Also the trace and the image differ because it belongs to the ratio of the trace to be caused by that thing in whose likeness is the trace. in some mode, just as it is clear inductively from the trace of a cow, from the trace of combustion, and from similar things. And here is the case that the trace is called something left behind by another. But the ratio of the image is not caused by that of which it is an image, for it suffices that the image of Hercules is caused by something other than Hercules Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 9 (OTh II:547). .

Nevertheless note that most strictly or most properly speaking about the image, and not in the common way as was the case before, it is proper to the ratio of the image that it is an extracted or begotten likeness from that of which it is an image, just as is said by Augustine , , question 74 , just as he exemplified there: as in a mirror he says, it is the image of a man because it is extracted from him . In is similar in the case of parents children, for likewise from a parent the likeness of a child is extracted, such that it is rightly called an image. Augustinus, , q. 74 (PL 40:86). . And nevertheless the image is properly understood in the sense that I have adopted from the witness of the Master, in book 2, distinction 16, chapter 2 where he says on behalf of the authority of Bede Bedae, , I, 26 (PL 91:29b; CCL 188A:25). speaking about the fact that the Trinity is improperly called an image the cause of which is, because the image he says, is relatively said with respect to another which the image carries a likeness and to which it is made in order to represent, just as the image of Ceasar, which carried a likeness of him and represented him in some mode Petrus Lombardus, , Bk. II, d. 16, c. 3 (Quarachi I:407) .

From this difference another follows: that the trace leads or is able to lead not only into complex recalling knowledge of that of which is habitually known, but also into other complex contingent things and even like assent to these things, into similar things of which the image is not sufficiently able to lead. For example, the trace of a cow is not able to cause the remembrance of a cow habitually known, but leads commonly into conforming belief to the following contingent proposition a cow has travelled here, but the image of Peter does not lead to the following, Peter has travelled here and other propositions of this type. However, trace and image are understood in various senses, just as is clear in the case of Ockham Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 9-10 (OTh II:544--9, 553) .

But how any creature is able to be called in some mode the trace of the Trinity, such that, namely, somethings in that creature, like unity, species, and order, are able in some mode to lead into incomplex recalling knowledge of those things that belong to the divine persons, and even into complex contingent knowledge, is sufficiently well taught by Ockham, in the question on the trace, article two Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 9 (OTh II:548, l.8--549, l.2). . And again in the same place, in what things in the creature the trace consists because sometimes it is in really distinct things, and sometimes in non-really-distinct things.

And similarly in the question on the image, in the second article Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10 (OTh II:557--9) . In the first of which, in the proper opinion Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10 (OTh II:555--7) , he teaches how in a rational creature the image is said to be more present than in any other creature. And in the second place Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10 (OTh II:557--9) he consequently teaches how the imperfect image of God both radically and originally consists in this soul according to the substance of the soul, but the full perfection of the image consists in the substance of the soul and two produced acts Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10 (OTh II:557). , and with respect to each act the soul is productive; . but for the act of willing to occur, there is a mediating act of understanding, which with the substance of the soul and the object, co-produces the act of willing, and consequently the soul expresses with these acts the order and origin that exists between the persons.

But that the act of willing is effectively from the act of understanding Guillelmus de Ockham, , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10 (OTh II:559) , he also proves well. And I concede the conclusion and I hold this in distinction 1 Wodeham, , I, d. 1, XXX because every absolute thing necessarily presupposed by another has with respect to that the ratio of the cause in some genus of cause. But so it is about the act of understanding with respect to the act of willing, therefore Guillelmus de Ockham , Bk. I, d. 3, q. 10 (OTh II:559). . Also the major is conceded by Scotus, in distinction 3 of book 1 Iohannes Duns Scotus, , Bk. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 589 (Vatican 3:348) , and he uses this because, according to him, every effect of something sufficiently depends on its essential causes Iohannes Duns Scotus, , I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 2, n. 414 (Vatican 3:251) , therefore, etc.

To the first it is true that in order to save the ratio of the image in the rational mind, some posit a certain distinction or non-identity between the substance of the soul and the intellect and will, just as Scotus in II, distinction 16 Iohannes Duns Scotus, , Bk. II, d. 16, q. 1, n. 17-19 (Wadding, VI, 772) . But according to the same author in the same place, no argument is sufficiently able to prove that such a distinction exists, as I have shown above, in the last question of the first distinction Wodeham, I, d. 1, q. ?? . Nor does this seem to me necessary in order to save the image because, if several powers were really the same, then this would not preserve some sort of origination between these powers, etc.

But because I do not hold that there is such a distinction between powers of the soul, I say with the Subtle Doctor and the Master, in the text, in this distinction 3 , that a likeness of the image to the prototype is not able to be found in us because according to the Master Petrus Lombardus, , Bk. I, d. 3, c. 3 (Quarachi, 1:74-75) there is more dislikeness than likeness, and therefore I say that there are not three things in our mind that our really distinct, among which there is a similar ratio of the origin, of two things from one thing, and of one thing from two, with consubstantiality, that is, with an essential identity of three really distinct things. It is therefore necessary that the ratio of the image is understood either with respect to origination and distinction or with respect to consubstantiality. And above all this is not unsuitable for that in which the ratio of the image (of which the substance of the soul is) consists only principally or virtually.

To the second, I say that the image is deficient in consubstantiality in comparison to the Trinity of Persons, between which there is consubstantiality. It is nevertheless true that it is possible that there are some signs expressive of those distinct parts which are truly affirmed about the same substance, and perhaps this is the consubstantiality which the authors intend to hold there, for the same substance is memory, intelligence, and will. For thus according to Augustine and asserted in the text of distinction 3, I Petrus Lombardus, , Bk. I, d. 3, c. 2, n.7 (Quaracchi, 1:73-74) , they are said relatively to one another Augustinus, , IX, c. 5, n. 8 (CCSL 50: 301; PL 42:965). which would not able to be unless they signified distinct things which are the substance of the soul.

To the third, I say that some things, through which we express distinct parts of the image, are never truly removed from the rational soul. Whence the following is in itself true and necessary: if the soul is formed, then there is memory, intelligence, and will, at least if the soul exists. And Augustine, when he says the image is immortal, does not intend anything other than that the soul necessarily and immmortally, while remaining itself, is like that which is meant when it is said to be memory, intelligence, and will.

To the fourth, Scotus Iohannes Duns Scotus, , Bk. I, d. 3, pars 3, q. 4, n. 590 (Vatican, 3:349) responds well with respect to God as an object, the ultimate and most perfect ratio of the image is held in the mind because then these three things are not only an expressive likeness of the uncreated Trinity, from which there are three such things relating to themselves in this way, but more than this because every act is truly a likeness of the object of which it is and some expressed image of it, though equivocal. Therefore when these acts are elicited with respect to God as object, then the image and the conformity to the uncreated Trinity is had more perfectly, most especially when the objective Trinity is found in the object corresponding in some mode to the subjective trinity in the mind which does not happen in other objects.

From the same solution vide supra (Cross Reference to above paragraph) it is clear with respect to the fifth that the most perfect ratio of the image possible to be had in a creature with respect to the Trinity is not in the soul and its sensitive acts because these acts are not able to have God as their object. Nevertheless it seems to me that in the sensitive human, which is the same as the its intellective human, the image of the Trinity is able to be posited in the substance and sensitive acts ordered in the manner mentioned above, (although a more imperfect image than with respect to a purely intelligible object) because the sensitive and appetitive human acts are simple and nonextended, just as intellective and volitional acts. (And this different from the way it is in a brute, where such acts are extended forms.) And therefore, though more imperfect, there is a likeness to the most simple uncreated Trinity.

And it seems that not, in the first place, because then what would be called memory is indeed the pure substance of the soul, and this does not suffice without an object, or species, or a habit initiating an act, for if it did then it would always be understanding, just as the Philosopher argues in book II , that the sense would always be sensing Aristoteles, II, c. 5 (XXX) , if it would by itself alone actualize sensations, and not the intellect with species or habit because actual intellection is not distinguished from habit or species just as it is not produced by them. The assumed is clear because actual sensation is a species in the sense, therefore similarly in the intellect. The antecedent is clear through the Philosopher Aristoteles, De anima III, c.2, 425b12ff and the Commentator II comment 136, Averroes, Comm. de anima, II, 136 (Crawford pp.337f) where they say and prove that the sensible action and the sense as it is in act are the same thing. As the Commentator , explains sensible action outside the soul in moving the sense, and the action of sensing, which is in the one sensing, namely the quality by which the one sensing is qualified, is the same action Averroes, , II, 138 (Crawford, 340-341) . This the Commentator also in the two following comments exemplifies with respect to hearing: just as he says, the action of hearing, that is to hear, and the action of having sounded, that is to sound, are the same thing .

Similarly, that actual intellection is not distinguished from habit is seen from the fact that this would be generated from acts, and then there would immediately be a habit and a most perfect act able to be received in this potency, since the first act would be causative of the habit. The consequent is false. The consequence is clear because the first act causes some degree of habit, and the intellect with this grade will cause more of the act than it had been able to before it had nothing from the habit. Therefore the act would be intensified, and the more intense the act, the more of the habit it will cause, and thus circularly without end, until the intellect has something of the species both of this and of that, to the degree that it is able to reach. But this is false. Therefore also this from which it follows is false, namely that the act is distinguished from the habit. Therefore intellection is not, like an offspring, proceeding from the memory, like a parent.

To this doubt, I say at the present that indeed actual intellection is distinguished, like an offspring, from memory (that is from an intellect existing in a first act sufficient with respect to begetting an intellection) either through the presence of an object with respect to a first act naturally causable in it with respect to such an object, or through a species or habit afterwards in the absence of the object with respect to abstractive cognition begetting with respect to such an absent object. Whence this is true regarding the causing of first intellective act, (namely with respect to such an natural object). This is held by Augustine, IX , 30 de parvis : the knowledge is brought forth from each, namely from the one knowing and from the thing known Augustinus, , IX, c. 12, n. 18 (CCSL 50:309; PL 42:970) , and said nearby in XV , c. 24 de parvis , he says, when we speak what we know, the word is born from knowledge we have with memory, which is entirely of the same kind -- supply of the object -- as the knowledge from which it born Augustinus, XV, c. 10, n. 19 (CCSL 50A:486; PL 42:1071) . For it immediately follows, it is the case that the expression of the same kind refers to the object and does not note the object of cognition, for, he says, the knowledge formed from that thing which we know is the word which we speak in our heart

Again, in chapter 28, he says that the word is begotten from the knowledge which remains in the soul Augustinus, , XV, c. 11, n. 20 (CCSL 50A:488; PL 42:1072), and similarly in chapter 36 Forte Augustinus, , XV, c. 14, n. 24 (CCSL 50A:497; PL 42:1077) . From these and many other similar authorities it is sufficiently clear that Blessed Augustine agrees that actual intellection is really distinguished from the species or habitual knowledge from which, according to him, it is begotten, as if an offspring from a parent, but in this case from the mind, just as the word is also an offspring of the one speaking.

Nevertheless against his and my opinion, it is able to be argued through the arguments of those who hold that actual cognition is able, while remaining subjectively in the mind, to cease to be intellection, such that in this case the quality will remain, not existing as an intellection, but as a species or habit. Therefore this same thing which is the species or habit when the soul is not in the act of thinking becomes actual thinking when the soul begins to think. Therefore a species or habit distinct from such actual thinking is needlessly posited, and as a consequence it would be needless to posit a real part of the second part of the image coming from the species or habit of the intellect, which naturally presupposes it in the same thing. The assumed is proved in the first place because otherwise if someone were understanding, then they would have at the same time distinct likenesses with respect to the same thing, which seems superfluous. The consequence is clear because likewise according to Augustine, where he seems to follow this distinction of act from habit or species in 29 , c. 15 and in many other places , actual thinking is the greatest likeness to the species from which it is begotten Augustinus, XV, 12, 22 .

Again, sometimes through the same act the word and another thing in the word is known, and at other times this thing is not known, but other times that thing is not known but rather something else or nothing else This is not the case unless it is granted that the quality, which is the intellection, is able to remain while not being intellection since by what reason would it be able to remain and at the same time not be an intellection of that of which it was an intellection. The same argument applies for everything else.

Further, when I love all good people with one virtuous act, if one of them becomes bad without my knowing, then I cease to love that person with the love with which I loved all such good people inasmuch as they were good, and nevertheless the act does not cease, therefore by this reason the same is true for the intellect.

Further, nothing is loved unless it is known, but a thought is able to be destroyed by God without the destruction of the quality, which is love, therefore this love will then remain, and nevertheless there will not be love. By this reason the same is true for the intellect.

Further, let the love by which Socrates loves himself be put in Plato, then Plato will experience loving himself, therefore then something will be loved through this love which was not loved earlier and will not be loved through the same love that was earlier. The assumption is proved because, if Socrates wishes that he loves an angel, and this volition is put in Plato, then through this wish Plato will wish that he himself loves an angel, therefore similarly in the proposed. And the last assumption is proved because through putting the intellection, by which Socrates experiences himself to understand an angel, in Plato, Plato will experience himself to an understand an angel, therefore similarly also through volition.

Further, the love for Socrates and the hate for Plato are naturally compatible in the will of Socrates, therefore since the hatred for/of Socrates and the hatred for Plato are qualities of the same species, if one is able to exist in some subject together with any form then also the other, but the hate for Plato exists in the will of Socrates together with a love terminated in Socrates, then in the same intellect with a volition terminated in Socrates the hatred of Socrates is able to exist. However, the hatred for Socrates is not able to exists with the love for Socrates, therefore the hate for Socrates is able to be in the will of Socrates when it will not be the hatred of Socrates. And by the same reason, this is able to occur for cognition, just as for volition, therefore.

Further, some vision is able to be in the sense of sight while not being a vision, therefore similarly in the intellect regarding intellection. The antecedent is proved because some intellectual part of a one foot long white thing seen from just short of the maximum, , namely the point at which it would not be visible from this distance all things being equal. But if it were present in itself, then it would be seen as a completely white existent thing, and nevertheless, if it were present over there , then it would cease to be seen without this quality ceasing to be, which is now present, therefore the vision, etc.

That this now seems to be true is clear because, if the entire whiteness of surface that faces the eye is seen, then some part of it with respect to the same surface is seen. Nevertheless because every such part contributes to the vision of the whole and adds to the fact that the whole is able to be seen from a distance more remote than the distance that what is left of the whole after this part has been removed would be able to be seen. If all things are equal, then because what is composed from two whitenesses maximally non-visible appears from some distance to have a part outside part in this distance, therefore the middle part of it is seen from such a distance, and by the same reason, the middle of the middle is seen, so on without end. But because this would not be seen, no other whiteness has been seen, and nevertheless the previously possessed quality is conserved with respect to it. It is argued because sensitive delight is able to be so small and diminished that through it such an appetite is not able to be perceptible delighted, therefore similarly regarding the sensitive vision. The consequence is clear because, just as through a lesser sensitive delight such an appetite is delighted less, so the lesser the vision, all things being equal, the more imperfect it represents its own object.

Again, either it is necessary to posit the following, namely that a minimum visible thing from distance A should not be given or that if it is, then there will have to be given a last visible of the permanent thing in being, for example, of the vision of that whiteness, namely from the present instant in which it is seen it would begin to be more distant from what is seen, all things being equal. Each of the second among the others is inconvenient, therefore these people have to concede the first.

Further, if parts of a whiteness seen according to the surface visible to the eye are continually corrupted "as the object is turned on its side" to the point that the remaining whiteness is no longer seen by an animal, then I ask whether in every instant this animal has a new vision -- and this would then give a final visible thing of the permanent thing in being -- or in every instant it has a vision less extended than before. And the latter is not true because in the sight of an animal, while something is seen, the vision remains continually equally extended because thus two-footed whiteness act in the whole eye and sight of the animal in the same way as one footed whiteness. Or in the third place, it follows that it has the vision more removed than before, but such remission does not occur through the gradual subtraction of one part because forms are not intended or remitted in this way. Therefore it is necessary that this is because while the same quality remains it ceases to be vision of those things of which it was earlier vision.

Further, let there be a whiteness A having been seen by vision B, and after this instant let there be posited another most similar whiteness, which is called C, in the same place that A was, and then let A be annihilated while the vision is conserved. I ask then whether through B C will be seen most similar to A or not? If it would, then vision B, which is now not the vision of C, will afterwards be the vision of it, and consequently by the same vision, by which one integral part of whiteness is seen , it is seen and other things most similar to it. Therefore the integral part newly acquired is seen through the vision continuously preexisting before the representing integral part. If not, conversely, A is able to be seen by my eye and your eye and by an infinity of eyes and thus others, therefore there are an infinity of visions representative of A, none of which is able to represent C as a whiteness most similar to A nor different than A. The consequent is false because then it would follow that this term representative of A would be a term common to an infinity of individuals of a species suitable and repugnant to another infinity of individuals of the same species. The consequent is false, for otherwise the way of proving of a universal proposition would be destroyed.

Similarly, I Aristoteles, , I, ? (276b9-276b18) it is argued that, if this piece of earth was intended by nature to descend to this center, and just as it is said by the Commentator, in comment 80 Averroes, , I, 79 [80] (Carmody, 1:147). , we should say that the earth of another world is moved to the center of that world and not to the center of another world because it [the kind of thing that] belongs to that center. This [opinion of Averroes] is outside the norm and does not lack for refutation, where it is held also that the closeness does not change the type. And note for this opinion see 78 and 79. But this argument of the philosopher would not be valid, have negated the principle here assumed for what is proposed, therefore.

Again, the intellect which now does not understand through intellection a is able to understand through a. Therefore and similarly, the object now not understood through a will be able to be understood through itself. (I speak here about similar intellections and similar objects.) The assumed is clear because Socrates' intellection is able to be put in Plato. And the consequence is clear because knowledge depends more essentially on the subject than on the object.

Again, all numerical concepts are of the same species, otherwise the parts of divided whiteness would be able to cause infinite specifically distinct qualities, for having seen these things the intellect would have whatever numerical concept that it wanted to form. Therefore these concepts in this way are able to be intensified and remitted because they will be most similar, and as a consequence, what earlier represented five, will be able to precisely represent three, just as it represents another to which it is most similar because if something is suitable to one of those most similar things it is similarly suitable or able to suit the rest, otherwise what was deduced earlier in argument ten would be inconvenient.

Again, if the eye were to continuously see something previously moving and afterwards at rest, then the same vision which earlier represented what was moving, will represent what is at rest and not moving.

Again, any quantitative part of animal's vision, inasmuch as it is a vision, is a perception or a perceptive vision, and there are many parts so small that if they existed by themselves, none of them would be a perceptive vision, though it would remain in the eye as before, for some things will be able to be so diminished that by means of nature there would be no perception, therefore by the same reason some part could be so small in extension that there would be no perception. And similarly the object is able to be so small that it will not be seen perceptibly, therefore a quality could be so small that it will not be perceived, and nevertheless there will be perception of this part in the whole because the whole is a perception through its parts, and further these are of the same species, therefore if one is a perception, therefore etc.

Further, if a vision or intellection were separated from its subjects, then these would not be cognitions, therefore, since the antecedent is possible, it happens that those things would be cognitions which would not cognitions.

Again, through the Philosopher, VII Aristoteles, , VII, c. 3 , for qualities belongs to the first species there is no motion because they are with respect to something. But this does not suffice unless understood in a special way because all things in the world are with respect to something generally speaking or are some kind of relation. But if one understands that the thing which is knowledge is able to be greater and clearer knowledge when doubled, and thus proportionally increased, then the proposed will be had. And in this way the saying of the Philosopher is explained, therefore etc.

There are also other arguments which for me do not have as much merit , indeed none or only the smallest amount of merit, therefore they are omitted.

These objections not withstanding, I hold the contrary conclusion which I have elsewhere declared and proved in the first distinction cross reference , though this conclusion is also held by many modern thinkers. And Fitzralph Richardus Fitzralph, , I, q. 6, a. 2 (Paris BN lat. 15853, ff. 30d) argues against this original conclusion through the authorities of Blessed Augustine, who in XI , c. 22 , says that, that which is formed in the mind of the one knowing is different from that which is conserved in the memory, and the latter comes from the former as if a child from a parent Augustinus, , XI, c. 8, n.13 (CCSL 50:350; PL 42:994) , and in many other passages, which he introduces, he says similar things.

Again, through the argument, if the quality, which is actual cognition is able to cease to be cognition, nevertheless while adhering to the soul just as before, therefore by the same reason when it is able to begin again to be actual cognition, and in this case the intellect would understand afresh without there being any new cause of this intellection in an intellect because nothing would act anew or receive anew. And without a doubt, he says, this does not seem to intelligibile. He argues many other things Cf. Richardus Fitzralph, , I, q. 6, a. 2 (Paris BN lat. 15853, ff. 30a-32b) which I omit. Some arguments touched upon the passing from contradictory to contradictory are sufficient for me, (but this would be put more rationally about the power of the soul than about a received accident) and also similar arguments.

To the first contrary argument, it should be said that the inferred conclusion is often true about similar things, one of which is only habitual representation of that object and the other is actual. Indeed about actual things there is no inconvenience, provided that they are of another thing, just as it is clear in the case of intuitive cognition of some thing and abstractive cognition of the same thing or about vision of one thing in the word and vision of the same thing in its proper genus.

To the second, I have responded in the preceding that this is not through the same act in number.

To the third, there the subject of that which is loved through itself, namely the subject of moral goodness, is not loved unless by accident. In the case of this argument and arguments of this type, I have conceded above, in distinction one, that they are able to not be known or not be loved while the same acts still remain. For just as in the same act of vision, in which I first see by accident the substance of the bread in the host about to be consecrated, I do not see the same substance in the consecrated host, so here in what has been proposed when I love indistinctly morally good things because when these such things, unbeknownst to me, case to be good, they cease to be loved by me in this act.

To the fourth, that then something would be able to be loved and at the same time not be known. This is clear from the first distinction, where I held that love is cognition, therefore I deny this consequence.

To the fifth, it should be said that, if the love by which Socrates loves Socratem himself were put in Platone, then Plato through this love would not love Platonem but Socratem. And similarly, if the love by which Socrates wishes that he loves an angel, through this love Plato would wish that Socrates loves an angel. And in the same mode, if the understanding by which Socrates experiences himself understanding were put in Plato, then Plato would judge or experience that Socrates understands unless the word experience connotes something else.

To the sixth, I well concede that the love of Socrates and the hate of Plato are naturally compatible in the same thing. Nevertheless it is able to be said that not every hate of the same species with the hate of Plato is naturally compatible with the love of Socrates because there is some hate of the same species that is contrary to it. And in this case this not so because for the contrariety of individual acts of this type, or acts of cognition, numerical identity of the object is required. Whence also to this judgement, by which I would judge that this man is Socrates while pointing at Socrates, would be contrarily repugnant the judgment, by which I would judge that this man is not Socrates, and nevertheless it is compatible with this judgement, by which I would judge that this man is not Socrates when pointing at Plato. Whence the love and hate or error and knowledge are not contraries unless with respect to the same thing, though they may be of the same species with things that are contraries to each other, and in this is especially the case in the vital acts which are themselves the motions and successions of potencies toward those objects.

Further, if there were contrariety between these qualities, then it would not cease that these are contraries merely from the fact that they cease to be related to those thing to which they were previously related. Thus, that would seem possible to be said in one mode. Otherwise it truly might be the case that they (the hatreds) are not of the same species because from different causes concepts are had according to different species. Nevertheless this argument and perhaps all others proceed from the fallacy of non cause as cause because the difficulty is common to this which has not been posited, and it is asked how its cause is avoided?

To the seventh, when it is argued, that vision is able to be in the sense subjectively without this being the vision itself, I deny this. And when it is proved that the lesser whiteness is able to be seen better in the whole than if it were seen through itself, I concede that this may be, if nothing else were seen better than if it were through itself because many such things posited at the same time would be able to change the sense, though they would not compose it. And beyond this, because if all other parts were destroyed, this kind of part would cease to be seen, and thus also the quality would cease to be the vision which previous was its vision. And when it is proved that this is not the case through a similar argument, namely that through the delight of the appetite which will be able to exist in such a remitted state the appetite so informed will not be able through this delight to be perceptibly delighted, if it is understood that this delight will be able to exist having been so remitted or in such a small amount that this delight would not be perceived, then I deny this because no such act in the sense or in the intellect is distinctly perceived through itself.

To the eighth, I do not posit that there is some minimally visible thing from some given distance.

To the ninth, I hold that the gradual increase or diminishing in forms occurs through the addition or subtraction of things similar in species.

To the tenth, it should be said that the whiteness c is not able to be seen in the vision b by which whiteness a is de facto seen. And the conclusion to which the argument is led to is not inconvenient, not any more inconvenient than that the fact that this term is naturally producible from this pointed to prime matter is suitable to an infinity of individuals producible from it, and nevertheless to none of them producible from other matters. And nevertheless this second part of this argument is denied by no one which is why therefore the first part of this argument ought not to be denied, and the fact that it is accepted that it would perish by way of inducing the universal does not follow, but is the fallacy of the consequent. For it is true that the following universal statement, all vision of such species, that is a vision of whiteness b, is able to be vision b, perishes by the true way of inducing the universal, but not this universal, that every such vision is a vision of whiteness.

To the second proposition about the Philosopher and the Commentator, I and Aristoteles, ???; Averroes, ???; , no catholic ought to hold such an argument to be valid, unless one were to deny that the omnipotence of God outside this world is able to produce another entirely similar world. And having supposed that this world comes to be, the conclusion which the philosopher tries to prove there would be false and de facto is false and erroneous according the principles of faith because he intends to prove there the impossibility of many worlds. Therefore this argument ought to persuade the catholic hardly at all.

To the eleventh, indeed I wish to reply that something which now is not understood through intellection a is able in a particular case to be an object of that intellection accidentally, nevertheless not in itself. And when this is proved that this is so -- namely, because another person is able to understand through this intellection if it was put in that other person and the intellection depends more essentially on its subject than on its object -- I say that this dependence often is more essential in being, but that this intellection, would represent the object (of which object it is an intellection inhering in it while in act) to the subject (to which subject the intellection inheres just as in a vital principle). It (the intellection) has this (the above characteristics) inseparably from its own nature, and in this regard does not depend on an object, nor is it necessary that it depends on a subject actively, but only on the fact that someone actively conserves it in the subject, whatever that was.

To the twelfth, it should be said that purely numerical concepts are not of the same species, but are merely syncategorematical concepts, just as every and someone, which is clear because these kinds of terms make the mediately following term to be merely confused, just as the word every does. For it does not follow, you have eaten bread twice, therefore you have eaten this or that bread twice . And therefore however much the number one is intended or remitted it will never become maximally similar to the other, just as a concept to which this word some corresponds will not be able to become maximally similar to the concept which is expressed through this word every. And consequently through all this, to the proposed, it should be said about those things, as it is has been about these.

Nevertheless one thing should be known namely that things nominally expressed are taken as if collectively and they do not make the following mediating term to supposite in merely confused way, just every does not when taken collectively.

To the thirteenth, it should be said that it occurs to the vision that its per se object is moved or at rest, and consequently that it itself is motion or is itself rest, although through the mediating vision it is able to be judged evidently or at least to appear that the seen thing is moved, and therefore it is said that motion is from the number of sensible things. Therefore here it should be said consequently just as it was said above in response to the third.

To the fourteenth, just as it is said to the proof of the seventh.

To the fifteenth, it is true that every cognition represents to someone that which it represents or of which it is a sign. And therefore, if it is subjectively in no one, then such a sign naturally offering the object of which it is able to be a sign is of nothing unless perhaps in the manner of the object, just as the image of Hercules represents Hercules and makes Hercules which is known habitually to come into actual cogitation. But signifying in such a way is not relevant to what has been proposed, and nevertheless it should be conceded, that in the mode in which it occurs to the thing which is the intellection, that this is an accident, for something is not an accident unless it is actually occurring, and just as in order to be a quality it must occur to itself because it is not a quality unless by qualifying, so it occurs to itself that this is cognition because its own nature is able to be intellection, not to its very self, but to its subject, and just as it is not possible for this to inhere subjectively that does not qualify this, so also it is not cognition to itself.

To the sixteenth, it should be said that this conception does not prevent the fact that in such things there is no motion, according to the mind of the Philosopher, because this conception posits that every form -- in which the Philosopher puts motion according to quality -- is without addition or subtraction of the thing. But the truer thought on behalf of the Philosopher is that sometimes science occurs or is able to become science without any mutation in the one knowing, when calling science any true judicative knowledge. For if while the knowledge of such a thing exists another thing is different disposed and afterwards begins to be disposed just as this knowledge signifies, then the knowledge is had without mutation of the one knowing because by virtue of the fact that the thing is or is not the statement is true or false.

It is similar in the case of a virtuous act, both appetitive and cognitive, because it is able in this way to be good and it ought to be good after it as not good without something new added to it in the subject through of example new instruction or something of this type. Similarly about beauty and about health, and thus about many things which are put in the first species of quality, for some things become beautiful or healthy through the removal of other things without addition or subtraction from that or from those thing which will be beautiful or healthy.

Et videtur quod non , quia si sic, tunc amor angeli qui peccavit quo affectavit aequalitatem Dei processit ab alia notitia dei , aut igitur ab ob scura notitia aut igitur ab obscura notitia Dei aut a clara. Si igitur ab ab obscura notitia Dei , igitur cum obscura notitia in illo fuerit fuit pena peccati, sequitur quod ipsum primum peccatum angeli processit praecessit a alia pena peccati, et ita sequitur quod pena naturaliter saltem praecessit pc culpam, contra Augustinum 11 c. 24. non invenimus Si amor istius angeli iste processit a clara notitia Dei, igitur angelus malus clare vidit Deum dictum quando fuit in maximo peccato, et per consequens simul fuit et miser et beatus, quod nullus potest Deum videre clare nisi beatus, quia haec est vita aeterna ut cognoscant cognoscat te Iohannes 17:3 etc., 17.

Secundum. Item, tunc primus amor in mente alicuius procederet a notitia et supposito, quod iste amor sit respectu alicuius delectabilis, cum non tunc illa notitia sit verbum verum , quia haec est cognitio alicuius respectu placentis, igitur est verbum per definitionem verbi. Ex quo sequitur quod primus amor mentis in isto casu procedit a verbo. Consequens falsum, quia tunc idem recte esset causa et esset effectus respectu eiusdem, quia omne verbum procedit ab amore secundum Augustinum IX c. 14, 21. Augustinus, IX, c. 9, n. 14 (CCSL 50: 305; PL 42:968) "Conceptum autem verbum et natum idipsum est cum voluntas in ipsa notitia conquiescit, quod fit in amore spiritalium." Non invenimus c. 21. Et per consequens, si amor iste primus procedit ab aliquo verbo et illud verbum ab aliquo amore tunc primus primum amor procederet procedet procederet a ab a primo amore, et ita idem causa sui.

Tertium. Praeterea quod primus amor non procedat procecedat ab aliqua alia notitia videtur, quia prima notitia videtur, quia prima notitia procedit ab amore, igitur non econtra, primus amor a notitia . Assumptum probatur, quia prima notitia cognitio sensitiva procedit ab amore, igitur et prima intellectiva intuitiva . Ultimum assumptum probatur, quia prima notitia sensitiva sit fit a voluntate copulante sensum cum sensibili secundum Augustinum XI c. 2, 4, 7, 9, 21, 29, Augustinus, , XI passsim (CCSL 50: 333-355; PL 42:983-998). et quasi per totum librum. Sed voluntas non copulat nisi per amorem, cum non habeat alium aliquem actum actum aliquem alium aliquem actum quo sic copulet, igitur quaelibet cognitio sensitiva procedit ab amore.

Quartum. Praeterea appetitus sensitivus potest esse sine cognitione, igitur et appetitus intellectivus. Assumptum probo, quia naturaliter haberet quis haberes haberet famem et sitim et si numquam sentiret haberes vel sentire aliquid ab extrinseco. Sed fames et sitis sunt appetitus sensitivi, igitur appetitus sensitivus potest esse sine cogitatione, et igitur appetitus intellectivus. Assumptum probo, quia naturaliter\ haberet quis famem et sitim, etc., secundum per Commentatorem II , commento 28, Averroes, , II, 28 (Crawford, 170-172 check latin) igitur igitur etc . secundum Commentatorem II De anima, commento, 28, igitur

Quintum. Item quinto, sit sic talis dilectio libere lebere haec elicita a voluntate aut esset esset est eadem res cum intellectione praesupposita ad hoc haec quod aliquid libere haec diligatur aut non. Si sic, cum non sit vera a maior ratio quod ista res possit potest fieri dilectio quam odium, igitur dilectio posset esse potest fieri odium contra consequentia probatur per syllogismum expositionum haec res est dilectius dilectius haec res potest esse odium igitur dilectio potest esse odium si non est intellectio intellectus cum Deus omne absolutum creatum causatum posset servare conservare cum sine alio igitur posset servare dilectionem istam destructa ista intellectione dilectione et eadem pari ratione omni cum intellectione destructa et tunc voluntas posset diligere incognitum contra Augustinum et contra experientiam. Et iuxta hoc haec ex de libertate voluntatis potest idem inconveniens deduci. Confirmatur confirmatur quia tunc voluntas vere libere posset imperare cognitionem de aliquo de quo non cogitatur actu. Aut igitur illud apprehenditur actu aut vel non. Si non, voluntas operatur volitione volitive circa incognitum. Si sic, frustra praeciperet quod fieret particularem fieret prius quam perciperetur et propterea praeciperetur in prima perciperetur et prima perciperetur et , hoc haec erat contra casum.

Ad oppositum, XV c. 67 et 77 Augustinus, , XV, c. 23, n. 43, (CCSL 50A:520; PL 42:1090) ". . .et amor hominis de scientia procedens et memoriam intellegentiamque coniungens tamquam parenti prolique communis . . ." utrobique, enim dicit quod amor procedit de ex scientia et et de ipsa mente.

Praeterea, notitia praesupponitur amori sicut probat in V and T aobut reference numbers --> Augustinus VIII c. 16, Augustinus, X, c. 1, n. 2 (CCSL 50: 312; PL 42: 973) "certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest"; cf. X, c. 1, n. 3 "non potest amare quod nescit" (CCSL ?); non invenimus VIII, 16 vel X, 48. et X c. 48 Augustine, De Trinitate, X, ??? et quasi per totum librum, et III dicit hoc capitulo 42 92 quod nihil potest amari nisi cognitum Augustine, De Libero arbitrio, ??? quamvis aliquid possit cognosci et non amari, sicut vult Augustinus in omnibus locis praeallegatis. Igitur, cogitatio aliquo modo est causa amoris et certum est quod non materialis malis nec finalis nec formalis , igitur effectiva, igitur amor procedit a notitia actuali .

Praeterea, nisi amor procederet a de notitia actuali seu cognitione, non esset amor inter ista tria proportionaliter spiritu sancto. Cuius oppositum declarat Augustinus IX c. 29 Augustine, De Trinitate, IX et XV c. 67. Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, ???

Praeterea, Philosophus et Commentator III , determinantes commento 50 15 50 Averroes, In Aristot. De anima III, 50 (Crawford, 519, check latin); cf. Aristoteles, , III, c. ? (433a19-26) determinantes modum per quem generantur in animali desiderium sive appetitus, dicunt quod hoc fit ex hoc quod imaginatio imaginatur rem primo vel intellectus et postea res ipsa concupiscitur vel res praesentatur repraesentatur , igitur ipsi volunt quod amor sive desiderium quod ipsi vocant ibi intellectum appetitum intellectivum, sicut ibi dicit Commentator fiat ex actuali cognitione.

Praeterea, commento 54 dicit Commentator 54 commento Averroes, In Aristot. De anima III, 54, (Crawford, 524, double check wint) quod: omnis appetitus fuit fuerit ab intellectu in actu.

Praeterea, commento 56 dicit Commentator quod: omnis appetitus fit ex imaginatione, et imaginatio ex quinque sensibilibus partibus sensibus particularibus quinque sensibus particularibus . Averroes, In Aristot. De anima III, 56, (Crawford, 528)

Praeterea, XII XI commento 36 Averroes, ??? sicut sit appetitus in brutis animalibus est propter semper sensum qui apprehendit comprehendit voluptuosum, et ita voluntas sive desiderium intellectus est propter semper intellectum et statim post desiderium, enim non est propter semper aestimationem aestimatione eius illius quod est est aliquid esse bonum vel quod et et quod vel enim nos aestimamus aliquid esse bonum propter quod desideramus ipsum etc.

Ad istud dubium dicendum est quod sic loquendo de amore qui quae est actus amandi vel appetendi per viam naturae causatus causatur , et ideo amor huiusmodi huius inter partes imaginis a proportionaliter Spiritu Sancto in imagine increata causata secundum Augustinus, ubi prius arguendo ad partem oppositam dubitationis huius. Haec conclusio satis patet per argumentum supra positum suppositum in primo articulo quaestionis et per haec hoc ad argumenta ad partem secundam.

Si instes per Beatum Augustinum IX Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, ??? ibi ubi , quasi per totum, dicit quod mens humana est imago Trinitatis increatae ratione illius Trinitatis, scilicet, mentis notitiae et amoris in qua Trinitate, notitia procedit de mente et amor de notitia. Et tamen secundum eum ibi tam amor quam notitia sunt una essentia mentis, igitur amor isor ibi non distinguitur realiter a notitia actuali a qua procedit nec notitia actualis quae est ibi proles a mente ipsa tamquam a parente.

Respondet unus doctor quod amor, et similiter notitia, tripliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo pro potentiis; secundo modo pro habitibus; et tertio modo pro actibus. Et ultra secundum hanc distinctionem esset dicendum quod aliud ad verba augustini in isto passu quia per aequivalenti tnri ad Augustinum in isto passu quod per evidentiam tantum et secundum imaginationem imaginem solum est illa tertia Trinitas non secundum rem cuius partes proprietates partes imaginatae sunt secundum Augustinum ipsa substantia animae nec est ibi processus unius ab alio in ipsa substantia mentis mente secundum veritatem rei extra nisi virtualiter solum, quia, scilicet, mens ipsa continet partialiter ista quorum unum procedit realiter ab alio et tertium ab utroque.

Utrum autem voluntas possit diligere incognitum ingratum est dubium magnum in se et ad propositum etiam quia tunc in isto casu pars tertia imaginis non procederet a secunda. Et teneo quod non tum quia apud me omnis volitio est apprehensio quaedam, sicut patet distinctione prima, quaestio tertia, tum tamen quia secundum Augustinum in visa diligere possumus, incognita nequaquam.

Praeterea non plus potest voluntas velle incognitum quam intellectus assentire non apprehenso, quia volitio non minus in suo esse et in suo fieri et esse dependet ab apprehensione quam assensus, sed assensus non potest naturaliter causari sine apprehensione istius cui assentitur, igitur.

Iterum Item apprehensio sensitiva non potest naturaliter haberi sine sensatione exteriori exteriori a sensatione vel interiori praesupposita naturaliter, igitur similiter in proposito, quia libertas non tollit similem ordinem in proposito.

Iterum Item omnis effectus praesupponit causam suam, sed omnis volitio naturaliter causata est effectus alicuius cogitationis et nullius potius quam istius quod diligitur cognitio et cum volit ita quod essentialiter tali volitione. Assumptum patet quia illud est causa quo posito ponitur aliud et per naturam poni non posset sine eo. Nam omnis effectus sufficienter naturaliter dependet a suis causis, ita quod illis positis poni posset aliis circumstantiis. Sed sic requirit volitio cognitionem per auctoritatem Augustini praeallegatam et per experientiam, igitur.

Primum. Sed contra hoc arguitur quia voluntas praecipit intellectui quod consideret A, aut igitur tunc A est actu consideratum et tunc superflue praeciperet voluntas, aut non et habetur propositum.

Secundum. Item voluntas potest conformare se intellectui et suspendere actus proprios et velle istos et etiam sensationes quas experitur, etiam si eas actu non intelligat.

Tertium. Item non minus videtur quod requirit requirat effectum suum praecognosci quam obiectum subiectum quia effectum suum libere et contingenter et a proposito producit. Sed primum non requirit secundum omnes, igitur nec secundum.

Quartum. Item voluntas potest intellectum velle non habere aliquam cogitationem et potest continuare istam. Aut igitur intellectus obediet sibi, et tunc stabit volitio visio sine intellectione, aut non, et tunc voluntas non esset potentia libera, non plus quam ignis.

Quintum. Item si non hoc maxime videretur quia cogitatio ista intellectiva eiusdem obiecti naturaliter sibi praesupposita volitionem concauset causa esset volitionis cum volitione esset . Sed hoc videtur falsum, quia causa naturalis non potest causare in idem passum uniformiter dispositum contrarios effectus. Sed stante stanti eadem intellectione potest voluntas velle vel nolle indifferenter illud quod intelligitur, igitur non est est causa naturalis utriusque.

Sextum. Item cognitio habitualis videtur sufficere quia habitibus uti possumus cum volumus secundum Philosophum. Igitur non videtur requiri cogitatio actualis.

Septimum. Item dato quod mors intellectio actualis requireretur ad causationem volitionis volitio volitionis , tamen cum videtur quod voluntas ex sua libertate, postquam actus causatus est causatus, possit istum continuare cessante intellectione quacumque quancumque quacumque quandoque . Nam species rei sensibilis in organo sensus exterioris non minus dependet a receptivo sensibili quam volitio ab intellectione. Sed hoc non obstante licet res extra requiratur ad causandum speciem istam et visionem consequentem, tamen tam illa species, postquam est causata, per aliquod tempus potest conservari sine praesentia istius rei sensibilis, sicut patet per experientiam perspectivae de claudente ad caludentes oculos postquam vidit res lucidas suades . Et Augustinus idem ibidem dicit.

Octavum. Item dato quod requiratur cogitatio actualis obiecti illius quod debet esse volitum, ita quod volitio non esset nisi intellectio praecessisset actum, non videtur illud eam semper actualiter coexigere exigere coexigere eam exigere se sicut nec actus voluntatis non requiritur semper actus actu existere intelligere inde?re ad hoc quod homo libere et meritorie vadat ad ecclesiam. Sed sufficere videtur quod vel tunc actu sic vel vel quod sic sit vel quod sic sic vel sic praecessit, quod nisi praecessisset illuc illae illud , non iuisset misset . Nisi enim istud sufficeret, sequitur enim quod omnis distinctio distractio tolleret meritum mentum executionis, et tunc ex hoc informa argui sic potest potest ex hoc argui potest sic argui potest argui sic , non plus requirit actus voluntatis intellectionem quam libera executio exterior actum voluntatis, sed ista executio exterior non requirit semper quod actus voluntatis. Tunc actu sit, igitur etc.

Nonum. Item videtur quod saltem respectu alicuius obiecti posset voluntas habere potest voluntas habere habere posset voluntas posset habere voluntas actum suum, licet pro tunc illud obiectum non sit verum obiectum obiectum alicuius intellectionis. Nam quando aliqua intellectio est in in intellectu circumscripta omni alia intellectione potest voluntas velle istam intellectionem, et tamen intellectio non est obiectum isto casu posito positu non est obiectum intellectum intellectus actualiter, igitur. Probo assumptum probatio assumpti quia cognitio ista potest esse conveniens, licet sit respectu alicuius obiecti odibilis et stante ista cognitione voluntas potest delectari sicut patet per experientiam ista delectatio non est respectu obiecti cogniti quia illud imaginatum cognitum non est sibi delectabile per positam positum , igitur est respectu igitur respectu est istius cogitationis, et per consequens voluntas potest velle istam cognitionem licet istam non intendat quia delectatio huiusmodi huius est quoddam velle vel saltem velle aliquid potest esse respectu eiusdem omni alia cogitatione circumscripta eodem modo posset argui de delectatione sicut de actu voluntatis non intellectio.

Ad primum istorum responsum est inmediate ante ultimam introductum reflexionem dubitationem vel enim non distincte dicente vult tunc voluntas A nec intellectus distincte dicente cognoscit sed confuse et indistincte et in communi, et tunc imperat rationabiliter voluntas quod distinctius cognoscatur per inquisitionem vel reflexionem vel simili modo, sicut patet alibi in de questione de distinctione de distincta specifica cognitionum quod tunc per imperium voluntatis reflectit reflexit se intellectus super actum rectum per hunc modum attendendum qui agit attende quod agis attendendum qui agit ubi operatio quae praecipitur cognosci et attendi in communi cognoscitur solum quando voluntas imperat eius distinctam considerationem. Si autem voluntas distincte vult A, tunc non praecipit rationabiliter distinctam cog cogitationem ipsius primo causari, quia habet eam sed potius habitam continuari continari act vel aliam aliquam eiusdem cogitationem causari, puta definitivam vel intellectivam intuitivam vel huiusmodi.

Ad secundum dicendum quod oportet voluntatem si quem actum debet suspendere istis istum apprehendere distincte, si particulariter et distincte istum, vel in illum communi, si in communi. Et ideo assumitur ibi falsum illud quod additur de confirmatione conformatione verum est, sed hoc non est velle cogitationem sed obiectum cognitionis.

Ad tertium assumptum falsum est quia non vult effectum suum quemlibet quem quaelibet quae quemlibet quae libere producit sicut obiectum quodlibet quod diligit quem, tamen si vellet et illum proportionaliter cognosceret nisi quando intellectus dictat dictant aliquid esse diligendum et voluntas conformat se dictamini illi, tunc enim praecognoscitur eius effectus.

Ad quartum concedatur concedo concedetur assumptum et cum quaeris quaerit aut obediet sibi ei intellectus etc., dicendum quod si intellectus debeat sibi obedire, oportet quod ipsamet obediat sibi ipsi ipsi quod cessando ab omni volitione, et ab actus actu cum imperati contradictione continuatione quia omnis actus volitionis cognitionis essentialiter et naturaliter et naturaliter dependet a cogitatione, si detur alia pars non sequitur quin ipsa sit libera quia ipsa potest cessare ab actu propositio et simul vel consequenter ab actu quolibet intelligendi, forte saltem non habet libertatem cessandi ab omni intellectione nisi cessando simul vel prius ab omni non volitione A .

Ad quintum minor falsa est de causa partiali illimitata ad varios effectus determinabili libere ab alia causa concausa sicut est in proposito.

Ad sextum negandum est assumptum. Et ad probationem dicendum est quod habitibus uti non volumus cum volumus non possumus nisi cum de eorum usu confuse vel distincte cogitamus actu actualiter.

Ad septimum dicendum species quodlibet rei sensibilis causata in organo sensus exterioris non minus dependeat in suo fieri a re sensibili quam volitio a voluntate voluntate notitia voluntate cognitione . Prima naturaliter tamen cum cum tamen minus dependeat dependet ab eo in essendo et permanendo saltem in aliquo subiecto. Unde etiam aliqui ponunt quod species in organo imaginativae natae sunt ibidem naturaliter credere naturaliter permanere sine re sensibili cuius sunt species et in organo sensus exterioris aliquantulum et sed licet in medio exteriori. Volitio autem non non ideo aut non volitio autem non minus requirit in suo primo fieri et in suo toto conservari intellectionem a qua in essendo naturaliter dependet quam radius solis in medio exteriori non volitio autem non minus requirit in suo primo fieri et in suo toto conservari intellectionem a qua in essendo naturaliter dependet quam radius solis in medio requirit solem et eius praesentiam.

Ad octavum dicendum quod executio exterior non est libera nisi rei denominatione extrinseca a libera causatione voluntatis et electionis interioris a qua causata libere. Ipsa executio huiusmodi huius mediante vel immediate naturaliter causatur, et patet quod mediante virtute motiva sit fit quod ex sola volitione, nulla executio exterior provenit sine alia causa vel eadem aliter operante quam volitione propter quod etiam cessante volitione potest executio quandoque aliquam quoniam diu continari continuari , sicut ad hoc, scilicet, quod substantia creatura alia nihil nisi operetur extra per solum velle, est articulus Parisiensis. Et per talia probatur propter potest hoc singulariter tribuit Deo quod et hoc dixit ipse et facta sunt, mandavit seu voluit et creata causata sunt, et quod omnia quantumque quaecumque quacumque voluit fecit, et quia tota ambulatio erat volita tota est extrinsece meritoria merito, scilicet, actus interioris eadem bonitate meritoria sicut secundum quosdam ad hunc sensum quod eiusdem praemium praemii praecise meritoria sicut secundum quosdam subiectum et omnia accidentia sua corporalia unica extensive extensione seu quantitative quanitate extenduntur vel in exemplo minus dummodo sicut calor ignis et subiectum ipse ignis eadem calefactione calefaciunt et sicut similiter album et albedo eadem visione videntur universaliter videretur quia subiectum non videtur nisi quia formaliter informatur ab accidente viso eodem modo nulla executio exterior est meritoria nisi quia causatur ab mediante operatione interiori meritoria quae si desit non est meritoria sicut in proposito sicut album et albedo eadem visione universaliter quia subiectum non videtur nisi quia formaliter accidente viso eodem modo nulla executio exterior est meritoria nisi quia causatur mediante operatione interiori meritoria quae si desit non est meritoria et pro quanto tempore deficit actus interior pro tanto tempore. Iste actualiter non meretur licet mereretur sed actuale meritum novum prius post habitum et acquisitum adhuc in perpetuum sibi imputetur donec per pro velle et nolle contrarium demeretur demonstratur ipsum conservari, id est, non imputari . Et ideo concedo quod ille sit ambulans ad ecclesiam, si moreretur in instanti quo cessat habere actum meritorium interiorem tantum praemium haberet in caelo quantum sicut si ultra procedat precederet ambulando sine omni actu meritorio interiori. Et ideo ratio sumit falsum, distractio enim impedit meritum novum meritum novum , non tamen tollit antiquum et praehabitum nisi sit distractio affectata et ubi haberetur habetur praeceptum de cognitionem in operando et sicut habemus habens de officio divino ad dicendum studiose et devote ibi dicendo devote et studiose ibi enim distractio de libertate praemissa promissa non solum impedit augmentum meriti, sed reputatur imponatur ad demeritum et peccatum. Ratio autem quod ulterius formata sumit maiorem falsam vel minorem secundum quod diversificandae diversimode possunt capi secundum iam declarata.

Ad nonum dicendum quod assumitur falsum, licet enim experientia doceat quod quandoque delectantur delectamur delectatur de ordinata et debita cognitione rei alterius odibilis , experientia tamen docet non quod hoc haec sit sine apprehensione istius cognitionis convenientis, sed contrarium potius.

Quintum dubium principale est an partes imaginis creatae causatae sint aequales. Et videtur quod non quia Augustinus 15 c. 68 66 Augustine, De Trinitate, XIV, c. 68, ??? a singulis bina, et a binis singula, et a singulis singula , maioribus minora vincuntur et per hoc probatur probat quod non sunt aequales. Sed respondetur quod ipse probat per hoc quod non sunt aequales haec secundum suos actus in via et hoc est verum.

Primum. Contra: si hoc haec intelligit, tunc acceperit accipit acciperit falsum quod a singulis singula vincuntur quia numquam vincitur memoria ab intellegentia quod quicquid intelligentia intelligit actu, memoria retinet meminit suo modo actu.

Secundum. Item si sint, tunc aequales quicquid memoria meminerit , intellectus intelligentia intelligeret, sicut dicit Augustinus 10 , c. 28 Augustine, De Trinitate, X, c. 28, ??? et Magister allegat primo libro, d. 3, Lombard, Sententia, I, d. 3, c. 2, n. 4 et in hoc ibidem ponitur aequalitas partium imaginis quia sic possunt saltem. Sed consequens videtur videntur falsum, quia aut intelligeret Augustinus de intelligere actu primo aut de intelligere actu actu de actu The reading from S is the only reading that really seems to be mistake as it suggestions that Wodeham is discussion Augustine's understanding of the "term" "actu" rather than "intelligere". The reading from M and V rely on the earlier part of the disjunct, but T restates the full meaning in the second side of the disjunct. While redundant it is also more explicit, so we follow the reading of intelligere here. secundo. Non primo, quia intelligere in actu primo non est nisi meminere manifestum est, et tunc nihil declararet declarat per illud dictum. Si intellegat de intelligere in actu secundo, tunc accipit falsum, quia scilicet quicquid meminit intelligit, quia multa habeo in memoria quae non actualiter cogito.

Tertium. Item tunc memoria, et intelligentia, et voluntas essent aequales. Consequens est falsum, quia ista non distinguuntur realiter. Igitur ista non sunt aequalia. Consequentia patet per Hilarium III Hilarius de Poitiers, De Trinitate, III, ??? et per Magistrum primo libro, distinctione 31, ubi dicit quod aequalitas et similitudo non sunt, nisi ubi est distinctio realis Lombard, Sententia, I, d. 31, c. 1, c1 .

Quartum. Item si sic, tunc istae partes forent aequales ratione suorum actuum. In patria, tamen cum , ibi erunt erant sanatae a languore, sicut dicit Augustinus 15 3 c. 68 Augustine, De Trinitate, XV, c. 68, ??? , sed hoc est falsum, quia tunc in patria amor naturaliter esset aequalis cogitationi, si voluntas non impediretur, sed voluntas ibi quia voluntas non impeditur quia voluntas potest ibi tantum amare quantum sicut intellectus potest videre. Et per consequens, cum voluntas ibi habeat habebit adiuvans ipsam, puta caritatem, quae non excidit secundum Apostolum, sequitur quod voluntas plus amabit quam intellectus intelliget.

Quintum. Item tunc, in patria, cognitio cogitatio mentis et eius amor forent aequales. Consequens videtur inconveniens falsum quia ibi amor eius erit perfectus Augustine, De Trinitate, 9.4.4 sicut dicit Augustinus IX c. 9, de parvis . Si igitur cognitio sit aequalis amori, sequitur quod ibi nisi mens tantum se cognoscit se quantum est. Sed Deus ibi ipsam non cognoscit nisi tantum quantum ipsa mens est, igitur ipsa mens est ibi tantum se cognoscit quantum Deus eam cognoscit quod est impossibile.

Sextum. Item si sic, tunc beatus in patria purum aequaliter amaret Deum et omnia alia posito quod aequae clare aeque claro cognoscat Deum et omnia alia quod est impossibile quia cogitatis cognitis bonis in aequalibus aequaliter magis amat beatus magis bonum manifestum est. Praeterea Item actus malus hic in via non est volitus nolitus a beato quia tunc ipse peccaret, nec est nolitus quia tunc non esset in omnibus sicut ipse vellet, et per consequens non haberet quicquid vult, et ita non esset beatus, et tamen talem actum cognoscit, igitur non aequantur in eo, igitur etc.

Ad oppositum arguitur per Augustinum 10 c. 28 Augustine, De Trinitate, X, c. 28, ??? et Magister allegat d. 3 primi libri , Lombard, Sententia, I, d. 3 ubi probat Augustinus quod memoria, intelligentia, et voluntas sunt aequales.

Praeterea 15 c. 68 dicit quod erunt haec aequalia quando erunt ab omni languore sanata Augustine, De Trinitate 15.23.43 .

Praeterea 9 , in fine, mens, amor, et notitia, aequales sunt Augustine, De Trinitate, 9, xxx Praeterea 9 de trinitate capitulo 9 de parvi in principio mens amore et notitia eius aequales sunt tria quaedam sunt, et tamen cum perfecta sunt et aequalia entia sunt. Si enim mens minus se amat quam est, verbi gratia, si se tantum amet amat hominis mens quantum amandum est corpus hominis, cum plus sit ipsa quam corpus hominis , peccat et non amat perfectum perfectus amorem amoris sui, Augustine, De Trinitate, 9, xxx etc. Item, si Apostolus se amet quam est velut, si tamen se amet quam amandum est Deus etiam sic minimum minimim minimum peccat et non habet perfectum amorem sui etc.

Et nota notitia bene hanc auctoritatem auctoritate Augustini cuius , quia qui probat solutionem quam alias respondi quod quia tunc compraehendit apprehendit intellectus creatus aliquid cum cognoscit illud ita perfecte, sicut ipsum est ens, non autem sicut ipsum est cognoscibile, quia infinite est cognoscibile. Ita dicit hic Augustinus quod partes imaginis cum sunt perfectae, tunc mens non minus amat se quam est et non dicit non minus amat se quam est amabilis, nam est infinite amabilis infinite divini amoris .

Sed primum movtum primum motivm haec faciliter potest impediri sic: quia quod caritas viae, id est quae acquiritur communiter vel habetur a viatore in via, non est mensura beatitudinis conferendae tam cognitive quam sensitive fruitive , et potest esse, ut videtur, quod tanta visio sibi correspondeat pro merito et tam causa clara quod voluntas non sufficeret sine caritate naturaliter ad causandum ista visione habita amorem aeque intensum in specie amoris fruitivi fruendi , sicut ista visio est clara et intensa in specie visionis. Et per consequens, si habebit ex se quasi naturaliter amorem aequalis intensionis intensioni intensoni visionis ubi omnis , requirit aliquod aliud promotum promotivum .

Assumptum arguo sic, ubi multae causae effectivae alterius rationis concurrunt et requiruntur ad naturalem causationem alicuius effectus. Duplatio alterius earumdem eorumdem sine alia alio non sufficit, ut videtur, ad duplationem effectus, licet sufficiat ad notabilem eius meliorem melioriem meliorationem , ergo cum ii sola Dei visio non sufficiat, licet sit sufficiat ibi efficiat ibi inter causas creatas, ad beatificam dei fruitionem finitorum sed ipsa voluntas sicut causa creata causata principalior principior principior requisitas cum ista visione. Ideo licet dupletur huius huius visio eius visio , quia cum tamen manet praecise eadem voluntas et eiusdem eius virtutis et et non tamen duplatae, non sequitur quod duplabitur duplicetur fruitio. Igitur ad hoc quod dupletur fruitio ad duplationem visionis per naturalem actionem voluntatis oportet eius activitatem promoveri per caritatem vel aliquod aliud aliquod aliud principium promotum promotivum motum promotum in tali proportione, ut ad hoc sufficiat et sic excluditur prima huius eius ratio manifeste in aliquo .

Et cum probatur arguitur quod voluntas semper potest aeque ferventer ferventur diligere , id est aeque intense obiectum summe delectabile et placibile diligere sicut intellectus illud intelligit, etiam et amota caritate istud negandum est. Haec tamen concedenda concedendum est quod ita intensum amorem posset causare voluntas voluntatem respectu summae delectabilis visi, sicut esset visio illa intensa, quae imaginaretur causari mere naturaliter ex natura obiecti et potentiae intellectivae secundum imaginationem falsam secundum falsam prae praehabitam physicam , quae imaginaretur Deum agere mere agerendae naturaliter quicquid ageret agit et ita est de aliis amabilibus et placibilibus causatis naturaliter cum intellectu vel sensu suarum visionum. De illa tamen visione quae beatifica est quae non est et talis sed excellentioris excellentius excellentioris forte specie quam talis esse imaginaretur quae et voluntariae et non vero non naturaliter est causabilis ab ipso obiecto credibile est mihi, quod in multis beatis sit talis clarior visio et intensior quam esset intensio amoris, quae quam cum tamen cum ista visione sive promotivo sufficeret voluntas ad causandum causandi .

Exemplum huius, qui quod velim dicere: ecce, unum brutum animal vel homo videt rem multum placibilem visione naturaliter causata vel causabili causabilitate causabili a tali re placibili et potentia cognitiva, bene volo quod appetitus correspondens tali potentiae cogitativae cognitivae cogitativae potest, si nihil obstet obiectum illud sicud illud , sibi naturaliter placibile et conveniens seu delectabile, ita fruenter ferventer seu ita intense diligere vel appetere quam intense apprehenditur. Dico tamen iuxta rationem praefatam praefatam praefatam quod si Deus duplaret duplet huius apprehensionem ultra intensionem in illam quam posset quam natura naturae talis potentiae cogitativae cognitivae virtute sui et obiecti sic praesentis, appetitus iste idem manens non sufficeret sine alio promotivo duplare appetitum seu amorem priorem cum illa duplata cogitatione, quia totalis causa non est duplata, sed solum pars et eius minus. Principalis causa autem et ratio et non quare quando potuerunt aequari in primis naturaliter causabilibus est quia ita fecunda et potens est talis natura respectu amoris a se causandi, sicut respectu cognitionis cogitationis a se causandae respectu eiusdem obiecti, quamdiu promotiva hinc inde fuerunt paria. Sed cum tamen duplatur actus non ex natura potentiae et obiecti, sed a causa voluntaria voluntariae vel tali modo receditur a proportione aequalitatis huiusmodi nisi aliud adiuvet, sicut credo.

Ex eodem patet planissime ad secundum, dato enim quod dupletur visio Petri et etiam eius etc igitur bonitas, dummodo non dupletur duplicetur activitas propria voluntatis sit duplatio duplo clarius videntis eum, non sequitur quod duplabitur dilectio erga Petrum, quia ut prius duplatio partis causae non infert duplationem effectus naturaliter, consequenter ex causa collecta vel ex collectione causarum ex illa et alia vel aliis cum causis.

Aliter etiam enim dici potest ex eodem primo principio respondendo respondendi quod licet duplaretur bonitas Petri vel caperetur bonum aliud duplatum duplum Petro quod obiceretur eidem eadem intellectivi cui primo obiciebatur obiciatur Petrus non sequeretur ceteris permanentibus, sicut ante duplex visio dupli boni, quia licet dupletur obiectum, et per consequens activitas obiectiva , non tamen duplatur alia principior et visionis causa, scilicet, intellectus actus datus , et tamen a cognoscentis causatus et omnia cognoscibilitas et et cognitio cogitatio cognito pariter notitia, sicut supra. Igitur non oportebit visionem duplari cuius oppositum imaginatur argumentum, si ad formam debitam deducatur. Qualiter autem sit sic ] de facto, utrum videlicet amor et visio beatifica beatifica obiecti beatifici bene sint aequaliter intensi, quodlibet hic in sua specie, nescio, quia ista et hic in sua est quaestio facta facti et non est nobis scibile in via peregrinantibus, nisi fuerit a Deo due alicui vel aliter revelatum.

Ad primum argumentum istius dubii, Augustinus loquendo loquitur ibi de aequalitate secundo modo dicta in positione, et isto modo verum est quod non sunt partes istae imaginis aequales in viatoribus communiter quando quia , ut saepius, una pars sic loquendo est in viatore magis plus impedita quam alia.

Ad secundum respondet Fitzralph cum accipitur quod tunc intellectus intelligeret quicquid memoria memineret dico, inquit, quod intelligere est duobus modis, scilicet, in actu et in habitu. Et in secundo modo ibi loquitur loquendo Augustinus, et cum accipitur quod sic sicut intelligere non est, nisi tantum nisi meminere, dicendo inquit quod hoc est verum sed et tamen secundum aliam rationem dicitur intelligere secundum aliam rationem dicitur intelligere et tamen secundum aliam rationem dicitur intelligere et secundum aliam meminere et secundum aliam meminere , dicitur enim nisi enim meminere intelligere quatenus conceptus est cognitio conservata est habitus cognitativus et dicitur intelligere quatenus absolute est habitus cognitivus cogitativus quae rationes diversae sunt sicut intellectus et memoria. Unde bene probatur per idem medium quod memoria et intelligentia sunt aequales quoad obiecta obiectum .

Aliter tamen potest responderi quod illa auctoritas et consimiles intelligendi intelligendae intenduntur vel intendendae sunt sic quod quicquid meminerit meminere potest intelligere et econtra, et ita de velle vel de nolle sub distinctione disiunctione disiuntive respectu eiusdem subiecti sui vel alterius cuiuscumque.

Ad tertium patet quod memoria, intelligentia, et intelligentia, et voluntas in eadem mente non sunt aequales proprietas naturales proprie sicut nec sicut sunt partes partis mentis sed sunt aquales per modum in positione in positione dictum, scilicet, quo ad obiecta obiectum . Et secundo modo similiter et sed auctoritas Hilarii solum probat quod non proprie distinguuntur aequales, quia non realiter distinguuntur dicuntur , et hoc totum conceditur est verum concedo .

Ad quartum respondet Fitzralph quod amor est intensior in patria propter causam superius improbatam. Sed patuit quod illud medium non necessitat illud ponere, sed argumentum tangit unum dubium facti ubi posset esse sic et aliter, et ideo qualiter sit de facto nobis totaliter est fit incertum.

Ad quintum respondet Fitzralph quod Augustinus dicens quod quando amor erit perfectus, tunc mens amat se quantum est Augustinus, xxx , intelligit quod amat se quantum ipsa sit amanda a se, et a se tunc amanda sed deus multo magis amat eam quantum sit amanda a se est a se ipsa est a se tunc amanda a se sed deus multo magis amat eam quam ipsa sit amanda a se ideo non sequitur ad intellectum Augustini quod ipsa tantum tamen amet se quantum Deus amat ipsum ipsam .

Sed haec responsio est glossa obscurior textu vel potius obscuratio textus clari, cuius causa non est alia nisi quia conatur vere vitare unum verum conclusio. Enim deducta per illud quintum argumentum est ad illud quintum argumentum est ad intellectum Augustini vera ad litteram sicut sonat, sicut enim nos actu finito Deum diligimus infinite infinito ad intellectum saepe datum quia, scilicet, praeponimus eum in amore vel per amorem infinitis amabilibus, si darentur illa, econtrario econtra econverso non est negandum quin Deus suo amore infinito finite fiere infinite diligat Petrum vel mentem de qua loquimur et appretiatur eam quantum est. Et quantum valet valore laborare naturali et gratuito naturale in gratuite et non ultra et secundum istum istum valorem praeparat vel confert sibi bonum, et isto modo loquendo plus diligit Petrum quam linum secundum istum excessum secundum quam quem quaestionem plus valet Petrus et plus meruit quam meruerit huius quam bonus et plus meruit Petrus quam bonus et plus meruit eodem modo sic loquendo mens ipsa iam beata licet infinite infinitorum appreciationis passive, et , ut ita loquar, diligat Deum et infinite in infinitum plus gaudium et omne bonum illi possibile optet competet Deo quam sibi quam sibi vel infinitum in infinitum , sic loquendo, plus complacet in eo quod Deus habet gaudium et sed seu gaudet gaudio sibi proportionali proportionale quam facit in gaudio quod ipsa habet obtenet vel in infinitum, sic loquendo, plus complacet in eo quod Deus habet gaudium seu gaudet gaudio sibi proportionali quam facit in gaudio quod ipsa optimum quam sibi cum tamen ipsa praecise diliget seipsam quantum ipsa valet vellet appreciative et praecise ad tantum bonum quantum ipsa meruit et minus seipsam et tamen ipsa praecise diligat se ipsam quam quantum quam animam Christi vel beatae virginis isto modo quia, isto modo loquendo , unumquodque diligit et appretiatur secundum gradum gaudium valoris sui suis et secundum hoc optat sibi et proportionaliter tantum bonum quantum quam ipsa meruit optinere meretur obiective . et secundum hoc optat sibi proportionaliter quantum bonum ipsa meruit optinere

Sic igitur concedenda est conclusio quod, sic loquendo, mens, quando amor eius suus sumus erit perfectus, ipsa tantum amat se sed quantum est et Deus ipsam etiam ipsum tantum quantum etiam ipsa unde quantumcumque ipsa est. Et ideo ipsa seipsam quantum Deus ipsam quia neuter, nisi quantum valet, licet Deus diligat ipsam eam in infinitum plus quam ipsa seipsam, secundum magnitudinem si augmentationem perfectionis ipsius dilectionis quia Deus, quidquid amat, amat infinite infinitae amoris quidquid amat infinite amoris , et creatura nihil diligit, nec Deum nec creaturam, nisi finite finitae amoris.

Ad sextum sexta dicendum quod mente aequae clare cognoscere Deum, et alia potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo vel quod aeque proportionate proportionare et aeque comprehensive comprehensare , ut et dixi alias quod isto modo in infinitum infinite minus perfecte et minus clare cognoscit Deum quam seipsam et vel aliam creaturam visam a se amat et hoc quamvis visione multo intensiore intensiori videatur Deus quam aliquid ad aliud. Alio modo potest intelligi quod aeque clare cognoscat Deum et aliud vel alia, quia cogitatione cognoscere aeque intensa in sua specie sua diligit diligat cognoscit Deum sicut facit creaturam vel aliud ibi visum vel quam intense diligit cognoscit aliud in specie visionis congrua creaturae. Et dico quod non est sic quia Deum videt visione visionem suam capacitatem in specie fine visionis in qua Deum videt replente nihil vel autem aliud, ita intense ibi videt per cogitationem in genere proprio quia talis tali non videt utique nisi visione quam ipse cum obiecto ipsa ipsa cum subiecto causare naturaliter sufficiunt ibi et ista illa multum deficit a tanta secundum intensionem extensionem intentsionem quanta est illa quantum ipsa cum ista quae habetur respectu Dei cuius est probatio plana plane , quia si imaginetur imaginaretur duplari entitas creaturae datae creata creaturae causatae ipsa cum eodem intellectu sufficeret ad causandum cognitionem causationem eiusdem speciei priori intensiorem intendere intenderem , licet non duplo intensiorem quia altera causa: puta obiectum est idem quod actius quam primo creatum datum totale, igitur tamen principium non duplatur.

Dicendum est igitur quod nihil aliud a Deo potest cognosci in genere proprio ita clare, id est in , ita ita intense in specie visionis cognitionis sibi congrue videri seu cognosci a creatura creata beata sicut cognoscitur ab ea Deus et hoc cogitatione in gradu naturaliter naturali ab ipsa causabili et obiecto. Et propter hoc argumentum imaginatur unum falsum super quo fundatur, scilicet quod mens ita clare sic ibi cognoscat cognoscit ibi sit ibi cognoscat clare ibi aliud ad sicut Deum. licet Dices licet licet nihil aliud posset possit sed ibi mentem replere sui cognitione cognitionem naturaliter ab ipso et mente cui obicitur causabili, tamen Deus poterit istius speciei cognitione cognitionem ipsam replere quo posito stat argumentum quod vel partes imaginis non erunt respectu illius creaturae aequales secundum intensionem vel quod mens isto casu posito tantum diliget diligit aliud sicut dictum. Et est sciendum dicendum est dicendum quod neutrorum neuter sequitur quantum ad sensum praesentem loquendo in quo ly tantum et quantum debet debent negare notare aequalitatem intensionis intensivam actus hinc, inde nam, si Deus in ea duplaret duplaretur respectu a creaturae cognitionem i maximam naturalem ab ea et a tali obiecto causabilem et relinqueret ipsam eam sibi ipsi respectu amoris causandi respectu eiusdem creaturae amabilis et rationaliter placibilis, ipsa non diligeret eam ita intense sicut cognosceret, quia ibi non duplicaretur creu?unt teruit trivit , nisi altera de causis et minus etiam principalis respectu amoris causandi sicut superius est notandum notatur etc . Alia autem pars consequentis illati vera esset si Deo placeret amorem duplare ibi proportionalem cogitationem quam per causam duplaret certe hoc non esset impossibile, et si in facto poneretur, tunc mens e illa ibi tantum diligeret creaturam sicut Deum, si ly tantum et ly sicut notent aequalitatem intensionis. Dico alio tamen in modo isto casu posito loquendo infinite plus diligeret mens illa Deum quam creaturam illam qua tamen istam qua tamen istam quantum istam quam aeque intenso intense actu diligeret diligit quanto Deum ut iam praedeclaratum est.

Ad ultimum respondetur quod peccatum, si sit sic aliquid aliquis in mundo medio , est volitum a beato sicut et a Deo , tamen nec Deus nec beatus vult illud hic esse peccatum. Sed credo quod argumentum non cogat cogitat nec necessitet necessariam illud concedere, immo credo quod multa velint beati voluit bene quae numquam fient quia cum caritatem magnam habent habeant erga viatores quos optant saltem salvari et orant oram pro eorum salute sibi devotorum quae ad hoc possibilis est . Quorum tamen plurium damnabuntur et hoc immo supposito posito sicut sic possibile est quod non reveletur revelet eis qui quid erit finaliter similiter de tali pro quo orant erat orat oram et eius cuius salutem optant optat .

Item in habetur vidi angelos viros flentes, igitur illi vel angelis angulis displicuit displacuit ruina istorum iuvenum de quibus fit ibi sermo .

Item in magnum gaudium est angelis erit in caelo super uno peccatore, Lucas 15:7 etc. Credo quod tales displicentiae quae procedunt procederunt ex caritate ad proximos viatores non repugent repungunt repugnet eorum eodem statui beatifico, nec credo quod omnia fient fiant circa alios quae fieri optant circa alios , sed circa se concedo quod quicquid optant sibi ipsis optinent optent , et si velint volunt non circumstari tristari de ruina suorum devotorum, non circumstabuntur tristabuntur tristabitur , sicut visibile est quod omnis eis circumstantia tristitia sit adempta adepta ab eis dempta , et si vellent quod eis tristitia sit adepta et si vellent vellerent quod eis non displiceret ruina talium, non eis displiceret eis , et ita illa de similibus .

Et tunc ad aliud argumentum de actum peccati bene credo quod vellent vellerent ipsum non esse in aliquo eis devoto de voto et tunc ad alius de actu peccati bene credo quod vellent illum non esse in aliquo eis devoto nec aestimo quod tenentur in omni volito conformari Deo nec credo eos consequi in omnibus quicquid vellent vellerent citra circa saltem divini iudicii divinum iudicium , quia animae beatae appetunt, secundum Augustinum, ibi uniri suis corporibus in tantum ut semper sint sint propter hoc semper hoc minus beati semper quam post prius erunt quia hic hoc non distentio discutio dissentio qualiter debeant intelligi . Consequenter consequentis tamen quicquid volunt de hiis in quibus aequaliter essentialiter sunt beati, quia non possunt desiderare nisi quod ratio secundum legem divinae iustitiae dictat eos licite posse velle vel nisi quod Deus eis liberaliter confere voluit quod dum in via viverent meruerunt. posse velle posse velle posse velle vel ??? hoc igitur eis deus liberaliter conferre voluerit ut quod dum in via viverent meruerunt