than of Christ with respect to the entity, nevertheless not with respect to virtue and goodness or perfection. To the authority of Augustine it is said that the lessening of cupidity is with respect to the intention of charity, but not the converse. In the second place, it would be able to be said that he intends to say that these causes are only partial and not total.

To another, , in a question Augustinus, 83 quaestiones it is said that the venom of charity, thought it is cupidity, nevertheless it is not s?ois, just as venial cupidity, therefore through such distinction charity is not able to be measured.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that not every cupidity is the love of temporal things, just as is clear from jealousy and blasphemy and many other similar things. To the authority of the Philosopher, it is said that he speaks about the temporal motion of bodily things, therefore it is not relevant to what has been proposed about charity.

To the two first arguments in the opposition is clear what should be said from what has been said.

To the third, it is able to be said that these two charities made one thing through the unity of aggregation, just as two equal things make one through themselves. Again, it is one through the unity of composition and homogeneity, therefore it does not follow that there are two habits in the soul differing in number only. To the confirmation, it is said that the grade after it has been acquired is essential to it because such a grade with the preceding makes and constitutes one form in itself. And when it is said, therefore preexisting charity, this consequence is denied because nothing required by that species it its being was lacking for it before nor before this was essential to it because it was not, etc. But on the contrary because it follows that this soul will be charitably pleasing in many ways at the same time, namely have been intensed and remissed and thus it will be intensely please and remissly pleasing which is clear because some form is able to denominate a subject, and as a consequence intensed and remissed grade denominated the intensed and remissed subject. This is said by denying the consequence because though intensed and remissed charity are not contrary, nevertheless because to be pleasing remissly conveys the negation of intensed charity, therefore at the same time it is not possible for the same thing to be pleasing intensely and remissly. And when it is said because some form, etc., it is conceded that it will denominate the subject, thus this is pleasing in so much charity and so much etc, but not by saying this is pleasing remissly.

Principal arguments

That not in the first place because, if God is able to make something please from what is not pleasing without such a habit, then he is manifestly able to make something pleasing from what is not that has this habit in itself. The consequent is false. Again, it follows that God is able by himself alone to make that a white thing is without producing whiteness and that man exists without producing humanity, which are false. And the consequences are clear because the argument does not seem to about one more than another.

In the second place principally, it would follow that God would be able to be the formal ratio making the will pleasing. The consequence is clear, the falsity is proved because, if so, then it follows that it would be possible there to be motion of ordered love in the created mind. The consequent is false since motion indicates an imperfection.

In the third place, if God were able to withdraw rectitude from the mind, it follows that it would be able to make a sinning mind. The consequent is false because no one is bad from God as author according to Augustine Augustinus, XXX . The consequence is clear because every mind lacking rectitude is unjust. This seems to be the opinion of Anselm, in his book , in chapter 4 Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 4, xxx .

In opposition, it is argued that the first part has already shown above, but the second is proved because rectitude and the will are absolutely distinct things, therefore God is able to separate one from the other. And as a consequence he is able possible to separate and remove the will from its rectitude, therefore.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though from the ordered law no one is able to be pleasing from what is not pleasing without infused charity, nevertheless from the absolute or possible law it is possible that the one not having this charity is more greatly pleasing to God than another having it and ordinately loves God with a greater intensity. The first part is clear from what has been said. The second part is proved because the Holy Spirit alone actuates the mind and elevates it to God for loving more intensely than in fact a certain pilgrim who has this habit of created charity in the mind, therefore. The antecedent was clear above.

First corollary: although concerning the common law created charity is required for a pilgrim to be pleasing, nevertheless no created charity is required to act meritoriously to act well. The first is apparent because no one is pleasing without this habit. The second part is proved because if any charity is given the pilgrim would be able to act meritoriously with that created charity.

The second corollary: any created mind eliciting a meritorious act of love loves God infinitely more than is absolutely necessary. This is proved both because it is not absolutely necessary that the created mind loves God and secondly because the mind would be able to love God meritoriously with infinitely less charity or love.

Third corollary: the identity between whiteness and being white is greater than between created charity and being pleasing . This is clear because nothing is able to be white without whiteness, but it is possible to be pleasing without this charity.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though it is not repugnant to the Holy Spirit to be a formal power by which the power meritoriously an act of love, nevertheless it is repugnant to the Holy Spirit to be for the created mind the motion of ordinate love. The first is clear because to be such a formal power indicates no imperfection, indeed it indicates perfection and excludes everything repugnant, as was seen above, therefore. This is confirmed through Blessed Augustine, IV , capitulo 18 Augustinus, De Trinitate, IV, c. 3, n. 5 (PL 42:XX) explaining that passage We know that we will be like him when he appears I Ioannes 3:2 . The second is clear because such motion indicates an imperfection, namely potentiality, but the Holy Spirit is the highest act excluding from itself every potentiality, therefore.

The first corollary: this denomination of love should be more greatly applied to the formal ratio than to the vital motion of love. This is clear because this ratio per se and intrinsically is called love, but this motion is only called love extrinsically because it is determined to this love.

The second corollary: that not every formal ratio of formal love a being of the highest perfection is a mode of acting well or of meritorious loving because the Holy Spirit is or is able to be the ratio of this and not of motion.

Third corollary: that the one having the meritorious motion of love has the habit of charity is not necessary, and conversely it is not necessary that the one having the habit of charity joined to the mind has the motion of love. This is clear through the conclusion, and it is confirmed because to the grace of predestination alone corresponds the being of one meritorious from the power of divine acceptance, therefore. This was also made clear above.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: though God is able to introduce no latitude of guilt to human beings, nevertheless God is able to remove the rectitude of the will from human beings. The first part is clear because then such a person would become worse from God as author, against Augustine, in , in question 5 Augustinus, 83 questiones, q. 5 . In the second case it is proved because everything that is not the will God is able to separate and remove from it, but the rectitude of the will is not the will, therefore. The major is known because everything that is absolutely distinct, God etc. The minor is clear because rectitude and the created will, if they were the same, it would follow that every created will would be upright, indeed it would further follows that no will would be able to sine because then every will would be formally justice and rectitude, which is false, therefore.

First corollary: any absolute rectitude of a human will really includes the latitude of gratifying gratitude of charity. This is clear because, if not, then it would follows that the will would be able to have it from itself or from another creature, against the Venerable Anselm , in chapter 14 Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 14, xxx .

The second corollary: it is the case that the personal mind is in the entire latitude of rectitude and never demerits some latitude of penalty or reprentance. This is clear because, if God deprived as creature of rectitude, he would still not love it less, indeed he would be able to accept a greater prize than before, if he wished.

Third corollary: it is the case that a person deprived of the rectitude of the will is not also unjust, but would be just. This is clear because God is able to deprive someone of rectitude and is not able to inflict injustice or malice. From this it is clear what should be said to the question.

Objections

Against the first conclusion: it is argued, if it were not absolutely necessary that some creature is just, it would follow that God would be able to do the opposite of that which he eternally ordained. The consequent is false because the God would be changeable. And the consequences is clear because, if it not necessarily thus just as he ordained, then the opposite would be able to come about. This is confirmed because by through eternally predestining he wishes a to be just.

In the second place, because the ordained law is absolutely necessary, therefore whatever is necessary according to that law is absolutely necessary. But according to that law it is necessary that pleasing human beings have created charity, therefore. The antecedent is clear: because every eternal thing is absolutely necessary, therefore the eternal law is necessary, therefore.

In the third place against the first corollary: if no grace is required for doing good meritoriously, therefore one would be able to be saved according to the ordered law while having no grace.

In the fourth place against the second corollary: not just any grade of charity suffices for conquering strong temptation or for suffering martyrdom for God, therefore nor does just any grade of charity suffice for performing a meritorious deed. And as a consequence, if one were to love with a lesser charity, they would not love sufficiently.

Against the second conclusion: it is repugnant that the mind is united to God beatifically without motion toward the object, therefore the Holy Spirit is not able to be formally the ratio of perceiving God beatifically or of meritorious love. The consequence holds since this motion is repugnant tot he Holy Spirit. And the antecedent is proven because otherwise it would follow that such a beatific object would be essentially and intrinsecally present to the create potency, which is false because it is present thus to God alone.

In the second place against the first corollary: it would follow if motion of this type could stand without terms which would not be perception or vital operation. The consequent is false. The consequence is proved because every vital perception suits itself alone terminatively extrinsically, as the corollary says.

In the third place, no such motion should be put, therefore. The antecedent is clear because this would be on account of the distance of the potency from the object, and this distance does not exist because God is always present to the potency.

In the fourth place, if the third corollary were true, it would follow that it would be possible for there to be gratuitious charity in something, and nevertheless that this thing not be pleasing to God nor accepted by him. The consequent is against the truth. Again, it follows that is not good. This is clear because one is not good which does not rejoice in good deeds, as is seen in I Aristoteles, Ethica, I, xxx .

Against the third conclusion: if God were to withdraw the rectitude from the will, he would do this this either unwillingly or willingly. Not the latter because God does nothing unwillingly, nor the second because, since the rectitude of the will is to will what God wills that it wills, it follows that God would be able to will that a will does not will what he wishes it to will, but this implies a contradiction, therefore.

In the second place against the first corollary: the rectitude of the will coexists with the mortal sin, therefore it does not include gratifying race. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is clear through Secundo, contra primum corollarium stat rectitudo voluntatis cum peccato mortali, ergo non includit gratiam gratificantem. Patet consequentia et antecedens patet per Anselm , chapter 13 , saying, the one wishing to have rectitude has rectitude Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 13, xxx , but one existing in mortal sin is able to wish to have rectitude, therefore.

In third place, it is argued through Anselmus, in the same work, in chapter 14 , saying, everyone having rectitude is able to be said to have justice and to be just because everyone having justice is just, nevertheless ?sensio? the promised eternal life is for just men, but only to those who are just with any injustice Anselmus, De libero arbitrio, c. 14, xxx .

In the fourth place against the third and second corollary: the privation of justice and rectitude is formally guilt, therefore to any such person a penalty should be given. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is from Anselm, in , in chapter 4 , saying The devil he says loses the original justice in which he was made and for this reason invents his privation which has no essence, which we name injustice Anselmus, De casu diaboli, c. 4, xxx .

Responses

To the first, the consequence is able to be denied because such vital motion is something distinct from the vital potency.

In the second place, it is able to be said that God by himself alone is able to beatify the mind without some other quantity however incomplex, nevertheless it is not able to be without something complex. And this is the solution of the first argument against the second conclusion.

To the first against the first, the consequent is conceded about those things which are not past nor posited in being through speaking. The reason is because what he wills from eternity he is able to never have wished.

To the second, the antecedent is conceded because the law is God. But the consequences is denied because then all things would come about from necessity, which is false.

In the second place, it is able to be said that law is able to be taken in two ways, one mode from something in Christ which is God, in another mode for something complex something said to have been eternally ordered. In the first mode the antecedent is conceded and the consequence is denied. In the second mode the antecedent is denied and the consequence is conceded.

To the third, the consequence is denied.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied because, thought charity does not incline less intensely just as ?, nevertheless to every act to which the greater inclines, the lesser also inclines or is able to incline.

In the second place, this consequence would be able to be denied, a charity does not suffice for making the will to wish to be martyred, therefore it does not suffice for loving God sufficiently.

To the first against the second conclusion, a response has already been said.

To the second, the consequent is conceded, for just as generation is never properly said to another unless a generated terminus follows, so such motion would not be called a vital perception unless a terminus were vitally perceived.

To the third, the antecedent is denied, and to the proof I say that, though God is always really present, nevertheless not vitally objectively, whence such motion is to return objectively the thing not present. In the second place, I say that while God is always sufficiently present to the soul objectively, still the soul lacks such motion on account of other extrinsic objects which are not vitally present to the potency.

To the fourth, the consequent is conceded concerning his absolute power, and a contradiction does not follow from this when speaking about his acceptance for eternal life, nor does it follows that is not good because, though he does not accept this work for eternal life, nevertheless he will return or has returned to them something for that.

To another where it says if follows that God is not a just returner etc., here says Gregory, in distinction 17 of books 1, in question one, article two, corollary two, of conclusion two Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, concl. 2, corr. 2, xxx , that an act of a human being elicited from some charity is meritorious from condign among God neither of eternal life nor of any eternal or temporal prize, but the opposite of this is held by Bonsemblates Bonsemblates, XXX and some other hold this as well, nevertheless everyone should hold that what seems good to them, and the consequence is able to be denied.

To the first against the third conclusion, it would be able to be said that it neither is the case nor is the case but not by willing to keep this rectitude. Alternatively, Adam and Bonsemblantes say willing, and the consequent is conceded which is inferred in the divided sense. The first solution seems more secure.

To the second, it is able to be said that rectitude is able to be taken in two ways, in one mode absolutely, in another mode secundum quid. But Anselm speaks about rectitude secundum quid, But the corollary is understood concerning rectitude spoken absolutely.

In the second place, it is able to be said that to will is twofold, the first is an indicative efficacy, the second is chosen efficacy. Anselm speaks about the first saying that what wishes rectitude, namely with indicative efficacy, has it, and this kind of willing does not stand with mortal sin but the second kind does.

To the third, it is said that Anselm does not speak about rectitude or justice absolutely, but secundum quid, as is clear to the one paying attention to his words, therefore nothing is concludes against what has been said.

To the fourth, the antecedent is conceded de facto, but in the case in which God removes rectitude from the will with demerit of the will, this privation would not be a guilt, nor do the words of Anselm prove the opposite because the justice of the bad angel was in itself, therefore its privation was a sin, but in this case it would not be concerning its justice which God would deprive its rectitude without its own sin. To the arguments in opposition the solution is clear through what has been said above.

Whether the temporal giving of eternal gifts is an infinite obligation for the one receiving; whether an eternal gift temporally given obliges the good person immeasurably absolutely?

Principal arguments

That not because no divine supposite is immeasurably perfect which is clear because, just as one is not the other, so the perfection of one is not the perfection of the other because then there would several immeasurably perfect things, one of which would not be the other.

In the second place, the divine supposites are distinguished from one another by their related properties and by the perfection attributes, therefore they are not distinction from them. The consequence holds because these personal properties are not divine supposites, as is seen.

In the third place, the divine supposites are infinitely distinguished in small ways, therefore. The consequence holds because it does not seem compossible that something is infinitely such in small ways and infinitely such. But the antecedent is clear because the divine supposites are distinguished by a real personal distinction which is the smallest possible distinction.

In opposition, it is argued because the divine supposites are distinguished in such a way that in no mode are they able to be the same suppositionally and not another thing from themselves, therefore. The consequence holds because the degree to which identity is repugnant to distinction, to the same degree do they seem to be distinguished among themselves. The first part of the antecedent is clear because by how much necessity God is God, by the same necessity are the three divine supposites. The second part is clear because, if so, it would follows that in the divine essence there would be a quaternity. The consequent is false.

First conclusion

The first conclusion: any divinal supposite is immeasurably perfect and equal to the other. The proof is because between divine supposites there is the highest essential identity of perfection of many things, therefore. The consequence holds because the highest essential identity of several distinctions is the highest equality of them. The antecedent is proved because a greater essential identity of several things than the identity of the divine supposites is not able to be imagined.

The first corollary: though supposite being is determined under no perfection, nevertheless the uncreated supposite being is of an immeasurabley perfection. The first part is clear because, if so, the Son would not have every perfection of the Father, nor the converse, which is false. The second part is clear through the conclusion.

The second corollary: no created simple thing or composite is able to be as equal to another as the divine supposites. This is clear because no plural created things are as much the same as the divine supposites are the same

Third corollary: though the equality or identity of any equal things of the creator is infinitely less than the identity of the divine supposites, nevertheless it is not repugnant according to some denomination that only one is the similitude of similar composites. The first is clear because otherwise the identity of the divine supposits would not be the highest possible identity from nature, which is contra to what has been said. The second part is proved because from the absolute power of God the same whiteness would be able to inform two distinct substances. And consequently this would return similar things and designate white things.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: just as no divine supposite is distinguished from its personal property, so no divine supposite is distinguished from the essential or attributable perfection. The first is proved by taking supposite with the inclusion of the origin, and this is clear through Jermoe in Hieronymus, Exposition, xxx saying the impiety of the Sabellians who deny the three persons under divinus?? property and place under, for not only the names in this mode but even the names of properties, that is the persons or as they say in Greek the hypostases and subsisting things which acknowledge from these words Jerome, The Exposition of the Catholic Faith, XXX . The conclusion is clear, and these words are treated below in distinction 35, in the last chapter XXX . The second part is proved because attributal perfection is the essence itself imported into many things through a term generally importing a perfection absolutely common to the creator and to the creature according to some analogy from a revealing investigation of creatures into the creature, like wisdom, justice, goodness, and others of this type. But any divine supposite is formally ad really justice, goodness, wisdom, and things of this type, therefore no divine supposite is distinguished from attributal perfection. The first part of the antecedent is clear through the description of the attribute or the attributal perfection, which is able to drawn out from what is said by Thomas of Strasbourg, in distinction 6 of the first book, in question one, in article one Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 6, q. 1, a. 1 . Through that which is said generally signifying absolute perfection they differ from notions because, though the generating Father is a kind of perfection absolutely, nevertheless it is not generally because then it would be a perfection in the Son or Holy Spirit. Through that which is said to God and to creature they differ from those things which are not and are not able to be suitable to creatures, like deity, immensity, etc. But through that which is said according to some analogy they differ from those things which we only believe by faith to suit God, and to depend on his free will alone, like to become a man, to be born, to suffer, etc.

First corollary: because the will, intellect, goodness, and attributal perfections of this kind are not and they do not indicate distinct formalities in God. This is clear because otherwise there would be an infinite process in formalities, which is false. The consequence is clear because, if wisdom is formally distinguished from the will, therefore let this distinct formality be a, and it follows that a has another formality, and then it is asked whether this is distinguished from that or that, as before, and thus there will be a proceeding into infinity or there will be admitted that somethings are distinguished formally and they do not have diverse formalities.

Second corollary: every attributable divine perfection within it is formally the same and absolutely equal. This is clear.

Third corollary: though attributes of this type are not pluralized nor distinguished from the nature of things, nevertheless a distinction of reason is had between them or is taken up through the operation of our intellect. The first is clear from what has been said. The second is proved because from the fact that such attributable perfections are not distinguished in God, the plurality of them would not be able to be had unless through distinct conceptions of the same things accepted by creature in whom understanding is one thing, willing is another thing, etc. But such compositions and divisions are operations of our intellect, therefore.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: just as equality among many created things recognizable in the equality of the divine supposites is properly incomparable, so the personal distinction of the same divine supposites is disproportional to every other distinction. The first is clear through what has been said since in no case are several created things as essentially the same as these divine supposites are essentially the same. The second part is proved because this personal distinction in a line of distinctions is not of some quantity, since it is the smallest possible. And in the second place because no distinction recognizable among created things is of the same ratio with this, therefore this is disproportional from one to other.

The first corollary: just as two divine supposites are not something greater than one, so one of them is not less distinguished from one than from the remaining two. This is clear because something is distinguished in itself from another.

Second corollary: though amount any two men there is able to be found properly a personal distinction, nevertheless we do not say properly that this distinction will be greater, lesser, or equal to the divine distinction. This is clear because they are of diverse rationes and infinitely and incompossibly disproportionate because it is impossible that one person is another. Nevertheless it is not distinguished infinitely impossibly infinitely differently such that the person is distinguished infinitely incompossibly and distantly, and nevertheless is distinguished indivisibly because it is the smallest distinction possible.

The third corollary is the affirmative part of the conclusion when taking supposita with the inclusion of their origin.

Objections

Against the first conclusion, it follows that there would be in the divine three perfect things in the highest degree. The consequent is false because only one thing can be the most perfect. The consequence is clear because anything of equals such that it is equal to another is to this perfect. But the divine supposite is not equal to another unless to the extent that it is against what is distinct, therefore some divine supposite such that it is distinct from another will be the most perfect, and thus there will be three things that perfect in the highest degree.

In the second place, it follows that there will be infinite equal things in God. This is clear because any attributal perfection will be equal to another.

In the third place against the second corollary, its subject and accident are one in quantity, therefore in as much as something is one in quantity so they are able to be equal. The consequence is clear because quantity is according which we say something is equal or unequal as the Philosopher says.

In the fourth place against the third corollary, it follows that there would be a greater identity of the Son and the Father in the divine than of man to itself. The consequent is false because, just as it is true to say Plato is Plato , so it will be true to say the Father is the Son, which should not be said. But the consequence is proved because the identity of man to itself seems to be identity of many because man is its matter and its form which are its parts and are many.

Against the second conclusion, it would follow that the Father by one and the same relation is referred to the Son and the Holy Spirit. The consequent is false because then conversely the Son and the Holy Spirit are referred by one relation to the Father, and thus there would only be one person. The first consequence is known and the second is proved because it is impossible that one and the same thing will correspond to two relations according to species.

In the second place against the first corollary, wisdom and justice are formally distinguished and from the rationes of them and formalities in creatures, therefore wherever the formalities of them are found, there also distinctions will be found because infinity does not destroy the distinction in the thing.

In the third place against the second corollary, if the attributes were not distinct in God, it follows that power, justice, goodness, and attributes of this type would synonymous names. The falsity of the consequent is clear because they do not seem to signify the same thing nor in the same mode.

In the fourth place against the third corollary, these things are distinguished, one of which is pluralized, while the other has not been pluralized, but the essence is not pluralized, but the attributes have been, otherwise our intellect would invent or would be deceived. The antecedent is clear, for we have one concept of justice, another concept of goodness, and another of mercy.

Against the third conclusion, the divine supposites are distinguished by their properties, therefore one supposite has more properties than another, therefore in a line of a distinction a certain quantity corresponds to this distinction, therefore one internal distinction is proportional or comparable to another distinction.

In the second place, for any property inasmuch as it corresopends from a distinctive ratio in the same degree it corresponds to it from the entitative ratio, but to any divine property the proper entitative ratio corresponds, therefore a proper distinctive ratio, and consequently any property adds a proper distinction above the other.

In the third place against the first corollary and the first conclusion, if the Father is distinguished in himself from the Son, it follows that the Father convenes with the Son in nothing of himself or that the Father does not convene in something of himself with the Son. The consequent is false because then it would not be one and the same essentially in the higheset degree. The consequence is clear because those things which are distinguished in themselves do not convene in something of themselves.

In the fourth place against the responsive corollary, the divine persons are simple things in the highest degree, such that the essence is not simpler than the persons nor is some thinkable property in the persons simpler than the person, therefore by whatever means such a person is distinguished it itself from another, it is distinguished in isolation from any other, therefore it is distinguished by an isolated origin from itself in turn for the others This is the argument of Gregory, in distinction 26, article one, question 2 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 26, a. 1, q. 2 .

Responses

To the first, the consequence is denied, and to the proof the major is conceded because, though every divine supposite is immeasurably perfect in incomplex perfection, nevertheless it follows that there are three perfect supposites. See Hugolinus XXX . Otherwise it is possible to say that the consequent is true because common predications belong to three persons, and they belong through nouns, adjectives, or participles. If they are held to be pure adjectives, then they always speak about many things, namely about three things plurally and according to this rule they are able to said to be three blessed, three eternal, and so on about similar things. See Henry of Ghent, first part, article 49, question 3 Henricus Gandavensis, I, a. 49, q. 3 .

To the second, the consequences is denied, and to the proof it is said that between the attributes there is not distinction from the nature of things, as is clear from the third corollary of the second conclusion.

To the third, in the first place it would be possible for the antecedent to be denied because any of them is quantity or an amount in their own quantity.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that the argument is not against the corollary because quantity is from an essential ratio of those amounts.

To the fourth, in the first place it would be possible to be said when admitting the consequent, and when it is further inferred, therefore just as this should be conceded Plato is Plato , etc., this consequence is denied.

In the second place, it is even better able to be said by denying the first consequence because the identity of man to its very self is not properly the identity of many, but of only one man.

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequent is conceded, and to the disproof, because then the Son and the Holy Spirit, etc., the consequence is denied because, just as Socrates by the same whiteness in number is able to be similar to Plat and dissimilar to Cicero, so a single relation is able to correspond to two relations.

To the second, the consequence is denied, and to the proof it is conceded that divine infinity does not destroy the formal distinction of attributes absolutely, but destroys the formal distinction in God.

To the third, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is said that, though the names thoroughly signify the same thing in the divine, nevertheless they do not signify the same thing in a creature, and therefore they are not synonyms because synonyms signify the same thing thoroughly in whichever thing the signified of those things is found.

To the fourth, the minor is denied. To the proof, I say that, just as the essence is not pluralized, so neither are the attributes pluralized from the nature of the thing in God, though we express the same signified thing through diverse terms. And this is on account of the weakness of our intellect because we are not able to grasp or understand otherwise.

To the first against the third conclusion, the major is conceded, but the minor is denied because, if the Father is generating, the Son is generated, and the Holy Spirit is not generated, and so on for similar things.

In the second place, it is said that there are not more incomplex properties in one than in another because any supposite is its own properties, when speaking intransitively.

In the third place, grated there would be more complex properties, nevertheless because they arise from a single and first distinctive ratio, therefore they add nothing.

To the second, Hugolinus would say that what is assumed is not true because he says in this distinction, in the first question, in the fourth conclusion Hugolinus de Orvieto, XXX that any distinction in the divine is infinitely small, and nevertheless the entity is infinitely great.

In the second place and in a different way, what is assumed is able to be conceded, namely that, it only corresponds, etc., but of so many, and thus the consequences is not valid, the distinction between the Father and the Son is infinite, therefore they are infinitely distinguished , unless in the sense given and expressed in the last corollary

To the third, it is said that it ought to be understand that they are distinguished in themselves, that is by no other incomplex entity. If nevertheless the consequent is understood that the Father does not convene in the essence with the Son, it would be denied because the essence belongs to each. Again, concerning what Hugolinus says that divine persons are distinguished in themselves in a degree of distinction since any person in their own entity is essentially the same thing that another person is because they are essentially one in the highest degree. And he says further that it does not belong to some of it as if some part, but they are essentially one in total.

To the fourth, it is said in the first place that this plurality is not repugnant to simplicity, just as multiplicity of the persons is not repugnant to the simplicity of the essence.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that the corollary does not say absolutely that the persons are distinguished, but says that the are not distinguished among themselves without the inclusion of the origin, therefore the argument does not conclude.

To the first argument in the opposition, the consequence is denied because one is the perfection of the three persons made plural. And to the confirmation, because the it is called perfect as if perfectly made, it is true according to the imposition of the name, but not according to the property of signification.

To the second, it is clear from the conclusion that the divine supposites are their own properties and attributable perfections.

To the third, it is clear through the third conclusion and corollaries how and how great is the distinction of the divine supposites.

Principal arguments

That not because among the divine supposites there is not equality properly speaking nor the highest equality, therefore they do not have equal power. The antecedent is proved first because equality properly said is not able to found except among moveable magnitudes. In the second place because quality of the divine supposites is not and does not assert something positive, as appears to be the opinion of the Master sentire in distinction 23, chapter 2 Lomardus, I, d. 23, c. 2, xxx . And again because such equality would be a real relation or a relation of reason, but neither of these is said, therefore.

In the second place, if this were true, it follows that the Son and the Holy Spirit have the power of producing the Son. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear since the Father has this power and de facto alone produces the Son

In the third place, the Father alone is God, therefore the Father alone is omnipotent, therefore the Father alone has the power of producing every possibile thing, therefore the Son and the Holy Spirit are able to produce nothing in any more or to making anything exist. The consequences are known, and the antecedent is proved because the Father alone is God which antecedent should have proved.

In opposition, it is argued through the Master in these distinctions Lombardus, I, dd. xxx . Again, Augustine, in , says none of the three divine persons precedes the other in eternity or exceeds it in magnitude or surpasses it in power Ps-Augustinus, , therefore.

First conclusion

The first conclusion: though everything with respect to moveable quantity is repugnant to every divine supposite, nevertheless the divine supposites are equal in the highest degree understanding equality in the proper sense. The first part is clear through Blessed Augustine, V , in chapter one where he says we understand God inasmuch as we are able to be great without quantity, good without quality Augustinus, V, 1, 2 etc. The second part is proved because every proposition, if it is through regarding the property of the word, is true. But this is true, the divine persons are equal or equality is in the divine persons, therefore properly and not improperly. This part is proved by Scotus and Landulphus, the arguments for which are stated by Alphonsus, in book one, distinction 19, question 2, article 2, conclusion 1 Vargas, I, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, concl. 1 who works to resolve them, and he holds the opposing position and proves it in thee same place.

First corollary: though the same thing is the equality of perfection among the divine persons, nevertheless between them there is a true likeness properly speaking. This is clear through the conclusion. It is confirmed because where there is greater perfection, equality and likeness are truer and more proper. But among the divine supposites there is equality and likeness, therefore it is most proper and most true.

Second corollary: a divine is compared to another only and similarly because, if one of them were shown clearly to a creature and it was not prescinded from its origin or emanation, then no distinction between them would be posited by the one seeing. This is clear because every distinction in the divine is founded upon the origins and emanations of the persons according to Damascenum Ioannes Damascenus, xxx .

Third corollary: it is not the case that the created intellect conceives the equality of the divine supposites and at the very same time grasps the same essence and perfectional magnitude. This is clear through Augustine, V , in chapter 7 , where he says we ask according to what is the Son equal to the Father; not according to what is to the Father si the Son said to be equal to the Father. Therefore it remains that it is said to be equal according to that which is to itself Augustinus, V, 6, 7 (xxx) , and therefore it is inferred that the substance is equal. And after these words the Master concludes, therefore he says the equality of the Father and the Son is not a notion but a unity of nature. Lombardus, I, d. 31, c. 3

From this it seems to follows in the first place that the equality and likeness are not said in the divine only privatively, but really and positively because the Son is equal to othe Father according to his substance, as Augustine says. Again, if they were not differing positively, then the equal divine persons would not differ than non entities and impossibiles. The consequence holds because a chimera is not greater or lesser than a unicorn, if therefore such remotion suffices for equality, then the inferred consequent follows.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though it is necessary that the Father alone produces something omnipotent, nevertheless only the Father is able to produce anything contingent or to conserve it in being. The first is clear because only the Father in the divine produces the omnipotent Son necessarily, as was clear above. The second part is proved because it follows that only the Father produces something contingent, therefore the Son does not produces what is contingent. But outside the works of the Trinity are undivided. The consequence is clear through explaining in an exclusive way.

The first corollary: though the Son has the power of generating from the Father, nevertheless the Son is not internally able to produce himself the Son nor another. The first part is clear because the power of generating the Son falls under omnipotence, but the Son is omnipotent, therefore. The second is clear because, if he were able to produce the Son, then de facto he would have done so from eternity, and thus there would be a quaternity of persons in the divine, which is false.

Second corollary: to be something omnipotence does not imply the power itself to produce everything producibile. This is clear because the Son in the divine is producibile, and nevertheless the same Son is not able to produce itself, therefore, even though it is omnipotent.

Third corollary: that no one explains divine omnipotence sufficiently through the power to make whatever exists or or cause something that does not imply a contradiction. This is clear because in the divine the essence is and nevertheless no one is able to make it, therefore.

Third Conclusion

Third conclusion: though it is necessary that every divine supposite is equally omnipotent, [nevertheless] it is not the case that only one divine supposite is God. The first is clear because the omnipotent Father, the omnipotent Son Quicumque Vult , etc. The second is proved because it follows that only the Father is God, therefore the Son is not God. The consequent is impossible, but the consequence is clear because an exclusive saying, taken purely exclusively, added to one of the related things, excludes the other, as is clear through deduction of the Philosopher I making a similar consequence, saying only the beginning is, then what is from the beginning is not Aristotle, I, 2 185a305 This is confirmed because only the Father is God, therefore nothing else from the Father is God The consequences is clear from from the one explaining to the explained. The consequent is false because the Son, which is something else from the Father is God, and similarly the Holy Spirit is God.

First corollary: though every merely exclusive proposition, whose predicate suits any of its correlatives, is false, nevertheless every proposition, whose predicate is able to suit one of its correlatives without the other, is true. An example of the first, this is false, only the father is because to be suits not only the Father, but any of the three supposites which is proved because it follows only the Father is, therefore the Father is and it follows the Son is not, therefore the Father is not which is the opposite, etc. An example of the second, only the Father generates. This is true because the predicate does not suit the Son or the Holy Spirit and thus those propositions expressing it are true because the Father generates within the divine, and nothing other besides him, therefore alone.

Second corollary: the application or apposition of a saying exclusive to one of the relative things is an implication or inference of a formal or virtual contradiction. This is clear from the propositions about which the first part of the first corollary speaks, as it was deduced there.

Third corollary: though it is not true that only the Father is God exclusively, nevertheless only the Father is God in the most precise way. The first is clear through what has been said. The second is clear Father as taken precisely with nothing added to it is true God from which follows the affirmative part of the conclusion.

Objectiones and responses

Against the first conclusion, in the divine there this and that quantity, therefore neither is there a quantity properly said. The consequence is clear because equality properly said is the disposition of one quantity to another. The antecedent is clear through Augustine, V in chapter 10 , who says just we do not say three essences but one, so we not say three magnitudes but one Augustinus, V, 10, 11 .

In the second place against the first corollary, either this likeness is a distinct thing from the identity or it is precisely the same thing. It is not the first because then there would be some distinction in the divine which is greater than the personal distinction. The consequent is false. Nor is it the second because according to Scotus the foundations of such relations are not the same from the nature of the thing, for the essence founds the identity, infinity founds equality, and wisdom founds likeness, but these things are distinguished from the nature of the thing, as is held by ut tenet Scotus in distinction 19 of book I, in question 12, in distinction 13 Scotus, I, d. 19, q. 12

In the third place against the third corollary, complete being of equality dependent on the intellect, therefore it is not a real relation but a relation of reason. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved because the Father is not able to be conceived as equal to the Son unless the same magnitude is accepted twice by the intellect at once in the Father and in the Son

In the fourth place, a real relation requires real extremes that are really distinct, but the same thing is not able to really distinct from itself,, therefore the equality of the divine supposites is not a real relation, but only a relation of reason. The consequence is clear since reality and identity are the same.

Against the second conclusion, omnipotence is possible in everything which is the terminus of active power, according to which this is able to be produced. But the Son in no mode is capable of initial generation, therefore the Son either is not omnipotent or the generation of the Son is not the terminus of active potency.

In the second place against the first and second corollaries, the Father is able to produce the Son and the Son is not able to produce the Father, therefore the Son is not as extensively productively powerful as the Father, therefore.

In the third place against the first part of the first corollary, if the Son were to have the power of producing the Son, it would follow that this production would be able to be reduced to act. The consequent is false through the second part because the Son is not able to generate the Son. And the consequence is clear because a potency which is not able to be reduced to act would be useless, but the potency in the Son is not useless, therefore.

Against the third conclusion, the Father is not able to be separated fromthe Son in being, nor the converse, therefore the exclusive saying added to the Father does not exclude the Son. The consequence holds because an exclusive saying neither removes nor excludes one from the other if those things are not able to be excluded from one another in being and be separated.

In the second place, the greater the connection between the two correlatives than between the entire whole and its parts, but the exclusive saying added to the whole does not exclude the part, therefore what has been added to one of the relatives does not exclude the other. The major premise is known because the posited relatives posit themselves and having been destroyed permeate themselves. The minor is clear because the house alone does not follow therefore it is not equal, rather the opposite follows.

In the third place, if the Father alone is, the Father is, but if the Father is the Son, therefore the exclusive saying does not exclude the correlative

In the fourth place, one of the relatives is from the intellect of the other, therefore it follows that one is not able to be excluded from the other. The consequence is clear because, just as it does not follows that man alone is, animal is not because animal is from the intellect of man and is necessarily included in man, just as the superior includes within itself the inferior, so in what is proposed.

In the fifth place, it is argued with the authority of Augustine , libro 3, capitulo 13 Augustinus, III, c. 13 , where he says, if it were said about the Father alone that he is wise and God is not, nevertheless the Son and Holy Spirit would be excluded because these three are one and they are inseparable.

To the first, the consequence is denied. In the second place, I say that those denying true and proper equality in the divine, consequently have to deny active generation because this follows. In the third place, I say that Augustine in the proof of the consequent receives the abstract through the concrete, and thus equality will still be int he divine properly speaking, for though there are not three magnitudes, nevertheless there are three great things adjectively taken.

To the second, it is said that equality and likeness are not absolutely an identity, but there is an identity of the three persons. And when it is said that not because the foundations of such things are distinguished, this is denied.

To the third, Alphonsus would deny what has been assumed for the proof, because the Father is not able to be grasped, etc He denies this because, as he says, the equality is not other than the identity. But if the response were valid the divine identity would be able to be said to be equal to itself. Therefore I would say differently that the antecedent is true because it does not seem to be well thought that the equality in the divine is grasped unless two essences are received. But it does not follows that the Father is not able to be grasped as equal to the Son unless the essence is grasped twice by the intellect, therefore the Father is not able to be equal to the Son unless the essence is taken twice because it is the case that it is thus and that no created intellect grasps it thus.

To the fourth, it is said that equality in the divine has sufficiently distinct extremes because I do not say that identity and equality are the absolutely the same as Alphonsus. But I say that equality is the identity of many distinct things and this suffices for the foundation of such relations in the divine

To the first against the second conclusion, I say that Scotus who makes this argument, takes for the same thing to generate and to be able to generate and the power of generating which those who hold the opposite do not have to do. In the second place, it is able to be said that he proves to be held nominally and verbally, but Scotus and all the others standing with take it for the same thing, therefore the argument does not conclude that

To the second, the consequence is denied because the Father just as much as the Son are productive of an infinity of things. In the second place, I say that to not produce the Son is a perfection not an imperfection, therefore the consequence is also not valid.

To the third, the consequence is denied, and to the proof it is conceded as true where the power de facto is not reduct to act or where one having this power is not the terminus reduced through this power to perfect act. But in the proposed, the Son, who has this power, is the terminus reduced to act, therefore the authority of the Philosopher does not conclude.

To the first against the third conclusion, the consequence is denied.

To the second, the major premise is denied universally because the integral part intrisically considers the constitution of the whole, but one of the related does consider instrinsically to the constitution of the other.

To the third, the conditional or consequence is able to be denied because an exclusive saying has been added. A relation knows the nature of a separating saying, whence just it does not follows that man is dead, therefore man is, so it does not follows that only the Father is, therefore the Father is. In the second place, it is able to be said that that the Father is when the Father is not, especially in creatures.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied because, though one relative is from the intellect secondarily or implied in what is the signified of the other, nevertheless it is not from the intellect or what is principally signified.

To the fifth, it is said that Augustine in such places does not intend this proposition properly, and according to the force of the word it should be conceded, only the Father is God or wise, if only is taken exclusively. But he intends to say that when these propositions are found in scripture, it ought not to be understood that, if an exclusive saying is added to one person, scripture intends to exclude the others because then these authorities would be false by virtue of the fact that the divine persons are one. For sometimes scripture uses these propositions on account of the brevity of the word, supposing that it will be understood about all what is said about only one. And other times he uses these propositions, when taking the exclusive sayings non-exclusively but precisely, and then such propositions are conceded, as it has been said.

To the first argument in the opposition, it is clear what should be said from the first conclusion and corollary.

To the second, it is clear from the second conclusion because, if power or potency are taken nominally or entitatively, thus it is conceded, but if it is taken verbally and executively, then the consequence is denied. And to the proof, because the Father has this power, I say that this power is not something but to something. In the second place, I say that if this gerundive generating is the gerundive of an active verb, then only it is only in the Father, if it is of a passive verb, then it is only in the Son, if an impersonal verbi, then it is any divine supposite.

To the third, it is clear from the conclusion that the antecedent should be denied. And to the proof, the consequence is denied because this is not its converse, but it ought to be converted thus, only God is Father, that is, every Father or every persona of the Father in the divine is God, and this should be conceded as true.

Principal arguments

That not because then, just as true number is posited and found in creatures, so true number would be found in the divine. The consequent is false because number is a real accident which in no mode should be posited in the simplicity of the divine essence. The consequence is clear since the trinity of divine persons is not less than the trinity of created persons, as is seen, therefore.

In the second place, there no single concept for God and creature, therefore no name properly suits God and creature. The consequences is valid, and the antecedent is proved because God and creature differ more than substance and accident.

In the third place, God is not nameable and a creature is, therefore. The consequences is valid, and the antecedent is from Augustine in on the , sermon 34 Whatever is able to be spoken is not ineffable, but God is ineffable Augustine, Sermo 17, c. 5, n. 7 (PL38, 665) , therefore. Again, through the author of , in proposition 6 , saying, the first cause is above all speaking and languages fall short of its telling V (VI) .

The Master seems to be in opposition from distinction 21 up to 26 exclusively, therefore.

First conclusion

The first conclusion: though number secundum quid is obtainable from corporeal things, nevertheless number absolutely is in discoverable in spiritual things. The first part is proved because number is a plurality of unities or several unities, therefore number secundum quid in is able to be posited in corporeal unities. The consequences is clear because, if several unitieis are number, it follows that those unities which are not unities absolutley but secundum quid do not constitute number absolutely but secundum quid, but in corporeal things nothing is one absolutely, therefore. This is clear since any such things is composed from several parts or uniities, namely from matter and form. The first antecedent is able to be had from the Philosopher Aristoteles, III and the Commentator III Averroes, III, commento xxx . The second part is proved because number absolutely is unity absolutely or plurality of simple unities, but this kind of simplicity is only found in spiritual things, therefore.

The first corollary: that when taking number for a any plurality of really distinct things then number absolutely should be put in the divine. But if it were taken for plurality of some things neither existing or constituting one thing through itself, in this way should number should be totally removed from the divine persons. The first part is clear because the blessed trinity is a true plurality of persons distinct from one another. The second is proved because these persons are one through themselves essentially because something composed having parts at the same time is not called number because they are one this something, therefore a fortiori the uncreated trinity, since it is one most simple essence, is not number in the mode taken. And in this sense should the authorities be taken which say that there no number in the divine. The corollary is from Gregorius, in distinction 24 of book 1, article 3 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 24, a. 3. .

Second corollary: that no number absolutely is an accident inhering formally in numerated things. This is clear since no accident should be put in God and number absolutely is there. This is confirmed because, if number were an accident, either it divisible or indivisible. Not the first because no number is divisible into many numbers, as is clear from a binary. Again, should any of these numbers have parts it would be able to be asked about them without end. Nor the second since every quantity is divisible as is clear through the V Aristoteles, V, xxx . And nor is it able to be said that it is divisible into unities, since numeric unities are not superadded to numerated things, but are things themselves. It follows that number is not a divisible accident. Again, it follows that the same accident would be in many things separated in place by a maximum distance. The consequences is clear because the number one hundred of men/to man would be in some of them, since there is not a greater reason for it to be one than in another or in all. This is the corollary of Gregory mentioned above Gregrious Ariminensis, xxx . The opposite of this is held by Thomas de Argentina and he responds to this argument in distinction 28, article 4 Thomas de Argentina, I, c. 28, a. 4 .

Third corollary: that no number taken absolutely and properly depends on an act of the intellect or a numerating mind. This is clear because otherwise when such an acts ceases number would cease, and thus when a disordered rich person does not a florin would cease to have the number which it previous had, indeed this person would have neither more nor less than any poor person. The consequence is clear because where there is not number there are not are not rich and poor, nor more or less discretively or numerically. This corollary is from Thomas of Argentina lio in distinction 24 Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 24. . For which things it is clear that just as no one thing per se is several men, so no number is one thing, but many. This is clear because it is numerated things. See Gregory where mentioned above Gregorius Ariminensis, xxx .

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: that any divine supposite conveying absolute perfection is able to be said properly and formally of God, It is proved because God is formally that which is in anything is better it is than it is not, therefore. The conclusion is true. The consequence is valid. And the antecedent is from Anselm 15 Anselmus, 15, xxx . Note nevertheless that this description of Anselm ought to be understood thus, that perfection absolutely is that through which, for any single thing in which it is, it is better that it is than if it were not in this, and were not this, and were not in it formally, and were not in another equivalently or virtually, from which it follows that Anselm's description of absolute perfection in itself and in the sense which it makes does not seem true. This is clear because, so understood, it would follows from this that nothing would be absolutely perfect. The consequence is clear because nothing is that which for every single thing is better than not being because either this would be the creator or creature. It is not the creator because it would not be better for me to be God than not to be God because through being God I would become not me. Nor would this be a creature because it would not be better for God to be a creature than not to be a creature. Therefore some gloss Anselm, saying the following, absolute perfection is that which in a single thing in which it is, is better for that thing that if it were not in that thing. xxx . But this does not suffice because then hotness has 10 degrees and it would not be absolutely perfect. The consequent is false, and the consequence is clear because, if this charity were removed from me, and if another charity were given to me of a thousand degrees, it would be better for me than before, and nevertheless I would not have that which I had before, and consequently to have this would not be a kind of absolute perfection, which was the derived consequent.

The first corollary: that some names implying negation or privation signify the divine nature perfectly and an immeasurable perfection. This is clear because an unmeasured, infinite, and immensity, infinity, signify the divine nature and perfection, and nevertheless they are negative names, therefore. The antecedent is clear from Richard, III , chapter 9 , saying, we have production because the divine substance is nothing other than his own immensity. Ricardus de Sancto Victore, II, 7 .

Second corollary: no name purely negative or privative is perfectly declarative or expressive of the divine essence. This is clear because such a name says perfection absolutely, therefore. The antecedent is clear because such a name does not speak what the thing is, but what it is not.

The third corollary: no name said about God temporally speaks a perfection absolutely or suits God formally. This is clear because any such name is able to not suit God. This is confirmed because otherwise it follows that God would more perfect after the creation of the world than before. This is clear because in the creation of the world God began to be, since this name is said about God in in relation to creatures, as is show by the Master in distinction 22 I, d. 22, xxx. .

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: though God is not perfectly knowable or conceivable by us in this life, nevertheless in this life God is nameable by us in some mode. The first is clear through the Prima patet per Apostle in 13 now we know God in part and imperfectly I Corinthios 13:12 . The second part is proved because that which we conceive or are able to conceive in some mode, we are able to express and name that through names, since words are signs of the passions and coneptus of the mind. But through the first part, we are able to conceive God in some mode, therefore.

The first corollary: that no mental or vocal name is properly univocal to God and to creature. This is clear because the world being seems most especially to be univocal and common to them, but this is false. This is clear because God suits the created being less than an accident does with substance.

The second corollary: though God is conceivable and nameable by us nevertheless the concept of him cannot be placed in any category. This is clear because then the term of the category would be said univocally of God and creatures, which is false. This corollary is against Gregory, in book 1, distinction 8, question 3, article 3 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 8, q. 3, a. 3. .

Third corollary: though no proper name found in scripture is properly univocal of God and creatures, nevertheless the same mental and vocal name is able to signify God and creature analogically. The first part is clear by taking proper name univocally and strictly because no such thing is suitable to God and creature. The second part is clear when taking proper name loosely and for any concept significative of a thing by analogy or in some manner equivocally.

Objections and Responses

Against the first conclusion and corollary: first every number absolutely properly said is a plurality of quantums, but in the divine itself in innumerable things there is not plurality of quantums, therefore. The major is clear because every such number is a type of quantity because it is discrete quantity, as is clear in what has been proved. The minor is clear because no immaterial thing is a quantum.

In the second place against the second corollary, it follows that numerated things are number. The consequent is false because then some numbers of the same species would be unequal. The consequence is clear because six men and five are of the same species because all men are of the same particular species, and nevertheless they are not equal numbers. Again in the same mode, it follows that equal numbers will be of diverse species, just as quaternary of roses and a quaternary of violets. The consequence is clear because rose and violent are distinguished in species.

In the third place, it follows that some substance would be quantity. The consequence is clear since every number is quantity and numerated things are substances. The consequent is false, both because every quantity is an accident, and because substance and quantity are diverse and distinct categories.

In the fourth place, it would follows that the one seeing a crowd of men would know the number of them because the number of them and those men are the same.

Against the second conclusion, God and creature are totally distinguished from one another and agree formally in nothing, therefore no ratio abstracted or taken from one would formally suit the other, therefore no name abstracted from a creature is said formally of God. The consequence is clear because, if such a ratio were to fit any of them, this would not be totally formally distinct, but rather would agree formally in something, which is repugnant to what has been said.

In the second place against the first corollary, if some negative name were said about God formally this would either be through information or identity. Not the first because the most simple act is not able to be the subject of something through what is informed. Nor the second because then privative and the negative would coincide through identity and would really be the same thing, which is false.

In the third place against the second corollary, infinity is as negative as incorporeality, but infinity is formally said about God, therefore.

Dionysius I seems to be against the third conclusion, saying, God is unnamable by us because we do not name anything that we do not know by any thought Ps-Dionysius, I, xxx. . But, as he shows in the same place, we do not know God by any thought, therefore.

In the second place, there ought to be a certain proportion of any sign to its significatum. But no proportion is able to be between some mental and vocal name and God, therefore God is conceivable by no concept.

In the third place against the first corollary, every intellect certain about one concept and doubtful about others has a concept about which it is certain which is different from the concepts about which it is uncertain. But the intellect of the pilgrim is able to be certain about God when doubting about finite or infinite, created or uncreated being, therefore the concept of being about God is different from this or that concept. Therefore neither by itself is it included in either of those things, therefore it is not univocal to those things. Scotus, in book 1, distinction 3, question 2 Scotus, I, d. 3, q. 2. . See the arguments of Thomas Argentina Thomas de Argentina .

Against the second corollary, everything that is predicated truly in quid about a pronoun pointing to some thing and about a pronoun pointing to another thing specifically distinct from it, nevertheless not about anything, that is a genus or category of that thing. But this is the case regarding this name spirit with respect to God and other things, therefore God or his concept is able to be found in some category. The minor is clear because this name spirit is predicated in quid about of a pronoun demonstrating God and angels, there spirit is a genus to God and angels, and consequently God is in some genus.

To the first, the major is able to be denied because a ternary of angels is number absolutely and properly said no less than a quaternary of horses.

In the second place, it is said that there quantity of perfection suffices because in spiritual things this is greater because it is more perfect. However any divine suppose is immeasurably perfect, though they are not three immensely perfect substantially distinct things, nevertheless they are truly three of which something is immensely perfect.

To the second, the consequent is conceded, and to the proof, that unequal numbers are of the same species of this genus which is number, is understood in two ways. In the first way, that the same most specific species of number is predicated of each number, in this way the consequence is denied. In the second way, that they are of the species of some other genus, like of substance or of quality, in this way the consequence is conceded. And the consequent as true is not proved false in this sense, but in the first place in the same mode said to the second by conceding the consequent, for two men and two horses and any other two things are in the same species of number inasmuch as they are two, but inasmuch as they are men, the others are horses, they are diverse in species, nor is this inconvenient because the same thing in diverse modes is in diverse categories.

To the third, the consequent is conceded, and I say further wither Gregory that not every quantity is an accident. In the second place, it is said that, though substance and quantity are distinct categories, nevertheless they are able to be predicated of the same thing.

To the fourth, it is said that one seeing the whole crowd of one sees the number of a man and the one seeing a crowed of a thousand men sees the number of a thousan, but it does not follow that he sees those men determinately to be a thousand. Gregory offers the example Gregorius Ariminensis, XXX .

To the first against the second conclusion the consequence is denied because in this way it would be proved that a horse would not be formally an animal because man and horse are themselves formally distinct and agree in no from the part of the thing, therefore the concept of an animal abstracted from on of them would not suit the other, and thus either man would not formally be an animal, and if this is true, the horse will not be formally an animal.

In the second place, I say to the form that the argument only proves that the ratio abstracted through the intellect by a creature does not suit God formally outside the intellect because this common and abstract ratio does not have real being, but is only a being of reason. Nevertheless it does not follows that goodness and wisdom and things of this kind do not suit God formally.

To the second, it is said that through the identity and the inferred consequence is denied, therefore the positive, etc., because, though these terms infinity, immensity are something privative with respect to the word, nevertheless not according to the thing or the signification.

To the third, what is assumed is denied, nevertheless for the matter of the argument I say that some names are negative according to the thing and word, some according to the word, and some absolutely, concerning the first is the invisibility in sound, concerning the second immensity, infinity, concerning the third ignorance, blindness. See Alphonsus, distinction 22 of book 1, article 2 Alphonsus Vargas, I, d. 22, a. 2, xxx where he puts several distinctions of types of names.

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said that this authority and similar doctors intend that in life we are not able to know God perfectly, nor even to name, but we are only able to name him imperfectly, as the conclusion says.

To the second, it is said to the antecedent that it suffices that the sign is imposed on the signified by some property which exists in the signified in reality and appears in some mode or is expressed in the signified. Nevertheless it is not necessary that between the sign and the signified there is a proportion through adequation and equality because otherwise a circle would not able to be a sign of wine, for it suffices that there is a proportion according to imposition.

To the third, the major is denied because the intellect is able to be certain about a disjunct created from two contradictories and to be doubtful about each, just as in this case, Plato is or is not, and nevertheless it is not necessary that he has a distinct disjunctive concept. Whence when a bachelor is equivocal of a bachelor in theology and medicine and you know the following both that Peter is a bachelor in theology and John in medicine, and you do not know which of them is the theologian and which is the medical doctor, then you are certain that Peter is a bachelor and that John is a bachelor, but you also do not know whether each one is a bachelor in medicine or in theology. Therefore through this mode of arguing this term bachelor is different from each of these and is included in each, therefore it is univocal, which is false. Therefore it is clear that the argument does not conclude.

To the fourth, the major is denied unless it were predicated about these things univocally and according to the same quidditative reason. In the second place, the minor is denied because it is not distinguished specifically from something. And when it is said that spirit is predicated about, etc., there the consequence is denied because it is not predicated univocally about them. Whence Augustine denies that God is substance where substance is one of the ten categories because the divine essence is not contained or limited by any category. Therefore Dionysius says that God is not being but above being Dionysius, xxx

To the first in the opposition, the consequent is conceded, and to the disproof it is said that the consequence is not valid because, as was made clear above, this number is not different from the supposites.

To the second, it is said what was said in the third conclusion.

To the third, it is clear how God is imperfectly nameable by us and in someway knowable by us, and this suffices.

Principal arguments

That not because in the divine there is some absolute supposite, therefore there are more supposites than properties. The consequence holds because there are precisely as many relative properties as there are relative things. The antecedent is proved because actions belong to supposites, but action formally suits the divine essence, therefore also the suppositable ratio. Again in the second place because understanding only suits supposites, but the essence understands formally, indeed essential understanding, as it seems, precedes notional understanding, therefore.

In the second place, the divine supposites are distinguished from the essence, therefore. The consequence is clear because a distinction in the divine implies a relative opposition according to Anselm, and consequently he argues for a relative property in each distinct thing, therefore in the divine essence there is a relative property distinct from the properties of the supposites. The antecedent is proved because about the essence and persons there are truly called contraries, as for example communicable and non-communicable. In the second place, the antecedent is proved because the Son is something that is not the Father, therefore the Son is something that is not the essence. The consequence is clear because whatever is the essence is the Father. The antecedent is proved because the Son is the supposite of the Son which is not the Father. In the third place, the same antecedent is proved because the essence is absolutely perfect, but no supposite is absolutely perfect, therefore.

In third place principally, it is argued there are more relative properties than supposites, therefore. The antecedent is proved because any relative property constitute a supposite. In the second place because there are as many real things internally as there are relations. In the third place, because a personal property or person and the essence are formally distinguished, as holds Scotus, in book 1, distinction 33 Scotus, I, d. 33 , therefore.

In opposition is the Master in these distinctions Lombardus, I, xxx. . Again, Richard, IV , chapter 17 , says, in the Trinity there are as many personal properties as there are persons Richardus de Sancto Victore, IV, 17. , therefore.

First conclusion

First conclusion: just as any divine supposite is simple and necessarily in the highest degree, so no divine supposite is properly constituted in being by a property. The first part is proved because any divine supposite is not less simple than the divine essence, but it is necessary that this being is simple in the highest degree, therefore for the supposite. The second part is proved because, if the Father were constituted in being by a property, it follows that the Father in some mode would have a cause or beginning. The consequent is false because the Father is the beginning without a beginning. And the consequence is clear because something constitutive is in some mode a cause and beginning of that which it constitutes.

First corollary: if some divine supposite were constituted in being by its own property, then every supposite would be distinguished by its own property. This is clear because everything constituting is distinguished by what it constitutes, since every thing constituting is a beginning and cause of what it constitutes, as is the proof of the conclusion states.

Second corollary: it is as repugnant that the Father is distinguished from his paternity, as it is repugnant to him that he is constituted in being by his paternity. This is clear because otherwise the same thing would constitute itself in being, which does not seem to be imaginable.

Third corollary: just it is not the case that in the divine there is some constituted supposite, so it is not the case that in the divine there is some absolute supposite. It is proved because then there would not be a trinity in the divine, but also a quaternity, just as is attributed to Father Ioachim by the Master of the Lombardus, I, xxx. . Thomas of Argentina, in book one, in distincton 26, in article 4 Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 26, a. 4. proves this corollary.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: just as personal identity is repugnant to the immeasurable trinity, so the distinctive formality of a distinction is repugnant to the highest simplicity. This entire conclusion is proved in the first place through the common rule of Anselm Anselm in, chapter 2 , in which it is said, all things are the same where an opposition of relation is not found Anselmus, 7, xxx , but only among the persons is there a relative opposition of this type, therefore in the divine only a personal distinction should be posited.

The first corollary: just in the divine there is no constitutive ratio, so between the person and the essence there is no distinctive ratio. This is clear because between the persons and essence there is no relative opposition, therefore there is no distinction. The consequence is clear through the conclusion and proof.

The second corollary: just as a person is not constituted by its property, so the divine is not composed from three persons. This is clear both because the highest simplicity and because composition imply potentiality and imperfection, just as constitution.

Third corollary: though divine essence is said about something about which Father is not said and conversely, nevertheless between the Father and the divine essence a distinction should not be posited. The first is clear because the essence is said about the Son about whom nevertheless Father is not said. The second part is clear through the conclusion.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: that the divine essence, a person, and relative properties are formally the same thing or the same formality or identity. This is clear from the second conclusion because between these things there is no relative opposition.

First corollary: that when a personal property is abstracted through the intellect the essence does not remain in common. This is clear because these are immeasurably the same thing, as is clear from what has been said. Saint Thomas, in the first part, in question 44 Aquinas, I, q. 44 puts the opposite of this corollary.

Second corollary: a relative property in the divine does not appear or exist in the persons, as opposed to the way of speaking of some ancient doctors. This is clear because this appearance or existence indicates some distinction.

The third corollary is the affirmative response to the what was asked.

Objections

Against the first conclusion, what constitutes a person in being is that through which this person has being and without which a person is not able to be understood. But the Son has being through being generated and without this the Son is not able to be understood, therefore the Son is constituted in being through being generated.

In the second place, that which multiplies divine persons is what constitutes them in being, but relation multiplies the Trinity, therefore relation constitutes the persons in being. The major seems known, an the minor is from Boethius, in his book , where he says that, the essence contains unity, and relation mutliples the Trinity Boethius, xxx .

In the third place against the third corollary, that which suits creatures by reason of their perfection seems like it should be attributed to God, but in things separated from mater the supposite and nature are the same, therefore the divine essence will itself be a supposite and not something relative, therefore absolute.

in the fourth place, against the same act of speaking it presupposes the person speaking and not the relative, therefore the absolute. That it is not relative is shown because when relatives are posited at the same time, it follows that the same act of speaking would presuppose the said person, and thus it would be said before it were said, which implies a contradiction.

Against the second conclusion and first corollary, identity is greater between the Father and paternity than between the Father and essence, therefore some distinction should be put between the Father and the essence. The consequence holds because distinction and identity seem to be related through the mode of opposite latitudes.

In the second place, it is able to be argued through the second argument made in the opposite because concerning the person and essence contradictory predicates are verified. Again, because the Son is something that the Father or essence is not because it is the supposite of the Son. Again, because the divine essence is immeasurable perfection absolutely and the person is not, therefore between these there must fall a distinction.

In the third place against the third corollary, it would follows that this form is not valid, this thing is common, and this thing is not common by the same demonstrated thing, therefore the same thing is distinct from itself formally and in someway.

Against the third conclusion, it is argued with the authority of Augustine, VII , in the first chapter , who says every essence which is called a relation is also something when the relation is removed Augustinus, VII, 1, 2. . But this would not be unless there were some distinction between the essence and person and property, therefore the conclusion is false.

In the second place against the first corollary, there appears the opinion of Augustine VII primo 7o , chapter 2 , the Son is not by virtue of the Word by which he is wise because the word is not said from itself but wisdom is only truly understood relatively. Augustinus, De Trinitate, VII, 2, 3 .

In the third place against the second corollary, there appears the saying of Avicenna III , in his chapter on relation , where he says that, paternity is a disposition having its being in the father alone Avicenna, III, xxx . Therefore it seems that paternity which is a property of the Father instantiates the Father, the opposite of which was asserted by the corollary.

Against the third corollary, if it were precisely the supposite in total, then it follows that active spiration would not be a true thing. The consequence is clear because it is not a relative property, since it is in the Father and the Son. But the falsity of the consequent is clear, since such active spiration is a real relation which does not seem able to be posited unless a real difference were posited, since every real relation or distinction requires two really distinct extremes, therefore it follows that this is a true thing.

In the fifth place, when a inferior thing is multiplied it is multiplied above, but the thing is something related to the above, therefore in total things will be in the divine which are relations, but there will be four relations there, namely active and passive generation and active and passive spiration, therefore there will be four real things.

Responses

To the first, the major is denied because no constitution is properly posited in the divine on account of composition or potentiality which such terms convey.

Similarly with respect to the second, the major is denied.

To the third, it is said that, though it is of such a perfection that the supposite does not differ from the nature, nevertheless it is not of such a perfection that for one nature there is only supposite because the essence would be more perfect if this manifestly indistinct thing had many supposites and were really the same thing, just as it is in the divine.

In the second place, the minor would be able to be denied because in creatures a supposite adds something beyond the nature or somehow the being, and is a certain kind of difference between this, and they are not convertibly the same, as will be clear elsewhere.

To the fourth, it is said that the person meaning an act of speaking and person spoken with respect to reality are simultaneous, and between this there is not a praecession or presupposition, unless perhaps according to our mode of understanding which does not change anything in reality.

To the first against the second conclusion, the antecedent is denied, whatever might be said about the consequence, because the Father is neither more nor less identified or distinguished from the essence that from paternity or the converse.

To the second, in the first place the antecedent would be able to be denied because they are not predicated with respect to the same thing.

In the second place also, the consequence would be able to be denied because according to some it is possible that one term supposites for that which is that for which another supposites, nevertheless it is does not supposite for everything for which the other supposites.

To the third, the consequence would be able to be denied, and to the proof, because whatever the Father the essence is and the converse, this is able to have two senses. First that that about whatever the essence is said the Father is said about this, and this is false because in this way the Son would be the Father. The second that every incomplex being which the essence is is this entity which the Father is, and this is true.

In the second place, the antecedent would be able to be denied because to be the Son is not something but a relation to something.

In the third place, it would be able to be said that the Son is nothing that the Father is not, and to the proof, because the Son is not the supposite of the Son which is not the Father, therefore etc, the consequence is denied because a fallacy is able to be assigned many times namely fallacy of amphiboly, of the fallacy of the consequent, and a process from the secundum quid to the simpliciter.

To the fourth, the second part of the antecedent is denied because some divine supposite is the same immense perfection which is the essence.

To the fifth, the consequent is conceded, namely that this form is not valid.

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said that Augustine wishes to say that the essence, which is said to something, is also said from itself, just he explains there, and this is not against the conclusion.

To another from this authority, it is said that he wishes to say that the Son is not the Word inasmuch as he is wisdom, thought it should be held, or inasmuch as it is reduplicative. And this is conceded as if true because otherwise the Father would be the Word, since he is wisdom and similarly the Holy Spirit also.

To the third, in the first place it is able to be said that Avicenna does not speak about God or about the divine, therefore it does not conclude.

In the second place, it would be able to be absolutely denied if he wished to say that generation is really distinguished from its foundation.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied because, though it is not a distinct thing from the other three things, which are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, nevertheless it is a true thing. See Thomas of Strasbourg, in distinction 28 of book 1, article 2 Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 28, a. 2 .

To the fifth, the antecedent is conceded, and when it is further argued, that in one supposite, etc., it is said that in the same supposite the relations are not pluralized with respect to reality belong to something intrinsecally and directly, but only with respect to a reality of terms thought through such relations. Whence the Father is referred to the Son and the Holy Spirit by a single relation according to a thing which nevertheless corresponds to two other opposing relations, and to it belongs the relations of several species according to which many things correspond. For Socrates by the same whiteness is similar to the white Plato and dissimilar to black John etc.. The same relation according to a thing corresponds to likeness and dislikeness which are opposites. And thus likewise the same most simple thing, which is the Father, is spiration and paternity which corresponds to the filiation in the Son and spiration in the Holy Spirit. This is the position of Gregory, in distinctions 26 and 27 Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 26 et 27. .

To the first argument in the opposition, the antecedent is denied, as is clear through what has been said. And to the proof, it is said that, with the supposites circumscribed, the divine essence neither acts nor understands nor is there some action suitable to it.

In the second place, I say that the antecedent is not univerally true because in the sacrament of the alter accidents act and are acted upon, and nevertheless non accident is a supposite. From this it is clear because to this, that the ratio of activity suits something, it suffices that this has being through itself.

In the third place, I say that essential understanding does not proceed notional because some divine understanding is relative from a person because understanding in the Father is notional.

To the third, it is clear through what has been said the antecedent is false. And to the proof it is clear that the name constitution ought not to be admitted in the divine on account of composition and potentiality which imply it implies.

In the second place, I say that paternity and active spiration, though they do not constitute the person of the Father, they are nevertheless the same most simple thing that the Father is and they are not many real things.

In the third place, I say that personal property and essence are not formally distinguished, but they are the same formally, as is clear from the third conclusion.

Principal arguments

That not because, if there were some word in the divine, then that would either be said essentially or relatively. Not relatively because a word is an act of the intellect according to its own manifestation which is not said relatively. Again in the second place because according to Augustine, book XV , in chapter 19 verbum est cum amore notitia Augustinus, IX, . But knowledge is not said relatively, but essentially about any person, therefore. Nor should it be said that the word is said essentially because according to Augustine, in the aforesaid book, chapter 17 in this Trinity word is only said of the son Augustinus, XV c. 29

In the second place principally thus, there are several understandings or utterances in the divine, therefore there are many words there or nothing should be put there. The consequent is false. And the consequence is clear because with respect to any utterance there is a giving of a word. The antecedent is clear through Anselm, , chapter 62 , where he says that every person speaks itself Anselmus, c. 62, xxx .

In the third place, in the divine there is no beginning. Proof, because this would either be through an internal or external relation. Not the first because the beginning and the cause are the same, as is held in IV and V Aristoteles, XXX , but no cause should be posited in the divine through an internal relation, therefore. Nor the second because it is produced internally equally, perfectly or even more perfectly, than it is produced externally. And in the second place because then, just as the three supposites produce three created things, so three principles would begin three begun things, which is false. And the consequence is clear since any of these supposites is the principle with respect to what is creatable.

On the contrary is the Master in these distinctions Lombardus, I, d. XXX, c. xxx , where puts forward Augustine for his position.

First conclusion

First conclusion: just as the Word or Son is the operative art of omnipotence, so it is the infallible declarative knowledge of every true thing. The first part is from Augustine, VI , in the last chapter , who says, the divine Word or Son of God is the art is the art of omnipotence full of every living reason Augustinus, VI, 10, 11 . The second part is clear through the same author in , question 63 et in the beginning was the word Ioannes 1:1 saying in this place the Word would be better interpreted as ratio as it signifies not only a relation to the Father, but also to those things which through the Word are made operative powers . Again, V , in chapter 5 the word is the beginning of every work Augustine, V, c. 5, xxx .

First corollary: though the Father is said to be everything which is and which has to communicate with the Word, nevertheless the Father is able to reveal nothing to the Son or the Word itself. The first is clear through Augustine, V , chapter 15, de parvis , who says, the Son not only has itself from the Father, such that it is the Son, but also entirely, such that it is. Augustine, V, c. 15, xxx . The second is clear because to reveal conveys imperfection because it argues that there is a non-knowing in the one who a revelation is made, therefore it ought not to be attributed to the divine Word, since it is the true art and declarative knowledge of the truth.

Second corollary: the eternal and infallible word really relate to everything possible or makeable. The opposite is held by Scotus, distinction 27, question 3, near the end Scotus, I, d. 27, q. 3, xxx. . The corollary is clear through Anselm, , in chapter 33 , where he says by one and the same word God the Father says himself and whatever he makes Anselmus, c. 33 and in 34 he says the work which he makes according to some art, not only when it was made, but before it was made, and after it is dissolved, always is in the art itself not other than what it is itself. Anselmus, c. 34 . This corollary is also clear from the sayings of Saint Thomas, question 4, , article 5 where he says the name word is used to signify something absolute with respect to something joined Aquinas, q. 4, a. 5 and below the word principally relates to the Father, but as a consequent and as if by accident it is related to the creature Aquinas, q. 4, a. 5 therefore.

Third corollary: just as every intelligible or producible thing is impressed in the Father, so every intelligible thing is expressed through the Word or in the Word. This is clear because the eternal word is not only expressed about the essence as if about an object present to the paternal intellect, but it is also expressed about every intelligibile thing. But all intelligible things are in the Father unitively impressively, therefore the divine Word is expressed about every intelligible thing.

From what has been said it is clear that besides the divine suppositional, there is not absolute or essential Word, or beyond the filial supposite, there is no divinal word. This is clear because in the Trinity the Word is not said unless the it is the Son Augustinus, XV, c. 29 , as is clear from Augustine 5 , chapter 27 .

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: the divine Word is a singular term of paternal intellection, emanating from the one understanding by an act that remains internal and of another and declarative of itself. This conclusion is clear because, if it were not singular, it follows in the first place that paternal understanding would not have understood itself, which is false. In the second place, it follows that such a term would not have been produced from the full fecundity of understanding and from every intrinsic perfection, which is false. In the third place, it follows that such a power would not be actuated in the highest degree because such an act of understanding would be intrinsically potential, which is false.

First corollary: though something is produced externally by the same Word, nevertheless it is said that something is produced from the Word because it is not said from the Word. The first part is clear through what is said by Anselmum because by the same word God the Father speaks himself and whatever he makes Anselm c. 33 The second part is clear because the Holy Spirit is produced spiratively by the Word, and nevertheless the Holy Spirit is not spoken because then it would be the word of the word, against Augustine, in principio. Augustinus, XXX .

Second corollary: only the Father produces the Word so perfectly or expresses what impresses every level of consubstantial likeness to it, or thus the divine Word exists so similarly to the one speaking that it excludes every level dissubstantial likeness. This is clear through Anselm, 40 where from many things said he thus concludes the Word, therefore the highest of the Father thus is similar to itself, as no offspring thus is, namely, entirely similar to its parent. Anselm, 40 .

Third corollary: though the Father having been produced in love is loving, nevertheless the Father having been produced or begotten in the Word is not understanding or knowing. The first is clear through what has been said and the Master Lombard, xx since the Father and the Son love themselves and us through the Holy Spirit who is love produced spiratively. The second is clear because the Father knows wisdom formally unbegotten, without origin. The opposite of this second part is held by Scotus, in distinction 27 of book one, in the third question near the end, in the solution of the third argument Scotus, I, d. 27, q. 3 .

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: if it is so properly received, namely for that to which another being follows, and this beginning is said to be what is produced through something, then from the Father with respect to the Son a beginning is admitted within the divine, and the name with respect to the same thing is excluded. The first part is clear because the Son truly and really is generated from the Father, therefore the Son is produced from the Father, therefore the Father is the beginning of the Son. The first consequences is clear because every generation is production, and the second consequence is clear through the acceptance of the principle posited in the conclusion. But the antecedent is a catholic truth. The second part is proved because in the divine there is nothing before or after, therefore there is nothing there to which something else follows, therefore the name of cause has not place there unless with respect to what it is creatable.

The first corollary: though from the three supposites something created is produced, nevertheless from the three uncreated principles no produced thing is co-created. This is clear through the Master, in distinction 29 , where he says, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three principles, but one principle of all creatures because from one and the same mode the initiated things, for it is not the case that things are in one mode from the Father, and in another mode from the Son, but the are thoroughly in the same mode .

Second corollary: it is not the case that something external is immediately caused through the will of the first principle and that the divine knowledge does not terminate to it. This is clear because, just as things are produced through the will and power of God, so they are directed by knowledge, for these are the eternal foundations of all creatures and the first principle, as says Hugh, in I , part 2, in the last chapter Hugo de Sancto Victore, I, pars 2, xxx .

Third corollary: thought God the Father alone is not able to create anything, nevertheless he is able to begin something. The first part is clear because whatever is an external creatable thing is producible by the three divine supposites. The second part is clear because the Father alone begins the Son through the mode of understanding, therefore.

From all of these things, the affirmative part of the conclusion follows.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion, it is argued, because the Son is in it the World by which the Son and is in it the Son by which the Word, but the Son as divine Son not indicate an operative power nor a declarative power, therefore neither does the Word, and consequently the conclusion is false.

Against the second corollary, if the Word is related to the creature and to the Father either in one respect or by the same relation or by diverse relations, If the second, it follows that there are two distinct relations because with respect to anything possible there is a distinct relation, which does not seem true. Nor the first because a relation of the Word to the Father is an actual relation, but a relation which it has to possible things is only habitual, therefore.

In the third place, against the third corollary, if the Word is expressed, etc., either therefore in the first place it is either equally expressed of the divine essence as it is of other knowing things or according to what comes first and then later. If the first, it follows from the fact that the divine intellect is equally beatifically views for its object any understood things just as the divine essence, which does not seem to be true. If the second is given, it follows that the in the divine there will be priority and posteriority, which was denied above.

In the fourth place, against the sub-corollary, it is argued thus from the saying of Basil regarding word in one , upholding all things by the word of his power Hebraeos 1:3 , where he says that that the Holy Spirit is the Word of Son.

Against the second conclusion: it is argued through Anselm, , 40 saying that, to think the thing of which we have a memory, this is to speak it in the mind . But in God there are many utterances, therefore there are many intellectual terms there.

In the second place, against the same and the corollary: this is the internal word remaining, which is signified in itself and first through the external word. But the quiddity of the thing, as understood is signified through the external word, therefore the thing understood is the internal word. But such a thing does not emanate from one understanding, therefore.

In the third place against the third corollary, understanding is formally in the Father, therefore also the Word, and as a consequence he understand through a begotten understanding, which is the opposite of the corollary. The antecedent is clear, and the consequence is proved because love formally suits volition and the word formally suits understanding. But an internal volition is not without love, therefore there is no understanding without a begotten word

Against the third conclusion, it is argued through Damascene, in book one, chapter 2 , where he says that the Father is the cause of the Son, therefore in the divine the name of cause should be conceded Ioannes Damascenus, I, c. 2, xxx .

In the second place, if the name of principle is said in the divine through a relation to the external and internal either this will be equally primary or not. Not the first because then it would be said univocally of the internal and external. Nor would the internal be prior to the external since the internal notionally speaks the external, indeed essentially, nor would the external be prior to the internal since it speaks the internal eternally.

In the third place against the responsive corollary, if the Father is the principle of the begotten word and of produced being, then he is equally the principle of those things or the principle in one way and for the other in another way. Not equally because externally it is the principle in such a way that it is also of procreated being. Not in one way and for the other in another way because both the creature and the word proceed through the mode of understanding, therefore in the same mode. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is clear because they proceed from God just and artifact from the artist, but this is to proceed through the mode of understanding.

To the first, it is said that the Son is the declarative art of the Father, though it does not appear in this name Son. Whence Anselm when he says by that Word which is the Son Anselmus, XXX , and conversely he wishes to say that just as in the divine the Son is said notionally, so also the Word.

To the second, it is said that it is related by the same relation to each, nevertheless it does not follows that the creature is eternal or that the divine word is the word of the creature such that the creature speaks the word itself. But it is able to be said thus because this is spoken eternally through through. In the second place, I say also it is as if the same because the divine Word ought not to be called the word of the creature actively, such that he speaks it, but it is well said passively by virtue of the fact that the creature is said through this.

To the third, it is said that equally primary because in the Father there is one ratio of understanding and being, and there is no diversity or priority there with respect to parts.

To the fourth, it is said that Basilius and other Greek doctors used the name of they used the name of word and image for everything that proceeds in the divine, and thus the Holy Spirit is able to be called the word. But nevertheless properly the name word is said only of that which procced from the understanding, therefore Basilius there used word figuratively and improperly.

To the first against the second conclusion, it is said that not every saying or understanding, speaking loosely, has a term, as was made clear above in distinction 6 Lombardus, I, xxx . This is also held by Hoc etiam tenet Scouts, in book, distinction 32 Scotus I, d. 32 .

To the second, it is said in the first place that a thing understood is not a word, but rather something produced from an intention because word remains in the intellect. In the second place, it is said that names signify the understanding of a thing secondarily.

To the third, the consequence is denied, and to the proof when it is said, that internally there is no volition without love, it is said that if the word is is copulative or an indication of an origin and not of formality, then it is conceded, and in this way it is not against what has been said. In the second place, I say that when taking the word love loosely it is able to be conceded that volition is produced or producing love, nevertheless it is not necessary that it is produced through that same supposite which is love. Whence the Holy Spirit is love produce, nevertheless not through love which is personally the Holy Spirit and is what I call volition in the divine.

And if it is objected against the corollary and response that it follows that there are many wisdoms in the divine because the Father is wise with unbegotten wisdom and the Son is wise with begotten wisdom, here the consequence is denied because this is not more valid than to say God is begotten and God is not begotten, therefore there are several gods. It is clear that the latter is not valid, and thus neither is the former.

To the first against the third conclusion, here it is said that the Greeks use the name cause in a different way than us, therefore the Damascene speaks there in the mode of the Greeks.

To the second, in the first place it would be able to be said according to Thomam Argentina Thomas de Argentina, XXX that the beginning suits God through internal comparison and relation prior to external because the emanation of the divine persons is the ratio of emanation of creatures, and as a consequence it is prior. In the second place, it is said according to the same in the same place that the beginnig in the divine according to relation to creatures intrinsically and with respect to creatures extrinsically is not said univocally nor equivocally, but anologically, because the relation which he has internally posits something real, but the external relation does not always posit something real. In the third place, I say that what is essential is not always prior to something notional.

To the third, it is said that not equally nor in the same mode. And to the proof, te consequence is denied becase though emanation of each is according to the intellect, nevertheless it is not precisely according to the same ratio nor in the same mode. Again, it would be able to be said that creatures emanate from God freely and through the mode of the will, but the Word is through the mode of the intellect.

To the first, it is said in the opposition that the Word is said relatively. And to the proof the assumed is well conceded, but nevertheless this is not the complete and sufficient ratio of the Word, and therefore nothing nothing concludes. Similarly, it is said to Augustinum that from knowledge the Word is begotten, but nevertheless this is not the precise ratio of the Word.

To the second, the consequence is denied because not every act of speaking or understanding has a produced term.

To the third, the consequence is denied. And when it is further argued that, if the beginning were through an external realtion, etc., this is denied, but there is only one beginning producing the creature, just as the Master teaches in this distinction.

Principal arguments

That God does not depend on something contingent, producible, or temporally produced, therefore he does not really relate to any such thing. The antecedent is known, and the consequence is clear because, what relates to another things, depends on that thing.

In the second place, if this is so, then either this would be a relation distinct from itself and from any absolute thing or it would be related to itself. Not the first because when a relation is related to God, it follows that there is a relation of the relation, and thus there would be a process into infinity in relations, which is false. Again, it follows that which mediates the relation between God and the producible would be in God. The consequent is false because God is not the subject of any accident. And the consequence is clear because non-being is not able to be the subject of an accident. Nor the second because by the same reason any created thing would be related to what is different than itself, which is false because every related thing is distinct from the absolute thing.

In the third place, either God is related to this by a temporal relation or an eternal relation. Not the first because then God would change. This is clear through the Commentator V , comment 19 Averroes, V, commento 10, xxx , where he wishes that when something genuinely new comes into being related through the change of another each is changed through an accident or by the relative change. And the second is not able to be said because no creature was eternally, but a real relation is not able to be between two extremes unless they are really positive, therefore.

In opposition, it is argued that God knew from eternity that would produce a creature, therefore the question is true. The consequence holds because the one knowing and the knowable or thing known relate to one another. And the about the antecedent there is no doubt because God does not begin to know anything in time.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though God is related to created things from time or temporally, nevertheless anything to which God relates temporally was already related from eternity or eternally. The first part is clear because God is the creator from time and really the lord of creation, therefore. The antecedent is clear through the Master, in distinction 30 Lombardus, I, d. 30, xxx . And the consequence is clear because a lord is related to his servant and the lord is not a lord before his servant exists. The second part is proved because God was eternally foreknowing and productive of what is producible, therefore he was eternally related creatable and knowable being. The consequence is clear the creative and creatable, the knowing and the knowable are correlative. But that is a real relation and not a relation of reason only because having removed every operation of any created thing, it remains that the case that God is creating and the lord of creation and he is related to whatever is producible.

The first corollary: just it is not repugnant that real being is related to something that lacks actual being, so it is not repugnant that non-being is related to the highest necessity. The first part is clear because memory is of things absent and of things past, therefore being is related to non-being. The consequence holds because memory is called memory, as is clear through Augustinum, X , chapter 10 Augustinus, X, c. 10 . The antecedent is clear from the Philosopher in Aristoteles, xxx . This part is confirmed because the image of a rose existing on a wall or in the memorative power is equally an image of a rose when it is present while it is nonetheless not present, therefore being is related to non-being. The consequence is clear because the image inasmuch as it is an image is something related. The second part is proved because being is related to non-being, therefore. The consequence holds because relatives are called convertences, and the antecedent is clear from the conclusion and from the position of its first part

Second corollary: though it is impossible that created existing entities do not have dependence, nevertheless not everything having dependence on something is a real entity in existence. The first part is clear because it implies that something is created and does not depend on God because it follows that it exists and does not exist. The second part is proved by taking dependence for any disposition of one thing toward another because non-being has a relative dependence on being, as is clear through what has been said.

Third corollary: though father, as father, and the lord as lord are not able to be related unless to some essence, as they indicate an actual relation and not habitual one, nevertheless some things are relative, to which it is repugnant to be related to real being or to some existing substance. The first part is the determination of Augustine, VII . Augustinus, VII, xxx . In the first place because a father does not exist unless it has a son, and lord does not exist unless it has a servant. The second part is clear because the factive or productive does not relate properly to something real existing being, but to some that is not and is able to be or what is producible. Note here that Gregorius holds that the divine thing is an absolute relative in some mode

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though any discoverable relation between created beings is somehow really distinct from everything thing, nevertheless no such relation apart from the absolute thing is able to be distinctly understood. The first part is proved because a real relation and an absolute thing or a realted thing and an absolute thing, as thus are really found in diverse categories, since they differ not only number and species, but also in genus, therefore. ergo. The antecedent is proved because relation is a category distinct from another from itself. The second part is proved because, if the relation of father and son were ale to be conceived without any thing distinctly absolute, it follows that someone would be able to know for themselves that something is father and not know that he has a son. Again, it would be possible to know that Socrates is similar to not be aware of whether it is similar to something, indeed one would not even know Socrates, since Socrates is an absolute thing. But these things should not be conceded, therefore.

First corollary: that any real relation of creatures is from each term really distinct. This is clear because the foundation or term of a relation is an absolute thing, as is this case.

The second corollary: not every thing related to something by its own relation is really a distinct thing. This is clear because then it would follow that in relations of relations there would be a procession into infinity, as it has been argued above. The consequence is clear because every relation has some disposition to something else, then it is asked whether such relation is related to itself or something else. If the first, the intention is had, If the second, it would be asked about that through what would it be related, just as before, and it follows, having inferred the consequent that there will be a process without end.

Third corollary: by the same real relation one is able to be related to many things because otherwise it would follow that there would be as many paternities in one father as he has sons. The consequent is false, and the consequence is clear.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: that the relation of an uncreated being to created being is not prior to the relation of created being to uncreated being. This is proved because from the beginning the creature is equally related to God and God to the creature. I prove this because from eternity the producible creature was related to God, as is clear from the first conclusion.

First corollary: that not anything related to another is ordered to this finally. This is clear because is really related to creature, and nevertheless God is not ordered to it finally, but rather the conversely the creature is ordered to him.

Second corollary: it is the case that something is related to something else by a new relation and having been newly related nothing is conferred to it or there is no change in what has been related. This is clear because the creator is related in time to the existing creature, but the creator is not intrinsically susceptible to something new or to an accident, therefore

Third corollary: it is not the case that every relation is an accident and it is in any of the related things formally. This is clear because, if any relation were an accident inhering formally in any of the related things, it follows that in God there would be an accident, which is false. And the consequence is clear since he is really related to created things, as is clear from what has been said.

From what has been said, it is clear that, though that by which God is disposed relatively to creatures does not depend on a sole act of the intellect, namely effectively, nevertheless it is should not be put in God subiectively or inhesively. The first part is clear because, even when there is no existing created intellect, God would still be disposed relatively toward a piece of wood. The second part is clear because whatever is in God is God. From all these things the affirmative part of the question follows.

Objections and Responses

Against the first conclusion: God is outside the order of creatures and is not ordered to them, therefore neither is he really related to them. The consequence is clear since thing that are really ordered to one another, these seem to be of the same order.

In the second place, it would follows that God would not be the most simple thing. I prove this because, if he were really related, it follows that there some reality in him which necessarily coacts for his being another term.

In the third place, against this is the Master in this distinction, saying the name, by which the creature is said to the creator, is relative and it notes the relation which is in the creature. But the name, by which the creator is said relative to the creature, indeed there is something relative, but it does not note a relation, which is in the creator Lombardus, XXX .

In the fourth place against the first corollary, everything that is related is, but nothing that is non-being is, therefore. The major is clear because haec ipsa quot sunt, as is clear in the , but what is not, is not this itself, which is neither of itself nor of another.

In the fifth place, everything that is different is something and being, but every term of a real relation is different from the related, therefore any such thing is a being. The minor is clear because the related is of another.

In the sixth place against the second corollary, it would follow some being would depend on non-being. I prove this because because every relation is a certain dependence on something else.

Against the second conclusion, if the relation in creatures were a distinct thing from the associated, it follows that God would be able to make a creature without dependence. The consequent is false. Proof of the consequence because God is able to remove the subject from any accident really distinct from it, since he posit that an accident is to separate from a a subject from which it is really distinguished.

In the second place, it is asked by what such dependence is caused effectively whether from a foundation or not. If yes, since God is able to suspend all action of a creature, it follows that the foundation is able to be without such dependence, which is repugnant to what has been said. If it is not caused by a creature but by God, the same consequent follows because God by causing the prior effect is not necessitated to produce the later effect from which the prior is really distinct.

In the third place, the creature and its dependence are produced by the same production, therefore. The consequence holds because the same production is not able to terminate in diverse really distinct things. The antecedent is proved because, if they are produced by diverse productions, it follows that the first would be able to be without the second, and thus the creature would be without the dependence.

In the fourth place, depends on God, apart from everything by which it is not, therefore. The consequence holds. The antecedent is proved because having posited one creature alone and removed it from everything by which it is not this, such a thing is still an effect of God. In the second place, the antecedent is proved because, if a creature were to depend through another on itself, it follows that it would not depend absolutely, but only secundum quid. The consequence is clear because what depends through another only depends secundum quid. In the third place, the same antecedent is proved because, if a stone were to depend on itself with a distinct dependence, it would follow that the dependence of a stone, which depends itself, would more greatly depend on God than the stone does. The consequent is false because each depends causally. The consequence is proved because what depends in itself depends first and principally, but what depends in another does not depend on the first, but from the consequent.

In the fifth place, against the second part of the same conclusion, the effect is able to be understood without a cause, therefore the relation without any absolute thing. The consequence holds because understanding of one disparate thing does not depend more on another distinct thing than the understanding of the effect on the understanding of its cause. The antecedent is clear because someone is able to know that something is the father and not know whether it has a son, and conversely that something is able to know that Socrates is a son and to not know whether he has a father.

Against the third conclusion there are the three arguments made in opposition, nevertheless it is argued different against it, just a foundation is disposed to the foundation, so a relation to a relation, but God is prior to the creature, therefore the relation of God to the creature is prior to the relation of the creature to God. Again, the relation of God to the creature is only a relation of reason, therefore it is posterior to the relation of the creature to God. The consequence is clear because every real relation precedes a relation of reason.

To the first, the consequence is denied because similarly it would be proved that the creature is not related to God himself, since it is not of the same order with God.

To the second, the consequence is denied and likewise its proof. In the second, I say that not every relation go out to its own being because its term is existing in the nature of things.

To the words of the Master, it is said that he intends that when God is related to the creature for the first time, no newness or change is in him, but only in the creature on account of which change the creature is both newly related to God and God is newly related to the creature.

To the fourth, the major is denied, and to the proof it is said that these terms are meant in a different way when taken for those things which are not real entities and do not exist, and thus it is conceded that relatives are said to be of others generally and commonly, when taking the term of others as it is said bout about existing things and about non-existing things.

The same thing is clear with respect to the fifth.

To the sixth, the consequence is denied, and to the proof it is said that not every relations properly is dependence because then a father would depend on the son, and the son on the father, indeed any person would depend on another, since everything is related to something else, which should not be said. Again, a lord is not dependent on his servant, nor cause on what is caused, though no one is able to be a lord unless there is a servant, and there is no cause unless there is something caused.

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequence is denied because a relation is nothing except the disposition of a foundation to a term. To the proof, it is said that, though God would be able to separate an accident of relation from its subject, nevertheless it does not follows that he is able to make an independent creature, which implies a contradiction.

To the second, it is said that this dependence is produced by God as an accident because for the production there is necessarily posited a relation of dependence. And to the proof, because then God would be necessitated, etc., it is said that God is not absolutely necessitated to produce something outside himself, but rather secundum quid and from the supposition of another produced thing, and this is called conditioned necessity or necessity from the supposited.

To the third, the consequence is denied because, though they are produced by the same action, nevertheless the creature is produced per se, but dependence is per accidens.

To the fourth, it is said that for something to depend on another is able to be in two ways, namely formally and fundamentally. In the first mode, it is said that a creature does depend formally on itself, when everything else is restricted by God. But in the second mode, the creature depends on itself in another kind of seclusion. But here we speak of relative formal dependence, and therefore the antecedent is denied.

To the first proof it is said that the case is impossible. In the second place it is said that, if it were admitted, then the creature would depend fundamentally and not formally.

To the second proof, the consequence is denied because this thing depends on itself absolutely fundamentally.

To the third proof, similarly the consequence is denied because, though dependence itself depends formally on God, nevertheless a stone depends fundamentally on itself.

To the fifth principle argument, it is said that, if the antecedent is understood about distinct and perfect intellection, then this is denied. If about confused, then it is conceded, but in this case the argument does not prove anything against the conclusion.

In the second place, it is responded, having conceded the antecedent, by denying the consequence because, whoever distinctly knows one of the relations, knows the others because the being of a relation and the related is being to another, but the being of a stone is not being to another, but to itself, though the being of the effect, in so far as it is an effect, is to another, and thus it is not able to be understood without intellection, etc.

To the first in the opposition, the consequence is denied because, though God does not posit a being to be created that is not something creatable, nevertheless when properly speaking about dependence, God depends on nothing.

To the second, it is said according to Gregory Gregorius, XXX that a relation of God is God, but Alphonsus Alphonsus Vargas, XXX says otherwise.

To the third, it is said, the statement that God is related by an eternal relation, is able to be understood in two ways. In the first mode thus, that the thing, which is a relation, is eternal and is God, such that God is related to everything by an eternal relation because he is related by himself. In the second mode, by an eternal relation, that is, eternally related and temporal, that is, temporally related in time or after was not related in this way. Thus it is said that God is related eternally to somethings which were not in virtue of the fact that he pre-knows this and is related to this temporally inasmuch as he is the creator and lord of these things because, though he was, nevertheless he was not lord. To the proof, because if temporally, then it follows that there is a change in God. The consequence is denied when understanding change properly. And to the Commentator it is said that something changes is able to be understood in two ways. In the first mode properly and strictly., and in this way that is changed relative what is moved according to that thing according which it is related, just as if Socrates were made more similar to Plato in whiteness through the intention of whiteness in Socrates, then Socrates would be properly changed. In another mode improperly and loosely, and thus now everything that is related to what before was not related is able to be said to be changed relatively. And it is in this way that the Commentator speaks of the example in the column, which only through the change of Socrates is able now to be to the right of Socrates dextera which before was to the left. Note that Gregory holds that every entity is aboslute and relative and that no relation is a distinct thing from every absolute thing, contrary to the opinion of Alphonsus. See Gregory around distinction 28 ad following Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 28 .

Principal arguments

That not because then it would follow that everything is infinitely loved. The consequent is false. THe consequence is clear because everything would be loved through an infinite love.

In the second place, it would follows that everything is always uniformily loved and would never be able not to be loved. The consequent is false because then God would equally love the sinner and non-sinner. And the consequence is proved because what is loved by indissoluble connected love, that is not able not to be loved.

In the third place, if the Father loved with a spirated love, it follows that he would know with begotten wisdom. The consequent is against Augustine VII Augustinus, VII, 3, 4 . And the consequence is clear for a similar reason because the Father is not knowing any less than he is loving.

In opposition is the Master in this distinction 32 Lombardus, I, d. 32, XXX and above in distinction 14 Lombardus, I, d. 32, XXX .

First conclusion

First conclusion: every rational creature is loved by an immense love, nevertheless no created things immeasurably loveable through an intrinsic worth. The first part is clear because the Father and the Son love every creature through the Holy Spirit, therefore they are loved by an immense love. The consequence holds and the antecedent is from the Master distinction 32 Lombardus, I, d. 32, XXX and distinction 14 Lombardus, I, d. 14, XXX . The second part is proved because any created thing has intrinsically a finite worth, therefore from the ratio of his own intrinsic worth he is finitely loveable.

First corollary: every created thing is loved by an infinitely greater love than its intrinsic worth according to which it is positioned in its species. This is clear because it is loved by an immeasurable love and it is positioned in a species with an intrinsic worth of finite perfection.

Second corollary: love or delight ought to be measured precisely according to the worth of a good choice or action. This is clear because God loves all things with the same love, and nevertheless he does not confer the good equally to all things.

Third corollary: though God loves all created things with the same love, nevertheless they are loved by in greater and lesser degrees. This is clear because otherwise he would not love a virgin more than a demon, which was condemned at Paris .

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though the Father and the Son love all things by the same spirated love and indissoluble connection, nevertheless they love and confer love freely and contingently to a loveable created thing. The first part is clear because the Father and the Son love all things with the Holy Spirit, who is love spirated by the Father and the Son and their indissoluble connection. The second is clear because three divine persons only perform external actions contingently and freely.

First corollary: it is the case that something is loved through an infinite love and indisolluble connection and that is loved when it is not able to be loved. This is clear because God is able to annihilate some created thing and nevertheless to love , and nevertheless any such thing is loved by the Holy Spirit who is the loving fetter and indissoluble connection of the Father and the Son, therefore.

Second corollary: it is the case that God is clearly seen by someone and that God is not loved by the one seeing him. This is clear both because God is not necessitated for causing love or loving in someone on account of something distinct from then, and secondly because the one seeing God is able to apprehend God under the ratio of their punisher or afflictor, and from this they are able to have displeasure or hate, just as in the case for the damned.

Third corollary: though God in one case loves the sinner more than a certain lover, nevertheless he loves both the lover and the sinner not with less love, but with an equal love. The first part is clear because in this case the one sinning venially is in greater grace than the one lacking venial sins. This is confirmed because it is the case that the one sinning is predestined and it is foreknown that he is existing without sin. But God loves the predestined more than the foreknown because he proposes to give him eternal life

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: though the Father is loving all things through the Holy Spirit, nevertheless the Father is not knowing by the eternal word or the begotten wisdom. The first part is clear. The second is proved because the Father is knowing through that by which he understands, but the Father understands through himself and not through the Son, therefore.

The first corollary: it does not follows that because the Father is knowing through an unbegotten wisdom and the Son is a begotten wisdom, therefore there are many wisdoms in the divine essence, nor from this that the wisdom of the Father is different from the wisdom of the Son or the wisdom of the Holy Spirit. This is clear because, if the consequence were valid, for a similar reason it would follow that because the begotten God would not be the unbegotten God, therefore there are many gods, which nevertheless is not a valid consequence, just as it is not the case that God the Father is not the begotten God or the Son, and therefore there are many Gods.

Second corollary: though the Father is wise through an unbegotten wisdom and the Son through a begotton wisdom, nevertheless it should be confessed by the catholic that in the divine there is a single wisdom.

The third corollary is the affirmative part of the question.

Objections and Responses

Against the first conclusion, it follows that God would not love the predestined more than the foreknown. I prove this because the virgin is loved more than the damned because immeasurable love is not able to be more and less in the same thing.

In the second place, it follows that the love of creatures would be necessary. The consequent is false because then the creature be necessarily beloved, which is repugnant to the second conclusion. And the first consequence is clear because by however much the love of the creature is from necessitated, in the same degree is the creature loved by necessity.

In the third place, the Father and the Son are not in the Holy Spirit, therefore they do not love through the Holy Spirit. The antecedent is clear, but the consequence is proved since according to Augustine VII , chapter 5 , if the Father would be wise by begotten wisdom, then the Father would be the Son, therefore similarly, if the Father and the Son love with spirated love, it follows that are in the Holy Spirit because the same for them to be as it is to love.

Against the second conclusion and corollaries, God loves himself by the spirit with love which is enjoyment, and he loves us by the love which is use, therefore. The consequence holds because to love something on account of itself and something on account of something else does not seem to be the same loving or by the same love. But the antecedent is clear from the first distinction of the first book Lombardus, I, d. 1, c. 3 , where he shows that God uses us and enjoys himself.

In the second place, against the third corollary, if this were true, it would be the case because the one sinning venially would be in a state of greater grace. But this is not the case because it would be impossible that something is in the state of grace and sins venially. I prove this because the terms of each are incompatible, and therefore also the claims. The consequences holds because, if the terms of the claims are not compatible, then neither are the claims themselves. And the antecedent is clear because the claim/motive of meritorious operation is glory, but the term of venial sin is punishment and misery, at least the sense of it. But these are not compatible in the same thing, indeed it follows that no one would be delayed from their beatitude on account of a venial sin, which is false.

Against the same in the third place, it is easier merit the remission of venial sin than to merit the eternal life, therefore the one meriting eternal life would merit the remission of venial sin. The consequence holds because what is able to merit something greater is able to merit something lesser, and consequently he would merit the remission of venial sin as quickly as he committed the venial sin.

In the fourth place, it would follow that every grace co-suffer with every venial sin. The consequent is false regarding the charity of Christ and the blessed. And the consequence is clear because the grace of the blessed and the pilgrims do not differ in species.

In the fifth place, it would follow that grace would both increase and decrease in the same thing at the same time. The consequent is impossible. The consequence is clear because the increased merit increases grace and venial sin diminishes it.

In the sixth place, a venial sin is infinitely bad, therefore it cannot stand with grace. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is proved because joining venial sin with the merit of eternal life either means that the act is less meritorius than another would if it were not joined or not. If not, this is opposed because the one sinning thus loves something with God not on account of God, and consequently loves God less. The consequence holds through Augustine, 10 , who says he loves you less who loves you with something Augustine, X, 29, 40 etc. If yes, then it destroys some degree of eternal glory, and consequently it is something bad inasmuch as there is a good which is diminished.

Against the third conclusion, the divine essence in no mode is produced, therefore neither is love, and consequently the Father does not love with a produced love. The first consequence holds the essence and love of God in the divine are the same according to thing and ratio.

In the second place, it follows that in the divine there are two wisdoms two loves. This is clear because there is one personal and one essential.

In the third place, it follows against the second corollary that in the divine there is a begotten wisdom and an unbegotten wisdom, but not life wisdom is begotten and unbegotten, therefore

To the first, John of Rippa would concede the antecedent about intellective love, but because this is prohibited, therefore I say otherwise by denying the consequence because to love a creature is to know something which is not known in loving absolutely. Therefore it does not follow, God loves with an external love which is immeasurable, therefore he loves the creature immeasurably.

To the second, the consequent is conceded and the second consequence is denied, and to the proof it is said that the creature is loved by necessity inasmuch as by necessity the love by which the creature is loved is the love of the creature, not inasmuch as it is love by necessity absolutely. But the Holy Spirit is contingently the love of the creature when taking connection for love, nevertheless the Holy Spirit is necessarily love. Therefore though it is not able to be love, it is nevertheless able to not be love of the creature.

To the third, the consequence is denied because, though in God being and loving are the same, nevertheless they really differ by reason and disposition, and something, therefore it is conceded about the one what is not conceded about the other.

In the second place, it is said that the Father and the Son do not love through the Holy Spirit as if it were the form which is for them the ratio and principle of loving, but they love through the Holy Spirit as if it were a produced term and this ablative is not properly held to be causal.

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequence is denied when taking the consequence for an incomplex love because by the same love that is the Holy Spirit he enjoys himself and uses us for our benefit not his, as the Master Lombardus, I, d. 1, c. 3 says.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that, if love is taken for the act by which he loves us, to this it is said that by the same act he loves all things, himself and us, but nevertheless by this act he loves himself more than he love us because he wishes for himself a greater good than he does for us, and he loves one creature more than another.

To the second, the consequent is conceded, and to the proof it is conceded that the terms of motion, desire and love, are compatible when taking desire as a venial punishment of the sense, having removed any mortal guilt. Also when speaking about the absolut epower of God because de facto in the soul of Christ there was at the same time glory and afflictive punishment of the sense, therefore these do not seem mutually repugnant to one another.

In the second place, it would be able to be said, that concerning the common law these two terms are incompatible, namely glory and penalty, but the term motion of venial desire for venial sin as it is every ???. In this way it is conceded that this is compatible with grace which seems to be the end of a good act because through this grace is increased, nevertheless it is not compatible with glory.

To the third, the consequence is denied because, thought it is easier for a denari to be given to a man than a florin, nevertheless not everyone able to give a florin is able to give a denari because some have floren which have not have a denari

In the second place, the antecedent would be able to be denied. And when it is said, that the less good, etc. therefore, the consequence is denied because the less good is often acquired with more difficulty than the greater good. For it does not follow Socrates is able to generate a man, therefore he is able to generate a horse, and nevertheless a man is more perfect than every horse.

Again, according to the Master, in distinction 14 of book 4 in purgatory venial sins are removed, where nevertheless no one merits eternal life, despite the fact that some merit its acceleration, from which it seems that is not easier, etc.

To the fourth, the consequence would be able to be denied most greatly in the ordained law because in the glory of heaven, which is consummated grace which is mixed with desire, there is a compatibility between itself and some degree of desire. Further to the proof, it would be able to be said that the grace of the blessed and the grace of the pilgrim were of a different species. Otherwise it would be able to be said that though it is of the same species, nevertheless on account of some circumstances the grace of the blessed is not compatible with the desire which is compatible with the grace of the pilgrim. But it would be possible to be objected because whatever is repugnant to one individual of some species, that is repugnant to every individual of that species. Likewise he says like power. Note that Hugolino, in distinction 43 of book 4, question 2 , says that the justice of heaven is of another species of habit from the justice of this pilgrim life. The middle is true by which he proves that God requires beyond condign merit.

To the fifth, it is said that grace is able to be diminished in two ways. In one mode loosely and interpretatively, namely because grace is less than it would be if there were not a connected venial sin, and so it is able to be said by conceding the consequent because thus grace is really intended and remitted in this mode but accidently and interpretatively. In the other mode it is said that grace is diminished really and properly, and thus the consequent and the consequence is denied because, though grace on account of venial sin is less than it would be if the person had not sinned venially, nevertheless the grace in itself is not properly remitted.

To the sixth, the antecedent is denied, and to the proof, the ultimate consequence is denied both because it does not destroy the portion of the prize properly but only interpretatively and in the second place because then it would be proved that the omission of a council would be a sin because if the council were not omitted, then eternal prize would be given to the one ensuring that it will not be given to the one omitting.

In the second place, it would be able to be said that a venial sin removes grace in time, but when a venial sin has been removed a degree or latitude of grace will be returned which the one acting would have had if they had not sinned venially, and thus the eternal good is not eternally destroyed but only temporally

To the first against the third conclusion, the consequence is denied, and to the proof it is said that produced love differs from the essence only according to reason because the person in its own formal ratio includes in itself the relative property which does not include the essence, since the essence according to its own essential ratio is said unto itself, but the person or the relative properties are said relatively.

To the second, the consequence is denied because in a similar way it would be prove that two things are gods, therefore it is said that personal love does not really differ from essential love, but only according to reason.

In the second place, I say that, though properties and non essence is produce in the divine, nevertheless the whole Son is begotten and produced, and consequently wisdom taken personally is able to be said to be begotten, and it is able to be said similarly with respect to love.

To the third, the minor is denied because light, truth, wisdom, God, and similar names are sometimes taken essentially and sometimes taken personally and the former only in the singular and not in the plural, otherwise from something similar a plurality of gods would be proved because in the divine God is begotten, but no singular thing is begotten and unbegotten, therefore etc. It is clear that the argument is not valid.

To the first in the opposition, the consequence is denied, and it does not follow that if it is loved with an infinite incomplex love, then it is infinitely loved.

To the second, the consequence is denied, and to the proof the antecedent is denied, but it is necessary that this love is indissoluble, the love of the creature which is loved, which is not true because, though the Holy Spirit is the indissoluble love of the Father and the Son such that it is not able to be the love of both, nevertheless the Holy Spirit is able to be the love of a creature.

To the third, the consequence is denied because to know signifies motion of the soul toward a thing, but to love signifies motion of thing to the soul. See Thomam de Argentina, in distinction 32

Principal arguments

That not because, if knowledge of God were eternal, it would follow that nothing would precede it. The consequent is false because being precedes living, and living precedes understanding and knowing in creatures, therefore also in the creator.

In the second place, if God were to know all things, it follows that his knowledge would terminate in something external. The consequent seems false, therefore etc.

In the third place, it would follow that God would not know himself before he knows created or creatable things. The consequent seems false because then the direct act would not be prior nor more perfect than the reflexive act.

In opposition is the Master, in distinction 35 and Augustine 15 , in chapter 13 de magnis who says God does not know created things except through their creation Augustinus, XXX , therefore.

First conclusion

First conclusion: the ratio of understanding and the cognitive act of the uncreated essence are one grade, super simple, and immeasurable adequately to the same essence. This conclusion is clear through Augustine 15 , in chapter 14 in the simplicity, he says, of this divine nature, to know is different than to be , and he adds therefore all the things God the Father knows in himself, he knows in the son , similarly he knows all things both the Son and all things which are in the knowledge of them he sees each at the same time, not as particulars or individually as if seen alternatively, but he sees all things at once because there is nothing that he does not always see , therefore the conclusion is true.

First corollary: the divine will does not make possible the possible before the possible itself is or exists or before the divine intellect understands it. This is clear because otherwise it would follow that the divine will would be the cause of the possibility of sin, which is false.

Second corollary: just as nothing is able to precede the divine science, so nothing is able to exist as the cause of the divine science. This is clear because it is eternal, and because the name of cause is not admitted in the divine, and because the science of God in an instant of eternity.

Third corollary: though the divine science is terminated cognitively to every intelligible thing, nevertheless not every intelligible thing depends effectively on God. This is clear because God would be the cause of any possibility and impossibility, and in this case God is the prior cause of the impossibility of his own non existence, which is false because nothing is the cause of this.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though no created thing is able to be actual science of anything probable from itself or another, nevertheless God is all knowledge of any complex or incomplex knowable thing. The first part is proved because concerning anything there are infinite knowable truths, therefore. The consequence holds because no created thing is able to know distinctly at the same time infinite truths. The antecedent is proved because regarding anything there are infinite knowable propositions in connection with other existing or possible things without end. The second part is clear through the first conclusion. Again, this is clear through 4 , all things are naked and open to his eyes Hebraeos 4:13 .

First corollary: the intellect is a thing known intuitively and such a thing is not known abstractively, or it is the case that the intellect is a thing known intuitively and its knowledge is not terminated in such a thing. This is clear because the divine intellect knows all things eternally and intuitively in itself, just as in the exemplative art of those things, therefore. In opposition is Gregory, distinction 3 of book one, in an article , for he says that every knowlegdge of a thing in species and its proper likeness not terminating in a thing is abstractive XXX .

Second corollary: it is the case that the intellect sees a thing intuitively and that cognition of this type does not depend on anything. This is clear because the knowledge of God is caused by nothing and depends on nothing.

Third corollary: just as any existing thing is intuitively understood by the divine science, so the divine science is terminated to anything known in this way. The first part is clear through what has been said. The second is proved because otherwise God would not understand things existing outside himself, which is false. This part opposes Alphonsus, in distinction 35 XXX .

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: the divine essence knows itself and other things distinct from itself equally first and with an equally immeasurably perfect knowledge. This is clear because from eternity it knew all things, therefore it did so equally first. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved because God does not ever begin to know anew and he is not able to begin to know. But that he knows with an equally perfect knowledge is clear because his essence is his knowledge and his knowing is his being, as is clear through the Master and Augustine

First corollary: just as God knows all distinct beings distinctly, so he knows reflexively no produced or producible thing. This is clear because every divine cognition is correct in highest way, but reflexive cognition seems to convey an imperfection.

Second corollary: though God knows every complex and incomplex thing, nevertheless God knows nothing discursively or complexly. This is clear because to know in this way is a kind of imperfection.

Third corollary: that the divine intellect, while it grasps itself or other things cognitively is in no way made deficient from its proper immensity. This is clear because the divine intellect while knowing the essence apprehends it while comprehending adequately, but the formally immeasurable divine essence is comprehended by its own intellect, therefore the formally immeasurable intellect is adequate to it. This corollary is against the thought of Saint Thomas and is perhaps founded on the saying of Augustine, , question 8 , everything which he comprehends is finite to itself Augustinus 83 questiones, q. 8 .

From what has been said, it follows that, just as the divine essence is achieving something cognitively producible, nevertheless the super simple essence of immense perfection with respect to creatures ought not to be called a primary object of divine cognition.. This is against Thomas of Argentina, in distinction 35 who speaks of the divine essence as the primary object of divine cognition Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 35, q. 1, concl. 1 (Genoa 1585, 105r) and even created things as secondary objects of the same Thomas de Argentina, I, d. 35, q. 1, concl. 4 (Genoa 1585, 106r) . The corollary is clear because God knows all things equally first, as was said, then in the second place because the divine essence is not an object for the divine intellect, as infinite perfection, earlier than as a creative and exemplative of things. From this it is clear what should be said to this question.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion , it is argued that it is not repugnant to the divine simplicity that the knowledge is less than the substance, therefore the conclusion is false. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is proved because whiteness is able to be more or the likeness less than the whiteness is in itself, and despite this it will not be more composed or more simple, therefore by extension it will not be repugnant to the most simple essence to be less than knowledge than the essence.

In the second place, against the first corollary , that which has a cause comes later from that which does not have a cause. But the intelligible and possible as such have a cause, therefore the divine will, by the volition which does not have a cause, makes possible the possible itself before it exists This is the argument of the Profound Doctor, in book 1, chapter 12 and 13 XXX .

Against the second corollary: the divine intellect is the cause of the divine science, therefore it is prior to it. The consequence holds because a cause is prior to its act, as the same author says in the same place XXX .

In the fourth place, against the third corollary it is argued through Anselm, in the , who says that, every possibility and impossibility is subject to the divine will Anselmus, Cur Deus Homo, II, c. 17 , therefore every intelligible thing which has no defect depends on the divine will.

Against the second part of the secund conclusion, it follows that God that God knows all continuous parts distinctly, which is false because then, just as he would know these things, so he would be able to divide these things, then it is asked either this division will be able to be divided, and then it would not be evacuated, but if is not be able to be divided, then this is against the Philosopher, VI XXX , because a continuum is always divisible into divisible things, otherwise it would be composed from indivisible things and in this respect it would have no quantity, which is impossible.

In the second place, if God were to understand a thing outside himself, then his intellect would be made worse and would be dependent on created things, which is false. The consequence is clear then because everything intellect is made bad or is perfected by its own intellection, and as a consequence his perfection depends on it, and as a consequence by understanding vile things and corporeal things it becomes worse and becomes dependent on these things.

In the third place, if God knew diverse created objects, it follows that there would be a diverse and distinct divine science. This is clear because the diversity of knowledge is caused from the diversity of knowable objects.

In the fourth place, against the corollary, it is said by Alphonsus XXX , that Augustine, in IV , chapter 8 XXX , says that God from eternity was examining this and God does not examine this outside himself, just as we examine with our eyes bodily things that certainly did not yet exist Augustinus, Book 4, c. 6, n. 12 , and further below, therefore how God examined this, such that he arranges in this way is on account of the fact that he alone is able to do this Augustinus, Book 4, c. 6, n. 12 .

Against the third conclusion, it is argued that everything which is known by God in some way is an object to the divine cognitive power, but creatures are known, therefore. But they are not objectified as a primary object, therefore etc.

In the second place, thus the whole multitude of knowable things exceeds the multitude of all things known, therefore God does not know all things distinctly. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved as follows: let a be the whole multitude of possible angels known by God, and let b be the multitude of all souls, and c be all roses, and let d be the composed multitude of b and c only, then it is argued thus that a is equal to b et c separately, therefore a is less than d, therefore a is able to be imagined to grow to equality with d, by which fact God does not thus know distinctly the whole multitude of a which has been increased, therefore the whole multitude of all known things is exceeded by the multitude of all knowable things.

In the third place, thus the multitude of all knowable points and absolute infinity are therefore adequate to the entire capacity of the divine intellect, and as a consequence nothing else is able to be known. The antecedent is proved because, if to this multitude of points one point were added, then this would not have been the multitude of all knowlable points. And the consequence is clear because one absolute infinity is not greater to another absolute infinity.

In the fourth place, if God were to understand everything distinctly, it would follow that he would understood more than he can do. This is clear because he is not able to produce every knowable thing. But the falsity of this is proved because then God would not be omnipotent.

To the first , the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is said that this similarity between whiteness and knowledge does not exist because to be similar is extrinsic to whiteness, not essential or intrinsic. But to be knowledge is something that can be extrinsic to God, indeed it is essential or intrinsic. Therefore, if the knowledge were removed more than the essence, the divine essence would exceed itself from the fact that to be knowledge does not suit God through an extrinsic denomination, but only intrinsically.

To the second , the minor is denied because not every intelligible thing has a cause. In the second place, it would be able to be said by taking cause loosely for that which has being. The major is able to be denied because the Son is from the Father, and nevertheless is not posterior to him.

To the third , the antecedent is denied. To the proof it is said that it is true where power is distinguished from act, but this is not the sense here.

To the fourt , it is said that Anselm understand about impossibility with respect to a second cause and secundum quid, but not about impossibility absolutely. And in the same was speaks the Gospel, no word is impossible with God .

To the first against the second conclusion , the consequence is denied because not all parts are continuous, but if it is understood thus, he knows all things, that is there is nothing which he does not know, then in this way the consequent is conceded, but this is not against the conclusion in anyway. Nevertheless note that Gregory XXX responds differently as well as Hugolinus in distinction 35 XXX . Again, Thomas Argentina XXX says that, just as in nature the motion of parts is because they are in some succession and are not able to be at the same time, so God is not able to consider all these parts which are able to occur successively from continuous division because it is from the nature of such parts that they are in becoming and never total finished being. And just as the power of God is not made imperfect by the fact that he is not able to produce that which is not producible, so neither is his knowledge made imperfect because he does not distinctly understand what is not distinctly intelligible at the same time.

To the second , the consequence is denied, and the proof is conceded regarding an understanding distinct from its own intellection, if there is any truth to this, but it is not conceded with respect to the divine which is its own intellection.

And it is said similarly to the third , that the diversity of known objects does not always argue for a diversity of cognition because by the same cognition at the same time, namely by vision , I see at the same time black ink on a white parchment, and granted that this would be true in created things, nevertheless it is not true in the proposed.

To the argument from Augustine which Alphonsus XXX alleges that in this authority and similar ones he intends that the knowledge of God does not depend nor is caused by known things, as is clear in the examples given by him in the text XXX .

To the first against the third conclusion , it is said, that a created being is a secondary object of the divine intellect is able to be understood in two ways, in one mode, as that begin is in its proper genus or species, in a another mode, as in the exemplative divine art. In the first mode it is said that it is able to be a secondary object, but in the second mode it would not be possible, and otherwise it would able to be said that a motive and objective reason is suitable to no created being with respect to the divine cognitive power, but only a terminative reason

To the second , the antecedent is denied, and to the proof the case is admitted, but when it is argued that a is equal to b and c separately, therefore it is less than d, the consequence is denied when taking the word less distinctively, such that b is a multitude containing less than d, though d contains somethings which neither a nor c nor b contains, while it is nevertheless the case that there are as many parts in a as there are in d, not more and not less. But against this it would be able to be objected thus that b is part of d and d is some amount, therefore d is greater than b. The consequence is clear because every whole is greater than its parts.

Here responds Gregory that one infinity is not properly said to be part of another, since something is equal to another according to that according to which it is said to be infinite, though a body infinite in length exceeds by infinity according to the breadth not according to the length. In the second place, someone would say that this rule only holds for infinite magnitudes and infinite things. But if by saying that a body infinite and immeasurable in all directions and would be able to be separated by no one nor would anything be able to be added to it, thus it is in the proposed because the multitude of known things is absolutely infinite, therefore no addition to it is possible.

To the third , the consequence is denied because it would be proved similarly that this kind of multitude would be adequate to the entire capacity of possible being, such that nothing else would be possible or able to be produced, which is false.

To the fourth , the consequence is denied because whatever God understands he is able to understand, and conversely whatever God is able to understand he understands that he is able to understand and wishes himself to understand In the second place, it is said that, if the power of God is understand as the power to produce something outside himself, then it is conceded improperly that God understands more than he is capable of producing because with respect to anything God is able to produce with respect to those things he is understanding, but not the converse. And the following consequence is denied, therefore God is not omnipotent because something is not therefore called omnipotent because it is able to produce everything imaginable, but because it is able to produce everything doable, aside from what is blameworthy.

To the first in the opposition , the consequent is conceded, and it is not the same in the case of God and creatures because in God it is the same thing to live, and to be, and to understand, but not in creatures.

To the second , the consequent is conceded.

Similarly to the third , the consequent is conceded because there is eternal knowledge of each.

Principal arguments

That it is so because the evil of guilt is known by God, therefore this evil is ideated in the word. The consequence is held because whatever God knows, he knows this through a proper representing idea. The antecedent is proved because he right and knowing punishes and removes guilt.

In the second place, the divine word is able to reveal to someone a future sin, therefore the divine word is the cognitive or ideating ideal ratio of sin The consequence is clear because the divine word is not able to reveal anything unknown to itself. The antecedent is clear because de facto he revealed this to Peter and Judas, as is clear in the Gospel XXX .

In the third place, any sin shares in that which is of perfection absolutely, therefore the most perfect being in some way shares in this, and as a consequence it is ideated in God. The consequences are valid, and the antecedent is proved because sin shares in being, from this it is rightly called a what is.

To the contrary, to that which the ratio of positive entity is repugnant, the ratio of ostensible ideability is repugnant to the same thing. But the ratio of entity is repugnant to what is badly infective of the mind, therefore also the ratio of ideability.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though in the word or in the divine essence all created contained and distinct entities are contained, nevertheless these things, as they are contained in God, are not different amount themselves. The first part is clear through Augustine, , in question 46 , where he says that, ideas are forms, exemplars, eternal, unchangeable things according to which God knows and produces these things which arise amount creatures which are also contained in the divine intelligence. Augustinus, 46, 2 Again, VI , the divine word is an art full of all living rationes Augustinus, VI, 10, 11 . Again, V , Nor would God do something unless he knew that before he did it, and he would not know unless he saw, and he would not see unless he possessed these things which are not yet made but are in the mode in which he is not made. Augustinus, xxx, V, 16, 34, xxx . But this is the mode of his infinite perfection by which he contains all perfections of every type, therefore.

The second part is proved because, if created things, as are contained in the divine essence, had a distinct being, it would follows that creatures would have had some being distinct from God before their creation. The consequent is false, therefore. This is confirmed because it would follows that in the divine there would be a formal or essential distinction. I prove because created things, as they are contained in God, would be distinct from him not only personally, but also numerically and essentially. Again, this is clear through Dionysius, book 7 , chapter 5 , saying, all things are contained in God unitively through one virtue, just as various qualities are contained in one productive force of the sun Ps-Dionysius, VII, c. 5, xxx .

First corollary: every being was contained eternally in God, as in a productive cause, as in an exemplative art, and as in final consumptive and conserving cause. This is clear because contains all created things with effective excellence, just as the first cause contains inferior things with formal or perfective excellence, just the intellective contains the sensitive. Again, Dionysius, VII , in chapter 7 Ps-Dionysius, VII, c. 7, xxx the divine intellect knows all things, not according to one idea and then another idea, but through one cause of excellence according to which he prepossess all things . But this is the divine essence, therefore. Again, with final consumptive excess, like beatitude, he contains every other end.

Second corollary: that the divine essence contains all contrary and deformed things unitively and in conforming way. which are existing in a deformed way. This is clear both from the conclusion and from the saying of Dionysius, in the book , in chapter 5 , saying, all things diverse in themselves and which are contrary to one another are in God Ps-Dionysius, xxx, c. 5. .

Third corollary: though the divine word or immeasurable essence contains formally all perfections absolutely, nevertheless it contains perfections secundum quid and limited perfections only virtually and eminently. The first is clear because God is whatever it is better to be than not to be, otherwise he would not be and immeasurable perfection. The second is proved because, it this were true, it would follows that God would be a stone or stoneness, which is false.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: the divine essence is necessarily formally ideal and is necessarily clear eternal knowledge of itself and other things. This is clear through Saint Thomas, in distinction 3, , in article three , who says the essence of God is the idea of things not indeed as essence but as understood or intellective Sanctus Thomas, d. 3, a. 2, response. . Again, in the first article, in the same question , an idea is the form which something imitates according to the intention of the agent which determines its end Sanctus Thomas, d. 3, a. 1, response. . Again, , in question one of II , says, it is necessary that God knows his essence as imitateable by creatures, and for this reason his essence has the ratio of an idea, such that an idea is nothing other than the divine essence under the ratio of the relation of imitateability which is able to be immitated by other things Henricus Gandavensis, II, q. 1 .

First corollary: just as in the divine essence there is a single virtual ratio of continence, so in the divine science there is a single ideal ratio of relucence. This is clear because God knows all things through one thing inasmuch as he has the power of many, ergo. The antecedent is clear because God knows, contains, and represents through the same thing because in God the ratio of knowing creatures is formally neither more nor less than the ratio of containing them virtually. And the antecedent is proved because however much identity and unity is in the act of understanding there is as much unity in the principle and in the ratio of understanding. But in the divine act of understanding there is formal unity, therefore. The proof of the minor: because in one act, formally indistinct, he understands all things distinctly, otherwise he would not have a singular word. Regarding this Augustine, XV , in chapter 8 , says, all things which he knows are embraced in one eternal unchangeable and ineffable vision Augustinus, XV, 7, 13 . The second part is proved because a limited representative is able to represent some object distinctly, therefore the divine essence which contains the representive thing eminently is able to represent the object equally distinctly, just as if it were not representative of another. The consequence holds because it is immeasurable and immeasurably representative, virtually equivalent to the limited representatives, therefore. The second part is clear through Dionysium , as is noted above XXX .

The second corollary: if, through the impossible, the divine intellect were to be separated from the supreme essence, then the divine intellect itself would not be the exemplar or idea of things. This is clear because just as the ratio of the idea consists in the divine intellect formatively or formally and as an examplar, so also the ratio of the idea consists in the divine essence subjectively or fundamentally and objectively.

Third corollary: just as any created thing is more perfectly contained in God than in its own genus, so any such thing more truly and clearly shines in the divine art than in the being of its own species or genus. The first part is clear because in its own nature it has a limited, finite, and dependent being, but in God absolutely it is independent and unlimited. The second part is clear from the same fundamental reason because things shines in the same way that they having being. And this is confirmed because no created thing is able to impress a representation of itself so perfect that the divine ideal cognitive ratio does not represent it infinitely more perfect. Again in the second place because created likeness is a false copy of a created thing and diminished not being adequate to the being of the thing. But the idea is a perfect and certain likeness of anything. In the third place because before this was produced it would be able to be to known through this idea, and not in its own genus or species, when its is and how it is and its every manner of being.

From what has been said it follows that, just as in the divine essence the containing ratio of things is orderable according to before and after, so in the divine science the ideal ratio is not intrinsically able to be plurified. This is clear because were plurality to be posited, then it would follows that there would be in God many ratios or many principles of understanding and acting. The consequent is false because, just as there is a single act, so there is a single ratio, as has been proven since the idea is the principle or ratio of knowing.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: anything present ideally or as an exemplar in the divine science is producible by the divine science. This is proved because the idea is an exemplar according to which something is producible, but every producible being is producible by God, therefore God alone is such an exemplative idea. The minor is clear from Augustine, , question 36 , where it stated, where he says, ideas are those things according to which the Lord God produces what arises in creatures Augustinus, q. 46 . This is confirmed because the idea is the exemplar according to which the artist looks while making whatever he makes, therefore. The antecedent is from Seneca, in a letter, Seneca, xxx .

First corollary: it is both repugnant that evil of guilt causally depends on God and repugnant that this evil shines in God in himself ideally. This is clear through the conclusion because God is causally productive of that of which God is properly ideally representative.

Second corollary: though God does not the know the deformities of guilt through his proper ratio exemplative of these kinds of privations, nevertheless he knows every privative thing distinctly through idea of their positives. The first is clear from the things that have been said. The second is clear because a privation is known through what is had. Item, a person knowing that they do not have a florin turns their imagination to the likeness of a florin, whence no one would know that they lack a forin unless they had knowledge of a florin either in itself or in a representing likeness.

Third corollary: though God knows guilt with the knowledge of simple intelligence or vision, nevertheless he does not know the evil of guilt with the knowledge of it being accepted or approval. The first part is clear because God with the knowledge of simple intelligence knows both possible and impossible good and bad things, but with the knowledge of vision only past, present, and future things. The second part is proved because with the knowledge of approval he know only good things and the evils of guilt, otherwise God would be the cause of guilt, since whatever he seems to will positively he is approvingly disposed. Concerning this knowledge 8 says, whoever loves God, he is known I Corinthios 8:3 . Again, 25 , truly I say to you, I do not know you Matthaeus 25:12 , from which the negative part of the conclusion follows.

Obiectiones et responsiones

Against the first conclusion: it would follows that the divine essence would produce all possible things at the same time. The consequent is false because then God would be able to make himself able to do nothing. The consequence is clear because he is not more capable in knowing than in producing and containing.

In the second place, God does not know all things distinctly, therefore he does not contain all things. The consequence is clear because God distinctly knowledge whatever he contains. But the antecedent is proved through the gloss of Jerome on that passage from I you make men like fish Habacuc 1:14 etc. it is absurd, the gloss says to this, to deduce the divine majesty, such that it knows through singular moments how fleas are born, how many is the multitude of fleas and flies, and how many are floating in something, and similar things. Hieronymus, Glossa, xxx .

In the third place, it follows tat the same would being containing and contained with respect to the same thing. The consequent does not seem true, but the consequence is clear because God is in every created thing, and as a consequence every created thing contains God, and through the conclusion everything is contained by God, therefore the antecedent is true.

Against the second conclusion and its corollaries, if according to a single ratio, etc, then it would follow that a and b as distinct intelligibles would not be distinctly understood nor distinctly shine in the divine art. The consequence is proved because let there be one ratio c representing these two, then in this way the intellect through c would no more that a is distinguished from b that a from a. But c does not represent a as distinguished from a, since it would in this way falsely represent, therefore. The antecedent is proved because c does not represent a such that a is more distinguished from b than a because it is an indistinct representative of a and b just as with respect to a, therefore etc.

In the second place, it would follows that the created intellect seeing clearly the divine essence would see anything represented thing in it. The consequent is false because then it would not see one blessed more than another. The consequence is clear because the one seeing the formal reason of knowing something knowable sees this, but the divine essence is the formal means of knowing anything and ideal cognitive ratio

In the third place, someone clearly seeing the Son sees the Father, and it is not the case that the Son is seen such that the Father is not seen, therefore someone seeing one thing shining in the essence sees anything. The consequence is clear since there is one representative ratio. The antecedent is proved because someone seeing clearly that the Son is the Son sees its emanation, but this person is not able to see that he does not see the Father from which he emanates, therefore. This is confirmed because between the Father and the Son there is a real personal distinction, but among the things represented, as they are in God, there is no distinction, neither personal, or any other kind, therefore.

In the fourth place, if a more perfectly shines in God, etc., it would follow that there it would not shine truly but falsely. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because a would be presented in God differently in God than it would in itself.

Against the third conclusion and corollaries, if God were to know guilt, it would follows that the this created knowledge would be from guilt or what causes guilt. The consequent is false, because the knowledge of God is eternal and therefore does not have a cause, and in the second place no one become worse through God as author. But the consequence is clear through the Philosopher, XII , when he says that, every science is either the cause of things or is caused by things Philosophus, XII, xxx .

In the second place, it would follows that God would approve the evils of guilt. The consequent is false. But the consequence appears true because it seems that one approves everything that one is able to prohibit and does not prohibit. But God is able to impede every sin and prohibit that it should occur, therefore.

In the third place, privatin or sin is some intelligible thing totally distinct from every positive thing, therefore it has in itself and properly an idea in God. The consequence is clear because thing intelligible through itself is able to be ideated through itself. But the antecedent is proved because otherwise it would not be formally privation, but a positive being. This is confirmed because such a privation is known formally through the formal concept of privation, therefore.

To the first, it is said that God is able to produce all producible things at the same time, such that the word at the same time determines the word is able, and not produce this because he was not able to produce a before b.

In the second place, I says that he is not able to produce all things at the same time because the world at the same time determines the word to produce because his not able to produce the entirety of time at the same time with all of its parts because the entirety of time is not able to be at the same time as these parts. And therefore, though God is able to produce the entirety of time at the same time, nevertheless he is not able to produce it at the same time. Similarly, thought he is able to verify contradictories, he is not able to verify them at the same time. And through this to the form of the argument, if the world at the same time determines the word to produce, then the consequence is denied because God is not able to make what is not able to be.

To the second, it is able to be said that the gloss intends to say that God does not know in such a special way and he does not direct the flies and animals of this type, just as men. See another solution Vide alia. .

To the third, the consequent is conceded, but he does not contain and be contained in the same way because God contains things supereminently, as an art or principle, as a representative exemplar, and as a final resting highest good. But creatures do not contain God in this way, but imperfect as an effect contains its cause.

To the first against the second conclusion , the consequence is denied. And to the proof the antecedent is denied because this ratio so perfectly and distinctly represents a and b as if were not representing anything except a itself. And thus the intellect is able to perceive through this ratio and to understand a and b distinctly and to a distinction between them.

To the second, the consequence is denied. And to the proof it is said that because the essence does not naturally represent what is external but does so voluntarily and freely, therefore it is the case that the created intellect sees the formal ratio of knowing something represented, and nevertheless perceives the something, but only as much as it wishes. And if it were to naturally represent, then perhaps it would still see one more than the other because one would be better disposed through the light of glory than the other.

To the third, the consequence is denied because, though one sees the divine essence to be the idea of all things, nevertheless one does not see it, as the idea of this and that, etc. and any other things.

In the second place, it is said that the vision of all three persons is from the essence of beatitude because it is not the vision of any ideated thing shining in the essence

To the confirmation, it is said that not only identity is the ratio why the Son is not able to be seen clear without the vision of the Father, but also because to see the Son clearly is by necessity of the consequence to see the Son himself and to see his emanation or relation, and consequently one see that from which he emanates and to which he relates, and thus there is some complex concept from the essence of beatitude and it is not able to be separated from the simple act by which the intellect sees the essence as long as the beatitude of this intellect stands. For given the fact that God is the judgment by which he is known, it stands complexly that the Son emanates from the Father that the Holy Spirit emanates from both of them, nevertheless one is not blessed before he sees complexly, with all due respect . to him who responded earlier during vesperss XXX .

To the fourth, the consequence is denied. And to the proof it is said that it does not shine differently from the part representing than it does in representing itself, but it shines in the same mode and is in God.

To the first against the third conclusion, the consequence is denied. To the Philosopher it is said that he speaks about those things which are known through themselves, but privations and sins are not in this way known directly through themselves.

To the second, the consequence is denied. To the proof it is siad that God sufficiently prohibits sin through the ten commandments.

To the third, the antecedent is denied because privation convey a subject which is capable of undertaking the privation and that is a positive intelligible thing.

In the second place, it is said that the subject lacking the form which it ought to have is a lack or privation of form with respect to what is lacking. And thus the soul not knowing is its own privation or its own ignorance, but this happens contingently or accidently because the soul is able to not be ignorant. For just God is his own knowledge because here knowledge does not mean a simple form added to the divine essence, while the human soul is said to be knowing and not is not called its own knowledge because knowledge is a form added to it, so ignorance is not a form added to the soul, but is a subject with the negation of knowledge. Therefore the soul is able to be said to be its ignorance, though it is more greatly its own privation in concrete. If nevertheless the concrete is verified from something, the abstract is also able to be verified about the same thing, unless some simple form is added to this subject or another.

To the first in the opposition, the consequence is denied. To the proof, it is said that he knows through the idea of the positive opposites.

To the second, the consequence is denied, whatever the case may be regarding the antecedent. To the proof, it is conceded that God is not able to reveal anything unknown to God, but this does not prove the consequence.

To the third, the antecedent is denied, when taking participationem for some mutation of the divine perfection because sin does not have true being because it has no essence.

Principal arguments

That not because it would follow that God would not be able in some situations to act at a distance. The consequent is false because then an agent acts more quickly on something near at hand than something further removed. With the supposed disposition the consequence is clear, if God is everywhere, it follows no thing is locally at a distance from God. This is confirmed because it is the case that God is everywhere according to power and not according to essence, therefore.

In the second place, God is able to acquire a certain place, therefore God is not fixed in every place. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is clear both because God is able to be in a place or in a creature in which he is not, and also because it is possible that some being is not the locus of God because no created being is a necessary being.

In the third place, God is not present everywhere, therefore. The antecedent is clear in the first place God is able to begin to be anywhere, for having supposed that were to destroy every created place and then afterward were to recreate it, then in this case he would begin to be everywhere. Secondly because is not an inspiration or an empty imagined thing. Thirdly because the God-man is not everywhere, therefore God is not everywhere. The consequence holds because every God-man is man, and the antecedent is proved because God is not everywhere man, otherwise some body would de facto be in an infinity of places.

In opposition is the Master in this distinction XXX . And this is confirmed because to be everywhere is a type of perfection, therefore it should be attributed to God. The consequence is clear. The antecedent is seen in the Master in the text.

First conclusion

First conclusion: it is not the case that God is in a created thing through his own power that he himself is not in the same thing through is own essence. This is proved through the Master, in this distinction 37, chapter 2 , saying God is in all things and is always everywhere because to be everywhere proper to the deity. Lombardus, XXX . Nevertheless note that according to Giles, in his treatise on the body of Christ, theorem 5 , he says, though it belongs to the deity to be in every place, nevertheless he is not determined to a place nor defined or circumscribed in a place Aegidius Romanus, xxx . The same thing is said by the Master XXX .

First corollary: that if the divine power is not apart from any being or place, then it is sufficiently inferred that the essence is everywhere, contra Scotus, in this distinction Scotus, I, d. xxx . This is clear because the divine essence and power are the same.

Second corollary: though a created agent is able to act in some space removed from itself by a certain distance, nevertheless the uncreated agent is not able to act or produce something through its omnipotence in any space or distance removed from itself The first part is clear from the illuminating sun given that there are parts of air distant from it and it produces heat in these parts. The second part is proved because is intimately present to every being and position, since this is proper to him according to the Master Lombardus, I, d. xxx .

Third corollary: though de facto to be present in every location attinctive does not properly belong to any created thing, nevertheless some created mutable things is able to be in every place contentive. The first is clear because to be everywhere attinctive through power and essence is proper to the deity alone, therefore. The second part is proved because let it stand that every created place other than the one in which I currently am be annihilated, in such a case it follows that I am everywhere and in every place.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: just as God does not lack his being in any created place, so God contains no place determinately. This is proved because to lack place is the proper disposition or condition of that which has been placed, therefore God is not properly contained in any place nor is he locatable. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is clear. The second part is proved because to be properly contained in space is to be terminated and exceeded by some space. But no place terminates or is able to exceed God, therefore.

The first corollary: though place, time, and situation are affirmed or said about God in a translated sort of way, nevertheless the modes by which God is in creatures are in someways distinguished The first is clear from Augustine, V , chapter 8 , when he says, but to be situated and had in space and in time are not properly, but translatively and through likenesses, said about God Augustinus, V, 8, 9 . The second part is proved through Gerard of Siena, in the first book, in distinction 37, in article 2 Gerardus de Senis, I, d. 37, a. 2 because to be in according to essence is nothing other than to attain this other according to its essence such that between the essence of one and the essence of the other no intervening mediating distance occurs between these essence. And this leads back to the second corollary of the first conclusion , but to be according to presence is to attain something according to knowledge and foreknowledge, but to be in something according to power is to be in some mode according to a conserving operation.

The second corollary: it is as repugnant to God to be defined, moved, or changed in place as it is that there is some created being and that God is not intimately present with it. This is clear because according to Augustine, V , chapter 3 , he says, no things would be changeably good unless there were something unchangeably good. Augustine, VIII, 3, 5 . This is confirmed because to be defined or circumscribed in place is to terminate in place or to exceed something that has been placed.

Third corollary: it stands that God is in one mode only unchangeable in himself and that he is changeable in creatures in many or multiple modes. This is clear because God in diverse created things produces diverse and multiple effects, therefore. The consequence holds, and the antecedent is proved because he produces one effect in a rational creature and another in a brute creature. The consequence is clear because that God is in creatures connotes an effect of God in these things. For this conclusion and corollaries see Alanus in , regula 38 Alanus de Insulis, rule 38 , where he says a collection of the creator to creatures according to which the creature is in the creatures as if an efficient cause in its effects, where it is said in a comment, for when it is said that God is everywhere, this is not thus said as if it is understood that he is circumscribed in a place but rather is a way of indicating the immensity of God and that all things are contained within his immensity rather than that he is understood to be in places. Again in rule 39 Alanus de Insulis, regula 39 , when spatial statements are predicated of God either the divine immensity or the gathering of grace or the union is understood. Where a concept indicates, when God is every place, here the divine immensity is predicated, when it is aid that God is in the saints the collection of divine grace is signified, for in the saints is said to be through grace, but when it is said in the assumed man, here is predicated the union, such that there is the sense that human nature is united in Christ. These says are the sayings found there.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: thought it is necessary that God is in any created thing, nevertheless God has being in a body or place contingently. The first part is clear because it does not the case that the created being exists and that God does not conserve it or that God is not intimately present to it. The second part is proved because one is able to annihilate this place, there God contingently has being in this place.

The first corollary: just as it is necessary that God is in anything which is, while it is, so God does not truly have being in anything that is not. The first part is clear through what has been said. The second part is proved because, if this were true, it would follow that this would be and not be. The consequent implies a contradiction. The consequence is clear because that God is in anything or in something this is attained through his essence, knowledge, and operation, as is clear through what has been said.

The second corollary: just it is not the case that place is and that God is apart from this place, so it is not the case that some place does not exist and that God is present there or that his being is in this place. The first part is clear because that God is in some place is something he attains through his operation, but he does not operate nor conserve non-being, therefore.

The second corollary: though God is necessarily everywhere or in some place, nevertheless God is not beyond the heavens in an imaginary vacuum. This is clear from the preceding corollary. This is confirmed because is not in that which pure nothingness, but a vacuum is precisely this type of thing, otherwise it would not be a vacuum, therefore.

The third corollary: just it is the case that ceases to be everywhere, so it is not repugnant for God to be everywhere. This is clear because God is able to destroy every place and every created thing and to create it again, by which having been posited the proposed follows. From which it is clear that God or the first necessity is often able to be everywhere. This is clear because from eternity God was not everywhere, therefore. The consequence is clear because just as God began to be everywhere through creation, so he is able to annihilate everywhere and create it again.

With respect to the corollary, just as the fact that God is often everywhere does not imply he is composed or composable, so that God moves from place to place, from time to time, does not imply that he varies. This is clear because the same ratio applies in both cases. For this the affirmative part of the conclusion follows.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion, it is argued because God is able to produce something outside of heaven, therefore he is there through his power, but he is not in that same place through his essence. Therefore it is the case that God is everywhere through his power but not through his essence.

Against the second corollary, it would follow that God would be of less perfection than a created agent. I prove this because to be able to act at a distance is a type of perfection.

Against the same, the divine will is able to wish something distant from itself, therefore the divine power is able to produce something distant from itself. The consequence holds because the will and power are formally the same, and the antecedent is clear.

Against the second conclusion and corollaries, God is able to be in some way in a place he previously was not, and he is able also not to be where he previously was, therefor God is moveable and changeable. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved because, if b should be destroyed, then God is not there any more, and likewise, if a new place should be created, then God will be newly present in that place. This is confirmed because, if God now destroyed the highest heaven, God would not be where the highest heaven now is, therefore he is able to not be in the place where he is. Again, if God were to cause some body outside of heaven, God would be in that same place, and yet he is not currently there, therefore.

But immediately it would be able to be said here that this will not be through a change of God himself, but a change of the newly created body outside of heaven.

Against this, it is argued because to move locally is to be now in some place and earlier be in one place or another. But this body since it was previously nothing, it neither was earlier in some place nor did it come to be newly in this place outside heaven, therefore God is moved locally and determinately this place, which is what has been proposed. This is confirmed because, if God is not there except through body newly created there, it follows that the created body is naturally there before God. The consequent is false because it follows that the body would be able to be created there without God being there because what is naturally prior is able to be without that which is posterior. Again God is naturally in a place prior to acting there.

Against the first part of the third conclusion and its corollaries, it is argued, if God is not in empty space outside of heaven and is able to be there without the positioning of a new body, it follows that God is changeable and moveable locally. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because this kind of transition from not being there to being there is not able to be without change in God or in something else. But the fact tat God is there without a new position etc. is proved because in such an imaginary space God is ale to place an angel with a created body and then is able to annihilate this body while conserving the angel, just as if God were to annihilate the air existing in this house while conserving us here.

In the second place, before the creation of the world God was present to any imaginable space outside heaven, therefore. The antecedent is proved because that God acts in any created space presupposes that God is there since God was able to create the world before he created it. Similarly, he is able to create a world outside the highest heaven, therefore.

In the third place, God knows distinctly and intuitively the infinity of space outside heaven, therefore he is present in this space. The consequence is clear because everything understood by God is actually present to God unless it is in potency only, but this space outside heaven exists de facto, therefore.

In the fourth place, through Blessed Augustine, V , chapter , where against those asking why God began to create the world in this determinate time when earlier he had ceased for an infinite amount of time, and through this mode of objection he responds saying that in the same way it is able to be asked why in this space of the world did he determinately create the world, since outside this world infinite space stands open on every side , and below that if they say that the substance of God is absent from so many expanses of places outside the world and is present only in that one very small place in which the world is now occupied, this is inconvenient and empty speech . These are things Augustine says, from which the proposed seems to follow.

In the fifth place, let it be put that a is the site of the world and b is a similar imaginary site outside of and at a distance from heaven, and let God move the world from site a to site b situating the world in b, then it is asked, either God was earlier in site b or was not. If he was, then the proposed is had. If he was not, then by the same reason God is not now in site a, therefore God has removed himself from a and added himself to b, therefore God has moved locally, which is false. Therefore it follows that, just as God is now in site a so he was earlier in site b.

To the first, it is said that it is improperly said that God is able to act in some where which is outside heaven because outside of heaven is not some where nor a there or a place. In the second place, it would become possible that there is a difference between these statements, God is able to act there and God is able to act. In the third place, it would be able to be said that wherever God is able to act, there is the presence of the divine essence.

To the second, the consequence is denied because, though in limited causes not being able to act at a distance proceeds from imperfection, nevertheless in unlimited causes it proceeds from a perfection, namely from the divine immensity and simplicity and immobility.

To the third, it is said that the divine will is not able to will something distant from itself on account of its immensity and simplicity and immobility, as is said above.

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequence is denied as before. And to the proof it is said that something is where it was not before is able to occur in two ways. In the first mode through arrival of that thing to a preexisting place. In the second through a new position of the thing into being or the creation of that which is the place. In the second mode, God is able to be present newly in a place and to cease to be in a place, not through change of God, but of the thing which is the place. And thus it is clear that God does not properly leave a place nor has he deserted a place, but place has deserted God because it has ceased to be.

To the reply, it is said that, though this body does not change from place to place, nevertheless it changes because it has passed from non-being to being absolutely, and this suffices.

To the second reply, it is said that God is not there through is body nor through ratio of body. if it is some causality in the body with respect to God is noted, but if necessarily is noted commonly, then it is said that the God being is there neither before nor after the body, but according to the natural understanding the bodily being and the divine being are there before the God being is present to the body or in place

For which it should be noted that in this imaginary space outside heaven he is not there or elsewhere except potentially because it is possible that there is a magnitude there in which he would be formally one thing and another thing there.

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said that, if it is understood without a new position in the present or the past, then the second part. The antecedent should be denied. But if it is understood with out a new position of a present existing body, then the consequence is denied. And to the proof it is said tat if God becomes presen there, then there will be some present or past change with respect to body. But to the proof of the second part of the antecedent, when it is said let there be put there God, an angel, etc., it is said that this only proves that God is able to be there when having posited some created being outside of heaven. Either this remains or it does not, but it does not follows from this that he is able to be now outside heaven when no created being has been posited there at the same time or before, though an angel is able to be immediately placed ther by God because change is able to occur with respect to the angel but not with respect to God, just as God is not able to change from not loving b to loving b without change in b itself. And this is not an imperfection in God but a perfections because this comes from the unchangeability of God, on account of which such a transitions of a contradiction is not able to occur with respect to him without a change being made in something else.

In the second place, it is said that God is not said to be outside of heaven in an imaginable space because there nothing is nor was nor will be, and it would be in vain to posit that God exists through infinite space in which no action is ever undertaken.

To the second, the antecedent is denied because this space was pure nothing, as was said, but God existed in his very self.

In the second place, it is said that it should not be posited that God acts in an act outside of heaven unless reason or authority compels. Nor does his immensity demand this, but it demands that it is impossible that there is a place or thing outside of God and distant from him that God is not present to according to his essence, power, and intuition, and God has this from himself.

In the third place, it is said that, though through the power of God it is possible for some being to be everywhere, nevertheless this being would be apart from some existing place, and it does not have from itself the ability to be present everywhere, as God does who from his immensity is not able to be apart for any place as long as that place exists.

To the third, the consequence would be able to be denied because, just as God was not present in act at that time because nothing was, so neither is he present to this space which is nothing

To the fourth, it is said that Augustine is speaking against those who imagine that from eternity up to the beginning of the creation of the world infinite spaces of time transpired, and consequently when he asks, why God ceases in these infinite times and after this mode began in this determinate time, and he asks about those things by imagining what is outside the world proportionally to be a space of places extending on all sides in every dimension, and according to this he asks why world was founded in this determinate part of this space more greatly than in another. Therefore, he argues against those because they have to posit an infinity of worlds through the same argument by which they argue an infinity or eternity of the world. Therefore Augustinus speaks against those imagining space in act inasmuch as it is really a receptacle of coexisting bodies according to its parts really because nevertheless according to the truth of the matter nothing is more than a chimera.

To the firth, the thing posited is admitted, but it is said that b is not similar to this a because a is true real being and b is not. In the second place, dist , I say that b is not distant from a because between being and non-being there is no distance. In the third place, I say that God would not be ale to move the world from the site in which it is to an imaginary site. The reason is because it is impossible for motion to become acquisitive of place in a vacuum or to move to a terminus that is not a being.

Ad rationes in oppositum patet per dicta in conclusionibus solutio.

Principal arguments

That it is so because with respect to some future thing the knowledge of God is not able not to be with respect to knowledge of the same thing, therefore no future thing is able not to happen. And consequently there is a false conclusion of a valid consequence. And the antecedent is proved because the foreknowledge of God with respect to the antichrist is either a foreknowledge of the future from himself or from something else. If from itself, therefore the foreknowledge is not able not to be, just as that which from itself has three angles equal to two right angles is not able exist and not have these three angles, etc. If from another, it follows that the future things are the causes of God's foreknowledge, again the Master Lombardus, XXX. and Augustine, XV , chapter 14 , who says, therefore Good did not know because he created but he created because he knew Augustinus, XV, 13 .

In the second place, nothing is the future therefore. The antecedent is proved through conversion because the future is nothing therefore nothing is the future.

In the third place, God foreknows a, there a will be. The consequence is necessary, and the antecedent likewise, therefore the consequent, therefore a will be necessary. But the proof of the necessity of the antecedent is because what is true is eternal.

In opposition is Augustine, IX , chapter 9 , saying conclusively from premisses in the same place, he who denies that God is the foreknowledge of future things denies that he is God, but such foreknowledge never imposes necessity on what is foreknown to come to be, otherwise nothing would be praised or blamed on account of its merit or demerit, which is false, therefore.

First conclusion

First conclusion: though it is repugnant that the divine essence is not certain knowledge of every knowable thing, nevertheless it is not repugnant that the divine essence is not the foreknowledge of any knowable thing. The part is clear through what is said because according to Apostolum , no creature is invisibile in his sight, but all things are naked and open to his eyes . The second part is proved since it is possible that nothing is the future, therefore The consequence is clear because the divine foreknowledge is nothing other than the divine essence, as is evident and infallible knowledge or certain judgement with respect to the future comprehending that this will be in its very self, and in the thing outside, how it will be, as is able to be drawn from what is said by the Master, in distinctions 38 and 39 of book 1 . It is clear therefore that, if nothing were future, the there would be no foreknowledge or at least the foreknowledge would be the divine essence of nothing, since foreknowledge is only with respect t te future. But the antecedent is clear because a future thing will be contingently and not necessarily, as is clear below, and consequently it is able not to be. It should be noted that when we speak of foreknowledge, the word fore denotes an infinite delay of imaginary duration preceding the real existence of the future thing because God sees all things as if present in the presence of eternity, and therefore for God nothing is future or futureness.

First corollary: though God is not able to be the knowledge of the future, nevertheless God is able to not be the foreknowledge of the past. This is clear through the conclusion. It is confirmed because at sometime it will be the present and after the past, and then it will not be foreknown but known.

The second corollary: though the divine foreknowledge is the divine essence formally, nevertheless for the divine essence to be foreknowledge is not a type of perfection absolutely. This is clear because there is able to not be foreknowledge with respect of any future thing, but it is not able not to be a perfection absolutely.

Third corollary: though that God is foreknowing implies that there is some future, nevertheless that God is foreknowing does not imply that God is this future. This is clear because he is not effective of future guilt and of the futureness of this guilt since it is nothing.

The corollary stands that something is and at the same time while it is not, is able to be is not possible or thus the conclusion, when some contingent thing is it stands that that same thing is able not to be. This is proved any created thing is contingently and never contingently is unless while it is because while it is not, it is not contingently and not necessarily, therefore it is contingently, therefore while it is, it is able not to be. In the second, the corollary is proved because the being of a creature and the power of this same being to not be are not contradictories, therefore it stands that the same thing at once is and is able not to be, therefore.

Second conclusion

Second conclusion: though nothing future is able to begin to be future, nevertheless something future is able to not be future. The first part is proved because whatever is or every will be future was future from eternity, therefore nothing future is able to begin to be future. The consequence is clear because, if it is the case that future a began to be future, it follows that from eternity a was not future, which is the opposite of the antecedent. The antecedent is proved because it was true, at least for the uncreated truth, that the antichrist will be and also about anything else that will be.

First corollary: just as any future is contingently future, so any future is known contingently by God to be future. The first part is clear because any future will be contingently, therefore etc. The antecedent is proved because any such future dependes or will depend on the liberty of the will. The second part is proved because it follows, future a is not contingently known by God to be future, therefore a necessarily will be or is future which is repugnant to what has been said. This is confirmed because it follows that future a is able to not be, even though a will be, therefore God is able to know that a will not be, even though he knows that a will be.

The second corollary: though it is true that the antichrist will be, nevertheless no created or creatable thing will be the antichrist. This is clear because eternally it was true to say that the antichrist will be, but nothing created was eternally, therefore. From this it is clear that no futureness or pastness is able to be caused by God. This is proved because pastness and futureness are nothing, therefore no such thing is creatable or producible.

Third corollary: something known by God to be future God is able never to have known to be future. The corollary is clear by dividing future against the present and by taking it in the divided sense because everything that will be and is not and was not was always contingently foreknown to be, therefore every future is contingently known by God, therefore it is able to never have been foreknown. This corollary is seen from the mind of the Master, in distinction 39, in the second chapter .

From what has been said it follows through the mode of a sub-corollary that any future, when it is future, continently is future. This is clear because any future is contingently future, and not unless for the measure for which it is future, otherwise it would be some future which would not be future, which implies a contradiction. In the second place, it follows that nothing is able to be future necessarily. This is clear because every future is continently able not to be. In the third place, it follows that the following consequence is not valid, a future will be necessary, therefore a will be necessarily. This is clear because that the antichrist wished in b will be necessary when it happened, and nevertheless that the antichrist wished in b is not a necessary future, but is the future contingently.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: with certain and infallible divine foreknowledge may stand de facto with contingency in producibile things. This is proved because, just as it is not repugnant that Socrates will sin in a and Socrates is able not to sin in a, so the following at the same may stand with repugnance, God foreknowledge that Socrates will sin in a and Socrates is able not to sin in a. This is clear because foreknowledge imposes no necessity or adds no necessity to the foreknown. This is confirmed because every future depends or will depend on the liberty of the will of contradiction, and God has foreknown how this future will be, therefore it may stand at the same time that God foreknows infallibly and knows that the future will be contingently.

First corollary: that it does not follow, God unchangeably foreknows a, therefore God necessarily foreknows a.

Second corollary: in a way God foreknows contingently that the future is future and it is possible not contingently but necessarily that the future is future, indeed by however much necessity God is able to produce something the externally caused thing is able to be future by that necessity.

Third corollary: though that a will be was eternally true, nevertheless that a will not be was eternally false. This is clear because everything true from eternity was true by the uncreated truth, though not true by the truth of sign or of the thing, therefore. The first part of the antecedent is clear through Augustine, in his book XXX . The second part is proved because there was not falsity from eternity, therefore etc. The antecedent is proved because there is no falsity except in subordinated signs or in the estimation of a created intellect. From this it is able to be inferred that this consequence is in no way valid , one of the complexly signifiable contradictories is true, therefore the other is false. The is clear because before the creation of the world it was true that the world will be created, and nevertheless its opposite was not false. From what has been said, the affirmative part of the conclusion follows.

It should be noted that through the divine wish or non-wish arises liberty and contingency, and from the immensity of the divine intellect foreknowledge. For when determining with respect to future goods it is wishing, but when determining with respect bad things it is not wishing, but when determining with respect to its opposites, with respect to negative signs it is either the divine wish or divine non-wishing. I do not say predetermining, just as Scotus and his followers, but determining. Here note Fastinum in his principium of the second book

Objections and Responses

Against the first conclusion: any future necessarily is future, therefore the divine essence is foreknowledge, etc. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved by taking future a and by arguing that it is necessary that a is future, therefore it is impossible that a will not be. The consequence is clear, and the antecedent is proved because, if it is not necessary but contingent, then it follows its opposite is able to be true, namely that this a is not future. Then it can be argued thus that this is not true and it is able to be true, therefore it is able to begin to be true. The consequent is false, just as that which is true is not able to begin to be future, so that which was always not-future is not able to begin to be non-future. The consequences is proved because, if it has the potency, such that it true and now is not true, then it follows that it is able to begin to be true because everything that is able to be after non-being or after another being is able to begin to be after another being

In the second place, it is further argued let it be posted that God wishes future a to be in instant d and he wishes equally future b after instant d. Then thus, when instant d arrives God equally wishes a in d and b after d. But he is not able not to wish or to not have wished a in d, therefore he is not able to not wish b after d. This is clear because before d he wishes equally a and b, as the case states, and the divine volition does not vary through the placing of a into being in instant d.

In the third place, let it be posited that God wishes a exists in future instant b, then when b comes, just as it is necessary that in instant b and after b a is, so it is impossible that God is not its cause which is that b will be. Therefore just as the divine will is necessary with respect to a, so is it necessary with respect to the fact that b will be.

In the fourth place, let it be posted that nothing is unless God wishes and he wishes that a will be in instant b, then thus, that a is not future in b is not compossible with all the things which are now posited to be, therefore for the following, that a is not future, it is necessary that there is some change in those things which are posited as existing. But nothing exists unless through the divine will or foreknowledge as is posited in this case. But for change to occur in the divine foreknowledge or will is impossible, therefore that a is not and was not at sometime future implies a contradiction, therefore any foreknown future will be necessarily.

Against the second conclusion, that future a will not be is necessarily future, therefore something necessary is future. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved because that the antichrist will not be tomorrow is necessarily is future.

In the second place, that the antichrist will be is represented in the divine essence, therefore the antichrist will necessarily be. The antecedent is clear because that the antichrist will be is prewilled and preknown by God. And the consequence is proved because whatever is presented in the divine essence is naturally presented there, and consequently is necessarily there.

In third place, it is argued through Augustine, in book 6, chapter 22 and 23 Augustinus XXX , where showing how man is made is made limo saying that in this mater was man, thus he is able to become, but in this it was necessary that man came to be in this way, for this was not in contradiction of the teacher, but in the pleasure of the creator whose will is necessary. From these things it seems to follow that the divine will with respect to future things is necessary for the antecedent. In the same chapter he says, but necessarily the future is what he wishes those future things are what he foreknows.

Against the third conclusion, it is argued, it would follow that at the same time God would foreknow a and a would be able not to be. The consequent is false because it follows, a will not be, therefore God does not know that a will be. A let be supposed what is from the principle of the argument and it follows that God foreknowing that a will be foreknows that a will not be, which implies a contradiction. Similarly, it would be able to be argued from the perspective of the will, God just as he wishes that a will be is able to not will that a will be. And let be supposed that it is in being, the God wish that a will be and that it will not be.

In the second place, de facto God wishes that the antichrist will. Let it be posited therefore that a signifies the will of God with the disposition which toward the future antichrist, then it is asked either being a is purely dependent on those things which now are or is in some way dependent on the future. If the first, the a is now from the present, and consequently it is not able to be that a is not or future, just as it is not possible to make the past not be the past according to Anselm, , in chapter 4 . If the second, it follows that some being in act depends on a non-being, which does not seem true.

In the third place, if the were to happen contingently while the divine will stands, it follows that it would be in the power of a creature to make God will. The consequent is false first because it is not in the power of man to make another man will, therefore neither in the case of God. The secondly because the temporal would be a cause of the eternal. The consequent is against the Master, in distinction 25, in the first book, in chapter 4 . And the consequence is clear because whatever God wishes he wished eternally.

To the first, the antecedent is denied, and to the proof the antecedent is similarly denied and it is said that its opposite is contingent and is able to begin to be true, and when it is further argued, that a is future beings to be true, therefore a receives future being, this consequence is denied. And if it were argued be argued that a is not future and is able to be future, therefore it is able to being to be future, this consequence is denied, and further it is said that the follow stand at the same time, a is able to be future and a has no potency, such that future that is this a does not supposite for that which, but that which is able to be and is not

To the second, having admitted the case it is said because instant d will still be contingently true, b will be after d. And when it is said, equally, etc., it is said that if it is understood equally, that is with equal volition or the same thing intrinsically, it is conceded because by the same volition he wishes that a was and that b will be, and contingently he wishes that a is in instant d. In the second place, it is said he wishes contingently that b will be but he wishes necessarily that a was, and he wishes that it is necessary that a was and he wishes that it is contingent that b will be. In the third place it is said that before d he wishes equally a and b because he wishes contingely that each will be, but he knows that the existince of one of them will be past and the other future, just as this signifies, a was contingently and begings to be necessary, just has it occurred contingently but that is not the case about the fact that b will be.

To the third, in the first place it is said that, just as a contingently future before b, so is it contingently present in b was contingently, but after it was it not able to have been. In the second place, it is said that it does not follow, after b it is necessary that a was, therefore before b it is necessary that a will be. It is clear that the consequence is not valid.

To the fourth, having admitted Ad quartam admisso the case it is said to the argument that a is able not to be future without any change because this makes the inference that there is some future mutation, then a is, and therefore, if nothing is future, it follows that a is not future. Through this to the form the following antecedent is denied, namely that a is not future in b is not compossible, etc.

To the first against the second conclusion, in the first place it would be possible to deny the antecedent, and it does not follow, that a will not be tomorrow necessarily is nothing future, therefore a etc. In the second place, it is said, by denying the consequence because a will not be tomorrow necessarily is nothing, when properly speaking.

To the second, the consequence is denied, and to the proof the consequence is similarly denied, just as this complex does not follow, the highest pontiff naturally signifies the one who is the pope, therefore this naturally signifies this necessarily, because before this person was pope it was not signifying him, similarly, it is said that, though God naturally represents the antichrist will be while it will be, nevertheless not necessarily. Whence, just the same created sign signifies distinctly many things successively, so in the same simple act God knows future things, when they are future and the same things being present when they are present without any change in his knowledge, but only according to a change in the things known or knowable things.

To Augustine, it is said that he is only speaking about the necessity of the consequence and not of the consequent. For he intends that it does not stand that God simultaneously wishes from execution or efficiently that something will be or is and according to the measure for which it is will it is not. In the second place, it is said that in such contingent things, the consequent is contingent just as the antecedent because God is able to do and to will what he does not will and does not do and not will what he wills, as is shown by Augustine XXX and the Master, in distinction 43 of book 1 Lombardus, nor does it also follow, the fact that God wished that I read is eternal, therefore it is necessary, because it depends on the future.

To the first against the third conlcusion, the consequent and the consequence are conceded. In the second place, it is said that this proposition, God, while foreknowing a will be, is able to know foreknow that a will be, ought not to be posited in being as, God, foreknowing a will be, does not know that a will be, because it implies a contradiction but rather in this way, God does not foreknow a will be and is able to know that a will be, and in this way it is able to be said from his willing. And to this, something false or impossible does not follow, but it only follows that God never foreknew that a will be or wished that is possible.

To the fourth, it is said that in some mode it depends on the future, not as will but in as much as it is disposed to the fact that the antichrist will be. And it does not follow that some being in act depends on non-being because the will of God is something, but is related to something relatively. In the second place, it is said that the fact that the will of God is thus disposed to such a future, though this will is God's very will, nevertheless it follows that some being in being in act depends on that which is not. But it does indeed follow that the will of God that is disposed with respect to that future depends on that which is not, but this is not inconvenient.

To the last, the consequence is denied, though deductively and consequentially for man to wish it follows that God wishes, nevertheless not as a power or causally. That I wish is the cause of why God wishes or acts externally.

To the first in the opposition, the antecedent is denied. And to the proof, it is said that he has from himself what is foreknowledge. And when it is inferred, therefore he is not able not to be foreknowledge, the consequence is denied, just as it does not follow, the will has from itself that it wishes this object, therefore it is not able not to wish it.

In the second place, it is said that the foreknowledge of God does not have from itself what is foreknowledge in such a way that it is itself essentially foreknowledge of such a future, in the same way that a triangle has from itself three angles.

To the second, the antecedent is denied. And to the proof, the consequence is denied.

To the third, I says that the consequence is necessary, but I say that the consequent, just as it is contingent, so is the antecedent, and also it does not follow, it is eternal. Therefore it is necessary because that it was from eternity in some mode depends on the future, therefore it is possible that it never was because, just as it is able not be, similarly it is able never to have been foreknown or even fore-willed.

Principal arguments

That not because no foreknowledge should be put in God, therefore. The antecedent is proved then of the object of this foreknowledge is either true or false. It is not true because every true things is present, but foreknoweldge is only of future things not of present things acorrding to the Master as it stood declared above. Nor is it false because then God would be able to be decieved. In the second place, because foreknowledge as such does not imply a perfection. In the third place, because God is able to be and not be foreknowledge, but however God is able to be he is that way, therefore he is not foreknowledge.

In the second place principally, no contingent future is true, therefore. The antecedent is proved because then it follows that some proposition about a future contingent will be true or false, the opposite of which seems to be proven by Aristotle, I Aristoteles, I, xxx. , and Aureolus holds this with him. Then in the second place because everything able to be is, but the future is able to be, therefore it is and consequently it is not future but present. Then in the third place because some common measuring ratio would correspond to the entire latitude of contingency. This consequent is false because since such a ratio is not able to be suitable to a creature, it necessarily suits God, which is false because in God there is no intrinsic contingency.

In the third place principally, no such ratio corresponds to divine foreknowledge with respect to a future contingent, therefore. The antecedent is proved because it is not suitable to him, either that he knows a because then it would necessarily suit him, or that he wishes a because then God would be the cause of future sin. Then in the second place, because the divine effecting does not terminate except into something positive, but the future is not something positive. Then in the third place, because then he would cause freely, and then it would be the case that the divine effects no future, which is false because of the parts of the contradiction the other part is necessarily true.

In opposition, no thing is future from itself nor does something suffice to put itself into being or to produce itself, therefore it requires some productive cause which puts it into being, but not unless there is also God or a passive cause, which is therefore a certain and perfect foreknowledge of all future things.

First conclusion

The first conclusion: though the divine essence according to no perfection absolutely as such is necessary actual knowledge or clarity, nevertheless this is with respect to such a thing ratio freely representing and infallible and also and immeasurable certitude. The first is proved because, if this is so, it follows that necessarily that something is true the divine science would known or that it would be able to lack some perfection absolutely Each consequent is false. And the consequence is clear because this known thing would occur necessarily. The second part is clear through Augustine, III , in a chapter , dicentem, to confess that God is and to deny that he foreknows the future is obviously insane Augustinus, V, c. 9 . The conclusion is confirmed in 28 et 26 Do you think that I am not able to ask my Father that he will give more than twelve legions of angels? Matthaeus 26:53 , therefore that Christ does not ask the Father, it was merely free and contingent

First corollary: though every truth is an object of the divine science, nevertheless only a true future as such is the object of foreknowledge. The first is clear because God is the founder and knower of everything. The second is clear because foreknowledge is only said with respect to future things. From this it would be able to be inferred that properly speaking about foreknowing God does not know that the antichrist will be. This is clear because that is not future but present if nevertheless this is something. Nevertheless it should be known that this proposition God foreknows that the antichrist is future and things similar to this are admitted because it is true that God that God knows that the antichrist is not but will be, or according to others God knows this that the antichrist is a thing that will be future. Again, it should be known that having supposed that the antichrist is future, this will be nothing in reality, yet God still knows this because God knows that two gods are not distinct from him and nevertheless that there are not two Gods is nothing. From these things it is clear that the following consequence is not valid, God knows this or this is present, therefore this a real being.

Second corollary: though God according to no ratio is necessary knowledge of a future contingent, nevertheless God according to his essential ratio which is universally perfect is perfect knowledge of any possible future being. The second part is proved because that God is foreknowing the future is part of ratio of perfection, therefore it intrinsically belongs to the divine essence.

Third corollary: though God is not able to resolve completely the entire latitude of possible things into a line of future things, nevertheless God is able to resolve a line of future possible things into a line of things existing presently. The first part is clear because past and present things are able to be called possible, but these things as such are not able to be called future because such things were able not to have been. The second is clear because every possible being is able to be put in the being of existence through God.

Second conclusion

The second conclusion: though every future shines in the divine knowledge as if in his art, nevertheless anything contingent thing will be not from necessity. The first part is clear through what is said above. The second part is proved because any future thing that will be occurs contingently from its principle cause, therefore it occurs contingently The consequence holds because, just as the first cause has more influence in the caused than the second cause, so it determines more than the second. And the antecedent is proved because to the outside it acts contingently and freely.

First corollary: though every future just as it is foreknown and all things properly foreknown are future, nevertheless more things than those just those foreknown are able to be future. the first is clear because is foreknowing of all future things and only if they are future things as the first corollary says. The second part is proved because many things are able to be future which de facto are not future which if it were future, then they would be past.

The second corollary: just no future is necessary, so it is not necessarily the case that something is future. This clear because God is able to produce or wish or conserve nothing outside of himself, contra Bosemblantem, distinction 38 of book 1 in the solution which he offers for the same argument Bosemblantes, I, d. 38, xxx .

Third corollary: having supposed that every possible being exists, nevertheless the present future would still exist and the commensurative contingent ratio would not be able to correspond to the whole latitude of contingency. The first part is clear it does not follow, anything that is able to be future is, the future is able to be, therefore it is. But it ought to be said in the minor premise that the future is because it is able to be which does mean that it is already there. The second part is proved because then such a ratio commensurative of the latitude of contingency would be suitable to God. The consequent is false, and the consequence is clear because it would not be able to suit any creature. From this it is clear that, though in God there is no intrinsic contingency measuring the latitude of contingency, nevertheless the latitude of this contingency is measured through the will of divine liberty or the free rectitude, or though in God there is no intrinsic contingency by which the latitude of contingency is measured, nevertheless the beauty or validity of divine liberty sufficiently measures this latitude of contingency.

Third conclusion

Third conclusion: though divine foreknowledge including the divine willing and non-willing or approval of every incomplex being is a formal principle, nevertheless an efficient casual being does not correspond to the divine foreknowledge with respect to what will be future. The first part is clear because the divine efficiency and foreknowledge is the divine will and essence, but the will is the foundational principle of every incomplex being. The second part is proved because the future is nothing, there is no cause of it.

First corollary: if, through the possible or impossible, a future thing were to somehow exist as the cause of divine foreknowledge, nevertheless God would not acquire from this any perfection through its creating operation. This is clear because such a future thing would not be the creating cause of divine foreknowledge, but only the inferring cause. This is the understanding of Our Doctor Gregory, in question 2 of distinction 38 when solving the first principal argument Gregorius Ariminensis, I, d. 38, q. 2 , by saying that it is in the power of man to make it that God eternally knew or wished something. From this it is clear that John of Ripa insufficiently refuted him because he argues against the words but not against his meaning or understanding.

Second corollary: that it is improperly said that the antichrist will be is present or that it is some being. This is clear because it is nothing and consequently it is neither present nor future.

Third corollary: that if foreknowledge is received with the inclusion of the will, and the disposition of the divine, and the future for an incomplex thing, and producibile in itself, then the affirmative part of the conclusion should be held. But if it received as prescinding from these things, then the negative should be held. But if it is understood about a future complex things, then however foreknowledge is understood it is in someway falsely or improperly understood.

Objections and responses

Against the first conclusion, it is argued thus: God represents precisely future contingents and is himself necessarily existing by the same ratio, but he represents himself by a necessary ratio, there he does not represent himself freely. The major premise is from Augustine, XV , chapter 13 , saying, the Father knows all things in the Word Augustinus, XV, c. 14, n. 23 , and the minor is clear.

In the second place, every true past is necessary, but any eternally foreknown future is past, therefore.

In the third place, this is valid consequence, Socrates judges that b will occur tomorrow and it will not occur tomorrow, therefore he is deceived. Therefore similarly, Socrates judges that b will occur tomorrow and b is not able to occur tomorrow, therefore Socrates is able to be deceived.

Regarding the second conclusion, that any future contingent is a non-being, therefore no such thing is known or shines in the divine essence, the consequence is valid because according to the Philosopher I Posterior Analytics , of non-being there is no knowledge Aristoteles, I, XXX . The antecedent is proved because, if it were being, then either it would be determined in itself or in its own principles/beginnings. Not in itself because what is future should be known. Not the second because such things are not more greatly determined toward one alternative than they are to its opposite, since they are free with respect to each alternative.

In the second place, a future contingent has no truth, therefore. The antecedent is proved because just as each thing is disposed to being, so it is to truth, see II Aristoteles, .

In the third place, ever contingent thing is able to be other disposed, therefore there can be no knowledge or foreknowledge of this kind of thing. The consequence is clear, for knowledge is of those things that are impossible to be otherwise Aristoteles, I, c. 2 I . The antecedent is clear from itself.

In the fourth place, if any future were foreknown, then it would follows that we ought not to deliberate about anything. I prove this consequence because there should not be any deliberation about that which will occur determinately, but so it is about anything foreknown, therefore.

Against the third conclusion, it is argued through proposition 18 of Alexander in , where it is said all knowledge either is the cause of things or caused by things Alexander, xxxx , but the foreknowledge of God is not caused by things, therefore it is the cause of things.

In the second place, when a non insufferable sufficient cause is posited the effect immediately follows. But the will of God with respect to created things was eternally, therefore creatures were eternally or the will of God with knowledge is not a sufficient cause of things.

In the third place, the nature of contingent things has no certitude in itself, therefore it repugnant for these to be known determinately. The consequence holds because it belongs to the disciplined man to pursue in something only as much certainty as the nature of thing allows. And the antecedent is proved because contingent things are indeterminate and about these things there is no determinate truth, according to the Philosopher .

In the fourth place, the knowledge of God is able to be bound to many things and few things, therefore it is variable. The consequence is valid, and the antecedent is proved bot because he is able to foreknow what he does not foreknow, and because he is able to know foreknow what he foreknows. And in the second place because there is not a greater unchangeability in knowledge than in thing known, but in the thing known there is changeability as is known, therefore. The assumed is clear VII Metaphysics XXX where it is said that concerning corporeal things there is not able to be knowledge because they are changeable.

To the first, the consequence is denied because, though it represents itself and other things by a necessary ratio, nevertheless the representative ratio of this future is in existence freely and not necessarily

To the second, the major premise is accustomed to be denied when speaking commonly about past things having a relation to future contingents which depend on the coming to be of some future, and thus following kind of difficulties are solved, the soul of Christ knew but it wished or asserted. But against this it is objected that, let it be posited that yesterday the soul of Christ wrote the proposition, I wish a , and it follows that what the soul of Christ wrote yesterday is necessary today. Here some say that the soul of Christ is able to never have written this, But this is rejected because then the past would be able to never have been. Therefore it is said differently, that he asserted this and that he wrote this are not similar cases.

To the third, it is said that the second consequence is not valid because it is not a similar case when both are regarding what is in existence and when they are regarding what is possible See Scotus, distinction 39, in the solution of the first argument of the second question Scotus, I, d. 39, xxx .

To the first against the second conclusion, the consequence is denied because, though they are not beings existing in their own genus, nevertheless they are living in the word or in the first principle, according to what is said in , what was made, in him was life Ioannes 1:3-4 . And this suffices such in order for something to shine in the divine essence.

To the second, it is said that just as an entity is suitable to future things, so the truth is belongs to these same things, for they are entities in the productive principle, and thus also the truth, which is not distinct from the eternal truth.

To the third, the consequence is denied because concerning changeable and corporeal things is a science the book , and about accidental and causative things in the book of . In the second place, it is said that to be disposed to impossible things is different than a science with respect to a necessary and unchangeable ratio which is able to be had and formed regarding what it is able to known because the science of God does not depend on known things as our does.

To the fourth, the consequence is denied. And to the proof, it is said that, though the future occurs determinately from God, namely from a principle cause, nevertheless because it is able not to occur, we not take counsel in vain.

To the first against the third conclusion, it is said in the first place that here Alexander understands the term science with inclusion of the divine will and whatever pleases God, and thus the foreknowledge of God is the cause of things, but not of what is to come because this is not a thing nor something, just as was said above.

To the second, the consequence is denied because, though the will of God is eternal, nevertheless it wished from eternity that a creature were in time and not eternally. And therefore, though the cause of a creature was eternally, nevertheless it was not eternally the cause of a creature or producing a creature.

To the third, it is said that, though for our intellect future things do not have certain evidence, nevertheless for God future things have a determinate truth and are equally, evidently, clearly seen by him, just as when they are will be actually present.

To the fourth, the antecedent is denied. And to the proof, it is said that, though he is able to foreknow what he does not foreknow in the divided sense because what is not future is able to be future, nevertheless science of God is not able to be increased or restricted.

And to the second proof it is said that, though our science is, like known things, is changeable, nevertheless ths is not the case for the science of God which is not caused by things.

To the arguments in the opposition let it be said according to the force of the things that have been said